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PrefaCe and 
aCknowledgements
The current crisis affects a system which today is approximately 500 
years old. The forward motion of the capitalist system is founded 
on the continued prospect of future profits and economic growth. 
Yet the way ahead is obstructed by many difficulties: low rates of 
profit and over-accumulation of capital; under-consumption and 
insufficient demand; the breakdown of the system of global finance; 
the prospect of energy shortage and acute symptoms of environ-
mental crisis; and a crisis of world governability. Weighed down by 
these serious problems, the production of profits and growth in the 
future within the existing system has been thrown into doubt. The 
multiplicity and depth of the difficulties burdening contemporary 
capitalism poses the question of whether the system can stabilize 
and continue to reproduce itself, whether humanity is on the 
threshold of a momentous transition to socialism, or whether we 
face an unending stagnation and even a descent into ruin.
 if we want to understand the present, and act effectively within 
it, knowledge of the past is more necessary than ever. The fall into 
the credit crunch and deep economic crisis was not only completely 
unexpected by most politicians but unpredicted by most economists. 
events of this nature have not been seen for over 80 years – longer 
than the memory of nearly everyone alive today. Commentator after 
commentator has noted that the narrow focus of today’s econo-
mists left most of them intellectually floundering in the face of such 
momentous developments. a historical perspective is not, therefore 
something of interest only to academic researchers and antiquar-
ians. To understand what is happening now, we have to understand 
how we got here. for this reason, this book returns to a discussion 
that has been going on for some time among historians, but which 
the general public at this point needs to know more about – the 
birth of capitalism, or as it is generally posed, the transition from 
feudalism to capitalism.
 The aim of this book is to explain the background and terms 
of this vigorous debate, to reassess and shed more light on it, and 
bring it to the attention of a more general readership. This book 
is suitable for a general reader who wishes to understand both 
where capitalism came from, and the key historical debates about 
its origins. But it is also designed to ensure that a new genera-
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tion of students and scholars – beset with crisis – look upon this 
controversy with fresh eyes and a new sense of its significance.
 The future of Capitalism series calls for a fresh look at the 
fundamental issues and phenomena of world history. it seeks a 
reconsideration of the concepts and theories required to compre-
hend the present stage of world development. This work contributes 
to the effort by re-examining the debate on the transition from 
feudalism to capitalism in a way that throws fresh light on capi-
talism’s contribution to world development, its current crisis and 
future prospects. as the greatest crisis of capitalism since the Great 
Depression unfolds, and the power of emerging capitalist states 
challenges the centuries-old dominance of the West, a fresh and 
critical examination of this often eurocentric debate is necessary to 
understand the current historic conjuncture.
 Two things have inspired the writing of this work. in the first 
place i have been studying early modern history for nearly 50 years. 
it is a field of scholarship which is interesting from a great variety 
of perspectives, including the history of art, music and science. 
examining and analyzing the transition question offers the opportu-
nity of summing up the scholarship of this period from a particularly 
important and challenging perspective. indeed, the concrete under-
standing of the period that i bring to bear represents an important 
qualification for this task.
  politics has likewise motivated my undertaking this book. i have 
been passionately interested in politics since i was a boy, and i still 
regard political awareness as essential to the full development of a 
human personality. in my view history as a discipline can only be 
a dialogue between the political present and the past. my commit-
ment to politics only became deeper as a result of my engagement 
with marxism and the national liberation struggles in the under-
developed world dating from the anti-war movement of the 1960s 
and 1970s. indeed, the latter helped me to overcome the eurocentric 
bias of much of my primary research and published scholarship. 
it was at that time that i began to read the classic works on the 
transition by maurice Dobb and rodney hilton, as well as the 
seminal new works of immanuel Wallerstein, robert Brenner and 
perry anderson, which were products of the political turmoil of 
the period. indeed, my sense of the primacy of politics colours my 
understanding of capitalism’s beginnings. Capitalism is certainly a 
mode of production, but it should not be looked upon in merely 
economic terms. one of the motivations behind this work is to 
advance the idea that capitalism must be understood as a political 
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as well as an economic entity. Therefore this book takes issue with 
what i regard as the excessively economistic approach of robert 
Brenner and his followers, who ironically go by the name of political 
marxists.
 from its inception 65 years ago, the debate on the transition was 
motivated by the sense that the capitalist system is in crisis, and 
that gaining a historic perspective on its origins and trajectory was 
important. in the early years of the twenty-first century the sense of 
capitalism in crisis has deepened. at the same time the debate on 
the capitalist transition has been illuminated by a growing under-
standing of world history. Given my knowledge of the early modern 
period in both europe and the rest of the world and my growing 
comprehension of the marxist view of history, it seemed appropriate 
for me to undertake the demanding task of carefully tying together 
the relationship between the concrete facts of history and marxist 
theory in a way that does both justice.
 in writing this work i owe special thanks to radhika Desai, whose 
many theoretical and editorial suggestions have proved invaluable. 
i would also like to express my appreciation for the cultural theory 
and post-colonial groups at the University of manitoba. my discus-
sions with them have forced me to understand the theoretical 
foundations of my own marxism more deeply. i am indebted to the 
patience and careful copy-editing of susan Curran and proofreading 
of Chris Carr. Thanks also to my wife, Joanne inglis, for help with 
the editorial preparation of the manuscript.
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IntroductIon:  
Problems and methods
The focus of this work is the long evolution from feudalism to 
capitalism, the most debated and best known among transitions 
from one mode of production to another. It took 500 years for this 
transition to unfold in Europe, and it is still taking place in Asia, 
Africa and Latin America. This transformation began in Europe 
with the crisis of the feudal system in the fourteenth century and 
continued until the Industrial Revolution (1780–1850). In this 
book, I consider this European-centred transition, but do not limit 
the discussion to Europe. As Marx emphasized, the birth of capi-
talist relations of production witnessed the simultaneous genesis of 
the world market. Moreover, from the perspective of the twenty-
first century in which capitalist relations of production have spread 
everywhere and in which multiple centres of accumulation exist, a 
perspective limited to Europe, or worse, only to England (as it is 
in the work of some writers on the transition), would simply be 
parochial.
 Bringing this debate up to date is not merely an academic 
matter. Positions taken on the chief issues in debate will inform 
responses to the current crisis of capitalism. At the same time all the 
protagonists in the controversy have agreed that capitalism cannot 
be understood without understanding its history. Capitalism may 
be a forward-looking system which functions on the basis of the 
continuing expectation of profit. But it is also a system based in a 
historically evolving set of relations – including sale of wage labour 
and production and circulation of commodities in markets. These 
operate within a network of financial, legal-political and cultural 
institutions which are indispensable to their function. Profits emerge 
out of the particular way in which this system channels the forces 
of production.
 The articulated relationship between the forces of production and 
the social relations of production of a given stage of world history is 
called by Marxists a ‘mode of production’. In the Marxist conception, 
there are five or six modes of production: hunting and gathering, 
slavery, feudalism, capitalism and socialism. While the historical 
relationship of these different modes and the existence of the sixth 
or Asian mode of production are in dispute, it is generally accepted 
that capitalism organized around profit-making must be understood 
as a system in terms of the relationship between its various parts 
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– economic, political and cultural. It must also be understood tempo-
rally. These parts come together into a profit-generating system or 
mode of production through a concrete historical process.
 As I have noted capitalism is dynamic, fundamentally oriented 
toward the future, and the fact that today its intellectual apolo-
gists are having difficulty envisaging its future is symptomatically 
quite important. The profits that continue to drive it forward have 
depended on the existence of private property, the exploitation 
of what is not private property as a free good, the availability of 
an intellectually as well as materially alienated work force and 
the existence of the sovereign territorial state. The territorial state 
provided an essential political framework within which private 
capitals sustained by capitalist relations of production emerged and 
were integrated into a system. In other words markets were created 
politically as well as economically. It is a central thesis of this book 
that markets, too, have a real history. In any case it is important that 
the continued existence of such preconditions for profit-making are 
today imperilled, and this requires that we try to understand how 
the elements that compose capitalism came into existence, and how 
they came to constitute a system.
 The scope of this study may seem daunting at first. However, 
my task here is concerned not primarily with the concrete details 
of this great historical transformation but with assessing the 
critical debates that it prompted between Marxist luminaries such 
as Maurice Dobb, Paul Sweezy, Rodney Hilton, Eric Hobsbawm, 
Robert Brenner, Immanuel Wallerstein, Perry Anderson, Terence 
J. Byres and Giovanni Arrighi. While their works are indeed great 
historical labours in their own right, the topics and issues high-
lighted by them have helped to organize the historical content of 
the present narrative. In particular, Brenner’s own enormous, wide-
ranging and controversial scholarship, extending from late medieval 
Europe to early modern England, Holland and China, and that of 
his followers – Ellen Wood, Benno Teschke and George Comninel – 
bound together loosely in the school of Political Marxism, is one of 
the most important threads connecting this work.
 When I say that that these elements of profit-making were 
historically constituted I mean that they were neither determined in 
advance nor did they occur by chance. From the beginning I insist 
that the initial encounter between the owners of money and prole-
tarians was not predetermined and might not have happened at all. 
On the other hand, I argue that this historical conjuncture did not 
come about at a throw of the dice. History is not determined but it 
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is not entirely the result of chance either. The responsibility of the 
historian is to elicit as well as possible what concrete and determi-
nate lines of causation contributed to the emergence of capitalism. 
Understanding the balance between determinacy and indeterminacy 
is critical to gaining a perspective on the important factors at play 
in the past as well as in the current crisis.
 This introduction begins by briefly recalling the history of the 
largely Marxist scholarship on the origins of capitalism, noting its 
close connection to contemporary politics and crises. It goes on to 
give an overview of the book and its argument. It concludes with a 
consideration of Eurocentrism, a position which, while always prob-
lematic both morally and intellectually, has simply been rendered 
obsolete by the strength of capitalist development far beyond 
the shores of Europe and its offshoots, and even beyond Japan. 
Capitalism undoubtedly broke through in Europe. But we assert 
the existence of a non-European proto-capitalism, and accordingly 
reject an exclusive Anglocentric or Western European approach to 
capitalist origins, and insist on the historically late appearance of 
European economic superiority based on capitalism.
caPItalIst orIgIns and crIses
My discussion focuses initially on the rich and contentious literature 
on the transition to capitalism that emerged in the wake of Maurice 
Dobb’s Studies in the Development of Capitalism, published soon 
after the Second World War ended.1 For all the writers involved in this 
discussion, understanding capitalism’s origins was always a political 
undertaking, and for most scholars engaged in the enterprise it was 
an endeavour which sought to look beyond capitalism toward the 
establishment of a humane, equal and freer order – in other words, 
socialism. The catastrophe of the two great wars and the Great 
Depression focused the attention of Dobb on the transition question 
because of his sense that the capitalist system had entered into deep, 
possibly terminal, crisis. The result was an outline of a history of capi-
talism as a unified system with a beginning, middle and possible end. 
For him, the transition from feudalism to capitalism became the only 
clear and well-documented example of a passage from one mode of 
production to another.2 And understanding it could help to illuminate 
possibilities beyond capitalism.
 Though Dobb’s immediate expectations of the imminent end 
of capitalism were disappointed as capitalism stabilized after the 
war, the publication of his work provoked considerable debate 
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in the 1950s, and a second and revised edition of Studies in the 
Development of Capitalism appeared in 1963.3 The political 
upheavals of the 1960s and economic crises of the 1970s produced 
a second round of debate on the transition, whose fruits included 
Hilton’s review of the initial debate and influential new works by 
Immanuel Wallerstein, Perry Anderson and Robert Brenner.4
 Today, 65 years after Dobb wrote, Marxist scholarship stands at 
a particularly interesting conjuncture. On the one hand the historic 
hegemony of Western capitalism over the rest of the world is in 
serious doubt as rival centres of capitalist accumulation appear in 
China, India and other ‘emerging economies’ and link up with one 
another.5 On the other, scepticism about the future of capitalism is 
more widespread than in Dobb’s time, its links to economic growth 
are questioned, and ecological and energy crises loom. A fresh round 
of scholarly re-examination of capitalism’s origins and of the transi-
tion from the feudal to the capitalist mode of production is taking 
place.6 The French medieval historian Guy Bois, for example, has 
explicitly compared the deeper causes of the crisis with those that 
lay behind the crisis of feudalism. He points out that the current 
crisis, like that of feudalism, is marked by ongoing large-scale unem-
ployment, growing insecurity, violence, social marginalization and 
outbursts of irrationality egged on by the upper classes.7
economIsm and eurocentrIsm
Rich though it was, the literature on the transition from Dobb 
onwards took both an economistic and a Eurocentric view of capital-
ism’s origins, conceiving capitalism as a purely economic system and 
either assuming it to be a quintessentially European phenomenon or 
defining it in ways that left the distinctiveness of capitalism outside 
Europe out of account. These views are historically incorrect and 
impede a political and suitably universal understanding of capitalism. 
Both mar the otherwise brilliant contributions of Brenner.
 While Brenner broke new ground in stressing the importance of 
class struggle and the significance of agrarian capitalism in the transi-
tion, we argue that he disregarded the importance of the state as the 
ultimate linchpin of capitalism. For him, the extraction of relative 
surplus value – increases in investment increasing labour’s produc-
tivity and therefore surplus value and reducing the value of labour 
power by lowering of the value of goods consumed by workers – and 
the competitive markets that made it an imperative were capitalism’s 
defining features. However, as we show, they emerged only as the 
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result of a long process which involved the state as much as markets. 
Brenner’s economism also leads to an anachronistic understanding of 
the capitalist market and downplays the significance of primitive accu-
mulation and absolute exploitation on a world scale. The undeniable 
rising productivity of social labour highlighted by Brenner leads him 
to devalue and ignore the indispensable accumulation of capital that 
precedes it. Such economism cannot understand capitalism’s historic 
power and its vulnerabilities, which are political.
 Economism also leads Brenner and his school to wrongly dismiss 
the importance of state-backed colonialism and to assume the West’s 
economic superiority ab initio. This school also downplays the 
role of the early modern revolutions in the progress of capitalism, 
regarding them at best as icing on the cake of an already established 
capitalism, or at worst as non-capitalist events. As we show, the 
revolutionary transformation of the state was the critical step in the 
transition to capitalism.
 Brenner’s Eurocentrism is related to this minimizing of the impor-
tance of revolution in the past and future. He argues that while rural 
petty producers played a revolutionary role in undermining feudalism 
in the fourteenth century, thereafter they became economically timid 
or defensive. The initiative in starting capitalism was taken instead 
by landlords. We argue, however, that once the constraints of 
feudalism were removed, an upper layer of petty producers played 
an aggressive social and economic role in the inception of agrarian 
as well as early industrial capitalism. Petty producers also played a 
critical role as the mass base of revolutionary change. It is important 
to recognize this because it relates to the possibilities of peasant and 
worker resistance to imperialism in the under-developed world, and 
the historical importance of the political mobilization of the mass 
of humanity in the transition not only from feudalism to capitalism, 
but potentially from capitalism to socialism.
an alternatIve readIng
This book provides a more complex and nuanced understanding 
of capitalism’s origins. At the birth of capitalism the West was 
geographically, economically and culturally marginal in the world. 
In the Middle East, China, Japan and India, the forces of production 
were equally or more developed. The breakthrough toward capi-
talism in Europe was a result of a prolonged period of class conflict 
between the feudal ruling classes and peasants and artisans, during 
which the balance swung sufficiently away from the former to permit 
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capitalism to emerge. In similar conflicts in China, Japan, India and 
the Middle East, however, the balance of power remained, at this 
time, sufficiently in favour of the ruling classes to prevent rupture. 
And though capitalism’s productive superiority over the labour-
intensive economy of, say, China was visible by the late seventeenth 
century, it did not become globally significant until after 1800.
 Within Western countries, dispossession of producers from the 
means of production and the increase and intensification of work – 
in other words, primitive accumulation and absolute surplus value, 
both backed by the state – played their part in capitalism’s devel-
opment as much as markets and technical improvements. Abroad, 
the growing divergence in the economic fortunes of the West and 
the rest was compounded by aggressive state-sponsored Western 
conquest, pillage and appropriation of the wealth, land, labour and 
techniques of non-Western societies as well as the resulting fore-
closure of the possibility of an early capitalist breakthrough through 
Western political domination.
  The decline of feudalism in Western Europe began with the series 
of late medieval revolts of peasants and craftspeople prompted by 
economic crisis. The royal territorial states which initially emerged to 
guarantee the continued class rule of the landlords against the upsurge 
of producers formed a critical political bridge between feudalism and 
capitalism. By the sixteenth century the balance of class forces forced 
these states to provide an arena for the generalization and integra-
tion of capitalist relations of production, while the breakdown of the 
feudal order allowed the differentiation of producers into capitalists 
and wage workers, a process which was greatly aided by the state 
in England, and to a lesser degree on the Continent. Expansion of 
production within this new economic order necessitated the creation 
of home and world markets in which commodities, which was the 
form products took, could be exchanged. Once again, the state backed 
the process. Thus, from its beginnings, capitalist development was 
not merely market-driven. Rather, markets emerged at the national 
level only as a result of prolonged political and class conflicts, and 
were established by the coercive, legal and political machinery of 
the early modern absolutist states which gradually cleared obstacles 
to them. The bourgeois political and social revolutions in Holland, 
England and France overthrew the feudal ruling classes of these 
territorial states and then harnessed them to complete the develop-
ment of markets and the full entry of capital into agriculture and 
manufacturing. The revolutionaries, like the protagonists of the late 
medieval revolts, were petty producers led by the capitalist class that 
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had emerged from their ranks. The resulting development of export- 
oriented manufacturing combined with colonialism, the slave trade 
and the plantation-slave system guided by the mercantilist state proved 
crucial not only to facilitating ongoing capital accumulation but also 
to overcoming Europe’s backward and peripheral global position by 
establishing first military/political and later economic superiority over 
the non-European world.
 It is now acknowledged that capitalism’s development cannot be 
understood without comprehending the intrinsic importance of the 
state.8 It is only by denying the centrality of the state’s role in the 
development of capitalism in Western Europe that a false contrast 
is set up between this allegedly ‘classic’ European route, conceived 
in a largely economistic fashion, and the ways in which capitalism 
developed elsewhere. The fact is that once under way, capitalism 
and imperialism threatened other political and social formations. 
Many places – initially in the immediate periphery of the core 
Western states, for example in Scotland, Prussia and Russia, but 
later farther afield, for example in Japan, South Korea and Taiwan 
– eventually witnessed capitalisms imposed from above, by the state. 
In these processes, still ongoing in the early twenty-first century, 
capitalist landlords and/or the state undoubtedly assumed the initia-
tive to combat the adverse consequences of uneven development by 
engaging in forms of combined development. Combined and uneven 
development entailed a simultaneous struggle to overcome the 
barriers to development posed by the capitalism of more advanced 
states and the backwardness of the traditional economic sectors 
by far-reaching state intervention. This meant that rather than 
repeating the stages of previous capitalist development, latecomers 
sought to absorb earlier advances and used them to emerge in the 
forefront of capitalist development and profit-making. The role of 
politics and the state – already large in the development of early 
capitalism – loomed even larger in these later instances.
Plan of the book
Chapter 1 addresses the decline of feudalism in the West and its resil-
ience elsewhere. Chapters 2 and 3 stress the historical significance 
of relative surplus value and capitalist markets. All three stress the 
decisive importance of the state in the processes they discuss. Chapter 
2 discusses early modern capitalism in Italy – where, after all, capi-
talist accumulation, albeit focused on commerce and finance, began 
– and in Germany and France, where it has been denied or ignored. 
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Capitalist activity, we argue, sprouted in the late medieval and 
early modern periods across Western Europe in Italy, Germany, the 
Netherlands, France and even Spain. Understanding where capitalism 
developed further, and where such early development was interrupted, 
also demonstrates the existence of a specifically French route to capi-
talism which led to the revolution of 1789. Chapter 3 is devoted to a 
discussion of the origins of English capitalism but moves away from 
an exclusive preoccupation with England.
 Chapter 4 treats the capitalist revolutions in Holland, England 
and France. It explains why bourgeois revolutions were critical 
to the further development of capitalism in Europe. They trans-
formed the early modern state into an explicitly capitalist entity. 
Contrary to the view that the merchant capitalism of early modern 
Holland remained dependent on the feudal mode of production, we 
argue that not only did Holland develop an authentic agricultural 
capitalism, it also experienced a capitalist revolution.
 Too much of the necessarily comparative historical analysis of 
the origins of capitalism has led to insufficiently grounded and too 
hasty generalization from particular historical situations, usually 
European. Being at least roughly chronological, the early chapters of 
this book are necessarily focused on European history. However, the 
later discussions of capitalist transitions beyond the West European 
core – in Scotland, the United States, Prussia, Japan, Russia, Japan, 
Korea, Taiwan and beyond – are anticipated in the non-economistic 
and non-Eurocentric emphasis of the early chapters. In this wider 
framework, comparative historical analysis is indispensable. As 
Terence Byres, who has done so much to make the compara-
tive method in studying capitalism more authentically universal, 
suggests, ‘it is in a comparative perspective that one may reach for 
possible lines of causality. Comparison has the power to widen the 
range of possible hypotheses. Comparison can … prevent analytical 
closure … by keeping one alive to … diversity and historical contin-
gency ….’9
 The transitions considered in the first four chapters, as well as 
that in the United States, are regarded as instances of ‘capitalism 
from below’, originating among small-scale producers. The fifth 
chapter focuses particularly on the role of the state where the 
uneven development of capitalism elicited a response in the form 
of combined or state-directed capitalisms. It also discusses the role 
of the state in the fostering of colonialism and slavery, which were 
critical to overcoming the global marginality of the capitalist West 
and enabling it to impose itself politically, and eventually economi-
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cally, over so much of the world, inhibiting capitalist development 
there. The final two chapters complete the narrative by discussing 
capital’s entry into manufacturing during the Industrial Revolution 
and by looking at the significance of capitalism in the context of 
world history. Though vulgar technological determinism regards the 
Industrial Revolution as decisive to the rise of the West, it was much 
less so than the birth of capitalism in the sixteenth century. Its full 
productive power could only reveal itself thanks to the slow accu-
mulation of capital which began three centuries earlier. The final 
chapter completes the widening of the focus away from Western 
Europe and England to the broader context of Eurasian and global 
history, returning to the question of Eurocentrism as well as consid-
ering the future prospects of capitalism.
the argument
The overall argument of the work is a fourfold one: that capitalist 
development was drawn out over a long period, three centuries and 
counting; that class struggle and changes in the relations of produc-
tion were historically decisive in their emergence and evolution; 
that home and world markets developed simultaneously; and that 
the territorial state was, and remains, an integral component of 
capitalism.
 In the first place, the emergence of capitalism as an apparently 
self-sustaining ‘economic’ system, separated from politics, was the 
consequence of a centuries-long process in which, pace Brenner, 
political coercion played a major role. Autonomous competitive 
markets only emerged after a long apprenticeship under the protec-
tion of the state. Second, the class struggle between feudal landlords 
and urban and rural producers in the late Middle Ages was crucial 
to the decline of the feudal mode of production in the West in 
contrast to the fate of feudalism in states located elsewhere. Socially 
and economically ambitious, the upper stratum of this group of 
small-scale producers played the key role in the development of 
capitalism from the late fifteenth century. It was this proto-capitalist 
element which was critically important to the emergence of agrarian 
capitalism and the initial revolutionizing of the means of production 
in manufacture in a capitalist direction. But class struggle did not 
cease in the aftermath of the late medieval uprisings, as Brenner 
would have it. Rather it proved critical to the further development 
of the capitalist mode of production in the early modern period. 
The small producers challenged landlord power when necessary and 
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formed the shock troops of the early bourgeois revolutions against 
feudal absolutism in Holland, England and France. It was from their 
midst that the bourgeoisie emerged. It was from the bottom layers 
of these same petty producers that the wage-earning class slowly 
formed, pushed downward by the more successful small producers.
 The development of productive means to enhance the extrac-
tion of relative surplus value and the ultimate emergence of the 
law of value in the competitive market were what distinguished 
capitalism from feudal systems in Europe and elsewhere. But an 
overarching theme in this work is that the emergence of these 
distinctive features of capitalism was a slow process involving force 
as much as the market. Capitalism’s economic superiority did not 
register economically before the late seventeenth century, and did 
not become decisive in terms of its global economic and political 
impact until the beginning of the nineteenth century. It was only at 
that time that technologically advanced weapons of war deployed 
against India and China, and machine-made and chemically finished 
textiles, made possible the historic reversal of the longstanding 
European balance of payments deficit with Asia. Accordingly, we see 
the significance of the extraction of relative surplus value as making 
itself felt only little by little, and as such only amplifying the effects 
of primitive accumulation and the generation of absolute surplus 
value in the early phases of capitalism.
 The importance of competitive markets and the extraction of 
relative surplus value in the early development of capitalism have 
been exaggerated, while the significance of force and the assertion of 
state power have largely been overlooked. In other words, the way 
for the extraction of relative surplus value and competitive markets 
was opened by political processes. This makes it possible to agree 
with those scholars who argue against a too Eurocentric view of early 
modern history, which assumes an immediate and manifest economic 
triumph of the new capitalist mode of production from its first appear-
ance. It is a basic contention of this account that its emergence took 
centuries and its victory came late. It was not until the Industrial 
Revolution that Western capitalism forged ahead of the economies 
of the rest of the world. The Great Divergence between the capitalist 
West and the rest of the world came after 1800, not in 1500.
 Aside from the emergence of capitalist relations of production, 
this work argues that the simultaneous emergence of the world 
market triggered processes of uneven and combined development 
which became an independent factor in capitalism’s emergence. They 
came into play in an effort to counter the relative backwardness of 
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Western Europe in relation to Asia. Even within Europe, capitalism 
was not only not a uniquely English phenomenon, it was based on 
uneven and combined development across different countries. This 
led to the emergence of a hierarchy of territorial states and rival 
colonialisms in the early modern period.
 The reduced role of competitive markets in driving the early 
development of capitalism in our account goes with a fourth major 
argument: that the territorial state was an intrinsic part of the 
process. Capitalism was not simply about the development of capi-
talist relations of production or competitive markets. Capitalism 
arose dialectically within the cradle of a still feudal state. Nations 
like Italy and Germany that failed to become unified states saw 
their nascent capitalist development arrested, while capitalism was 
consolidated in Holland, France and England by the constitution 
of a territorial state. The gradual emergence of capitalist markets 
and capitalist relations of production was made possible by the 
state. The critically important process of primitive accumulation 
was assisted by the political and legal force of the state at the local 
and eventually at the national level. The emergence of overseas 
markets and colonialism were based on the support of the state. 
The important role of the state in early capitalism is reflected in 
the importance of mercantilism, the phenomenon of state-driven 
combined and uneven development, and in the modern period the 
role of the developmental capitalist state in Prussia, Russia, Japan, 
Korea, Taiwan, Brazil, India and China. Given the critical role of 
the state, its class nature and the importance of political and social 
revolution are highlighted.
the unIty of the marxIst method
The Marxist methodology and categories of analysis of the key 
protagonists in the debate help to unify the discussion despite great 
differences of argument and emphasis between them. Classically 
Marxist themes like the nature of a mode of production, of capi-
talism as a world system, the relative importance of internal and 
external prime movers in the fall of feudalism and rise of capitalism, 
the relation between the social relations of production and exchange 
relations, the tie between the forces of production and the devel-
opment of classes, the relationship between financial, merchant, 
agricultural and manufacturing capital and the role of the state, have 
been the chief axes of debate. The crises of feudalism in fourteenth-
century Europe, early nineteenth-century Prussia and Japan during 
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the Meiji Restoration may not appear to have much in common at 
first glance. But they raise theoretical questions like the relationship 
between the capitalist mode of production and earlier productive 
modes, the importance of class relations as against the significance 
of access to global markets, and the role of the level of develop-
ment of the forces of production in the transition, which help to tie 
together these disparate concrete instances.
 In particular, Marxism’s dialectical method is essential in grasping 
the transition from the feudal mode of production to the capitalist 
mode. In terms of this work the development of the new capitalist 
mode must be understood to have taken place dialectically within 
the bowels of the old feudal mode. How the new mode of produc-
tion arose out of the old and then eventually replaced it is the critical 
question of this inquiry.
 The essence of feudalism was the antagonistic relationship 
between a ruling class of noble landlords who controlled access 
to land, and a dominated class of subservient peasant farmers. As 
such, the overall setting of feudalism was a largely agrarian society 
with limited productive potential. The producers in such a society 
were largely peasant families interested primarily in producing their 
own subsistence. Most of the limited surplus they produced was 
directly or indirectly coerced from them in the form of rent. Capital 
existed under feudalism as it did in the slave mode of production. 
It operated in the form of merchant and financial capital facilitating 
the exchange of commodities and the provision of credit. In other 
words, it made itself felt at the level of exchange relations. But it did 
not enter into the sphere of production.
 Like feudalism, capitalism is a system that is founded on an 
antagonistic class relationship. In the capitalist case the opposition 
is between wage workers and capitalists. The workers who are the 
producers under capitalism have limited or no control over the 
means or processes of production, and therefore have restricted or 
no means of producing their own subsistence. They have no or inad-
equate means of independently producing their own livelihood. As a 
result, they are compelled to sell their labour power to employers in 
return for a wage that enables them to buy food and other necessi-
ties. The wage then is essentially the value of the commodity labour 
power. While the existence of wage labour is necessary to capitalism, 
it is not sufficient to it. The existence of capitalism also requires the 
entry of capital into the productive process. Indeed, capital’s entry 
into production is a distinguishing mark of capitalism. Capitalism, 
in contrast to feudalism, is a system in which capital, combined 
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with technological innovation, progressively introduces ever more 
sophisticated and productive means into production. Simple tools 
are replaced with more complex ones, and they, rather than labour, 
dominate the productive process, with ever more massive machinery 
and ‘fixed capital’. Using these increasingly efficient means of 
production with which they are provided, workers are able, during 
their hours of work, to produce increasingly more value than the 
value of their own labour power. This surplus value – unpaid labour 
– is the fundamental source of surplus under capitalism, in contrast 
to the primacy of rent under feudalism. Transformed by the produc-
tive process into commodities for sale in the marketplace, surplus 
value is realized by capitalists as profit. Such profit is then available 
as surplus capital for further investment in the productive process.
 In studying the transition from feudalism to capitalism we are 
trying to explain both theoretically and concretely the transition 
from the feudal mode to the capitalist. But to put it in more concrete 
terms, how, over the course of centuries, did the majority of people 
come to live in towns and cities rather than the countryside? How 
was it that whereas under feudalism most people were legally 
defined as serfs tied to a manor while paying a rent in kind or 
cash to a landlord, many if not all producers in capitalism became 
economically and legally free producers working for wages and were 
conceived of as such? How, finally, did it come about that whereas 
the object of economic activity under feudalism was consump-
tion, under capitalism it came to be the accumulation of profit? 
Understanding the means by which this transformation came about 
is the focus of the transition debate and of our study.
alternatIves to marxIsm
However, Marxism does not exhaust this study: non-Marxist 
historical scholarship is also introduced and assessed as relevant. 
Marxists have not been alone in interesting themselves in the origins 
of capitalism. Although there is no shortage of doubters, there are 
many who believe that Adam Smith’s Wealth of Nations offers a 
plausible account of capitalist origins. In his quest to understand the 
genesis of the market, Smith assumed an innate desire on the part of 
individuals to improve their material circumstances. According to 
Smith, they attempted to do this through resort to exchange or 
commerce. It is through such trade that life gradually improved, and 
society itself slowly evolved from hunting and fishing to pasturage, 
then to agriculture, and eventually toward commercialism. The 
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growth of exchange develops as a result of an increasing division of 
labour and economic specialization. Such diversification requires a 
growth of capital which comes about through individual saving.10
 Douglas North and Robert Thomas have recently attempted to 
improve on Smith while retaining his emphasis on market exchange.11 
For them history was a struggle to overcome Malthusian demo-
graphic pressures by creating institutional mechanisms which allow 
relatively inefficient production on the feudal manor to be replaced 
by more efficient market methods. It was the successful establish-
ment of private property rights in the sixteenth and seventeenth 
century which, above all, made this transformation possible.12
 From the perspective of Marxism, the problem with these views 
is that, focusing on the market and institutional change as they do, 
they remain at a superficial level of analysis. Smith’s and North 
and Thomas’s outlooks undoubtedly have some merit, but fail to 
penetrate deeply enough beneath the surface of economic rela-
tionships. For Marxists the key changes and the ones that require 
explanation in terms of the transition problem are changes in the 
social relations of production: that is, the development of the rela-
tionship between wage labourers forced into selling their labour for 
subsistence, and capitalists in control of the means of production 
who purchase such labour power and transform it into value and 
eventually profit.
 Another influential theory of the transition has been that of the 
early twentieth-century sociologist Max Weber. In The Protestant 
Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism (1904–5), Weber stressed the 
importance of the development and internalization of a capitalist 
ideology or spirit of economic accumulation. This spirit values 
thrift, diligence and the rational and calculated pursuit of profit. 
Weber found the source of this capitalist ideology in the ethics 
of Calvinism that crystallized during the Protestant Reformation. 
Weber acknowledged that the development of the market and wage 
labour were important to the development of capitalism, but he 
insisted that there was an elective affinity between this Protestant 
ethic and such capitalist activity.13 In other words, Weber argued 
that the Protestant faith was an important independent variable in 
the development of capitalism.
 Anticipating Weber by 50 years, in the Grundrisse, Marx has 
this to say about the relationship between Protestantism and the 
accumulation of money: ‘the cult of money has its asceticism, its 
self-denial, its self-sacrifice-economy and frugality, contempt for 
mundane, temporal and fleeting pleasures; the chase after the eternal 
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treasure. Hence the connection between English Puritanism or 
Dutch Protestantism and money-making.’14 Marx saw the connec-
tion between the so-called spirit of capitalism and the Protestant 
ethic. As such the Protestant ethic had a certain historical impor-
tance as an ideology of an emerging capitalism. But clearly it existed 
not simply in an elective affinity with capitalism but in a dialectical 
relationship with it. This was a more direct level of interdependence 
than Weber would have allowed. Friedrich Engels, who also took 
note of the so-called Calvinist predestinarian ethic years before 
Weber, particularly underscored Calvinism’s force as an ideology 
that served the interests of the bourgeoisie better than the passivity 
of Lutheranism.15 As is well known, it was the English economic 
historian Richard Tawney who in response to Weber, demonstrated 
that the development of sixteenth-century capitalism drove the 
spread of English Calvinist Puritanism, not, as Weber’s reasoning 
implied, vice versa.16
marxIsm and hIstory
As a result of what we regard as their superficial approach we 
eschew treatment of the transition problem from a Smithian or 
Weberian perspective and adhere to a Marxist one. Indeed, we have 
found that the writings of Marx and Engels, though they date from 
the nineteenth century, nonetheless contain many enduring insights 
on the transition. They are, of course, inadequate, especially in the 
light of the enormous progress made in historical research. Marx, 
for example, had only the vaguest conception of the factors behind 
the decline of feudalism: that is, the class struggles of the late Middle 
Ages. In Engels’s account of the German Peasant War, to take another 
instance, the author has little sense of the extraordinary develop-
ment of manufacturing in Germany prior to the Reformation. On 
the other hand, the works of Marx and Engels, surprisingly to a 
present-day professional historian, continue to offer many important 
insights into the historical and especially the theoretical basis of the 
transition. Moreover, as it turns out the subsequent Marxist debate 
on the transition is the one that offers the richest insights into the 
problem.
 In taking a Marxist approach to the transition we should make 
clear that we are not trying to write a history of the decline of 
feudalism and development of capitalism. An actual history of 
capitalism would preoccupy itself above all with eliciting the varied, 
complex and contradictory routes that societies took as they moved 
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from feudal or tributary societies to capitalism. This account is 
rather a histoire raisonée or critical history. This is a type of histor-
ical writing that originated in the early modern epoch in which as 
much or more emphasis was placed on reflection and commentary 
on the meaning of history as on the facts themselves. It focuses on 
reviewing the different ways that Marxist scholars have attempted 
to explain and theorize the transition. As such it has as much to do 
with theory or political economy as it does with history. But such a 
history, although preoccupied with theory and comparison, must be 
written with ongoing reference to the concrete particulars of history, 
and especially the findings of contemporary historical research.
 Marx’s approach to the relationship between the abstractions 
of theory and the concrete particulars of history is outlined in 
an important passage in the third volume of Capital in which he 
delineates the relationship between the mode of production as 
the independent variable and the dependent variables of class and 
the realm of politics. Despite the apparent determinate role of the 
mode of production, Marx insists on the role of specific historic 
circumstances which theory must take into account:
It is always the direct relationship of the owners of the condi-
tions of production to the direct producers – a relation always 
naturally corresponding to a definite stage in the development 
of the methods of labour and thereby its social productivity – 
which reveals the innermost secret, the hidden basis of the entire 
social structure, and with it the political form of the relation of 
sovereignty and dependence, in short, the corresponding specific 
form of the state. This does not prevent the same economic basis 
– the same from the standpoint of its main conditions – due to 
innumerable different empirical circumstances, natural environ-
ment, racial relations, external historical influences, etc., from 
showing infinite variations and gradations in appearance, which 
can be ascertained only by analysis of the empirically given 
circumstances.17
Concrete historical references were an intrinsic feature even of Marx’s 
most theoretical works of economic analysis. The abstractions of 
theory could only prove themselves by being tested and applied to the 
concrete details of history. Engels described Marx’s approach in the 
following way:
The critique of economics could … be exercised in two ways: 
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historically or logically. … History moves often in leaps and 
bounds and in a zigzag line, and as this would have to be followed 
throughout, it would mean not only that a considerable amount 
of material of slight importance would have to be included, but 
also that the train of thought would frequently have to be inter-
rupted; it would, moreover, be impossible to write the history of 
economy without that of bourgeois society, and the task would 
thus become immense, because of the absence of all preliminary 
studies. The logical method of approach was therefore the only 
suitable one. This, however, is indeed nothing but the historical 
method, only stripped of the historical form and diverting chance 
occurrences. … [W]ith this method the logical exposition need 
by no means be confined to the purely abstract sphere. On the 
contrary, it requires historical illustration and continuous contact 
with reality.18
Marx’s conception of capitalism and its chief elements was rooted or 
immanent in historical development and cannot be understood apart 
from it. Thus the categories that constitute capitalist commodities – 
use value, competitive markets, money, exchange value and value, 
private property, capital and abstract and concrete labour – not only 
have a history, they emerge in it, from it. Moreover, such concepts 
as value or abstract labour have a real social existence. On the other 
hand, writing in the middle of the nineteenth century, Marx was 
preoccupied with analyzing these concepts in order to reveal the 
logic of capitalist accumulation. Of necessity, the historic origins of 
such concepts were of secondary concern to him, if only because 
of a want of sufficient time or available scholarly material. For us, 
who look forward to the unravelling of these capitalist commodity 
categories and the beginning of a new historical epoch, the devel-
opment of these notions out of the concrete circumstances of early 
modern history is of central interest.19
 Given that we are concerned not with an established mode of 
production but with the transition from one to another, we must be 
even more mindful of history’s concreteness. On the other hand, it 
is also important to not let that overwhelm the need for theorizing 
about history. Students of Marxism will recall the famous debate 
between the celebrated English historian Edward P. Thompson and 
the Marxist theoretician and historian Perry Anderson in the late 
1970s. While Anderson defended the need to bring theory to bear on 
history, Thompson denounced this as overly schematic, as forcing a 
structure on the past based on the arbitrary imposition of ill-fitting 
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Marxist concepts.20 Such concepts seemed to Thompson to contra-
dict the historian’s commitment to the concrete as revealed in the 
primary sources, to a respect for narrative and to the contingency of 
historical outcomes, none of which ought to be surrendered lightly. 
Thompson’s admonitions in this regard are worth bearing in mind. 
Indeed, it is essential to admit from the beginning that theory can 
never completely grasp the complexity of the past. On the other 
hand, it is important to try to do so, as Anderson suggests, if only 
to better comprehend the facts of the past, and particularly those 
which are pertinent to the historical problem at hand. The concrete 
facts of historical narrative ought properly to be illuminated by a 
sense of the theory that stands behind them, and vice versa.
 Thompson and Anderson also had another disagreement 
relevant for us. In producing what is perhaps the masterpiece of 
Marxist historiography, The Making of the English Working Class, 
Thompson may be excused for perhaps paying too much attention 
to historical agents, men and women and their class consciousness, 
as against the objective realities of the mode of production and the 
social relations of production. As Ellen Wood has shown, he had his 
reasons for doing so: namely, to combat those who would deny the 
agency and even the existence of such a class.21 On the other hand, 
Thompson’s emphasis on consciousness and preoccupation with 
the complex tissue of working-class experience undoubtedly gave 
license to others to abandon notions of class, mode of production 
and surplus value altogether, and to take the ‘cultural turn’ into a 
fetishized world of discourse and idealist mystification.22 Thompson 
cannot be blamed for the deviations of epigones who abandoned 
Marxism in the age of neoliberalism, and it is for us to reaffirm our 
commitment to the historical force of consciousness and ideology. 
But from a Marxist perspective the social and economic aspects of 
history remain fundamental.
 Historical explanation certainly depends on the degree to which 
the political and cultural is convincingly linked to the social and 
economic, and the extent to which immediate events are tied to 
more enduring long-term factors. Revolutions, for example, need to 
be understood in political and cultural terms which enjoy a certain 
autonomy and cannot be reduced to the social and economic. Yet 
the challenge for historians is to try to grasp the ties between these 
different levels of social existence. In any case our project demands 
that we take our distance from an overly cultural approach to 
history which, moreover, shies away from comparison, abstraction, 
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generalization and sense of structure, by invoking the overriding 
importance of subjective experience, which is necessarily various. 
  Thompson likewise cannot be faulted for the sins of social history 
defined as history from below, another academically fashionable 
approach to history. Nonetheless he, like other British Marxist 
historians, gave license to an approach privileging the study of 
workers, plebeians and peasants. This was understandable given 
the previous neglect of the role of the people in history. But this 
opened the way to an approach which ignored the study of the 
political and economic opposition between workers and peasants on 
the one hand, and landlords and capitalists on the other, in favour 
of a one-sided preoccupation with the lower orders. The relation-
ship between opposed classes must be the focus of serious study 
of the origins and dynamics of capitalism. Moreover, class conflict 
is always resolved at the level of political struggle and the control 
of the state. Indeed, the doings of the upper class must always be 
borne in mind when studying history or practicing politics. It is the 
dynamic of class struggle which must be the focal point of a Marxist 
approach to history, and especially the study of the origins and 
development of capitalism. 
  The structural Marxism of Louis Althusser was Thompson’s 
particular bête noire. It was the epitome of what Thompson 
regarded as a schematic, a priori and overly theoretical approach to 
history based on the concept of the mode of production, which was 
the special target of his ire. Yet Althusser himself had insisted on the 
distinction between a mode of production and a social formation 
as a way of getting away from an overly mechanical and dogmatic 
understanding of historical process. According to the latter, the 
mode of production could not be found in the real world but was 
rather an abstraction from it. What did exist historically were social 
formations. While one mode of production might predominate, 
such a social formation might contain several coexisting modes 
of production, or fragments of such modes which might be out of 
phase with one another.23 This formulation makes sense in terms of 
apprehending the transition from feudalism to capitalism.
 Contrary to the views of non-Marxists, and even some Marxists, 
historical analysis requires a dialectical or relational understanding 
of the historical process. Methodological individualism and notions 
of causation based on the isolation of independent and dependent 
variables were not incorrect methods. They were merely insufficient. 
Competitive markets, for example, may determine the success or 
failure of individual entrepreneurs. But the historical constitution of 
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markets is not only an economic process but also a political, social 
and cultural one. Explaining their emergence requires understanding 
the capitalist mode of production as a totality whose constituent 
parts and overall development cannot be grasped except through an 
appreciation of their dynamic tension and ongoing interaction with 
one another. This is obvious with regard to class relations but is also 
necessary with respect to understanding the relationship between 
value and capital, markets and class struggle, the concrete and the 
abstract and the base and superstructure.
caPItalIsm and World hIstory
Studying capitalism’s origins invariably must lead to differentiating 
European from non-European societies. No one can deny that capi-
talism took permanent root first in Western Europe in the sixteenth 
century, and where it took root – England, Holland, northern France, 
northwest Germany – it accelerated economic growth. Translated 
into political and military power, capitalism made it possible for the 
European states to dominate the rest of the world from the end of 
the eighteenth century onward. As such it endowed Europe with a 
deep sense of superiority over other cultures and civilizations. It is 
this Eurocentric perspective which has increasingly been challenged 
in recent decades. Eurocentrism and the cultural arrogance that 
goes with it certainly need to be confronted, and we shall do that. 
Attention has already been drawn to how the economic superiority 
of Europe’s capitalism became evident much later than most histo-
rians think it did. But in contesting Eurocentrism some scholars, 
including Jack Goody and John Hobson have tried to make light of 
the historical significance of this eventual economic superiority of 
the capitalist mode of production as compared to the performance 
of other non-capitalist societies like traditional China and Japan.24 
In my view such a denial is quixotic. We can no more dispute the 
higher productivity of capitalist relations of production than we can 
repudiate the historic facts of European conquest of the rest of the 
world.
 One of the most convincing attempts to contextualize the rise 
of capitalism within the context of world history was made by the 
late British revolutionary Marxist Chris Harman.25 Harman insisted 
that capitalism was not the result of some special Western European 
quality or development. The forces of production have been cumu-
latively developing in Europe, Asia and Africa for centuries, and 
tendencies toward capitalism emerged in many places. For contin-
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gent historical reasons such tendencies culminated earlier in Western 
Europe than elsewhere, and once they did, further movement toward 
capitalism outside Europe was frustrated after capitalism triggered 
European imperialism. From the perspective of the twenty-first 
century in which non-European poles of development have emerged, 
the development of capitalism first in Europe is part of a much 
longer and yet unconcluded historical process. During the Middle 
Ages and the early modern period there was considerable progress 
in agricultural and manufacturing techniques in India and especially 
China. The Middle East, too, saw improvement. In the case of all 
three regions merchants and craftspeople played an important role. 
But in the case of China and the Middle East the entrenched power 
of landed elites, reinforced sooner or later by state bureaucracies, 
discouraged merchants and craftspeople from investing in the cumu-
lative development of the means of production. This was ultimately 
the case in India too. In a noteworthy if controversial break from 
stereotypical Western views of an unchanging India, Harman under-
lines the recurrent possibilities for the breakthrough of capitalist 
tendencies in India in the face of the repeated breakdowns of its 
dynastic state system. 
 In the Middle Ages Western Europe also saw the adoption of new 
methods of farming and manufacture, many of which were in fact 
imported from China, India and the Middle East. Harman concludes 
that in that epoch Western Europe was an economic backwater 
compared with much of the rest of Eurasia. In any event in terms 
of the development of the forces of production the whole of Eurasia 
shared a common experience. It can parenthetically be added that 
if we compare the most productive areas of Europe and Asia, 
as late as the eighteenth century the growth of fixed capital and 
levels of productivity and gross domestic product per capita were 
approximately similar. 
  What ultimately distinguished Western Europe from the rest of 
the Eurasian continent, according to Harman, was its distinctive 
political and social evolution. The relative economic backwardness 
of northwest Europe gave it a weak and fragmented superstructure 
which favored the flowering of capitalist tendencies more than in the 
rest of Eurasia. In the context of this political decentralization what 
became notable was the relative strength of the producer classes. 
Serfs may have been tied to the land but they largely controlled the 
processes of production. Merchants and craftspeople were able to 
achieve a greater degree of autonomy from kings and feudal lords 
through the development of town charters and liberties. More 
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than the peasants, urban merchants and craftspeople developed an 
independent productive base and an interest in its expansion and 
improvement. 
  The end of the Middle Ages saw a re-consolidation of political 
authority throughout Eurasia. But in the case of Western Europe the 
centralized states that did emerge were able to exercise less control 
than their counterparts elsewhere in protecting the class rule of the 
landed elites. Indeed, the fourteenth- and fifteenth-century economic 
and social crisis in Western Europe had enhanced the social freedom 
of the productive classes. In particular the transformations of that 
period opened the way for the increasing employment of wage 
labour by merchants and rich peasants on a scale which distin-
guished Western Europe from the rest of the world. Ultimately 
Western Europeans used the increasing economic power which 
accrued from the development of capitalism to block whatever 
indigenous capitalist tendencies existed in the rest of the world. 
 In this light, Eurasia as a whole shared a common development 
of the forces of production in the pre-capitalist period. Capitalist 
tendencies were present not only in Western Europe but in China, 
India and the Middle East. Historic contingencies – political and 
social – determined that capitalism emerged first in Europe and not 
Asia. Among those contingencies we would underscore the strength 
of the state in Asia, and later the effects of foreign intrusion including 
Western colonialism and imperialism in blocking capitalist develop-
ment. The restructuring of social and political relations through war 
and revolution in the twentieth century has produced a model of 
capitalist accumulation in China and East Asia which is now out-
competing that of the West.26 The same historic contingency, some 
argue, could lead in the twenty-first century to the overshadowing of 
European and American capitalism by a still more successful version 
in the East. Presumably there are some in Asia who look forward at 
long last to the day when the capitalist East will trump the capitalist 
West. There is no reason to believe that such an Asian capitalism 
would benefit humanity as a whole any more than that of the West. 
In fact the aspiration to replace Eurocentrism with some kind of 
Asian hegemony will likely run up against the same multiple contra-
dictions of intensifying class conflict, crisis of peak oil, ecological 
crisis and insufficient demand in the world economy.27
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the declIne of feudalIsm
This chapter reviews the debates on the decline of feudalism and 
origins of capitalism, beginning with the foundational exchange 
between Maurice Dobb and Paul Sweezy. The two differed primarily 
over whether an external prime mover, namely the development of 
commerce with the Mediterranean and the Middle East, or factors 
internal to feudalism caused the decline of this mode of production. 
Sweezy argued that commerce overseas served as an external prime 
mover which undermined feudalism. Dobb and others, including the 
medievalist Rodney Hilton and the Japanese historian Kohachiro 
Takahashi, argued that an internal prime mover – the crisis of 
the feudal mode of production – caused the decline. Meanwhile 
Eric Hobsbawm, another participant in the debate, insisted that 
changes in Europe had to be seen in terms of uneven development 
on a global scale. The decline of feudalism and advance toward 
capitalism came about through a series of crises that saw previously 
developed areas of Europe and the rest of the world regress while 
other regions forged ahead. England emerged at the forefront of 
this movement.
  In the original debate class struggles were recognized as important 
in feudalism’s decline. Subsequent argument centred on Brenner’s 
contention that these class struggles determined not only the decline 
of feudalism, but the genesis of capitalism. In England, according to 
Brenner, such conflicts paradoxically led to serfdom’s decline but also 
the landlords’ ongoing grip on the land. In the sixteenth century the 
latter initiated agrarian capitalism by forcing the better-off among 
the cautious peasantry to take up competitive leases. Based on the 
work of Guy Bois, Terence Byres and Chris Harman, we reject 
Brenner’s argument. Far from being conservative, petty producers 
and not landlords took the lead in not only dismantling feudalism, 
but initiating capitalism through their ongoing political and social 
struggles and their economic enterprise. In accord with a forces 
of production approach, furthermore, we insist that the economic 
and political capacity of this class of proto-capitalists has to be 
understood in terms of the previous development of the forces of 
production during the Middle Ages.
23
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 Perry Anderson’s account of the role of the state shapes our view 
as well. He points out that faced with revolt from below, the only 
way that class society survived was through the building-up of the 
territorial state. Despite its feudal framework the early modern state 
provided an essential container for the emergence of capitalism. 
Dobb and Brenner’s views of the transition are the focal points of this 
chapter. Yet their viewpoint is marred by an unfortunate economism 
and in the latter’s case a class determinism. In response we use the 
work of Hobsbawm, Anderson and Harman to provide a more 
dialectical view of the transition from feudalism. Hobsbawm’s sense 
of unequal development, Anderson’s view of the dual class character 
of the emerging territorial state and Harman’s notion of social class 
as defined economically but also culturally and politically help to 
provide this more dialectical sense. These debates cover the chief 
issues relating to the transition from feudalism, and form the essential 
basis for understanding debates discussed later in the text.
dobb’s oPenIng gambIt
Maurice Dobb was a don at Cambridge throughout his career. He 
was an economist by training, and founded the discipline of Marxist 
political economy in Britain. He also helped to mentor a strong 
left-wing student movement during the 1930s. As a communist he 
was more or less isolated from other academics especially in his 
own discipline, though the development economist and Nobel Prize 
winner Amartya Sen has recently written that ‘he was undoubt-
edly one of the outstanding political economists of this [twentieth]
century.’1
 Dobb justified his intrusion into history by suggesting that econo-
mists could put interesting questions to historical data; that the 
facts of concrete history could be illuminated by economic theory. 
At the same time he argued that economic analysis makes sense and 
is fruitful only if tied to the study of historical development.2 His 
Studies in the Development of Capitalism, published immediately 
after the Second World War, was based on thorough knowledge of 
the then existing historiography on the decline of English feudalism 
and emergence of capitalism.
 Dobb based his approach to the transition from feudalism to 
capitalism on Marx’s notion of the mode of production.3 While he 
recognized that one mode of production dominated a given epoch, 
he also accepted that elements of other modes of production could 
coexist with the dominant mode.4 In the passage from the feudal 
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mode of production to the capitalist mode, Dobb singled out three 
decisive moments – the crisis of feudalism in the fourteenth century, 
the beginning of capitalism in the late sixteenth and seventeenth 
centuries, and the eighteenth and early nineteenth-century Industrial 
Revolution.5 The decline of feudalism and start of capitalism are 
separated by at least two centuries. The capitalist mode proper 
dates from the latter half of the sixteenth century and the early 
seventeenth century, when capital began to penetrate production to 
a considerable degree.6
 Modern discussions of feudalism have been plagued by long-
drawn-out controversies over its conceptualization. These disputes 
have centred on whether feudalism should be thought of in essen-
tially political and legal or socio-economic terms.7 As a Marxist 
Dobb adopted the third perspective while trying not to not lose sight 
of the political. According to him, the feudal mode is defined as the 
extra-economic extraction by overlords of rents or services from a 
class of subsistence producers. The peasant producers largely control 
the process of production but are not legally free. Feudalism and 
serfdom are synonymous.8 The rise of the political and economic 
autonomy of the corporate towns, followed immediately by the 
economic decline of the fourteenth century, marked the crisis of the 
feudal mode, which was deeply shaken and thereafter continued to 
weaken. According to Dobb, towns had some part in the decline 
of feudalism, playing a role in the late medieval revolts, providing 
refuges to runaway serfs and serving as oases of freedom.9 But the 
confrontation between peasants and landlords in the countryside was 
the main arena of struggle. At the end of the Middle Ages serfdom 
had vanished while medieval forms of government and the class 
power of landlords lingered on in a kind of historical twilight.
 Though the peasantry as a class had grown stronger, they 
remained subject to manorial authority. The emerging class of 
hired labourers was subject to a good deal of coercion as a stratum 
which resorted to wage labour as a supplement to a livelihood still 
mainly drawn from subsistence farming.10 The merchant bour-
geoisie became more powerful but cooperated for the most part 
with the landlords. The novel element lay among urban craftspeople 
and well-to-do and middling peasants, whose particular mode of 
production had become independent of feudalism. They were petty 
producers who were not yet capitalists, but certainly contained a 
potential to become so, or who began to come under the external 
influence of capital.11 In Dobb’s conception it was this petty mode 
of production which predominated economically in the two hundred 
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or so years between the beginning of the feudal crisis and the advent 
of the capitalist mode in the mid-sixteenth century.
 Until Dobb it was generally assumed that the intensification of 
market exchange and the growing role of money brought about 
the decline of feudalism. On the contrary, Dobb demonstrated that 
money and exchange actually strengthened serfdom and feudal-
ism.12 The emergence of merchant capital was fully compatible with 
feudalism. Rather it was the economic weakness of the feudal mode 
of production, coupled with the growing need of the ruling class for 
revenue, which was responsible for the system’s crisis.13 The lack 
of incentive to toil and the low level of technique placed a limit on 
peasant productivity. The further development of productive forces 
was fettered by upper-class exploitation.
 Upper-class demands on peasants expanded inordinately due to 
the expansion of its numbers, the stimulus of luxury consumption 
and the exigencies of war and brigandage. This ‘parasitic’ ruling 
class expanded through natural increase as well as the growth in 
the size of great lords’ retinues in competition with one another. 
The rivalry between leading nobles increased spending on feasts, 
luxury commodities and pageants. Competition extended to war-
making, the nobility’s raison d’être and its most important form of 
conspicuous consumption. All this increased economic demands on 
producers.14
 The result was economic exhaustion, flight from the land and 
peasant rebellion.15 Over-exploitation and stagnant productivity 
resulted in a decline in population after 1300. Subsequent labour 
shortages, peasant resistance or threat of flight led to widespread 
commutation of labour to money rent. The manorial system was 
further weakened by the thinning of the ranks of the nobility 
through war, the growing practice of leasing demesne, the emergence 
of a stratum of rich and middling peasants differentiated from the 
mass of peasant poor, and the growing use of wage labour. By the 
end of the fifteenth century the economic basis of the feudal system 
had disintegrated.16
 The late medieval social differentiation of the peasantry, a key 
theme of Dobb’s work, prepared the way for the later dispossession 
of the mass of peasants. The subsequent spread of vagabondage 
across England and the rest of Europe at the beginning of the 
sixteenth century was widely commented upon by anxious contem-
poraries. The appearance of this rootless population heralded the 
arrival of capitalism, setting the stage for the emergence of capi-
talist wage labour. The role of the towns was above all to act as a 
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magnet attracting the unfree rural population and forcing further 
concessions from the landed class.17
 Dobb’s perspective on the role of the towns was later to be 
contested. What proved enduring was his view of the feudal crisis 
on the land. Dobb explained that the collapse of feudalism was 
the result of its own internal contradictions, stemming from the 
over-exploitation of the peasant producers: ‘it was the inefficiency 
of Feudalism as a system of production, coupled with the growing 
needs of the ruling class for revenue, that was primarily responsible 
for its decline; since this need for additional revenue prompted 
an increase in the pressure on the producer to a point where this 
pressure became literally unendurable’.18
 Dobb’s interpretation of the decline of feudalism set off the 
celebrated transition debate. As the repressive machinery of the 
Cold War closed in, leading Marxist scholars mainly from England 
and the United States calmly undertook an analysis of the historical 
foundations of the capitalist system. The subsequent debate unfolded 
largely in the pages of the well-known journal Science and Society 
during the early 1950s. It then appeared as a booklet whose publica-
tion was arranged by Dobb in London in 1954.19 Widely ignored in 
the English-speaking countries, the debate was chiefly followed in 
countries where strong currents of Marxism persisted.20 The contri-
butions to the discussion were eventually collected, expanded and 
published in 1976 by one of the participants, Rodney Hilton.21
dobb versus sWeezy
Paul Sweezy, another celebrated Marxist economist and co-founder 
with Paul Baran of the Monthly Review, was first into the fray.22 
Sweezy agreed with Dobb that serfdom was the dominant relation 
of production in Western feudalism. But organized around the 
economically autarchic manor feudalism was a mode of production 
for use, and as such tended to stagnation.23 An external force, the 
growth of trade and increase in production for exchange, was what 
was necessary to destabilize the system: ‘he [Dobb] mistakes for 
immanent trends certain historical developments which in fact can 
only be explained as arising from causes external to the system.’24 
Dobb failed to acknowledge sufficiently that the over-exploitation 
of peasants by the nobles arose from their increasing appetite for 
eastern luxury commodities. Sweezy’s view of an external prime 
mover was to prove untenable, as the ensuing debate demonstrated 
that the prime mover was internal to the feudal system. On the 
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other hand, his view forced the participants in the controversy to 
address the fundamental question of the historic dynamic behind the 
evolution of the feudal mode of production.
 Dobb for one rejected Sweezy’s view that feudalism tended 
toward stagnation, and insisted that it had its own momentum based 
on its internal – especially class – contradictions.25 Class conflict 
between peasants and lords did not directly lead to capitalism. What 
it did was to lessen the dependence of the petty mode of production 
upon feudal overlordship, eventually freeing the petty producer from 
feudal exploitation. Sweezy’s trade-driven external prime mover did 
not hold up in the face of Dobb’s historically and theoretically better 
informed view of feudalism as an internally dynamic system driven 
by economic growth and class conflict.
 While placing greater emphasis on internal factors, Dobb also 
considered the growth of trade a factor:
I am by no means denying that the growth of market towns and 
trade played an important role in accelerating the disintegra-
tion of the old mode of production. What I am asserting is that 
trade exercised its influence to the extent that it accentuated the 
internal conflicts within the old mode of production.26 
It was not a case of having to choose one factor to the exclusion of 
the other but rather consideration of their dialectical interaction.27 
Moreover, Dobb made more explicit than earlier that towns and 
therefore trade must be understood as internal rather than external 
to the feudal system.28
 Sweezy criticized Dobb for not signalling the existence of a 
system of pre-capitalist commodity production which was neither 
feudal nor capitalist in the wake of feudalism’s demise.29 This was 
simply not the case. Dobb had sketched out a prolonged period at 
the end of the Middle Ages in which the petty mode of production 
dominated the economy. At the same time he more strongly asserted 
his earlier stated view that the ruling class remained feudal and that 
the state continued to be its instrument in the sixteenth century.30
takahashI and hIlton
The debate on the transition was then taken up by the distinguished 
Japanese Marxist economic historian Kohachiro Takahashi.31 
Economic history and Marxism having been banned from Japan 
during the war, Takahashi’s intervention represented the renewal 
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of the ties between the re-emergent tradition of Marxist thought 
in Japan and that of Europe and the United States. Takahashi 
insisted in the first place that the debate be widened beyond the 
English case to include Continental Europe. Presciently he held out 
the prospect that such a wider debate might then illuminate the 
transition question in Asia.32
 Takahashi rejected Sweezy’s conception of feudalism as a mode of 
production for use rather than exchange. Commodities are produced 
and circulate in different modes of production including the feudal. 
In a definition of the feudal or other modes stress should be placed 
above all on how products are produced.33 As such Takahashi 
strongly supported Dobb’s view that the decline of feudalism was due 
to an internal rather than an external prime mover. But according 
to Takahashi, Dobb’s definition of feudalism was inadequate in 
that he immediately started from the abstractions of feudal landed 
property and serfdom. But just as Marx began his analysis of capital 
from the commodity, so likewise the analysis of feudalism had to 
begin from the fundamental social units of Western feudalism: the 
virgate (cottage, small plot, collective rights), the village community 
and the manor (seigneurie). It was the manor which dominated the 
other two and became the basis for the extraction of feudal rent 
and the mobilization of labour. The weakening or dissolution of 
these medieval categories entailed the decline of feudalism in the 
fourteenth and fifteenth centuries.34 Further empirical studies of the 
late medieval crisis only confirm Takahashi’s observations.35
 Takahashi’s deeply concrete analysis of the decline of feudalism 
was theorized by Rodney Hilton. This move toward theory appeared 
the more warranted as Hilton, of all the participants, was most 
versed in the concrete details of history. Throughout his career at 
Birmingham University he dedicated himself to rigorous empirical 
research in the archives. He became thoroughly familiar with 
Continental historiography on the Middle Ages and used it in 
a comparative way to illuminate his research work on England. 
Hilton was one of a quartet of British Marxist historians – including 
Christopher Hill, Edward Thompson and Eric Hobsbawm – who 
were initially close to the Communist Party of Great Britain and 
who re-founded the study of history in the English-speaking world 
during the 1950s and 1960s.36 As such Hilton had a thorough 
grounding in Marxist theory and was passionately interested in the 
transition question.
 Hilton began by questioning Sweezy’s prime mover, long-distance 
trade. Sweezy’s view was based on the so-called Pirenne thesis. 
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Henri Pirenne, the celebrated Belgian medievalist, claimed that the 
economic decline of the West coincided not with the fall of the 
Western Roman Empire but with the closure of the Mediterranean 
as a result of the Muslim occupation of the Eastern Mediterranean 
coast in the eighth century. Contrariwise the economic revival of 
Western Europe began with the reopening of the Mediterranean 
during the crusades of the eleventh century.
 Arguing against Pirenne, Hilton maintained that the decline of 
the Roman Empire in the West was the result not of the interruption 
of trade but of internal factors. The decline of commodity produc-
tion in the Empire began as a consequence of internal economic 
and demographic regression as early as the third century, hundreds 
of years before the collapse of Roman political authority, let alone 
the Arab intrusion into the Mediterranean. Likewise internal factors 
within Western Europe led to the revival of commodity production 
and markets before the onset of the crusades.37 Hilton concluded 
that the evolution of feudalism was the result of internal factors 
rather than an external prime mover.
class struggle
Hilton, like Dobb, produced a theory of the decline of feudalism 
which stressed class struggle above all.38 It was the prime mover, 
and the growth of the forces of production was its dependent vari-
able.39 As its dynamic element, class struggle between overlords and 
peasants led to the flourishing of the feudal mode of production 
and then to its decline. The nobility and princes also engaged in 
political competition with one another while striving to maximize 
their rental income. The resultant quest for increased rent at first 
stimulated technological innovation, the development of towns and 
commerce, and increases in productivity, only later contributing to 
feudalism’s decline. Among contributors to the debate, Hilton was 
the first to fully underscore the growth of the forces of production 
at feudalism’s zenith.40
 The interplay of these factors, including growing production 
for the market, led to increased social differentiation among the 
peasants. The richer peasants took more land into their holdings 
and employed more and more wage labour, which was increasingly 
that of the completely landless rather than that of smallholders. 
The better-off peasants resented the demands of lords for rent, and 
their resentment was reinforced by that of the rest of the peasants, 
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for whom such demands were not merely a restriction on economic 
expansion but an attack on their subsistence. The struggle over rent 
sharpened and reached a crisis in the fourteenth century.41
 Income from rent declined and was only partly compensated for 
by increases in state taxation, warfare and plunder, and commu-
tation of rents to money payments. Feudal rent was no longer a 
stimulus to production, and those dependent on it for income even-
tually had to look to the emerging power of the state for survival.42 
The number of tenants obliged to labour on their lord’s demesne 
and the value of rent, now paid predominantly in money, declined. 
Overall the legal claims of the lords over the persons of their tenants 
weakened.43 Money rent favoured the social stratification of the 
population of the manor into rich and poor as well as the begin-
nings of a land market.44 The holdings of the rich peasants in the 
manor expanded at the expense of the rest.45 More peasants were 
forced to resort to wage labour.46 Rich peasants and lesser nobles 
were the most efficient producers in an increasingly market-oriented 
economy, which began to take capitalist forms. With Hilton’s vivid 
demonstration of the role of class struggle both in developing the 
forces of production under feudalism and in its decline, this became, 
along with peasant social differentiation, the fundamental pivot 
around which debate on the transition would now revolve.
the role of toWns
Indeed, in Hilton’s argument, the role of towns and trade, seen by 
others such as Sweezy as an independent variable and prime mover, 
was itself the outcome of class struggle. For Hilton argued that 
the commutation of rents to money furthered the development of 
merchant capital and the growth of larger towns within the context 
of the feudal mode of production.47 Hilton’s view of the towns as 
part of the feudal system rather than as an external springboard to 
capitalism was greatly deepened by an article by John Merrington 
which appeared originally in New Left Review and was republished 
as the final contribution to the debate over The Transition from 
Feudalism to Capitalism, edited by Hilton in 1976.48 Merrington 
argued that town-based commerce facilitated the expansion of the 
feudal mode of production. The urban corporate form, although at 
times in opposition to local feudal landlords, actually functioned 
as a ‘collective seigneur’ within the cellular structure of parcellized 
sovereignty under feudalism, strengthening its economic founda-
tion as an intrinsic element of it. Feudalism was the first mode to 
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accord an autonomous structural place to urban production and 
exchange.
 Merrington completed his argument about towns and trade 
being intrinsic components of feudalism rather than external capi-
talist forces working to undermine it by denying them any role in 
the emergence of capitalism. For merchant capital did not create 
surplus value, it only redistributed it. While it played a key role in 
primitive accumulation, it could not be a source of a permanent self-
reproducing accumulation.49 For that to occur the extension of the 
market in the territorial state and the emergence of agrarian capi-
talism were necessary, and when they did emerge, urban merchant 
capital was reduced to a declining sphere of operations.50
 Merrington’s arguments were a powerful reinforcement of the 
role of class struggle and the internal logic of feudalism’s decline, 
but they may have overstated the imbrication of towns in feudalism. 
He overlooked three aspects of their role in its decline. First, the 
towns served as a potential or actual refuge for the subject rural 
population, as Dobb pointed out. Second, urban markets strength-
ened social and political links between rural producers. Finally, 
as Merrington himself noted, merchant capital played a role in 
primitive accumulation which was a necessary if not sufficient 
condition for the development of the capitalist mode of production: 
that is, the eventual entry of capital into the productive process 
itself. These aspects of the role of towns and trade could not be so 
easily dismissed, and as we shall see below, later accounts came to 
see class struggle and trade as joint factors in the rise of capitalism. 
Indeed, we shall argue that while exchange helps to maintain feudal 
relations of production, once capitalist relations are in place it is 
indispensable to the realization process.
uneven develoPment
Takahashi had pointed to the need to broaden the discussion on 
feudalism to include Continental Europe and Japan. This was part 
of a general trend in Marxism to extend the concept of feudalism in 
analyzing non-European pre-capitalist societies, rather than employing 
the problematical and Eurocentric concepts of communal and Asiatic 
modes of production. Feudalism, at least after Hilton’s intervention, 
was seen as a progressive mode capable of evolving toward capitalism, 
whereas the other two categories were seen as stagnant.
 In a deceptively simple contribution, Eric Hobsbawm helped to 
free Marxist understandings from the problems associated with 
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notions of Asiatic and communal modes of production, and recon-
nected them with ideas about uneven and combined development. 
Hobsbawm unreservedly admitted that the forces making for 
economic development in Europe were also present elsewhere in the 
world. Japanese feudalism, in particular, resembled the European 
variant closely, and it was conceivable that capitalism could have 
emerged there independently of European influence. In his view the 
intrusion of European imperialism ruptured an authentically endog-
enous process. Having raised the possibility of non-European forms 
of capitalism, Hobsbawm nonetheless insisted that the triumph of 
capitalism in Europe was unique: ‘there is no getting round the fact 
that the transition from feudalism is, on a world scale, a case of 
highly uneven development’.51
 We should note that the conception of uneven development dates 
back at least to Marx’s Grundrisse (1857–58), where unevenness 
represents the condition for a transition from one declining mode of 
production to another rising and more progressive mode. Moreover 
uneven development is a fundamental feature of the capitalist form 
of development. Its importance throughout the process of capitalist 
development cannot be overstated, and is key to understanding the 
contemporary capitalist crisis.52
  With respect to uneven development in Western Europe, 
according to Hobsbawm the crisis of feudalism involved the most 
advanced sectors of bourgeois development within Western Europe 
as well: ‘the interesting thing about the 14th century crisis … is 
not only the collapse of large-scale feudal demesne agriculture, but 
also that of the Italian and Flemish textile industries. … England 
advances; but the much greater Italy and Flanders never recover.’53 
Unevenness characterized not only the crisis of feudalism but also 
the emergence of capitalism itself. Overall European development 
from the fourteenth through the seventeenth centuries was marked 
by repeated crises in which regression in one place allowed progress 
elsewhere. West European advance came directly at the expense of 
Eastern Europe and Asia, Africa and Latin America. The process of 
West European transition entailed turning other areas into dependent 
economies and colonies. Seizing resources from advanced areas or 
later on from colonized regions became an intrinsic feature of West 
European development. In other words, the emergence of capitalism 
in Europe has to be understood in terms of an ongoing world-wide 
process of appropriation based on uneven development both within 
and outside Europe. Hobsbawm concludes that ‘the net effect of 
European capitalism was to divide the world ever more sharply into 
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two sectors: the “developed” and the “under-developed” countries, 
in other words the exploiting and the exploited.’54 Hobsbawm’s 
conception of the transition is one in which unevenness plays a 
central part. Gain in one place is invariably at the expense of other 
places, even those that were initially more developed.55 Hobsbawm’s 
sense of the dialectical quality and the unevenness of the process of 
transition is a dazzling insight, representing a significant contribu-
tion to the transition debate whose importance has even now been 
insufficiently acknowledged.
the neW left takes over
Hilton’s editing and republication of the 1950s transition debate (in 
1976) was the consequence of the revival of the dispute in the 1960s. 
But the political context was quite different. Whereas the earlier 
dispute had unfolded during the darkest days of the Cold War, its 
republication took place during the revolutionary ferment of the 
1960s and 1970s. Capitalism was deeply challenged by the Vietnam 
War, which sparked global revolt including revolutionary upheavals 
in France and Italy. Anti-imperialist revolution reached its zenith in 
the under-developed countries in the 1970s. In these years Marxist 
historical writing, especially as a result of the influence of the 
British Marxist historians, Thompson, Hill, Hobsbawm and Hilton, 
enjoyed a considerable vogue. Against this background Brenner, 
Anderson and Wallerstein published their important contributions 
to the transition debate.
 Both Brenner and Anderson assumed a Eurocentric posture. 
While Brenner was adamantly Eurocentric, Anderson at least made 
an attempt to widen the discussion of feudalism beyond Europe by 
including Japan, as we shall see. But Anderson’s contention that the 
inheritance of Rome was essential to the existence of feudalism in 
the first place and to the eventual crystallization of the capitalist 
notion of private property definitively placed him in the Eurocentric 
camp.56 Meanwhile Wallerstein adopted what he called a world-
systems approach, which attempted to view the development of 
European capitalism from a perspective which included the under-
developed countries. With the exception of Takahashi’s brief plea 
for a perspective beyond Europe, endorsed and elaborated through 
his invocation of uneven and combined development by Hobsbawm, 
the earlier phase of discussion of the transition question had scarcely 
touched on the non-European world. The fact that Anderson, 
and especially Wallerstein, found it incumbent on them to discuss 
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capitalist origins in a non-European context undoubtedly reflects 
the growing impact of Asia, Africa and Latin America on Western 
scholarship in the radical 1960s and 1970s.
JaPanese feudalIsm
Hilton’s republication of the original transition debate itself inspired 
a broadening of the discussion. A French translation of the English 
text was published by the radical publisher François Maspero 
(1977) alongside a companion volume which included an extensive 
discussion of the transition in Japan by Takahashi.57 Like many 
other scholars, Takahashi believed that Japanese feudalism closely 
approximated that of the West, and that like the Western version, 
its transition to capitalism was a matter of internal evolution, 
not, as was usually assumed of non-European cases, due to an 
external prime mover, in this case Western imperialism. The 
Meiji Restoration, or so-called capitalist revolution from above, 
may have been inspired by the threat from the West. However, 
Takahashi argued, its possibility and form were determined by the 
internal evolution of Japanese feudalism. The historical priority of 
Western capitalism could not be gainsaid, argued Takahashi, but its 
uniqueness, as argued by Hobsbawm, could.
 Takahashi notably attributed the top-down nature of Japanese 
capitalism to the resilience of its feudalism. While capitalism was 
breaking through in the West, the feudal regime consolidated or 
reconsolidated itself as the Tokugawa Shogunate in the seven-
teenth century on the basis of extremely heavy rents-in-kind and 
personal serfdom. The aspirations of the petty producers in Japan 
were crushed by the weight of feudal rent and the development 
of usury. On the other hand, these burdens on the peasants 
stimulated increased commercialization of the surplus. As a result, proto- 
capitalist manufacturing and agriculture, including some wage labour 
directed by small manufacturers and middle peasants, emerged in the 
countryside prior to the opening of Japan to the West. On the other 
hand, Takahashi stressed the dominant economic power of the urban 
merchants and financiers, who operated on the basis of their close 
dependency on the feudal state and great landlord magnates. Centralized 
collection of revenue made possible a high degree of commercialization 
and urbanization as well as an extreme level of peasant exploitation. 
On the eve of the Meiji Restoration, middle peasants and small manu-
facturers began to enter into opposition to the merchant and financial 
monopolists tied to feudal magnates in a way reminiscent of the 
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revolutions in England and France. Over-exploitation by landlords led 
to increasing misery and ultimately population decline. The country fell 
into an increasingly severe demographic and economic crisis which set 
the stage for the overthrow of the Tokugawa Shogunate. Yet Japanese 
feudalism proved much more durable than that of the states of the 
West, and its resilience fundamentally determined the nature of the 
capitalism that did emerge.
 Takahashi’s insistence on the profundity of the economic and 
demographic crisis and the polarization of Japanese society between 
the proto-capitalist and peasant opposition, on the one hand, and 
the resistance of its feudal and big merchant supporters on the other, 
has been confirmed overall by subsequent research. Legal serfdom 
in the sense of personal dependence appears to have been less 
prevalent than in medieval Europe, although economic exploitation 
was at least as severe. In fact, though initial advances made early 
Tokugawa Japan compare favourably with France under the Ancien 
Régime, over-exploitation created food shortages, peasant revolts 
and population decline. They engulfed the Shogunate in the last 
decades of its existence. Popular and proto-capitalist revolt proved 
essential to catalyzing a modernizing political elite to dismantle the 
institutions of the feudal regime while preserving the essence of 
landlord power over the peasantry. But revolt from below funda-
mentally failed to transform the feudal Japanese social and political 
order.58 Decentralized military power was broken but landlords 
continued to control their tenants socially and economically. The 
political and economic freedom of the bulk of producers remained 
fundamentally constrained. As a consequence it was the state rather 
than the petty producers that was to take the lead in capitalist 
development. For Takahashi, contrary to Eurocentric prejudice, 
the intrusion of the West was merely a catalyst which set off what 
was already the internal evolution of Japan toward capitalism. 
But despite Takahashi’s analysis Eurocentrism reasserted itself in a 
sophisticated and nuanced way through the intervention of Perry 
Anderson. Anderson dealt with Japanese feudalism in a long note or 
appendix added to his Lineages of the Absolutist State.59 He agreed 
with Takahashi that feudalism set the stage for a capitalist take-off 
and that the parallels between Japanese and Western feudalism 
were striking. Anderson underscored the gains in the productivity 
of Japanese feudal agriculture in the seventeenth century. The eigh-
teenth century, while less dynamic, was still marked by increased 
commercialization, including the spread of cash crops like sugar, 
cotton, tea, indigo and tobacco. The urban merchant class expanded 
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and became more influential while the cities grew prodigiously. 
Educational and literacy levels were as high as or higher than in 
the West. Indeed, the potential for capitalist development once a 
breakthrough occurred was enormous. However, Anderson rejects 
Takahashi’s suggestion that Japan could have liquidated feudalism 
through the power of its own internal contradictions. An external 
prime mover was required, which arrived with the abrupt intrusion 
of American imperialism.
 For, Anderson argues, although the conspicuous consumption 
of the elites set the stage for a major fiscal and economic crisis by 
the beginning of the nineteenth century, the Shogunate was not in 
danger of being overthrown from within. The isolation of Japan 
from the world market fundamentally blocked its evolution from 
feudalism toward capitalism. Citing Lenin, Anderson stressed that 
no country became capitalist without linking itself to the global 
market, a fundamental theme in Anderson’s broader narrative of the 
absolutist state mediating the historical transitional phase between 
the crisis of feudalism and the rise of capitalism. It was the intrusion 
of Western trade following the Commodore Perry’s expedition that 
destabilized the feudal regime and led to the Meiji Restoration.
 Though this is hardly definitive proof of Anderson’s Eurocentric 
arguments, late Tokugawa Japan, though racked by internal contra-
dictions, did not explode of itself. Eurocentrism aside, however, 
Anderson’s view of Japan has wider theoretical resonances. They 
suggest that between Dobb’s internal prime mover and Sweezy’s 
external prime mover, Anderson favours the latter. Or better, he is 
arguing that for capitalism to develop, connections to the world 
market and an appropriate set of social relations of production are 
both necessary. Anderson’s is a fundamentally dialectical view of 
capitalist origins. This Marxist methodology is manifest likewise in 
his overall view of the relationship between the relations of produc-
tion and trade, and above all in his discussion of the origins of the 
state. As we shall see below, the latter is seen simultaneously as the 
last redoubt of feudalism and the indispensable framework for the 
development of capitalism.
  As for the Japanese example, it makes evident that the commer-
cial and economic potential of the feudal mode of production in 
general needs to be taken into account more than it has been.60 
On the other hand, it also suggests that feudal territorial division, 
lack of secure property rights, and above all, isolation from world 
trade may block the further evolution of merchant capitalism and a 
transition to capitalism.
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the last ramPart of feudalIsm
Anderson’s Lineages of the Absolutist State reflected extraordinary 
mastery of the historiography of the transition. Anderson was, of 
course, the editor of the New Left Review, the influential journal of 
the English-speaking left intelligentsia. His interest in the transition 
question is but one of an incredible range of political and cultural 
interests, and his theoretical insight and erudition have arguably 
made him the leading Marxist intellectual of this generation.
 As we have noted, Anderson conceded the homology between 
European and Japanese feudalism. Once opened to the global 
market Japan rapidly made the transition to capitalism. But, for 
Anderson, only Western European feudalism could have created 
capitalism. Anderson’s view of feudalism and its demise combines 
an emphasis on class struggle with recognition of the importance 
of exchange relations. The emergence of the territorial state and 
the global market both provided indispensable foundations for 
capitalism. In feudalism the peasant producer was tied to the land 
by being legally bound to the soil as a serf. Agrarian property was 
privately controlled by a class of feudal lords who extracted a 
surplus in the form of rent from peasants by political-legal or extra-
economic coercion.61 These social relations provided the setting for 
a dramatic increase in productivity during the High Middle Ages.62 
In contrast to Dobb and Hilton, however, Anderson stresses the 
objective exhaustion of the possibility of further advances in the 
forces of production as the source of the feudal crisis, rather than 
over-exploitation of the producers. Population increased, forcing 
the clearing of increasingly marginal land, while necessary invest-
ments in improving the productivity of existing tillage were not 
undertaken.63 The subsequent economic crisis provoked widespread 
peasant revolts which were everywhere defeated in the short term. 
In the longer run the income and wages of the peasantry improved 
and serfdom declined.64
 Anderson also insisted, more than any other previous participant 
in the debate save Sweezy, on the important role of the towns to this 
outcome. Urban commercial networks tended to destabilize feudal 
social relations. Towns served as potential refuges for runaway serfs 
as well as allies in peasant revolts. Indeed, the most significant rural 
revolts were located close to towns.65 In the long term the noble 
lords’ need for commodities produced in the towns led them to 
commute labour services into money rents and to lease out demesne 
to peasant tenants. In England in the fifteenth century serfdom 
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virtually disappeared and peasant incomes rose. Social differentia-
tion increased in the villages, as a stratum of rich peasants emerged 
at the top and wage labour spread in the countryside. Anderson 
directly addressed the Dobb–Sweezy debate in a long footnote in the 
opening chapter of his Lineages of the Absolutist State.66 For him it 
was not a case of choosing between rural social relations of produc-
tion and commercial-trade relations but of their relative weight and 
dialectical inter-relationship. Indeed, based on Merrington, Anderson 
acknowledged that trade was intrinsic to the feudal mode.67
 Dobb had already suggested that the early modern state was above 
all designed to defend the nobility, and Anderson provided a conclu-
sive demonstration of this thesis. The end of serfdom did not bring 
feudalism to an end. The consolidation of the territorial monarchies 
at the end of the Middle Ages in fact represented ‘a redeployed and 
recharged apparatus of feudal domination, designed to clamp the 
peasant masses back into their traditional social position’.68 The 
class power of the nobility, which was put in question as a result of 
the disappearance of serfdom, was displaced upwards and central-
ized into the hands of the new territorial monarchies, which became 
the principal instruments for the maintenance of noble domina-
tion over the peasantry. Moreover, in so far as nobles blocked the 
emergence of a free market in land and peasants retained access to 
their means of subsistence, feudal relations persisted.69 Nonetheless, 
in England and elsewhere in Western Europe the emergence of the 
territorial state created a space essential for the further progression 
of the urban-based bourgeoisie. In the medieval period political and 
economic control had been combined. With the appearance of the 
territorial state in the early modern period, political power began 
to be separated from immediate control over the economy, allowing 
capitalist forces to emerge. The political order remained feudal while 
society under its aegis became more bourgeois.70
 Anderson sees the emerging territorial state as having a dual 
determination:
the threat of peasant unrest, unspokenly constitutive of the 
Absolutist State, was thus always conjoined with the pressure 
of mercantile or manufacturing capital within the Western 
economies as a whole, in moulding the contours of aristocratic 
class power in the new age.71
For all that the development of the territorial state bolstered feudalism, 
it also provided an enlarged political space within which capitalism 
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could develop. In such a space lay the market. Just as Merrington saw 
the medieval market as intrinsic to the seigneurial regime, Anderson 
insists that the capitalist market was a creation of the territorial state 
and almost as much a political as an economic institution.
 Anderson’s insight into the role of the state is critical to under-
standing the transition. Moreover, like his formulation of the 
relationship between relations of production and those of exchange, 
one must underline the importance of the fact that he grasps the 
nature of the state in a dialectical way. He demonstrates that the 
state both saved feudalism and incubated capitalism within itself. It 
is within the state that the transition is possible in the first place.
brenner and the late medIeval crIsIs
Beginning with Dobb, scholars separated the period of the decline 
of feudalism from the period of the rise of capitalism. Dobb and 
Sweezy, chief protagonists in the initial debate, both acknowledged 
the existence of an intermediate period prior to the emergence of 
capitalism, in which a weakened feudalism gave greater freedom 
to petty producers prior to the emergence of capitalism. Moreover, 
most of the participants in the debate, while stressing one or another 
factor leading to the transition, nonetheless tended to acknowledge 
a multiplicity of causes. Dobb, Hilton and Anderson stressed the 
vital importance of class struggle in the decline of feudalism. But 
Brenner took the importance of agrarian class struggle a step further, 
arguing that as it unfolded in England in the late Middle Ages, it 
not only destroyed feudalism but created a path leading directly 
to the emergence of capitalism. In taking this view Brenner largely 
abolished the conceptual and chronological divide between the 
decline of feudalism and the origins of capitalism.72 
  Brenner is a historian at UCLA who began his scholarly career as 
a student of early modern England. With roots in a radical family, 
he became politically active in the 1960s in the Trotskyist movement 
in the United States and is currently an editor of a leading Marxist 
journal, Against the Current. While maintaining his interest in the 
transition problem, he has become recognized as a leading analyst 
of the current capitalist crisis through the publication of The 
Boom and the Bubble: The U.S. in the World Economy (2002).73 
For his PhD he produced a magisterial thesis, Merchants and 
Revolution: Commercial Change, Political Conflict, and London’s 
Overseas Traders, 1550–1653, which while not bearing on the 
end of feudalism debate, proved important to the controversy on 
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the English Revolution.74 It is a work founded on deep primary 
research. His conception of the transition, like that of most of those 
involved in the transition debate, is simply based on a close reading 
of the current historiography.
 His view of the transition question is informed theoretically by 
the influence of analytical Marxism, a school of thought which 
was prominent in the 1980s and to which Brenner subscribed. 
It has recently been shown that analytical philosophy as a whole 
was a product of the 1950s Cold War, which saw Anglo-American 
philosophy sever all ties with Continental philosophy, transforming 
itself into a politically disengaged professional discipline preoccu-
pied with constituting a formal model of knowledge.75 Born in the 
midst of the waning of Marxism in the 1980s, analytical Marxism 
purported to salvage whatever could be saved by applying the 
same techniques of formal logic to Marxism. Committed to a 
positivist logic, this approach rejected a dialectical sense of totality, 
movement and contradiction to its own cost.76 Brenner’s view 
of the transition is fundamentally weakened by this constraining 
methodology.
the east–West dIvIde
Dobb and Hilton had already made the late medieval population 
collapse and ensuing class conflicts central to their conception of the 
crisis in England and elsewhere in Europe. In Brenner’s view such 
conflicts arose from a crisis of peasant accumulation, productivity 
and ultimately subsistence provoked by over-exploitation. Excessive 
landlord exploitation and the inherent conservatism of the peasant 
mode of production placed definite limits on the productivity of 
peasant agriculture. As Dobb and Hilton had argued, Brenner 
stressed that landlords used extra-economic coercion to extract 
more and more surplus from the producers. More originally he 
demonstrated the inherent economic limitations of the peasant 
economic mode within the constraints of the medieval manor. The 
economic objectives of peasants within the bounds of the manor 
were not to improve their holdings, maximize output or deepen their 
relation to the market, but rather to ensure the reproduction of the 
family unit. As a result a definite limit was imposed on economic 
growth. In the ensuing crisis the survival of the mass of producers 
was put into question. Following the demographic collapse of the 
fourteenth century, intense class struggles revolved around the issue 
of serfdom and the control of land. The outcome of these struggles 
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in the different parts of Europe depended on varying historical and 
social circumstances.77
 Brenner denied that trade or towns were important in the 
transition. Indeed, he rejected the idea that the towns in any way 
contributed to the dissolution of feudalism.78 On the contrary, it was 
the development of rural networks of solidarity and cooperation that 
was important to the varying outcomes of the late medieval class 
struggles, notably between West and East Europe.79 For some reason 
the relation of such networks to the existence or not of urban-based 
trade is not considered by Brenner as it had been by Hilton and 
Anderson. In Eastern Europe the weakness of the peasantries faced 
with landlord power led to the imposition of serfdom. In the class 
struggles in France, in contrast, the peasantry not only consolidated 
its free status but was able to hold onto land and rights into the 
early modern period. Surplus extraction sufficient to maintain the 
nobility transferred itself from the local to a higher level through the 
crystallization of the territorial state.80 Whereas local rents withered, 
royal taxes were employed to benefit the warrior and court nobility, 
amounting to a new system of centralized rent. The feudal system 
was perpetuated as a result.
the logIc of accumulatIon
England represented a third way that led to agrarian capitalism. 
Peasants were able to win personal freedom but were less successful 
in the class struggle than their French counterparts. As a result 
English nobles were able to hold onto most of the cultivable land, 
and from the late fifteenth century onward, they began to rent this 
land to rich farmers on terms which favoured enhanced rents based 
on growing profits. According to Brenner, ‘with the peasants’ failure 
to establish essentially freehold control over the land, the landlords 
were able to engross, consolidate and enclose, to create large farms 
and to lease them to capitalist tenants who could afford to make 
capital investments’.81 Unlike medieval peasants, capitalist tenants 
needed to improve productivity in order to meet landlords’ demands 
for higher rents, and in turn, to obtain higher rents landlords found 
themselves advancing capital to tenants in order to improve output. 
An economic logic of accumulation was initiated. On this basis there 
emerged the classic tripartite division of landlord/capitalist tenants/
wage labourers which transformed English agriculture in a capitalist 
direction.82
 Brenner underlined the rupture between the logic of this new 
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order and the old feudal order. In feudalism both the exploiting 
landlords and peasant producers had direct access to the means 
of reproducing their existence: that is, land for the peasants, rent 
for the landlords. In pursuit of their subsistence, the goal of the 
peasants was to produce as much of their needs from the land as 
they could without resort to the market. In the heyday of feudalism 
labour rents or rents-in-kind provided for the maintenance of the 
landlords. Consequently both classes were spared the necessity of 
buying what they needed to reproduce themselves on the market, 
and therefore the need to produce for exchange or to sell competi-
tively. They were not required to cut costs and therefore to improve 
production through innovation, specialization and accumulation. 
Whatever innovations there might have been were absorbed into 
the way of life of the peasant class, which was based largely on 
economic subsistence. The new relationships between landlords and 
proto-capitalist tenants at the end of the Middle Ages broke this 
traditional logic of social reproduction and imposed another based 
on cumulative economic growth.83
 One can only applaud Brenner’s insistence that class struggles 
in the countryside were decisive to the fall of feudalism and transi-
tion to capitalism. It lent rigor to a perspective previously taken 
by Dobb and Hilton. In conformity with the views of the latter, 
Brenner’s relations of production or social property relations 
approach especially targeted Sweezy and what Brenner dubbed his 
‘neo-Smithian’ insistence on the importance of trade.84 It also took 
aim at the neo-Malthusian historical school exemplified in the work 
of Michael Postan and Emmanuel Le Roy Ladurie. They argued 
that the decline of population accounted for the disintegration of 
feudalism. However, subsequent exchanges published in the Brenner 
Debate (1985) amply confirmed the strength of Brenner’s endog-
enous perspective on population. He conceded that in the absence 
of technological change, the ratio of land to labour determined 
the upswings and downswings of the population. But for him this 
argument reinforced the centrality of class relations. They set the 
parameters of demographic cycles and ultimately helped to burst 
through their limits.85
boIs obJects
Critics of Brenner attacked on the one hand his over-emphasis on 
class, and on the other his misunderstanding of late medieval class 
relations. As against his one-sided insistence on the determining 
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influence of class struggle, they insisted on the importance of a 
forces of production approach which understood the dialectical 
relationship between class capacity and the forces of production 
(material as well as non-material) at the command of a class. Class 
struggle remains at the focal point of their view of the decline of 
feudalism. But their conception of class is broader and more deeply 
situated in material reality than Brenner’s.
 The French medieval historian Guy Bois was the first to voice 
such objections to Brenner’s view of feudalism’s demise. In The 
Brenner Debate Bois expressed scepticism over Brenner’s rather 
schematic emphasis on economic class while insisting on the impor-
tance of the forces of production perspective, understood as the 
material and non-material resources at the disposition of a class. 
Bois calls Brenner’s perspective a kind of ‘political Marxism’ which 
reacts against economistic tendencies in historiography by stressing 
political and social agency. Bois acknowledged that Brenner’s 
injection of strong doses of class struggle into his account was 
commendable, and that it had been ignored in the past. However, 
he objected to the sketchy and overly ideological manner in which 
Brenner introduced such conceptions. He called it a voluntarist view 
of history divorced from all other objective contingencies and from 
laws of development specific to a particular mode of production.86 
In other words, Bois complained that Brenner’s view is based on too 
superficial a view of the economic history of the medieval period and 
of the dynamics of its mode of production.
 Bois insisted, for example, that the medieval hierarchical network 
of markets based on small and large towns could not be separated 
from the development of the seigneurie or manor, as Brenner would 
have it. The market, according to Bois, developed coincidentally 
with and was dependent on the system of manors or seigneuries:
the market is in no way an entity which is foreign to feudal 
society: its introduction, or rather its development, is linked with 
the introduction of new seigneurial structures and … the market 
played a central role in the development of medieval society.87
Indeed, the medieval market was not simply an autonomous economic 
mechanism which peasants entered or withdrew from at will, as 
pictured by Brenner. It was in part a coercive institution through 
which peasant surplus was extracted and commercialized by landlords 
using merchants as intermediaries.88 This insight of Bois’s that 
markets were not strictly economic entities but also had a coercive or 
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political aspect is of critical importance to an understanding of both 
the feudal and capitalist modes of production.
 With regard to the decline of feudalism, furthermore, Bois 
asserts that feudalism declined because of the tendency of rents to 
fall, which resulted from the structural contradiction of large-scale 
property and small-scale production. The dominant class was unable 
to maintain the economic base of its hegemony because there was 
an erosion of the productivity of family labour on the increasingly 
small patches of arable land as a result of population growth.89 Bois 
emphasizes the importance of the blockage of the forces of produc-
tion in setting off the late feudal crisis. At the same time, beyond 
the realm of economy which preoccupies Brenner, Bois stresses the 
many-sided nature of the late medieval crisis – political, religious, 
cultural – reflected as a crisis of values but also of class conflict. 
Writing in 2000, he insisted on and indeed demonstrated the simi-
larities between the crisis of feudalism and the current crisis of the 
capitalist system.90
harman’s rIPoste
Brenner’s view has become dominant at least in the world of English-
speaking Marxist academics, and some of Brenner’s followers have 
proudly accepted the label ‘Political Marxism’ and constituted 
themselves into a veritable school based on his approach.91 More 
recently, Chris Harman has engaged with Brenner and his followers 
by insisting, like Bois, on the importance of the forces of produc-
tion, in opposition to Brenner’s emphasis on class.92 The recently 
deceased Harman, a Trotskyist militant since the upheavals of the 
1960s, was long the political and intellectual leader of the influen-
tial British Socialist Workers Party. Harman was an acknowledged 
authority on Marxist crisis theory, played a leading role in trans-
forming the International Socialism Journal into an authoritative 
intellectual and political journal, and authored the monumental and 
enduring A People’s History of the World.93
 Harman insisted that the social capacity of a class depends on the 
productive forces that undergird it. Such forces include the material, 
intellectual and political resources at its disposition. The capacity of a 
class to change the social relations of production depends on its ability 
to mobilize such resources. Historic change occurs when the existing 
social relations block the further development of the forces of produc-
tion. In Harman’s view Brenner turns these relationships upside 
down, subordinating the forces of production to the determination 
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of class relations. At the same time Brenner’s rejection of the dialectic 
makes him take an excessively economistic view of class.
 Harman insists on the increases in the productivity of agriculture 
in the High Middle Ages both in England and on the European 
Continent. Agricultural surpluses were marketed in the towns, 
manufactures were consumed not merely by nobles but also by 
peasants and townspeople, and commercial ties between producers 
in town and country were strengthened. Wage labour began to 
be employed on a limited basis by incipient capitalists. Social 
differentiation among the peasantry strengthened these tendencies.
 The late medieval crisis affirmed rather than annulled these 
economic and social advances of the twelfth and thirteenth centuries. 
During that period of difficulty the lead in opposition to the nobles 
was taken by those peasants and craftspeople who were most in 
command of the forces of production that had developed in the 
previous period of prosperity. In other words, Harman considers the 
social upheavals of the fourteenth century throughout Western Europe 
to be a proto-capitalist revolution brought on by the development of 
the forces of production in the High Middle Ages and their fettering 
by the persistence of feudal relations. According to Harman, the 
religious heresies, new cultural movements and revolutionary social 
movements of the late Middle Ages were important factors in the 
decline of feudalism, but find no place in Brenner’s economistic and 
point of production perspective.94 Harman concludes that Brenner’s 
approach ‘may be “class struggle” Marxism, but it is class struggle 
without any element of class consciousness determining its outcome. 
Its focus is not really on politics at all, but on purely economic 
struggles confined to the countryside.’95 We might add that whereas 
Brenner’s notion of the intrinsically conservative peasant behaviour 
might appertain under conditions where feudalism was a stable 
system, he fails to address changes in peasant behaviour under 
conditions where feudalism was in the process of disintegrating. 
In point of fact the late medieval disintegration of the economic 
and social controls of the feudal manor helped to create more 
opportunistic economic attitudes among prosperous peasants.
 Brenner denies Harman’s view that either the expansion of the 
forces of production or commercialization led to the emergence 
of an incipient class of enterprising agricultural and urban proto- 
capitalists. While the peasants won their personal freedom, late 
medieval class struggle allowed the English landlords to retain 
and extend their control of the major part of the arable sector. 
Capitalism and a new class of rural capitalists emerged from above, 
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with the establishment by landlords of commercial leases let out to 
prosperous tenant farmers. At stake in this disagreement is whether 
capitalism was an economic project emerging from the feudal ruling 
class, as Brenner would have it, or was rather an initiative which 
emerged from below as a result of an across-the-board struggle 
against feudalism, as Harman argues. If we are to believe Brenner, 
late medieval changes in social-property relations determined the 
onset of capitalism in the sixteenth century. But there is no histor-
ical warrant for seeing the development of the capitalist mode in 
merely socio-economic terms, and especially not those outlined by 
Brenner, in which continued landlord domination remains key. The 
establishment of capitalist leases by landlords, rather than being 
the driving force behind rural capitalism, appears to have been a 
belated response to the emergence of a class of capitalist farmers 
in a long-term process which cannot be comprehended in terms of 
the persistence of landlord power in a market economy. The trans-
formation of a whole society and culture cannot be reduced to such 
a presumed single first cause. Brenner nonetheless insists on the 
emergence of capitalist social property relations which determined 
the development of capitalism from the fourteenth century.
the role of socIal dIfferentIatIon
A recent article published by Terence J. Byres powerfully reinforces 
Harman’s viewpoint.96 Byres himself is a scholar of Indian history 
and Marxist political economy. Long an influential figure at that 
focal point of third world Marxism, the University of London’s 
School of Oriental and African Studies, he was the major force 
behind the creation of both the Journal of Peasant Studies in the 
1970s and the new periodical, the Journal of Agrarian Change. As 
he proudly declares, he was heavily influenced by Hilton in studying 
Indian agriculture. Indeed, his article attacking Brenner is based on 
the closest possible scrutiny of Hilton’s works. Prior to invoking 
Hilton against Brenner, Byres produced Capitalism from Above 
and Capitalism from Below (1996), a great work of comparative 
history heavily focused on peasant social differentiation and based 
on Lenin’s Development of Capitalism in Russia (1899).97 We will 
examine Byres’s tome later. Hilton we have seen is celebrated as a 
historian of the medieval English peasantry whose publications were 
at one and the same time steeped in archival research and informed 
by Marxist theory. It is this body of work that Byres has carefully 
analyzed and brought to bear especially against Brenner’s view of 
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the roots of capitalist origins. Whereas Brenner minimized social 
differentiation within the medieval peasantry, stressing its homo-
geneity as a class, Byres makes the differentiation of the peasant 
class the linchpin of his notion of capitalist development:
So, rather than suggesting that it was the leases that brought 
about the necessary class formation … which is what Brenner 
appears to argue (that it was the lords who were the essential 
agents – that the causality ran from the lords), might one not 
suggest a causality running in quite the opposite direction: that 
it was the rich peasantry that forced the pace, rather than the 
landlords: that, indeed, one cannot grasp the nature of the 
eventual transition without reference to the differentiation of the 
peasantry?98
In the thirteenth century, if not before, the peasantry were internally 
divided between rich, middle and poor elements. Rich peasants had 
more livestock and land, and often worked for the lords as bailiffs, 
stewards and rent collectors, helping the lords maintain control of 
the bulk of the peasants. Contrary to Brenner’s notion of an essential 
equality among medieval peasants, the better-off peasants’ enforce-
ment of legal-political control over the remainder of the peasantry on 
behalf of the nobility amounted to economic control over them. The 
power of the rich peasants increased during the thirteenth century 
as they were able to market part of their agricultural surplus and 
purchase the labour of poor peasants and incipient wage earners. 
Their ability to produce surpluses had been enhanced by previous 
gains in productivity or improvements in the forces of production. 
In the late medieval crisis their power grew alongside that of the 
rest of the peasantry in relation to the nobles, as rents and personal 
servitude declined and more land became available for purchase.
 The crisis reduced the numbers of poor peasants and wage 
earners, limiting the ability of better-off peasants at this stage to hire 
labour. It was the middle peasants whose numbers and incomes rose 
most notably during this period. But from the late fifteenth century 
onward it was rich peasants who came to the fore, benefiting in 
particular from the cheap labour increasingly available as a result 
of the demographic recovery. This was a process which occurred 
across the face of Western Europe but assumed decisive significance 
in England. As we have noted, Brenner stressed the offering of 
economic leases by landlords to prosperous farmers as integral to 
capitalist beginnings. But he said nothing about where the farmers 
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able to take up such leases came from. According to Byres, such 
farmers were the product of previous social differentiation and 
especially the period of feudal disintegration. They then became the 
prime movers of sixteenth-century capitalism, which was based on 
the dispossession of a growing mass of peasants and their subjection 
to the emerging power of rural capital. This account seems to be 
consonant with Harman’s notion of the emergence of a class of rural 
proto-capitalists in the late medieval crisis in a position to command 
new forces of production.
 Byres, Harman and Bois do not underestimate the importance 
of class struggle to the decline of feudalism. They stress rather 
that the outcome of such struggles must be related to the level 
of development of the forces of production. In its turn, the level 
reached by the forces of production under the command of a given 
class determines the capacity of that class for leadership in class 
conflict.99 Brenner had seen the peasantry as more than willing to 
engage in class struggle against landlords in the late medieval crisis 
but also, being essentially peasants, unwilling thereafter to seize new 
economic possibilities opened by the decline of feudalism. Peasants 
engaged in market activity, but only in so far as did not endanger 
the subsistence family household. Only an upper stratum of this 
class was forced out of passivity by the imposition of competitive 
rents by the landlords at the beginning of the sixteenth century. It is 
the logic of accumulation imposed from the outside in the form of 
these competitive rents which initiates capitalism. Byres, expanding 
on Hilton’s view and opposing Brenner, sees the peasantry as socially 
combative and its upper stratum as the active base of an emerging 
capitalist class eager to seek opportunity in the market. Opportunity 
presented itself in the late medieval crisis with the disintegration of 
the restrictions of feudalism. Increasingly freed from the constraints 
of the decaying manor, rich peasants sought economic opportunity 
by acquiring access to more land, marketing increasing amounts 
of livestock and grain, and employing increasing amounts of wage 
labour. The enclosures of the sixteenth century transformed this 
impulse into capitalist accumulation.
 As a parenthesis to the above discussion we should note that 
the question of the role of the petty producers in capitalism has 
implications beyond their destiny in the late Middle Ages or 
sixteenth century in Europe. Peasant farmers and craftspeople did 
not disappear with the full emergence of capitalism, as is suggested 
by the above discussion. They have continued to be an important 
social group within Europe and in the rest of the world, constituting 
heller maintext.indd   49 6/7/2011   11:50:55 AM
50 t h e b i rt h o f  c a p i ta l i s m
and reconstituting themselves right up to the present. Indeed, the 
present crisis of capitalist agriculture has led to the re-emergence of 
movements in many countries attempting to revive the peasantry as 
the basis for a sustainable agriculture. Hence the class nature of this 
group continues to be a matter of some political moment.
 Earlier analyses tended to view the peasantry from the perspective 
of capitalist or socialist modernization, in which they were regarded 
as a dated social anomaly. Ernesto Laclau argued in the 1970s, for 
example, that they form part of an archaic set of social relations 
which blocked the emergence of a fully developed capitalism in 
the under-developed countries and facilitated the export of surplus 
within global imperialism.100 On the other hand, Jairus Banaji, who 
was more sympathetic, argued that rural petty producers were really 
disguised proletarians even in the absence of a real accumulation of 
capital.101 In other words Banaji tries to rehabilitate the peasantry 
by reclassifying them as part of the proletarian class. Neither 
Laclau nor Banaji are able to perceive the peasantry in terms of the 
future viability of an enhanced subsistence economy. In any case in 
the light of our view of capitalism, which sees both wage labour 
and the ongoing entry of capital into production as indispensable 
components of the capitalist mode, Banaji’s view appears dubious 
under the constraints of imperialism. The role of such rural petty 
producers might be quite different in a socialist economy. In such 
circumstances a revived peasant economy could help to absorb the 
constantly expanding global lumpenproletariat and constitute one 
essential part of a sustainable agriculture.
dIalectIcs of socIal relatIons
As we have seen, the initial debate on the transition focused on 
whether the prime mover in the long decline of feudalism was long-
range trade or factors internal to the feudal system. The outcome of 
the dispute was a nearly unanimous consensus that the exhaustion of 
feudalism from within, especially as the result of class struggle, was 
critical to its decline. The subsequent debate centred on Brenner’s 
view that class struggle alone was critical not only to feudalism’s 
decline but also to setting the stage for the beginning of capitalism. 
According to him, changes in the social relations of production 
unique to England, giving control of the land to the landlords but 
depriving them of control of persons, determined that they would 
attempt to gain control of future surplus by instituting competitive 
leases and encouraging primitive accumulation.
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 In contrast to Brenner’s economistic and class-determinist method 
we have insisted that the importance of the economic and social must 
be understood in the light of a dialectical perspective. Economic and 
social factors have their part as elements of a contradictory totality 
in which culture and politics have a role. Of course we accept the 
notion that changes in the social relations of production were critical 
to the demise of feudalism. But when it comes to the origins of 
capitalism, I reject Brenner’s notion that it was English landlords 
who played the major role in the origins of capitalism in the face 
of the economic passivity of the peasant producers. Rather than 
landlords being decisive to the inception of capitalism, I have made 
the importance of the late medieval social differentiation of the 
producers a central theme of my conception. In the new economic 
circumstances of the sixteenth century, the petty producers would 
increasingly divide into rural capitalist producers and wage workers. 
The revolts of the rural and urban petty producers against feudalism 
reflected not merely their social combativeness but their economic 
and even religious aspirations as well. They were neither socially 
nor economically passive as pictured by Brenner. The class capacity 
of these producers must not be taken for granted but be seen as 
a product of the previous medieval development of the forces of 
production.
 The early emergence of capitalism, furthermore, cannot be under-
stood as an exclusively English affair, but must be seen in terms of 
Western Europe as a whole. The struggle against feudalism and the 
development of capitalist relations appeared across Western Europe 
at the end of the Middle Ages. In order to fully grasp the specific 
conditions which allowed capitalism fully to crystallize in England, 
its development in Italy and elsewhere on the European Continent 
should be traced and brought into comparison with the English 
example.
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exPerIments In caPItalIsm: 
Italy, germany, france
The purpose of this chapter is to demonstrate that capitalism’s 
beginnings cannot be understood by looking at the isolated case 
of England. Capitalism – from the start a single system – actually 
began in Italy, spread to Germany and then to Holland and France. 
England was the last stop in this progress. Using the examples of 
Italy, Germany and France, which have been largely ignored in 
the transition debate, this chapter shows that many of the factors 
leading to the development of capitalism in England and Holland 
were also present in these countries. The key difference between 
these countries, where the development of capitalism was arrested 
or limited, and England and Holland lay in the balance of power 
between capital, the state and feudal power. Italy failed to consoli-
date a territorial state because of the too great strength of merchant 
capital, while in Germany and France feudalism proved too strong. 
Our study of these cases will demonstrate that, in addition to 
the economic conditions stressed by Brenner, two political condi-
tions were critical to the successful development of capitalism: the 
existence of a territorial state, and the influence of capitalist or 
incipiently capitalist classes over the state. The faltering of capi-
talism in Italy, Germany and France sheds light on the importance of 
the more propitious political conditions which obtained in Holland 
as well as in England. And capitalism, being a single system which 
developed in an uneven fashion, meant that its eventual consolida-
tion in Holland and England came at the expense of its further 
development elsewhere in Europe. The proper way of conceiving of 
capitalism’s origins is thus through a series of experiments which 
finally had their successful dénouement in these two states.
 Brenner’s insistence in his early work that capitalism developed 
more or less exclusively in England is certainly contrary to Marx’s 
views. He saw capitalism as a global or globalizing system of which 
Continental Europe was a part. The earliest process of capitalism, 
the expropriation of the peasantry, took place across Western 
Europe. Marx described it in Volume One of Capital: 
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the proletariat created by the breaking up of the bands of the 
feudal retainers and by the forcible expropriation of the people 
from the soil, this ‘free’ proletariat could not possibly be absorbed 
by the nascent manufactures as fast as it was thrown upon the 
world. … They were turned en masse into beggars, robbers, 
vagabonds, partly from inclination, in most cases from stress of 
circumstances. Hence at the end of the 15th and during the whole 
of the 16th century, throughout West Europe, there was a bloody 
legislation against vagabondage.1
Such primitive accumulation was necessary to clear the ground for 
capitalism. England was only the classic instance of this process of 
expropriation, which Marx makes clear took different forms and 
followed different paths in different countries.2
 Far from believing that capitalism originated in England, Marx 
explicitly recognized that capitalism developed first in the city-states 
of Renaissance Italy.3 Engels saw the revolution that shook Germany 
in 1524–25 as an early bourgeois revolution that arose from the 
development of capitalism there. Marx characterized the early 
processes of the emergent capitalism, what he called the different 
moments of primitive accumulation, as distributing themselves:
now, more or less in chronological order, particularly over Spain, 
Portugal, Holland, France and England. In England at the end 
of the 17th century, they arrive at a systematical combination, 
embracing the colonies, the national debt, the modern mode of 
taxation, and the protectionist system.4
England became the final station in a movement across the face of 
Western Europe, which as it developed came to involve more than 
the mere expropriation of the peasantry from the soil.
 In the light of this more global conception, Perry Anderson 
recently criticized Brenner’s Anglocentric view for what he describes 
as a ‘capitalism in one country’ approach. It makes only slightly 
more sense, according to him, than the notion of socialism in one 
country.5 While the latter makes nonsense of socialism as a tran-
scendence of the limits of capitalism based on the territorial state, 
the former not only ignored the sequencing of primitive accumu-
lation across Western Europe that Marx traced, but also forgot 
Lenin’s insistence that no state has ever become capitalist without 
connection to the world market.
 There is an unfortunate parochialism in Brenner’s viewpoint, and 
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its negative consequences are many. It allowed Brenner to make 
exaggerated claims about the role of competitive markets in the early 
development of capitalism. It led him to fail to take proper account 
of politics – in particular the centrality of a unified territorial state 
and the influence of capitalist merchants and manufacturers over 
its policies. This chapter will begin to remedy this by viewing the 
origins of capitalism from a Europe-wide perspective. Accordingly, 
we will examine the development of capitalism in Italy and Germany 
in the first place. Failing to take permanent root in these places, these 
capitalisms must be understood as prologues to the development of 
capitalism in England. These failed or partially successful transi-
tions on the Continent help to illuminate the reasons for England’s 
ultimate success. They also show that the development of capitalism 
is uneven – that success in one place comes at the expense of failure 
elsewhere. Finally it shows how historically contingent its full devel-
opment was. This chapter also discusses the case of capitalism in 
France, whose development did not miscarry so much as retreated 
into hibernation under the seventeenth-century Bourbon monarchy. 
The great influence of Brenner’s Anglocentricism has meant that the 
origins of capitalism in that country in the early modern period have 
been denied, helping to foster the serious misconception that the 
French Revolution was not a capitalist revolution. The discussion 
of Holland is left to the next chapter, where its history better fits in 
the sequence of early modern bourgeois revolutions.
renaIssance Italy
Marx noted that capitalism first developed in Italy, and it dominated 
the European economy of the late Middle Ages. Yet Italy was scarcely 
mentioned in the original Dobb–Sweezy debate. The first attempt to 
take Italy into account was made at an inter-university conference 
held in Montreal in 1975.6 Giuliano Procacci, a participant in the 
original debate, insisted first that there was no one Marxist theory, 
only Marx’s hypotheses of the transition and differing interpreta-
tions of them. Second, he pointed out that the transition had been 
Europe-wide. An important implication of this was that it was naïve 
to assume an exact similarity and symmetry in comparing various 
national transitions. This is even more the case when it is understood 
that the development of an international market and the concomi-
tant economic and geographic disequilibria were conditions of the 
transition itself.7 Here Procacci echoed Hobsbawm, who stressed 
world-wide uneven development as an essential characteristic of 
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capitalist development. From this we conclude that comparison may 
be essential and insightful, but has inherent limits. For the transition 
is not repeated in the same sequence (with or without interesting 
variations) by every country. It can be radically, qualitatively, different 
because capitalist development is a single global historical process.
 Third, Procacci introduced specifically Italian concerns into the 
discussion. Marxists in that country stressed that despite political 
division, the late medieval period saw the emergence of an internal 
market for labour and goods in the peninsula and, as a conse-
quence, the appearance of agrarian capitalism in the fertile Po valley. 
Capital there entered and transformed agricultural production, 
and producers were transformed into wage labourers. Industrial 
development was likewise strongest there, especially in Lombardy. 
Elsewhere, by contrast, historians found the development of 
capitalist agriculture to have been weak.
 Procacci’s insistence on the importance of markets was followed 
by the comprehensive and profound analysis of the origins and 
failure of early Italian capitalism in the light of the Dobb–Sweezy 
debate by the distinguished Annales scholar and Marxist historian 
Maurice Aymard.8 Following closely in the footsteps of the master 
of the Annales School, Fernand Braudel, Aymard acquired a deep 
understanding of Italian Renaissance history based on primary 
research.9 Beginning his analysis of capitalist origins by surveying 
the vestiges of feudalism in late medieval Italy, Aymard observed 
that by the mid-fifteenth century the remains of serfdom had disap-
peared throughout the Italian peninsula. A stage had been reached 
in which people could sell their labour freely. Indeed, the expropria-
tion of the peasantry through enclosures – taken as a hallmark of 
capitalism in sixteenth-century England – had already begun in Italy 
in the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries.
 In the wide plains of the Po valley – the most productive land 
in Italy – capitalist farming became prevalent. Throughout the rest 
of the peninsula, but especially in the centre, share-cropping was 
the most widespread form of tenure. Meanwhile in Naples and 
Sicily large arable estates continued to dominate. But over time 
the presence of the old ruling groups and the vestiges of feudalism 
there weakened. The landlords who owned or who were able to 
buy, sell and exploit these large estates came to be mainly urban 
merchants and notables. This change was manifest in a more intense 
and systematic exploitation of labour rather than enhanced capital 
investment. Hence the historic backwardness of southern Italian 
agriculture.
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 Alongside the large estates of the south a system of compact 
homogenous farmsteads of up to several hundred hectares emerged 
elsewhere by the fifteenth century, in conjunction with a more 
urbanized and commercialized economy. Such allotments produced 
a great variety of crops based on extensive and intensive methods of 
cultivation. Modern or rational economic attitudes and accounting 
methods appeared, and in contrast to the large estates, these smaller 
holdings also displayed the tendency to invest large amounts of fixed 
as well as variable capital. The employment of wage labour paid in 
money was used more than elsewhere in Europe.
 The consolidation of five large states on the peninsula by the fifteenth 
century enlarged markets. Inter-regional and maritime trade between 
north and south also grew. Compared with the rest of Europe, markets 
and the commodification of agriculture were highly developed. Italian 
agriculture of the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries possessed all the 
elements of high farming that later emerged in England.
 Large amounts of urban or commercial capital flowed into agri-
culture not simply to buy but to improve land. Aside from landlord 
proprietors there was a class of farmer-owners who utilized capitalist 
methods of land management and in particular employed wage labour. 
It was during this Renaissance that northern and central Italy took on 
the aspect of the celebrated bel paesaggio, or beautiful landscape, with 
its characteristic sculpted and terraced hillsides and valleys.10
 These developments not only raised the net agricultural product, 
and provisioned a particularly dense urban network in the north, 
but by doing so allowed a very early expansion of the manufac-
turing sector.11 In the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries the whole 
peninsula including the south was commercially linked in inter-
regional and maritime networks dominated by the northern cities of 
Milan, Genoa, Venice and Florence. The integration of the primary, 
secondary and tertiary sectors allowed a high degree of urbanization 
and the emergence of new political structures, social relations and 
cultural values which are associated with the Italian Renaissance.
 The merchants of northern Italy (along with those of Flanders, on 
whom more below) dominated European wholesale commerce from 
the thirteenth through the fifteenth centuries. They controlled the 
markets for raw materials and the outlets for manufactured goods. 
Long-distance trade in both precious and bulk goods lay in their 
hands. As needed, they developed new commercial and financial 
techniques while creating a financial network which covered Europe 
and the Mediterranean. Their dominance over international trade 
in wool cloth, silk, armaments, paper and glass set off the first 
heller maintext.indd   56 6/7/2011   11:50:56 AM
 e x p e r i m e n t s i n  c a p i ta l i s m 57
systematic processes of capital accumulation, and resulted in the 
reorganization of the countryside, especially in the Po valley.12
the domInance of merchant caPItal
Aymard holds that it was the northern Italian cities which were 
responsible for the economic transformation of the countryside. 
Looking at their role specifically from the perspective of the Dobb–
Sweezy debate, Aymard contends that Sweezy was right to see trade 
as a decisive factor in the transition, though he was wrong to see 
it as an exogenous force in causing the decline of feudalism and 
development of capitalism.
 According to Aymard the very merchant base of this capitalism – 
which was authentic enough – defined its limits. Unlike agriculture, 
no transformation of the means of production occurred in manufac-
turing, including in the all-important cloth industry dominated by 
merchants and guilds. Italian merchant capitalists proved to be unin-
terested in transforming the means of production in manufacture: 
we find once again the ‘structural’ character of merchant 
capital and its indifference to the mode of production of those 
commodities that enter into circulation which led to its continued 
preference for simple financial control over producers rather than 
real control of the processes of production.13
Rural capitalists were blocked from developing industry by the 
influence of urban merchants. Furthermore, the urban merchants who 
dominated this economy failed to develop a truly national market, 
which was critical to the further development of Italian capitalism. 
Only the creation of a wide and deep national market, especially one 
protected by a centralized territorial state, could have maintained the 
competitiveness of Italian manufacturing in the long term.
the faIlure of ItalIan caPItalIsm
According to Aymard there are three major interpretations of Italian 
capitalism’s failure to advance further. The first, epitomized in the 
work of Ruggiero Romano, insists that despite the appearance of 
modernity the Italian economy failed to achieve real breakthroughs 
in productivity. Not only did agriculture and industry remain 
technologically inert, this stagnation was compounded by an 
heller maintext.indd   57 6/7/2011   11:50:56 AM
58 t h e b i rt h o f  c a p i ta l i s m
urban–rural conflict which lacked any dialectical ‘virtue’: that is, did 
not issue in any positive economic outcome.14
 The second position, reflected in the view of Renato Zangheri, 
is a more nuanced version of the first.15 It acknowledges that 
real transformations in the direction of capitalism occurred in the 
late medieval period. But this modern sector remained too weak 
and local. No national market or national unification took place. 
Surpluses generated were not reinvested in agriculture or industry 
but in churches, country villas and palaces. As the sixteenth century 
waned, rent and interest came to dominate a process of refeudaliza-
tion which included the north. These two interpretations stressing 
the internal evolution of Italy should be placed in a third, more 
international interpretative context. From this perspective Italian 
merchant capitalism, such as it was, could not fully transcend 
its links to a Europe-wide feudal framework and so merged back 
into it.
  This wider view is provided by Immanuel Wallerstein – like 
Aymard a follower of Braudel.16 For Wallerstein the decisive factor 
in the evolution of Italy was the emergence of the capitalist world 
economy after 1450. Whereas late medieval Italy had shared the 
dominant role in the European economy with the Netherlands, 
the new economic hierarchy that emerged following the European 
voyages of discovery saw Italy’s decline. It lost its core position to 
Holland, which in turn lost out to England. With the emergence of 
the world market, the timing of capitalist development was critical 
to determining a country’s eventual position in the magic circle at 
the capitalist core or outside of it. As it turned out, Italy’s capitalism 
was too early while England’s was timed just right.
 But, Aymard complained, despite Wallerstein’s references to the 
rural sector, he prioritized trade and industry at the expense of the 
social realities of Italian agriculture in explaining the failure of Italian 
capitalism. As a result of his bias toward exchange he was unable 
to get at the root of the failure of the Italian transition. This lay 
in excessively exploitative social relations of production. Aymard’s 
own explanation of the falling-back of Italian capitalism focuses on 
the character of the merchant capitalism of the towns.17 In a way 
which was unique to Europe at the time, the merchant capital of 
the cities dominated and transformed the whole Italian countryside 
and most radically the north. Despite the wars of the first part of 
the sixteenth century, Italy fully participated in the positive West 
European conjuncture of that period. All the conditions for further 
accumulation and expansion were present including buoyant profits, 
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expanding demand, good prices, and increased production and 
consumption, amid stable or increasing productivity in industry and 
agriculture.
 It was the flow of Italian merchant capital into the countryside 
above all that made this surge of growth possible, but also deter-
mined its limits. The expansion of the Italian economy continued 
until about 1600. But from the 1570s agriculture was unable to 
sustain the commercial and industrial sectors, with food prices 
leaping ahead of those in trade and manufacturing. Signs of over-
exploitation, deforestation, erosion and ecological devastation of the 
land began to appear.18 The links between the north and south of 
the peninsula weakened, as northern cities tended to abandon the 
import of southern wheat and raw silk, while liquidating previous 
investments in southern land or municipal bonds. Instead the 
political and merchant elites of the northern towns came to favour 
urban self-reliance, based on the exploitation of their own coun-
trysides and through investment in local municipal bonds. From 
1600 a long inertia set in. Even the ruralization of industry did not 
allow a reconquest of foreign, let alone domestic, markets, which 
contracted.
the Predatory cIty-state
According to Aymard, it was the contradiction between the interests 
of urban elites and the rural dwellers which blocked further growth. 
The towns began to restrict freedom of markets, or permitted only 
those that were regarded as serving their interests, imposing controls 
on grain prices, production, marketing and exports in order to 
ensure supplies to their expanding populations, especially the urban 
poor. Rents rose, and the profit levels of capitalist farmers stagnated 
or declined. Between 1480 and 1680 grain prices rose twice as fast 
as prices for manufactures or raw materials, and wages declined. 
Once urban populations began to stagnate, imports of grain from 
the south as well as exports of textiles to southern Italy fell. By the 
seventeenth century the Italian economy was reduced to local urban 
economies exploiting an immediate hinterland through rents and 
taxes.
 As Aymard suggests, the Italian city-state and the merchant capi-
talism it spawned appeared to have had a built-in limitation. This 
was not unlike the view of Braudel, who spoke of the city-state and 
the countryside dominated by it as the basis for its expansion and 
power, and at the same time the cause of its ultimate weakness.19 
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Anderson’s perspective also comes close to Aymard’s. As Anderson 
saw it, the Italian city-states usurped rather than transformed 
feudal power, and in this respect suggest Merrington’s concept of 
the medieval town as a component part of the feudal system or as 
being unable to transcend it. But, according to Anderson, it must 
also be acknowledged that the Italian city-state was at fundamental 
odds with its countryside.20 The latter was considered and treated 
as a conquered territory. The peasants had no rights of citizenship 
and little sense of loyalty to the city, to which they were subject 
politically and economically.
 Aymard also argued that the Italian city-states had no chance of 
conquering and unifying Italy – an indispensable step in the creation 
of a unified territorial state and national market. Divided between 
themselves, they could not translate their urban-based economic 
power into mobilizing their rural populations toward such a proj-
ect.21 This argument reinforces Bois’s point that markets were not 
neutral economic entities, but depended on the political power of 
one or another jurisdiction.
 While Aymard’s arguments, and those of other historians who 
stress the limitations of Italian merchant capital, are well founded, 
I wonder whether Aymard’s discussion of the transition debate does 
that debate full justice. Though he chastises Sweezy for wrongly 
thinking of trade as an exogenous rather than endogenous force in 
capitalist development, he largely ignores the emphasis of Dobb and 
other debaters on the positive economic role of the petty producers. 
Yet it could be argued that the extraordinary development or over-
development of Italian overseas or exogenous trade from the Middle 
Ages onward warped the development of Italy’s internal economy 
by giving too much power to exporters and overseas merchants at 
the expense of small-scale rural and urban producers who, I would 
argue, took the lead in developing English capitalism.
 Ultimately Anderson’s suggestion that the failure of Italian capi-
talism was political seems conclusive.22 The inability of Italy to 
unify itself into an early modern territorial state set the limits to the 
development of its capitalism. No doubt this failure was connected 
to the entrenched localized power of these same merchant capital-
ists. Successive attempts to carry out such a unifying revolution from 
above by emperors or despots during the late medieval period were 
defeated. Failure blocked the emergence of a national market and 
of a national political entity that could defend Italy militarily and 
economically against foreign invasion. Unable to launch overseas 
exploration on their own, Florentine and Genoese captains and 
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merchants ended up taking the lead in Spanish, French and English 
overseas ventures. The lack of a national state not only made it 
impossible for capitalism to emerge in Italy until the nineteenth 
century, it led to a divided Italy becoming the plaything of foreign 
powers. In the sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries it was 
Spain that dominated the Italian peninsula. Subsequently the French 
and Austrian Hapsburgs vied with Spain for influence. These great 
power rivalries ensured that the peninsula would remain split into 
a multitude of small states and principalities. Within these political 
entities clerical and noble elites were able to maintain themselves at 
the expense of a weak bourgeoisie.
german caPItalIsm
Northern Italy continued to be the dominant actor in emerging 
European capitalism until the rise of Antwerp and the North 
Atlantic from the 1520s onward.23 But between the 1470s and 
the 1520s the most advanced pole of up-and-coming capitalism 
in Europe was Germany, or the so-called Holy Roman Empire. Its 
geographical position between still-dominant Italy and the emerging 
Netherlands helps to explain its dynamism. But more significant 
was the extraordinary expansion of its mining and metallurgical 
industries. Especially important were the gold and silver mines 
of the Tyrol, Erzgebirge (Saxony/West Bohemia) and Hungary/
Eastern Slovakia. Organized and controlled on a capitalist basis, 
these mines, which employed tens of thousands of wage workers, 
provided the liquid capital in the form of precious metals which was 
critical to the spectacular early expansion of the capitalist economy 
in Europe (1470–1530). Silver and gold from Central Europe also 
supplied virtually the only commodities Europeans could exchange 
for Chinese, Malay and Indian silks, spices and porcelains. Control 
of precious metals facilitated the opening of new trans-oceanic 
sea lanes, circumventing in part the Mediterranean and allowing 
Europeans for the first time to trade directly with Asia. After 1530 
American silver allowed this initial direct commercial link to expand 
into an enormous world market.24
 Like Italy, Germany emerged from the Middle Ages divided into 
many territories. Indeed, its very decentralization facilitated the 
initial emergence of markets and manufacturing based on hundreds 
of economically interconnected free or imperial cities operating 
within the web of late medieval feudal relations. In this respect, 
Germany differed fundamentally from late medieval Italy, where 
heller maintext.indd   61 6/7/2011   11:50:56 AM
62 t h e b i rt h o f  c a p i ta l i s m
only vestiges of medieval feudalism remained. But in Germany the 
feudal nobility, territorial princes and the Holy Roman Emperor 
not only survived, but were becoming stronger. In this respect 
Germany also differed from England, where we have seen that 
serfdom and lordship declined in the fourteenth and fifteenth 
centuries. This initial process of feudal decline then set the stage 
for the emergence of English capitalism in the sixteenth century. In 
Germany, by contrast, serfdom and lordship grew stronger at the 
end of the fifteenth and beginning of the sixteenth century, and the 
new economic dynamism in fact made possible the simultaneous 
strengthening of not only capitalism but also feudal reaction. The 
result of this volatile contradiction was the famous social and 
political explosion known as the German Peasant War (1524–25), 
characterized by Friedrich Engels as an early bourgeois revolution.
engels and early bourgeoIs revolutIon
As a still young professional revolutionary, Engels was not inspired 
by an interest in historical research or mere intellectual curiosity to 
investigate the German Peasant War. Basing himself on the historical 
work of William Zimmerman, a German historian, Engels wrote 
his Peasant War in Germany in the immediate wake of the revolu-
tion of 1848, to teach political and historical lessons and to inspire 
fellow revolutionaries in Germany.25 Engels’s analysis of the condi-
tions in which the revolution took place stressed the lack of German 
political unity and social cohesion and the progress of its mining, 
manufacture, trade and agriculture. At the same time he acknowl-
edged the relative economic weakness of Germany compared with 
Italy, the Netherlands and England at the beginning of the sixteenth 
century.26
 But the political failure of Germany was uppermost. Its failure to 
achieve national unity guaranteed both that the bourgeois revolu-
tion would be aborted and that Germany would remain excluded 
from world commerce:
while in England and France the rise of commerce and industry 
had the effect of intertwining the interests of the entire country 
and thereby brought about political centralization, Germany had 
not got any further than grouping interests by provinces, around 
merely local centres, which led to political division, a division 
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that was soon made all the more final by Germany’s exclusion 
from world commerce.27
Here Engels confirms my stress on the importance of the creation 
of the territorial state and access to the world market to the 
development of capitalism.
 As their power grew, Germany’s territorial princes levied heavier 
taxes and servile obligations on the peasants.28 The patrician rulers 
of the towns were allied to the feudal lords, and oppressed the rest 
of the urban population, including the rich and not-so-rich burghers, 
whom Engels pointedly compared to the middle-class liberals of his 
own time. The burghers emerge as a moderate opposition, aspiring 
to share in the town governments from which they were excluded 
and attacking the privileges and property of the clergy. Beneath 
them came the plebeians – ruined burghers, small-scale craftspeople, 
journeymen, day labourers and the numerous forerunners of the 
lumpenproletariat, some of whom became part of a radical opposi-
tion.29 No better, perhaps even inferior to them, were the peasants, 
who earlier had engaged in numerous local revolts, but who had 
never come together in a general national revolt.
 Though Germany was politically and economically divided on 
the eve of the Peasant War, the Reformation created a crisis during 
which revolutionary political and social ideas spread deeply and 
broadly in the population. During this crisis three large camps 
coalesced: Catholic or reactionary, Lutheran bourgeois reformist, 
and revolutionary.30 The religious conflicts of the sixteenth century 
were class conflicts fought out on the basis of the shibboleths of 
religion. This was the result of the ongoing powerful influence of 
the Church, as a consequence of which all questions – political, 
juridical, social and economic – were still posed largely in religious 
terms:
this supremacy of theology in the entire realm of intellectual 
activity was … an inevitable consequence of the fact that the 
church was the all-embracing synthesis and the most general 
sanction of the existing feudal order. It is clear that under the 
circumstances all the generally-voiced attacks against feudalism, 
above all the attacks against the church, and all revolutionary 
social and political doctrines were necessarily also mostly 
theological heresies.31
 With roots deep in the Middle Ages, the heretical ideology of the 
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burghers, to which some of the nobility also subscribed, called for 
the material dispossession of the wealth and privileges of the eccle-
siastical order. Agreeing with such notions, peasant and plebeian 
radicals took things a step further by calling for political, social and 
even economic equality.32 The propertyless, of whom there were 
increasingly large numbers, challenged the notion of a class-based 
society by espousing in utopian fashion the idea of all things in 
common.33
 The Catholic conservative camp included the imperial authori-
ties, the ecclesiastical and some lay princes, the richer nobles, the 
prelates and urban patricians. The Lutheran camp attracted to itself 
all the propertied members of the opposition, including the mass of 
the nobility, the burghers, and even some lay princes who wished 
to seize the property of the Church and increase their independence 
from the Holy Roman Empire. The peasants and plebeians consti-
tuted the radical party.34 The most important leader of the latter 
group was Thomas Münzer, who vainly advocated communism and 
a pantheism which, according to Engels, approached atheism.35
 While the aspirations of the radical party were doomed to fail, so 
too were those of the more moderate reformers. No effective alliance 
between elements of the nobility and the bourgeoisie of the English 
sort emerged. In England serfdom had largely disappeared by the 
end of the Middle Ages and the old nobility was virtually wiped out 
in the Wars of the Roses, replaced by a new nobility of bourgeois 
origin. In contrast serfdom was still rampant in Germany, and the 
nobles drew their income largely from feudal sources. Political 
power lay overwhelmingly at the local and regional level.36
 The nearest approximation to a bourgeois revolutionary program 
was articulated by Wendel Hipler in the so-called Heilbronn 
Manifesto, issued at the height of the Peasant War. Engels is careful 
not to claim that Hipler’s program was an expression of the bour-
geoisie: it was rather an expression of ‘what may be described as 
the cross-section of the nation’s progressive elements, [which] antici-
pated modern bourgeois society.' While nominally written on behalf 
of the peasantry, the Heilbronn program called for a standardized 
currency, standard weights and measures, abolition of internal 
customs duties and so on: demands which were more in the interests 
of the townsmen than the peasantry. In order to reach out to the 
nobility, concessions were made that substantially approached the 
modern system of redemption and would have transformed feudal 
into bourgeois landlordship.37
 Engels at one point compares the German Peasant War to the 
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French Revolution from a political point of view. In the case of the 
eighteenth-century revolution in a politically unified France, the whole 
country was split into two clearly opposed camps. In a deeply divided 
sixteenth-century Germany, this was a rank impossibility.38 On the 
other hand, Engels saw the Peasant War not simply as a German event 
but as an international one, based on the prospects for the further 
development of capitalism. As he reiterated on returning to the theme 
many decades later, ‘Reformation – Lutheran and Calvinist – is the 
No. 1 bourgeois revolution, the Peasant War being its critical episode. 
… Revolution No. 1, which was more European than the English and 
spread in Europe much more rapidly than the French.’39 Indeed, the 
Reformation spread throughout Western and Central Europe.
hIstory In the deutsche demokratIsche rePublIk (ddr)
Rejected by bourgeois historiography, Engels’s materialist inter-
pretation of the Peasant War and the Reformation became the 
foundation of the viewpoint of the historians of the now defunct 
German Democratic Republic (DDR). But respect for this view was 
more than mere state and party orthodoxy. Though much historio-
graphical water has flown under the bridge, Engels’s interpretation 
holds up remarkably well.
 It should be pointed out that East German Marxists historians 
were still inclined to take Luther’s and Münzer’s religiosity more 
seriously than did Engels. This stress on the historical importance of 
religious consciousness was in accord with the growing intellectual 
and economic rapprochement between the two states of divided 
Germany from the 1980s. Intellectuals in the DDR made efforts to 
conciliate Western German opinion while remaining faithful to their 
own materialist outlook. Their research also confirmed Engels’s 
view of the under-developed nature of the German bourgeoisie as a 
class. Finally, and perhaps most importantly from our perspective, 
the scholarship of both communist and Western historians revealed 
that contrary to Engels’s idea of a Germany economically lagging 
behind other countries, it was in the vanguard of an emerging 
European capitalism in the period 1470–1530.
 Between the 1950s and the 1970s East German historians 
produced a rich historiography on early modern German capitalism, 
the Reformation and the Peasant War. The results of this research 
were summarized in a magnificent collective history of the German 
early bourgeois revolution published in 1974.40 This work argued 
that the early bourgeois revolution in Germany must be understood 
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in the international context of the full flowering of the humanist 
culture of the Renaissance, the consolidation of the territorial state 
in France and England, the overseas discoveries and the beginning 
of the primitive accumulation of capital. This Europe-wide epoch 
saw the decline of feudalism, and the origin and development of 
merchant and manufacturing capitalism. The outbreak of the early 
bourgeois revolution in Germany represented the zenith of this 
emerging capitalism.41
 Population growth and overseas expansion led to an expansion of 
demand for commodities from the last third of the fifteenth century. 
The gold and silver mining sector expanded prodigiously – in the 
Tyrol and Styria, the Erzgebirge and in the border region between 
Western Hungary and Slovakia – facilitating exchange and accu-
mulation in the first phase of capitalist expansion down to 1530. 
Capitalist relations of production were established throughout this 
key sector, with technical progress and substantial capital investment 
by capitalists from Nuremberg and other south German cities.42 
Moreover, the influence of financial and merchant capital was also 
apparent to a greater or lesser degree in the grain and woad trade 
and the extensive metallurgical, wool, silk, linen, fustian, grain, salt, 
glass-making and printing industries that spread across the face of 
Germany. As the Reformation crisis approached, increasing sectors 
of the German economy came under the control of the powerful 
Függer family and other powerful merchant and banking firms.43
 In Italy and England feudalism declined and capitalism took 
its place, but in Germany a powerful feudal reaction consolidated 
itself as the capitalist economy and financial and merchant capital 
advanced. Capitalism exacerbated class conflict at every level of 
German society, prompting noble violence, increased feudal dues and 
growing attempts to impose or reimpose serfdom on the peasantry, 
especially in southern and southwest Germany and the Rhineland 
in the late fifteenth and early sixteenth centuries. The imposition of 
serfdom even served as a tool by which territorial princes exerted 
their authority.44 On the other hand, though they lacked leadership 
and common objectives the resistance of the common people became 
equally fierce, leading to the plebeian, worker and peasant protests 
that characterized the period leading to the Reformation crisis.45
  The further development of capitalism was also hemmed in 
by the imperial and feudal order. The Hapsburg emperor sought 
to rule a universal European state, not a unified and centralized 
Germany. The emperor, as well as the territorial princes, blocked a 
national political project. At the same time, serfdom and feudalism 
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fundamentally barred the route to the development of capitalism in 
agriculture.46 Such a route might have been opened by the demands 
of the peasants during the Peasant War to abolish serfdom, sweep 
away both feudalism and the nobility, and consolidate government 
under the emperor. The peasants also demanded an end to the estab-
lished Church with its landed wealth and feudal privileges, and the 
installation of a democratic church based on a revolutionary inter-
pretation of the Gospel.47 The latter demand would have dissolved 
the ideological foundation of the feudal order. The end of feudalism 
and serfdom would have eased the burden on the peasantry, helped 
to improve output and furthered the primitive accumulation of 
capital.48
 This account, like Engels’s, minimizes the role of the bourgeoisie 
in the Peasants’ War. Indeed, in so far as the financiers, merchants, 
burghers and skilled craftspeople participated in these events they 
generally sided with the Catholic or moderate Lutheran party, 
which opposed rural and urban radicalism. Faced with popular 
revolution, merchant capital was prepared to make its peace with 
feudalism. It was the peasants and plebeians rather than the still-
nascent bourgeoisie who led the way in this unsuccessful attempt to 
further the development of capitalism in Germany.49 The failure of 
this democratic revolt, the eclipse of the German mining industry by 
the increasing flow of New World bullion into Europe, and compe-
tition from the Dutch and the English sealed the fate of this early 
upsurge of German capitalism. The trade of the numerically larger, 
but impotent, merchant class of Germany came to be subordinated 
to ‘the bourgeoisie of little Holland’.50 As in the case of Japan, 
lack of direct access to the world market helped to stifle German 
capitalism.
revolutIon of the common PeoPle
Developed in the DDR at the height of the Cold War, this view of the 
Peasant War became part of the ideological struggle between East 
and West. With some exceptions West German historians rejected 
this Marxist interpretation. However, historians in the West were 
unable to produce a more convincing account. Their critique of 
the East German view, it must be said, was too often marked by 
misconception, logic-chopping and misrepresentation,51 and the 
East German interpretation remains the most convincing. 
 How convincing can be seen from the reception of Peter Blickle’s 
Die Revolution von 1525, published in West Germany in 1975. Its 
heller maintext.indd   67 6/7/2011   11:50:56 AM
68 t h e b i rt h o f  c a p i ta l i s m
substantial endorsement of the East German position prompted a 
dramatic shift in the West German perspective on this crucial event 
in Germany’s history. Moreover on the one main point of differ-
ence between Blickle and the East German school, later criticism 
vindicated the latter.
 Originally published in the mid-1970s and republished in an 
expanded and revised fourth edition in 2004,52 Blickle’s work 
undoubtedly reflected the influence of the radicalism of the 1960s 
in West Germany. Not only was Blickle respectful of the Marxist 
position, he agreed that the Peasant War represented a profound 
crisis that threatened to overthrow the whole feudal order. The 
authoritative nature of Blickle’s account cast a pall over the earlier 
Cold War historiography of the Reformation, produced so zealously 
in the West. On the other hand, Blickle differed from the East 
German interpretation on the key argument that the revolt was an 
early bourgeois revolution. Rather, he portrayed it as an urban and 
rural communal movement of common people, based on a radical 
and egalitarian interpretation of the Gospel of the Reformation. In 
Marxist terms, Blickle’s view of the Peasant War is one of a conflict 
between feudal lords and urban and rural petty producers.
tom scott’s structural adJustment
This was challenged by the British academic Tom Scott, one of the 
most prolific and erudite contemporary scholars of the Peasant War. 
His text on German history between 1300 and 1600 is an extraordi-
nary synthesis of recent scholarship on this exceedingly complicated 
period, and its axis is precisely the Peasant War. Scott provides an 
astonishingly clear and detailed analysis of the underlying forces 
leading up to and away from the uprising. Scott summarized his 
differences with Blickle on the Peasant War in a 2002 article.53 
He counters Blickle’s view of a unified rural communal society 
challenging feudalism by portraying the advanced development of 
commercial agriculture, urban trade, mining and manufacturing, and 
finance capital in considerable detail. The growth of rural industry, 
including putting-out systems operated by merchant capital and the 
high degree of social differentiation in the villages between well-
to-do peasants, cottagers, the landless and servants, throws doubt on 
the notion of a unified rural communal revolution.54 Extraordinary 
advances in research into the economic history of the period allow 
Scott to refute Blickle’s notion of the Peasants’ War as a communal 
revolution or of a revolt of petty commodity producers.55
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 However, while Scott’s views broadly confirm and amplify those 
of the Marxist historians of the DDR on the extensive develop-
ment of merchant and finance capitalism in Germany prior to 
the Reformation, he does not agree with them that the resultant 
crisis constitutes an early bourgeois revolution. He insists that the 
relations of production on the land determine capitalist develop-
ment, and that the mere existence of markets or manufacturing 
does not, in itself, demonstrate it. Invoking Brenner, he notes 
that there is a difference between involvement in the market and 
dependence on it. The former, in fact, could help sustain feudal 
agriculture.56 The preconditions for a genuine transformation of 
the agricultural economy to capitalism – the commodification of 
landlordship and of labour – were, Scott argues, entirely absent 
in Germany in the late fifteenth and early sixteenth centuries.57 
The commercialization of agriculture that did occur was fully 
compatible with feudalism. There was no crisis of feudalism, 
but rather only a structural transformation of it. According to 
Scott, it is difficult to speak of a crisis of feudalism when in fact 
landlords were improving their position rather than in decline.58 
As for German history overall between 1300 and 1600, Scott sees 
continuity rather than rupture. The three centuries under consider-
ation ‘witnessed the consolidation of a society of estates within a 
fragmented constitutional polity’.59
 Scott’s structural-functionalist analysis of the meaning of the 
Peasant War in German history must be taken seriously, informed 
as it is by an extraordinary mastery of the subject. Moreover, 
his insistence on the decisive importance of rural capitalism to 
the development of capitalism is something with which Marxists 
including those of the former DDR would have concurred. Having 
said that, we cannot ignore the significance of the massive entry 
of capital into, and the development of, capitalist relations of 
production in the very large mining industry in this period for 
the development of German and indeed European capitalism. Nor 
can we neglect the extraordinary influence of merchant capital 
on virtually every aspect of the extensive German manufacturing 
sector. Indeed, Scott himself admits, even as he denies a crisis of 
feudalism, that the Peasant War was:
a crisis in the sense that the assertion of seigneurial power 
produced a reaction on the part of those pushed down into a 
uniform category of subjection, of those, who, in the context of 
the 1520s, were able to invoke ‘biblicism’ against ‘feudalism’.60
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But this admission is of greater moment than Scott realizes. The 
Marxist view, and indeed the view of Blickle, is that the Peasant 
War was not merely a structural rearrangement of the feudal order 
but a fundamental or revolutionary challenge to it. The overthrow 
of feudalism in these circumstances would have meant the initiation 
of the process of primitive accumulation on the land. While citing 
Brenner on markets, Scott ignores Brenner’s argument that the 
fourteenth-century crisis was critical to both the decline of 
feudalism and the inauguration of capitalism in England through 
class struggle. While Brenner’s notion of a simultaneous death of 
feudalism and birth of capitalism in the fourteenth century has 
been contested by Byres in particular, who continues a line of 
interpretation shared by Dobb, Hilton and even Sweezy, it was 
precisely in Germany at the beginning of the sixteenth century 
that there really was both a crisis of feudalism and an attempted 
breakthrough of capitalism. In England the Peasant Wars of the 
fourteenth century spelled the liberation of the peasant producers 
and corresponding decline of feudalism. In Germany, on the other 
hand, the late medieval class struggles of the peasant producers 
against feudalism only reached their climax in the sixteenth century. 
Capitalism was born in the midst of a dramatic class conflict 
between the rural producers struggling to liberate themselves and 
a strong feudal reaction. The attempt to overthrow feudalism and 
install capitalism occurred simultaneously. This is what made the 
crisis there so acute and the Peasant War so significant.
  Finally, Scott’s contextualization of the Peasant War must be 
criticized. He views it in the framework of German history. From 
this perspective, he insists on the continuity of German history, 
signalled by the failure of the popular uprising and triumph of 
feudal absolutism. Having weathered the crisis the feudal system 
reconsolidated itself in the modern period on the basis of the 
princely states of a divided Germany. Throughout the early modern 
period the rulers of these aristocratic states centralized and bureau-
cratized their principalities in imitation of the absolute governments 
of their more powerful Hapsburg and Bourbon neighbours. But for 
Engels and the historians of the German Democratic Republic, the 
context of that event was certainly Germany, but more importantly, 
the wider global history of capitalism. In that sense, the Peasant 
War was an experience of rupture and change – Revolution No. 1 
in the chain of early bourgeois revolutions furthering the advance 
of the capitalist mode of production, as Engels’s revolutionary 
perspective led him to conclude.
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france
Having dealt with the failed development of capitalism in Italy 
and Germany, we turn finally to the case of France. It is important 
because of its role in the transition debate, especially as it unfolded 
under the influence of Brenner. Marx and Engels saw France as 
part of an emerging world-wide system of capitalist accumulation 
whose focal point was northwest Europe. As we saw, Marx includes 
it among the West European states undergoing diverse moments of 
primitive accumulation. Although he did not consider the matter 
in detail, Engels noted that capitalism in France developed within 
the contours of the emerging absolutist state. According to him, 
this early modern French monarchy reflected a balance between the 
emerging bourgeoisie and the feudal nobility.61 Anderson slightly 
modified this conception. He regarded the monarchy as above all 
reflecting the interests of the nobility, while recognizing that the 
absolute state fostered the influence of a commercial and manufac-
turing bourgeoisie moving toward capitalism.62
brenner’s other
Brenner, however, flatly denied that capitalism developed in France. 
The origins of capitalist accumulation lay in England alone. The 
notion that both feudalism and a subordinated capitalism could 
dialectically coexist within the absolute state is excluded by 
Brenner’s monocausal logic. Indeed, in Brenner’s hands France rein-
forces the uniqueness of English capitalism by becoming the perfect 
foil for the latter, experiencing the same upsurge of class struggle as 
England in the late Middle Ages with a quite different outcome. In 
France, peasants came to control roughly 45 or 50 percent of the 
land as against only 25 or 30 percent in England.63 As a result of the 
greater share of property retained by the French peasantry, whatever 
tendency there was towards capitalism in sixteenth-century France 
was arrested. It is, then, the differing allocation of property and the 
contrasting relations of production that determined the divergent 
evolution of the two countries in the early modern period. In 
the eyes of Brenner, England is the model and norm of capitalist 
origins. France is the feudal other. Brenner has recently muted his 
initial thesis of English uniqueness by acknowledging that Holland, 
like England, also made the transition to capitalist agriculture. But 
France remains the preeminent example of failed transition.64
 As the most important Marxist authority on the transition 
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question today, Brenner’s view matters a great deal. His treatment 
of France has provided grist for the mill of the revisionist trend in 
historiography which has sought to sever the relationship between 
the French Revolution and the development of capitalism. Since 
Marx it has been the view of Marxists that, like the English 
Revolution, the French Revolution was a bourgeois and capitalist 
revolution. Such a view was a fundamental feature of the Marxist 
view of history. The Brenner thesis could suggest that given the 
non-capitalist evolution of France under the Ancien Régime, such a 
bourgeois and capitalist revolution was, to say the least, doubtful. 
In a curious way Brenner’s view based in Marxism dovetailed with 
a developing scholarly and political trend against the Marxist view 
of the French Revolution known as revisionism.65 This undeniably 
conservative historiographical current, ascendant since the 1980s, 
attacked the idea that the revolution in France could be understood 
as a bourgeois and capitalist revolution.
 Among Marxists who denied the capitalist basis of the revolu-
tion was George Comninel.66 According to him, the bourgeoisie in 
France prior to the Revolution did not base itself on profit but on 
rent. Moreover, wage workers were dependent, not on wages, but 
on their own sources of subsistence.67 This view coincided with 
Brenner’s notion of the ongoing hold of the French peasantry on the 
land, and certainly Comninel’s teacher Ellen Meiskins Wood was 
deeply influenced by Brenner on questions of capitalist origins. She 
agreed with Brenner’s insistence on the origins of capitalism lying 
exclusively in the social relations of production of the English coun-
tryside. Under French absolutism feudal rent dominated to the point 
that there was no capitalist bourgeoisie. The French Revolution 
was a bourgeois, but not a capitalist, revolution.68 What was an 
argument in Brenner’s work turned into a dogmatic certainty in the 
hands of Comninel and Wood.
caPItalIsm In france
As I have argued elsewhere, Brenner, Comninel and Wood are 
gravely mistaken on France.69 As in England, the sixteenth century 
saw an ongoing advance of the capitalist bourgeoisie. The religious 
civil wars (1562–94) were undoubtedly a period of economic 
regression and confused conflict of all against all – the bourgeoisie 
divided against itself, peasants against peasants, as well as against 
nobles and townspeople and, to top it all, nobles against nobles, 
and all sides in revolt against the state. On the other hand, there 
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can be no doubt that class conflict between bourgeoisie and nobles 
was the critical element. And it is reflected in what we know of 
the subjective experience of these conflicts. For example, one of 
the French King’s representatives in the Midi, the Baron Raymond 
de Fourquevaux, reported in 1573 that the source of the violence 
lay in the fact that the nobility were confronted by an increasingly 
aggressive bourgeoisie.
 The essential arena of conflict was a struggle over the land, in 
which the peasantry were being drawn in on the side of the bour-
geoisie. The response of the nobles was to abandon the peasants to 
violence.70 As in the German Peasant War, the nobility responded 
to the threat from below by carrying on a class war from above. 
But the pugnacious French bourgeoisie were prepared to challenge 
the nobility in a way that the German bourgeoisie did not. Far from 
exhausting itself in the long war, the bourgeoisie, in league with the 
urban plebeians and an increasingly aroused peasantry, was prepared 
to confront noble power more and more as the conflict unfolded.71 
The concept of noble status itself came under ideological attack.72 In 
the end, the Catholic and Protestant nobles who had revolted were 
forced back into obedience to the king in order to protect themselves 
from the growing menace of the Third Estate. This was the basis 
on which the Bourbon Henri IV (1594–1610) was able to begin to 
reconsolidate the monarchical state.
 The increasing political and social assertiveness of the bourgeoisie 
was based on its growing economic strength. The civil wars were 
hideously destructive, and resulted in a considerable economic and 
demographic regression. In the south of France, the capitalism that 
had developed in the first part of the sixteenth century faltered. On 
the other hand, things were very different in the richer grain lands 
of the north. The violence and heavy taxation of the civil wars may 
have forced many subsistence peasants off the land, but the bour-
geoisie benefited from what amounted to primitive accumulation. A 
class of rural bourgeoisie in pursuit of profit was able to consolidate 
itself.73 The increased dependence of the expropriated peasantry on 
wages ensured the availability of abundant supplies of cheap labour 
for agricultural work. A wave of interest in agricultural improve-
ment, new mechanical inventions and new manufactures developed 
during the religious wars, which continued through the reign of 
Henri IV.74 Indeed, the Bourbon monarchy sought to support and 
control these initiatives through its mercantilist policies.
 The seventeenth-century French state tried to contain this bour-
geoisie while favouring the reconsolidation of the power of the 
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nobility and church. That it was successful in the short run was 
signified by the decline of the so-called sixteenth-century offensive 
of profit in favour of an offensive of rent. On the other hand, the 
rural and urban bourgeoisie that had emerged in the sixteenth 
century, though hard-pressed, survived and persevered in the 
seventeenth century.75 It re-emerged with new vigour in the age of 
Enlightenment. Capitalism expanded prodigiously in the last century 
of the Ancien Régime. Pace Brenner et al., the revolution that came 
at the end of that century was undoubtedly not merely bourgeois, 
but as we shall see in Chapter 4, also capitalist.
conclusIon
If, nevertheless, capitalism failed to blossom on the European 
Continent as fully as it did in England, surely its most glaring 
deficiency was the absence of unified territorial states in Italy and 
Germany. At the beginning of modern times Germany and Italy 
were as much nations as were France and England, and both 
witnessed the development of capitalist classes. But the failure to 
construct national territorial states in the former countries aborted 
for the time being their capitalist futures. The lack of such a state 
deprived merchants and entrepreneurs of the protection necessary to 
gain control of foreign markets and territories, blocked the further 
development of national markets and arrested the maturation of 
their bourgeoisies. The case of France is more contradictory. There 
the state did foster the development of a bourgeoisie to a certain 
extent. This is especially evident in the reign of Henri IV at the end 
of the sixteenth century, when the monarchy explicitly committed 
itself to a mercantilist policy. Especially important was its resolve to 
expand French access to the world market through a commitment to 
colonialism. Indeed, the continued construction by the monarchy of 
a strong national state by economic and other means strengthened 
French capitalism when it did emerge.
 On the other hand, the still divided and weak bourgeoisie was in 
no position to overthrow the nobility or to take control of the state 
during the religious-civil wars. The rather disorganized attempts by 
bourgeois elements to gain political, fiscal or religious concessions 
were rebuffed by a state increasingly committed to unrestricted royal 
sovereignty and to protecting the interests of the feudal aristocracy 
and established Church. Under such circumstances the capitalism 
that developed in the sixteenth century continued to exist but 
under severe constraints. In the latter part of the sixteenth century 
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capitalism did establish itself on the great open fields of northern 
France, and there was an intense interest in agricultural improve-
ment. But under the Bourbon kings’ heavy rents and taxes, ongoing 
economic difficulties and political control of the grain trade 
hampered further capitalist development. Capitalism was forced 
onto the defensive until the eighteenth century.
 Aside from the lack of political unity, the other great handicap 
of capitalism in Italy and Germany was failure in the agricultural 
sector. In the case of Italy, capitalist agriculture emerged in the Po 
valley. There the work force was fully proletarianized and capi-
talist farmers, urban merchants and the state made major capital 
investments in agriculture. On the other hand, earlier tendencies 
toward a national market in agricultural commodities weakened 
toward the end of the sixteenth century. Rural investment flagged, 
erosion and deforestation became more pronounced, and city-states 
increasingly adopted protectionist agricultural policies. The ongoing 
dominance of urban merchant capital smothered the initiatives of 
rural petty producers. Increasing grain prices tended to make wages 
in the industrial sector higher than in England, France and Holland, 
undermining the competitiveness of Italian manufactures. In the 
case of Germany and France, the importance of class struggles to 
the containment of capitalism should be underscored. The resilience 
of the feudal nobility in these instances was noteworthy. While the 
outcome of such struggles was not predetermined, the balance of 
class forces was important to the outcome.
 As we have noted capitalism began in Italy, and spread across the 
Alps to Germany and into France and the Netherlands. England was 
the last and most successful way-station in its early emergence. It 
was in the wake of this succession of more or less successful experi-
ments that capitalism flowered successfully in England. This in itself 
has important implications for understanding a possible transition 
to socialism. While nothing is certain or predetermined, we can 
suggest at least that socialism is developing historically through a 
succession of trials and errors based on an analogous underlying and 
general tendency. But having examined the birth of capitalism and 
its limits on the Continent, we turn to England, where it emerged 
for the first time in a complete form. In doing so we shall remain 
conscious of its antecedents on the Continent. Moreover we shall 
examine English capitalism while always bearing in mind its global 
context.
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englIsh caPItalIsm
In the last chapter I insisted, against the Anglocentric view, that 
the development of capitalism must be seen as the birth of a global 
system which included Western Europe as well as much of the world 
beyond it. Its early seeds were found not merely in England, but in 
Italy, Germany and France as well as in Holland. We concentrated 
on the fortunes of capitalism on the European Continent to substan-
tiate this point. This chapter deals with the early development of 
English capitalism, but in a way that underlines the need to see it 
in a global and European context, rather than as a development 
unique to England.
 The most important scholars we deal with in arriving at this view 
are Dobb, Wallerstein and Brenner. According to Dobb, capitalism 
began in England with the entry of capital into production, which 
he dated from the late sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries. 
Its origins were diverse but Dobb, as we know, stressed the impor-
tance of the transformation of the social relations of production 
through primitive accumulation, and through their subsequent 
transformation in what he described as the ‘really revolutionary 
way’. In opposition to merchant capital, which typically imposes an 
economically stifling control over still largely traditional methods 
of manufacture, the really revolutionary way is one in which 
petty producers in certain lines of industry become capitalists by 
undertaking to bring these sectors under their control while reor-
ganizing production and introducing new manufacturing methods 
and techniques. This path, championed by petty producers, is 
really revolutionary not only economically but also socially and 
politically, in a way that merchant capital is not.
 As in the chapter on the decline of feudalism, the main theme 
of this chapter is the debate on the relative importance of social 
relations of production championed by Dobb and Brenner or the 
influence of the market as argued by Wallerstein. I believe this to be a 
false dichotomy. It is based on a failure to understand that capitalism 
is a circular totality in which capital as self-expanding value always 
originates in production and its relations, but must realize itself again 
and again through market exchange which eventually universalizes 
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itself. The resultant realization of capital in money form allows rein-
vestment in production and the renewal of the accumulation cycle. 
The production of value is the decisive moment in this circuit, but 
exchange and a return to the money form are also indispensable to 
the self-expansion of value. Indeed, the renewal of production cannot 
take place without it. As Brenner and his followers would have it, the 
development of competition and the extraction of relative surplus 
value from the beginning play the key role in the development of 
capitalism. But it is my view that the emergence of these autono-
mous economic mechanisms itself has a history which is to be found 
in the coercive effects of primitive accumulation, the extraction of 
absolute surplus, colonialism and state policies rather than through 
innovations which were exclusively economic.
dobb versus sWeezy
The English case is critical to the debates between those, like Dobb 
and Brenner, who stressed the importance of social relations of 
production in capitalism, and those, like Sweezy, who also stressed 
the importance of the market, and especially the development of the 
world market. Sweezy’s views were aligned with those of the world 
system analyst Wallerstein, who relied on a Braudelian interpretation 
of capitalist history. Along with Sweezy, Wallerstein saw capitalist 
relations of production in the core capitalist states as significant, but 
only as part of a world-wide system of exchange in which profits 
were generated not simply in capitalist agriculture or manufacture in 
the system’s core, but also at the periphery. According to Wallerstein, 
Polish landlord magnates or Jamaican plantation owners were as 
much capitalists as English wool-cloth manufacturers. However, the 
bulk of profits generated at the periphery of the system were remitted 
to the capitalist core through a system of politically enforced unequal 
exchange. According to Wallerstein, states and political control were 
also critical to understanding capitalism as a world system.
 Brenner attacked Sweezy’s and Wallerstein’s views which stressed 
the centrality of markets as ‘neo-Smithian’. He insisted that the 
essence of capitalism lay not in exchange, which generates no new 
wealth, but in changes in the social relations of production at the 
centre of the system. The dynamism of capitalism was to be found 
not in the extraction of absolute surplus value dependent on the 
labour of slaves or serfs on the system’s periphery, but as a result of 
the extraction of relative surplus value based on wage labour found 
at its core. It was in English agriculture of the sixteenth century, 
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based on the issuing of competitive leases by landlords, that the 
first impulses toward capitalism manifested themselves. The ensuing 
necessity on the part of capitalist farmers to compete economically 
unleashed the unprecedented productive capacity of capitalism. 
While Brenner put his finger on the core of capitalism’s productive 
power, something which was more or less ignored by Wallerstein, 
he failed for his part to take account of the lead role of capitalist 
farmers and the ongoing importance of primitive accumulation and 
the extraction of absolute surplus value both in England and in the 
under-developed world. He also appeared to believe, incorrectly, 
that capitalism could exist in a single country. Finally, while rightly 
stressing capitalism’s prodigious and unprecedented productivity, he 
ended up focusing on the predominant role of landlords, economic 
leases and competitive markets, to the exclusion of the critical role of 
the state and its coercive power in the development of capitalism.
 Earlier we noted that both Dobb and Sweezy had postulated the 
existence of an intermediate phase between the decline of feudalism 
and the beginning of capitalism.1 In this phase petty commodity 
production and exchange appeared to predominate economically. 
This would accord with Marx’s celebrated formula C–M–C for 
exchange relations during which merchants did not occupy a 
dominant place in the market. Sweezy referred to this transitional 
phase as pre-commodity petty production, in which there were 
no really predominant relations of production to put a stamp on 
the whole economy and society. According to Sweezy, this phase, 
although real, nevertheless could not be thought of as crystallizing 
into a social system like feudalism or capitalism.2 Much evidence 
exists that small-scale producers – peasants and craftspeople – 
prospered during the late Middle Ages and the first decades of 
the sixteenth century on the basis of such petty production. While 
acknowledging this, Dobb cautioned against seeing this phase as 
a stage in the development of society in its own right. Rather, he 
insisted, it had to be seen from a revolutionary perspective on world 
history. From this point of view the critical question is which class 
is the ruling class, and, for this period, the answer is that while the 
early modern English state more and more accommodated capi-
talism and capitalists within its ambit, the ruling class remained 
feudal and the emerging territorial state was the political instrument 
of its rule,3 a position which was later endorsed by Anderson in his 
account of the absolutist state in Europe.4
 Dobb took an eclectic position on the actual beginnings of capitalism. 
He singled out the importance of the entry of capital into manufac-
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turing in England, which he dated from the late sixteenth and early 
seventeenth centuries. This took the form either of the complete subor-
dination of hired wage workers to an entrepreneur, as in the coalfields, 
or the partial subordination of craftspeople to an entrepreneur through 
the putting-out system.5 Dobb also underlined the importance of the 
rise in prices in the sixteenth century, which saw a dramatic decline in 
real wages and a surge of profit for the emergent capitalist class.6 As in 
his discussion of the decline of feudalism, Dobb recognized the signifi-
cance of the process of economic differentiation of the peasantry to the 
origins of capitalism.7 And, if this multiplicity of factors was not enough, 
Dobb also underlined the importance of foreign trade. Although it 
absorbed a relatively small percentage of total economic output, 
foreign trade, Dobb argued, played an important role in stimulating 
the expansion of English manufacturing.8 While taking these different 
factors into account Dobb nonetheless singled out two for special 
emphasis in a way which accorded closely with Marx’s own account of 
capitalism’s origin.
PrImItIve accumulatIon
The first of these was primitive accumulation. Dobb understood 
primitive accumulation to be an accumulation of capital claims 
or titles to existing assets, whether in England or overseas, for 
speculative purposes. As such it was a source of profits. But he also 
assumed that the class undertaking such primitive accumulation was 
capable of transforming such capital claims into means of produc-
tion capable of generating profits.9 In other words such titles could 
sooner or later become capital, which could hire alienated labour, 
from whose unpaid labour value could be extracted and then profits 
realized. Following Marx, however, Dobb laid particular emphasis 
on the primitive accumulation of land in England. According to 
Dobb, the essence of primitive accumulation of land was the transfer 
of property from subsistence peasant producers into the hands of 
an ascendant bourgeoisie, and the consequent pauperization of 
the former as a result of their divorce from the means of produc-
tion.10 The basis of accumulation lay in this divorce of the peasant 
producers from the means of production, with their consequent 
need to sell their labour power to capitalists in return for a wage 
forming the foundation of ongoing accumulation.11 The enclosure 
movement between the sixteenth and eighteenth centuries was the 
primary means of primitive accumulation in England.12 But we 
should reiterate that the English case had counterparts elsewhere in 
heller maintext.indd   79 6/7/2011   11:50:56 AM
80 t h e b i rt h o f  c a p i ta l i s m
Continental Europe at the time, and it remained a world-wide and 
ongoing phenomenon important to the subsequent development of 
capitalism, as we will discuss.
the really revolutIonary Way
The other factor in capitalist development singled out by Dobb and 
stressed by Marx was what they called ‘the really revolutionary 
way’. According to Marx and Dobb, production was historically 
reorganized under the capitalist mode of production in two possible 
ways.13 In one, merchant capital took control of the steps in the 
process of production from the outside, as it were, translating 
surplus labour into profits and reaching wider markets but doing 
little to revolutionize the means of production. This was typical 
of Italian merchant capitalism. Only the second way was ‘really 
revolutionary’, with small producers engaged in the actual produc-
tion process undertaking to reorganize production in their branch 
of manufacture. It is considered really revolutionary because it was 
more likely to lead to the acceleration of economic innovation and 
technological change that we consider characteristic of capitalism. 
In contrast to this, as Dobb notes, merchant capital may restrict 
and smother attempts at economic innovation by those producers 
who come under its domination. Indeed, Dobb noted that capital-
ists emerging from the ranks of petty producers tended to oppose 
monopolies and ultimately absolutist governments, while the former 
group of merchant capitalists tended to be complicit with the estab-
lished order.14 Complementing this development in manufacture was 
the emergence in the countryside of a class of increasingly well-off 
small producers who employed wage labour and were transforming 
themselves into capitalist farmers.15
 While Sweezy expressed scepticism over Dobb’s reading of Marx, 
and dismissed the notion of a ‘revolutionary way’ altogether,16 other 
contributors to the transition debate accepted Dobb’s view with 
few reservations. As we have seen, Dobb noted that the role of 
such emergent capitalists entailed not only opposition to merchant 
capital but, sooner or later, opposition to feudalism and absolutist 
government.17 In a piece published in Science and Society in 1990, I 
suggested that this was key to understanding revolutionary politics 
in the early modern period.18 At the same time the alliance between 
feudalism and merchant capital is important in explaining the failed 
transition to capitalism in Italy and Germany, which was discussed 
in Chapter 2.19
heller maintext.indd   80 6/7/2011   11:50:56 AM
 e n g l i s h c a p i ta l i s m 81
WallersteIn’s World system
A new stage in the debate was reached in 1974 with the publication 
of the first volume of Wallerstein’s The Modern World System.20 An 
American sociologist and Marxist specializing in Africa, Wallerstein 
was much influenced by third world dependency theory and the 
protest movements of the 1960s. Wallerstein had also been influ-
enced by the thought of Braudel, the leader of the Annales in 
France. Braudel conceived of the history of global capitalism from 
the perspective of someone who regretted the decline of European 
and especially French power. Braudel, who considered himself a 
socialist, may perhaps be described as a sentimental imperialist. He 
rejected the upheavals of the 1960s, while his acolyte Wallerstein 
embraced them. Wallerstein’s interest in developing world systems 
theory arose from his awareness that contemporary capitalism based 
on American hegemony was in trouble, yet rooted in a system of 
unequal relations which was both tenacious and of long standing.
 At Binghampton University he created the Fernand Braudel Centre 
which published Review, a Marxist academic journal based on his 
notion of world systems. Wallerstein may be said to have revived and 
developed the position of Sweezy. He took from the latter the need 
to move from a single nation or parochial unit of analysis to a wider 
perspective on capitalism based on global commercial and political 
interchange.21 In common with Dobb and Brenner, he acknowledged 
that the class struggles of the fourteenth century marked the crisis of 
feudalism. But in contrast to their stress on changes in the relations 
of production as key to capitalist origins, Wallerstein emphasized 
overseas expansion which, in the first instance, was a way out of 
the impasse of class conflict from the perspective of the ruling class. 
It led towards the beginning of capitalism.22 The expansion of the 
world market is an exit from class conflict.
 Marx had noted that the sixteenth century saw the emergence of 
both proletarian labour and the world market. For him these two 
developments, tied together dialectically, marked the beginning of 
the capitalist epoch. But Wallerstein acknowledged the importance 
of the proletarianization of labour only in passing, emphasizing 
instead the emergence of the world market or a trade-based division 
of labour as the starting point for accumulation.23 On the basis of 
such a commercial development the early modern European political 
order might have evolved in the direction of a world empire, as had 
the ancient civilizations of China, Greece and Rome. In the first 
part of the sixteenth century the Spanish-Hapsburg Empire under 
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Emperor Charles V (1516–58) made a serious bid to establish 
such a political dominion. If the Emperor Charles had succeeded, 
expanding markets and capital accumulation would have been 
permanently constrained by the fiscal and bureaucratic limitations 
of an overarching world state or political empire. But Charles’s 
failure to consolidate an imperial state allowed Europe to evolve 
in the direction of a world economy, or a capitalist world system 
characterized by a single division of labour or capitalist market, 
but multiple states and cultures.24 The failure of political empire 
favoured the proliferation of wage labour on the basis of a world 
market but also increased non-wage labour. Geographically, this 
‘world economy’ of the sixteenth century expanded to western, 
southern and east-central Europe, and included the Mediterranean, 
Latin America and the coast of West Africa.25
 Wallerstein may have decentred proletarian or wage labour, but 
only to place it in his more widely conceived capitalist world system. 
Its three main sectors were distinguished on the basis of the forms 
of labour each featured, the forms favoured by ruling classes in 
each sector based on the economic constraints and possibilities for 
profit within the emerging world market. At the core of the system 
in northwest Europe, wage labour became the dominant form of 
exploitation in agriculture and manufacture. In the semi-periphery 
which embraced the rest of western and central Europe, tenant 
farming, sharecropping and petty commodity craft production 
prevailed. In the peripheral zones of Eastern Europe, Africa and 
Latin America which produced mainly grain and sugar, serfdom and 
slavery or coerced cash crop labour became the rule.26 The existence 
of free or wage labour specified or defined the emerging capitalist 
economy, Wallerstein acknowledged, as ‘the “relations of produc-
tion” that define a system are the “relations of production” of the 
whole system, and the system at this point in time is the European 
world-economy’.27 But free wage labour could not be found 
throughout the world system, Wallerstein insisted. Free labour was 
the form of labour control used for skilled work in core countries. 
Coerced labour was used for less skilled work in peripheral areas. 
The combination of free and unfree labour was the essence of capi-
talism.28 This was a radical redefinition of capitalism, motivated by 
Wallerstein’s belief that accumulation at the centre was based not 
merely on the exploitation of wage workers in Europe, but also on 
the exploitation of producers on the capitalist periphery.
 In the core the market became the principal means of the control 
of labour. But such capitalist states also tended to be strong with 
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regard to other strong states and with respect to weaker political 
entities in the semi-periphery and the periphery. In the periphery 
states were weak or even non-existent.29 In the semi-periphery 
and the periphery political or physical coercion of the labour force 
persisted, and was even intensified, as they were absorbed into the 
capitalist world system. The development of classes was a function 
of, or depended on, its international division of labour.30 In this 
system of uneven development and of strong states dominating and 
coercing weaker ones, economic surpluses tended to move from 
the periphery and semi-periphery toward the core.31 Over the long 
term under-development in the periphery developed in tandem with 
development in the core based on unequal exchange. The initial 
advantages of higher skill levels and more fixed capital reinforced 
by greater political power provide the core countries with a cumu-
lative advantage over states located toward the periphery. ‘Hence,’ 
concludes Wallerstein, ‘the ongoing process of a world-economy 
tends to expand the economic and social gaps among its varying 
areas in the very process of its development.’ 32
brenner’s attack on ‘neo-smIthIan marxIsm’
In launching his attack on Wallerstein, Brenner insisted that what 
essentially differentiated capitalism from prior modes of production 
was its systematic tendency toward economic growth. The continual 
advances in labour productivity characteristic of capitalism had been 
facilitated by changes in the relations of production or property 
relations in the late Middle Ages that we have noted. Based on these 
changes, the onset of capitalism in the late fifteenth century increased 
productivity, reduced the price of goods and obtained a greater 
total output from the producers. This made it possible for the capi-
talist class to increase surplus without necessarily having to resort 
to increasing work time, intensifying work or reducing the standard 
of living of producers. The distinctiveness of capitalism lay in the 
extraction of relative surplus value through the development of the 
forces of production, which gave rise to a process of accumulation 
by means of cumulative innovation or, in other words, increasing 
productivity rather than depressing the workers’ wages or increasing 
their work time. This also laid the basis for an expanded reproduction 
of capital. Brenner insisted on this distinction because he wanted to 
argue that Wallerstein failed to take seriously enough the significance 
of the enhanced productivity of labour which is possible through the 
unique relations of production characteristic of the capitalist mode.
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 According to Brenner, Wallerstein is unable to do so in part 
because of his commitment to dependency theory. Wallerstein insists 
on the essential role of the under-development of the periphery to 
the development of the core through the transfer of surplus. Thus, 
for Wallerstein the mere extension of production for profit based 
on market opportunities brings about accumulation. For Brenner, 
in contrast, production for profit based on exchange will only 
engender systematic accumulation when it expresses certain specific 
social relations, namely, a system of free wage labour where labour 
is a commodity:
only where labour has been separated from the means of produc-
tion, and where labourers have been emancipated from any direct 
relation of domination (such as slavery or serfdom), are both 
capital and labour power ‘free’ to make possible their combination 
at the highest possible level of technology.33
Only when both labour and capital are commodities freely exchange-
able in the market will the resulting competition between productive 
units force them to produce at the socially necessary labour time 
necessary to survival, and entice them to surpass this level of produc-
tivity to reap the super-profit which, for a time, is the prize of the 
innovator. It is only under the pressure of such market constraints 
that capital accumulation develops. Brenner ties Wallerstein’s market-
based view to a line of thought running from Adam Smith to Sweezy 
and the dependency theorist André Gunder Frank. Wallerstein, 
Sweezy and Frank share Smith’s view that the specialization induced 
by a market-based division of labour will in itself produce gains in 
productivity.
 According to Brenner, Wallerstein and Sweezy appear to take a 
class perspective but in reality their analysis is tied to an atomistic 
or individualist approach to economic behaviour which is rooted 
in Smith. In contrast, Brenner insists that it is only under changed 
social relations of production where it is possible to employ free 
social labour that accumulation based on the extraction of increasing 
amounts of relative surplus value takes place. Under capitalist 
relations of production innovation, productivity increase and cost 
reduction become systemic economic imperatives; they are no longer 
choices. According to Brenner, attempts to increase surplus where 
the relations of production or class relations necessitate employing 
serf or slave labour take place where there is ongoing political 
control of labour, and therefore there is no systemic compulsion 
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toward economic innovation. The innovation that does occur is 
based on the vagaries of chance.
 Brenner allows that Wallerstein does interest himself in class 
relations. But he argues that for him the transformation of class 
relations of production are merely the consequence or effect of 
commercialization. The early modern capitalist class in England – 
merchants, bankers, manufactures, gentry, capitalist farmers – was 
merely the heterogeneous expression of the expansion of markets at 
home and overseas. So was the incorporation of peripheral regions 
like Eastern Europe into the world capitalist market: it compelled 
the owners of feudal states to act increasingly as capitalist entre-
preneurs. Wallerstein does not distinguish between the development 
of capitalism in the sense Brenner conceived it and the regressive 
transformation toward serfdom in the relations of production that 
took place under the impact of world market integration in Eastern 
Europe. For Wallerstein, serfdom, slavery and wage labour are all 
equally capitalist forms of labour control, differing only according 
to their place in the division of labour or the forms of economic 
specialization that develop in the world market. The distinctive role 
of wage labour in producing systemic imperatives towards accumu-
lation through innovation and increases in labour productivity is 
ignored. Indeed, Wallerstein cannot see that the bias of the modern 
world toward technological innovation is based on the existence 
of distinctively capitalist relations of production founded on wage 
labour.
 According to Brenner, Wallerstein discounts social relations of 
production because he shares dependency theorists’ idea that capi-
talist development and under-development are two sides of the same 
coin. The development of capitalism in the core states led to, and 
came at the expense of, under-development in the periphery. Such 
a view is incompatible with Brenner’s view of capitalism’s historical 
distinctiveness: accumulation via innovation rooted in the historical 
development of a class system based on wage labour.
 In Wallerstein’s perspective, surplus is steadily transferred over 
centuries from the periphery toward the core. Higher levels of skill 
and greater accessibility to capital reinforced by the coercive power 
of the strong core states ensure such a historic transfer of wealth. As 
Brenner puts it, in dependency theory under-development is the result 
of a primitive accumulation of capital extracted from the periphery 
by the centre and the resultant lack of capital in the periphery.
 For Brenner the primitive accumulation of capital in the periphery 
has nothing to do with the origin of capitalism. Quoting Marx, 
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Brenner insists that ‘the so-called primitive accumulation is nothing 
else than the historical process of divorcing the producer from the 
means of production.’34 In other words, primitive accumulation was 
the process of forcing subsistence producers from the land, forcing 
them to sell their labour power for a wage, and in so doing, turning 
the land into capitalist means of production. This occurred not in 
the periphery but in England.
 Brenner does not ‘deny there was a long-term transfer of surplus 
away from the periphery’.35 But he locates its cause elsewhere. Surplus 
was extracted by pumping out absolute surplus value through reducing 
wages and keeping workers’ subsistence at minimal levels. This limited 
the internal market for capital or consumer goods in peripheral 
countries. The upper classes were only interested in importing luxuries 
in return for the locally produced surplus. And the development of free 
wage labour was inhibited by the predominance of forced labour coex-
isting with peasant subsistence producers. But the flow of surplus out 
of peripheral countries was not determined by the unequal economic 
and political relationship with the centre as Wallerstein or the depen-
dency theorists argued. Rather, it was the class-structured lack of 
investment opportunities that determined this outflow. Other than the 
restricted market for luxuries, there was no market to make invest-
ment profitable. Driving the point home, Brenner uses the example 
of early modern Poland. He shows that not only could it not initiate 
capital accumulation because of its class structure based on serfdom, 
it could not even adequately respond to market opportunities for its 
grain stemming from Western Europe. As a counter-example, Brenner 
points to the English eighteenth-century colony of Pennsylvania. In 
contrast to most colonies and regions in the periphery where forced 
labour predominated, the population of Pennsylvania was mainly 
composed of free small-scale farmers, allowing the slow development 
of a process of capital accumulation. 
 Brenner recognized that his challenge to Wallerstein represented 
another round in the transition debate which had earlier seen the 
defeat of Sweezy’s notion of capitalist origins based on the develop-
ment of long-distance trade as the prime mover. Certainly Brenner’s 
critique was a conceptual tour de force. Steeped as it was in a deep 
understanding of both Marxism and the historical process, Brenner’s 
arguments decisively reassert the primacy of the development of 
capitalist relations of production to the origins of capitalism. In 
particular it points to the development of capitalism in agriculture 
as critical to the inception and consolidation of the new mode of 
production in England and elsewhere.
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the Problems WIth brenner
At the same time, Brenner’s position was not without its problems, 
all of them concerned with the privileged position England enjoyed 
in his account of the origins of capitalism. Brenner was absolutely 
correct to insist that the extraction of relative surplus value or 
increases in labour productivity is only made possible by the prole-
tarianization of labour. Yet Brenner tended to exaggerate the actual 
increase in agricultural productivity that occurred in the early phases 
of capitalism. Robert C. Allen has shown that over the period 1500 
to 1800 overall output of grain in England rose by 150 per cent.36 
Over the same period output per worker increased by 43 per cent. 
But most of this gain came in the eighteenth century in the period 
of the so-called agricultural revolution. In the sixteenth century, 
which is the period when the extraction of relative surplus value 
and productivity increases are supposed to have begun working their 
magic according to Brenner, output per worker actually declined, if 
we follow Allen. Productivity experienced a modest if steady rise 
in the seventeenth century. This seventeenth-century growth was 
enough to overcome the Malthusian crises to which other states in 
Europe were still subject. It is real growth, but of a moderate, rather 
than spectacular, kind. It is only towards the end of the whole period 
that competitive markets began perhaps to drive increases in produc-
tivity. Indeed, it ought to be kept in mind that it is not a certainty 
that competitive markets actually were responsible for the increases 
in productivity of the eighteenth-century agricultural revolution. The 
most that we can say is that they were then in place in a way that 
was not the case earlier.
 Brenner’s tendency is to associate the generation of relative 
surplus value based on free labour with the core, and the production 
of absolute surplus value with the unfree labour of the periphery. 
England, whose economy was increasingly based on the extraction 
of relative surplus value, advanced rapidly. The rest of Europe, 
where economies lacked this feature, lagged behind, retarded rather 
than bolstered by its connection with the periphery:
But surely to the extent that the early modern ‘European world 
economy’ … was defined by the interconnected systems of 
production based on coerced cash crop labour in the periphery 
and based on free labour in the core – it remained fundamentally 
‘pre-capitalist:’ a sort of renewed feudalism, with a somewhat 
wider scope. The lack of a real breakthrough was indeed reflected 
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in the inability of the ‘modern world economy’ to provide 
the material underpinnings for continuing economic-industrial 
growth in most of Europe through the early modern period deci-
sively better than had the serf-based economy of Europe during 
the mediaeval period.37
This analysis invites some scepticism. While he is right to insist that 
the capitalism is characterized by a systematic imperative towards 
producing relative surplus value, Brenner forgets that Marx saw 
these two forms of surplus extraction as working in tandem in the 
development of capitalism in England as well as the rest of Western 
Europe. According to Marx, increases in the working day, reduc-
tions in wages, increases in the intensity of work were all methods 
of increasing surplus value, alongside introducing new methods and 
technologies and reorganizing work or increasing labour produc-
tivity. The historical evidence suggests that the extraction of absolute 
surplus value remained important to the accumulation of capital in 
England and northwest Europe from the sixteenth until the middle of 
the nineteenth century.38 Indeed, the revisionist view of the Industrial 
Revolution which has become predominant among economic histo-
rians since the 1980s strengthens an emphasis on the importance of 
the extraction of absolute surplus value to the history of accumu-
lation. Such revisionism does not deny the importance of the new 
technological and organizational achievements of the Industrial 
Revolution, whose contributions to the economic growth of the 
period were taken for granted by most earlier historians. But this revi-
sionism does diminish their weight in the overall English economy 
until the later nineteenth century. As such it dramatically reduces the 
earlier overly optimistic estimates of economic growth in the late eigh-
teenth and early nineteenth centuries. While there was some economic 
growth, labour productivity throughout the economy scarcely rose 
during the Industrial Revolution. Per capita income prior to the onset 
of the Industrial Revolution was a lot closer to the level of the period 
of Industrial Revolution than previously believed.39
 More generally Brenner over-emphasizes the extraction of relative 
surplus value at the expense of the overall accumulation process, 
whereas it is necessary to keep in sight the dialectical historical and 
economic relationship between capital accumulation and the devel-
opment of relative surplus value. As capitalism advances the growth 
of the productivity of social labour leads to the devaluation of all 
existing capital, as the value of commodities is determined not by the 
labour time taken by their production originally but by the labour 
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time taken for their production currently. This labour time steadily 
diminishes as the productivity of social labour grows. Therefore 
existing capital, instead of appearing as the result of a long process 
of previous accumulation involving primitive accumulation and the 
absolute as well as relative exploitation of labour, appears in an 
illusory fashion the result of a relatively short reproduction period. 
The previous long and painful accumulation of capital necessary to 
the further increase in the productivity of social labour is lost sight 
of by Brenner.40
 The most we can say about the period 1500–1800 from this 
perspective is that technological innovation and the reorganization 
of production facilitated a gradual if uneven rise in the extraction of 
relative surplus value in agriculture and manufacturing in England, 
and to a lesser extent on the Continent. Progress in this respect 
gradually increased from the seventeenth century onward. Sparked 
by previous advances in Flanders, innovations like enclosure, mecha-
nization, three-field crop rotation, water meadows and selective 
breeding made headway in England and northern France in the 
eighteenth century. The same century saw the emergence especially 
in England of increasingly capitalized and concentrated industries 
based on technological breakthroughs like the spinning jenny, flying 
shuttle, power loom, puddling of iron and the steam engine. But it 
should be stressed that most of these innovations came late in this 
300-year period. Over the whole early period the development of 
dispersed rural industries and large numbers of large-scale handi-
craft workshops or so-called manufactures – the characteristic forms 
of industrial growth – saw longer hours and greater intensity of 
work at subsistence or near-subsistence wages as much or more than 
it did increases in relative surplus extraction through technological 
innovation. At the very least both methods of surplus extraction 
went hand in hand with the extraction of relative surplus value, 
gradually amplifying the extraction of surplus through continued or 
intensified absolute exploitation.
the non-euroPean contrIbutIon to euroPean 
caPItalIsm
Brenner’s acknowledgement that the extraction of absolute surplus 
value from the periphery did happen was acompanied by his 
discounting the importance of such non-European surpluses to capi-
talist accumulation in Europe. This is no mere academic matter. It 
stems from his fundamental political and theoretical disagreement with 
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dependency theory. Brenner, of course, is a distinguished professor, 
but like Wallerstein he was caught up in the events of the 1960s and 
has ever since been close to the theoretical positions of the Fourth 
International. Reflecting this perspective, Brenner attacked depen-
dency theory as promoting the overcoming of under-development by 
delinking politically and economically from global capitalism, rather 
than pursuing international class struggle. According to Brenner, this is 
to move toward the utopia of trying to achieve socialism in one coun-
try.41 The alternative is a politics which understands that capitalism is 
a globally interdependent system based on raising the productivity of 
labour, in which the only real choices are to join the capitalist system, 
or better, to overthrow it. Accordingly, a revolutionary politics strives 
for international revolution in which the working class assumes revo-
lutionary leadership in both developed and under-developed countries. 
The transformation of the relations of production or of class relations 
by revolutionary means must be the primary objective in the under-
developed as well as the developed world.
 Such a politics has a certain validity in that it insists on the 
necessity of the working class remaining in the driver’s seat in 
carrying forward a revolution which is both socialist and global. 
The force of this position has been demonstrated time and again by 
the failed attempts to institute national and democratic revolutions 
based on compromises with the bourgeoisies of different countries. 
On the other hand, the weakness of this perspective, aside from its 
tendency to political inflexibility and dogmatism, is its overly opti-
mistic view of the possibility of positive historical change in the face 
of imperialism and under-development. At the same time it has made 
the serious mistake of over-valuing the political importance of the 
first world proletariat and thereby failing to take the political and 
economic potential of the under-developed world seriously enough.
 It led Brenner himself to under-rate the contribution of the 
under-developed world to capitalist development, and ironically for 
someone committed to the international class struggle, to fail to take 
a sufficiently global view of such development. Indeed, Brenner’s 
view is frankly too Anglocentric, let alone Eurocentric. For in our 
view the Continental European and non-European contribution was 
indispensable to the development of capitalism. We have already 
noted how important the development of silver and gold mining in 
Central Europe was to the earliest phase of capitalism in the late 
fifteenth and sixteenth centuries. It was critical in providing a means 
of exchange and store of value, making possible the initial upsurge 
of capitalism in Europe and the establishment of the capitalist world 
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market based on trade with Asia. This flow of bullion was greatly 
amplified by the mines of Mexico and Peru, which began to deliver 
their riches to Europe from about 1530. By 1640 at least 180 tons 
of gold and 17,000 tons of silver had reached Europe from America. 
In the course of the sixteenth century the circulation of metal coins 
in Europe increased eight or ten times. A certain percentage of this 
precious metal made possible the expansion of the Asian trade. In 
Asia in the same period the stock of silver originating from the 
Americas (as well as Japan) may have tripled.42 This accretion of 
precious metal, it should be realized, is not a matter of heaping 
up treasure or even setting masses of goods into circulation, but 
of using money capital to set alienated labour to wage work, and 
extracting unpaid labour as surplus value.
the causes of under-develoPment
Brenner was certainly correct to insist that the fundamental reason 
for the failure of accumulation to take hold in peripheral countries 
was the class structure in such countries. But he discounts the effects 
of external political and economic pressures in creating and shaping 
that class structure. Spanish and English political and economic 
control of Latin America helped to maintain an upper class which 
blocked a possible social and political evolution or revolution that 
could have made capital accumulation possible. Whole strata of Latin 
America’s class structure served colonial and imperialist masters as 
compradores. Serfdom, imposed by an increasingly assertive Polish 
aristocracy, was powerfully reinforced by the demand for grain on 
the West European market. In turn the American Revolution, which 
facilitated the evolution of Pennsylvania and the other colonies 
of the northeast of North America towards capitalism, involved 
overthrowing the power of a local merchant oligarchy. But it also 
required breaking links with and dependence on a powerful political 
and economic empire, which was standing in the way of such an 
evolution. In other words, colonialism and imperialism internalize 
themselves in the class structure of dependent societies, reinforcing 
elements that are essentially comprador. They oppose capitalist 
development, and delay and inhibit the onset of capitalist accumula-
tion. In turn limiting the intrusion of foreign political and economic 
influence proved critical to the process of capital accumulation. 
The creation of a strong territorial state under whose protection an 
indigenous capitalist bourgeoisie could develop was essential to the 
development of strong capitalist states like the United States.
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PrImItIve accumulatIon In the PerIPhery
Brenner has summarized his own view of the origins of capitalist devel-
opment in England in an article on the origins of the English Revolution 
in a festschrift in honour of his teacher Lawrence Stone.43 Here, he 
makes much of Marx’s concept of primitive accumulation as it bears on 
the English countryside.44 In the formulation offered by Marx, subsis-
tence peasants were dispossessed and had to turn to wage work or were 
forced to sell their labour in return for wages. The land – the basic means 
of production – became capital in so far as it produced value based on 
the work of wage workers and became part of a system of exchange in 
which surplus value was realized as profit. But this does not exhaust 
Marx’s understanding of primitive accumulation. As he goes on to say in 
his famous discussion in the last part of the first volume of Capital: 
the discovery of gold and silver in America, the extirpation, the 
enslavement and entombment in mines of the aboriginal popula-
tion, the beginning of the conquest and looting of the East Indies, 
the turning of Africa into a warren for the commercial hunting 
of blackskins, signalled the rosy dawn of the era of capitalist 
production. These idyllic proceedings are the chief momenta of 
primitive accumulation.45
Marx especially singles out as an instance of primitive accumulation 
the massive transfer of surplus from South Asia to England at the 
time of the conquest of the Indian subcontinent which clearly helped 
England finance its Industrial Revolution and its global wars against 
revolutionary France (1792–1815).46
 Rosa Luxemburg saw primitive accumulation in the early modern 
and modern period as being closely linked to colonialism. It was 
militarism or the use of force that constituted the essential link 
between the two:
It [militarism] fulfils a quite definite function in the history of capital, 
accompanying as it does every historical phase of accumulation. It 
plays a decisive part in the first stages of European capitalism, in 
the period of the so-called ‘primitive accumulation’, as a means of 
conquering the New World and the spice-producing countries of 
India. Later, it is employed to subject the modern colonies, to destroy 
the social organizations of primitive societies so that their means of 
production may be appropriated, forcibly to introduce commodity 
trade in countries where the social structure had been unfavourable 
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to it, and to turn the natives into a proletariat by compelling them 
to work for wages in the colonies.47
Luxemburg glimpsed the historical relationship between the inception 
of capitalism in Europe and the invasion of the rest of the world by 
the Europeans from the sixteenth century onwards. Especially note-
worthy is her sense of the importance of the primitive appropriation 
of the land from the indigenous population. Indeed, according to 
Massimo De Angelis, Luxemburg already understood that primitive 
accumulation is an inherent and continuous process throughout the 
global history of capitalism.48
 More recently David Harvey has elaborated on primitive accumu-
lation, or as he calls it ‘accumulation by dispossession’, in order to 
remove any implication that it is a phenomenon characteristic only 
of capitalism’s origins and not its maturity. He sees it as a process 
going on both in the heart of capitalism and at its periphery from 
the sixteenth century right down to the present. In its latest forms 
it includes such phenomena as the privatization of public water 
systems, expropriation of homes, farms or small businesses for the 
sake of large-scale private development, corporate theft of workers’ 
pension funds, and last but not least, the invasion of oil-rich 
countries. Land, gold, silver, petroleum and other tangibles in Europe 
or overseas were not in themselves capital, Harvey explains.49 
Whether of European or non-European origin, they became and are 
still becoming capital in so far as they are included in an economic 
circuit in which surplus value is produced from the work of wage 
workers and as part of a system of exchange in which surplus value 
is realized as profit. It can be concluded that primitive accumulation 
outside Europe in the early modern period was as important to the 
development of capitalism as it was within Europe, and that the 
extraction of absolute surplus value as well as relative surplus value 
characterizes capitalism. This strongly suggests that colonial control 
over the periphery, and politically controlled labour in general, was 
more important to accumulation than Brenner allows.
 Brenner’s conception of primitive accumulation in relation to 
the market is also historically problematic. He appreciatively cites 
Marx’s assertion with respect to primitive accumulation that ‘the 
expropriation of the agricultural producer, from the soil, is the basis 
of the whole process’.50 According to Brenner, Marx noted that 
England is the classic case of primitive accumulation:
for Marx, this classic form involved a series of processes by which 
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the English lords used coercion, law and taxation to reduce the 
former peasant possessors to market dependence; by which a 
class of capitalist tenant farmers emerged to take up the lords’ 
commercial farms on economic leases, and by which, through 
force and the market, a proletariat devoid of the means of subsis-
tence and production arose to hire themselves out to the capitalist 
farmers as agricultural labourers.51
Brenner tends to mistake the reason for Marx’s emphasis on primitive 
accumulation in England. Marx did not underscore it because it 
produced any specific class pattern, he stressed it because he wanted 
to underline the role of force in creating the capital relation – with 
accumulated means of production on the one hand and a proletariat 
devoid of any on the other – and because he wanted to emphasize 
that even in England, especially in England, this was the basis of the 
apparently peaceful and bourgeois pursuit of accumulation. Brenner 
conflates this with his own insistence on the importance of the impo-
sition of economic leases by landlords on capitalist farmers as if they 
were part of a single process.
 It is true that Marx notes the leasing of the land by noble landlords 
following enclosure, but he does not indicate that these leases were 
competitive or economic. As we shall see, there are some scholars 
who doubt the importance of these so-called economic leases to the 
process of accumulation, or indeed whether they existed at all in 
the prolonged initial period of agricultural capitalism. More funda-
mentally, fully formed markets or rational and competitive markets 
in land and labour were more the result of a historical process of 
primitive accumulation and growing opportunities for profit for 
capitalists than the driving force behind them. Capitalist rent and 
property emerged out of the development of wage labour, rather 
than capitalist rent and property producing wage labour. It should 
be emphasized that capitalist property rights established themselves 
gradually, and that it was only in the aftermath of the English 
Revolution that landlords obtained absolute legal control of their 
property rather than holding them on the basis of feudal tenure.
markets and hIstory
In Brenner’s account most peasants are reduced to market depen-
dence, and a small number of others emerge as capitalist tenant 
farmers to take up the lords’ commercial farms on economic leases. 
Higher prices for grain and wool in the first part of the sixteenth 
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century encouraged these trends by opening up opportunities for 
profit. But it is a mistake to assume, as Brenner apparently does, 
that an already rational and competitive market imposed a strict 
market rationality on the emerging rural capitalists. As we have 
seen, increased opportunities for profit failed to reflect themselves 
in increases in agricultural productivity in the short run during the 
sixteenth century. In the longer term, a more rational and competi-
tive market favouring innovation was the consequence of the 
growing possibility for profits realized through the coercive effects 
of primitive accumulation and the gradual progress of exchange 
relations. In other words capital – born of primitive accumulation 
and pursuing its repeated cyclical movement in the course of realiza-
tion – eventually removed, by economic but also political means, the 
barriers to exchange inherited from the old mode of production, and 
imposed a more rational and competitive market. The initial profit-
able windfalls of the sixteenth century, reinforced by unprecedented 
inflationary pressures, cannot be thought of as the way ‘normal’ 
or established markets based on competition operate, but rather 
describe a process of market formation. Competitive markets did 
not fully emerge until the seventeenth century under the shock of 
straitened economic conditions which encouraged greater discipline 
in the market.52 Overall it is the circular movement of capital which 
undermines the obstacles in its way that leads to market competi-
tion rather than vice versa. The emergence of capital as a circular 
totality has a history that Brenner does not grasp but rather takes 
for granted.
 The ongoing barriers to fully rational markets in the first two 
centuries of capitalism based on the political practices inherited from 
the feudal mode of production need to be emphasized. C. G. A. Clay’s 
study of social and economic change in early modern England takes 
note of ongoing government interference in the market to ensure 
social stability.53 Dobb emphasizes the degree to which markets 
in England were controlled and regulated by formal and informal 
commercial monopolies.54 Such monopolies increased in the late 
Elizabethan and early Stuart period. The Stuarts even tried to restore 
the decayed guild system. An end to monopolies at home and abroad 
was to be one of the fundamental demands of the revolutionaries 
of the Civil War. All this is just another way of saying that until the 
English Revolution helped to sweep away many of these restrictions, 
there was nothing approaching a competitive market.
 Gregory Clark, a neoclassical economic historian, complains that 
determining the rental value of farmland in the first part of the 
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sixteenth century is not easy, since in early years much farmland 
was not rented for its (hypothetical) current rental value. Instead 
land was held on a bewildering variety of tenures or customary 
leases, which were well below supposed or estimated market values. 
At the beginning of the sixteenth century one can hardly speak of 
a real market in land.55 Keith Wrightson confirms Clark’s view, 
describing how over the next century a rational land market only 
gradually emerged out of a process that involved enclosure and 
class struggles including struggles over rents.56 Brenner speaks about 
capitalist farmers taking up economic leases. Yet having stressed 
class struggle in the fourteenth century, Brenner seems content to 
ignore it in the sixteenth century. In contrast Mark Overton points 
out that the establishment of rental terms between landlords and 
capitalist farmers was fraught with conflict, which frequently led 
to lawsuits and violence.57 We have already spoken of the role of 
force in constituting both national and international markets. It is 
important to understand the creation of the markets in land at the 
local and regional levels in a like way.
 The creation of a labour market, like the creation of a land 
market, was a prolonged and highly coercive process which was more 
political and ideological than based on the market. The process of 
primitive accumulation already reflects this. Dispossessing producers 
moreover did not automatically lead them to take wage work. The 
imposition of humiliating and punitive poor laws was required to 
deal with recalcitrants and vagabonds. Indeed, one aspect of the new 
Puritan Calvinist religion that especially appealed to the emerging 
class of rural and urban capitalists was that as a form of ideological 
coercion it helped employers to enforce and implant a ferocious and 
paternalistic work discipline on their workers.
 In sixteenth and seventeenth-century England, furthermore, 
labour was not viewed as an unfettered commodity whose disposi-
tion could be left to the play of the market. Rather those who worked 
for wages were seen as a common resource to which the powerful in 
the community had rights. Labourers and artificers had legal obliga-
tions to make that resource available, not on the basis of terms set 
by the wage worker or the market, but on terms imposed by the 
local community. While for the most part they were not members 
of an employer’s household and under his control, wage workers 
were governed paternalistically in an analogous way.58 Wage labour 
remained under strict local government control. Employers used 
these paternalistic regulations to continue to block labour mobility 
and to suppress workers’ demands for improved working conditions 
heller maintext.indd   96 6/7/2011   11:50:57 AM
 e n g l i s h c a p i ta l i s m 97
into the modern period. It is only in the nineteenth century that there 
emerged a labour market and labour as a free commodity, as it were. 
Moreover it only did so after prolonged struggle by the emerging 
trade union movement.59 Pace Brenner, these developments were 
pointed out in Marx’s Grundrisse.60
 I should underscore that I agree with Brenner that in the history 
of capital the appearance and spread of wage labour and a market 
for it must be regarded as decisive. They are the basis on which value 
emerges, as we see below. Yet it is important to appreciate that the 
development of wage labour itself has a history. It emerged as the 
gradually predominant element in a complex set of hierarchical 
forms of economic exploitation and domination in the early modern 
period which included apprenticeship, craft workshops, domestic 
service, indentured labour, female employment both in and outside 
the family, child labour and slavery. The successful abolition of capi-
talism, I might add, will involve the settling of accounts with this 
complicated historical legacy of exploitation, in which labour is not 
really free.61 The abolition of capitalism is not simply a matter of 
doing away with the capitalist economy and state through social and 
political revolution. It entails a prolonged struggle to democratize the 
centuries-old social and economic hierarchies of the existing division 
of labour. In any event it does not help to speak, as Brenner does, of 
the free play of labour in the market from the sixteenth century.
the caPItalIst farmer
The class of capitalist tenant farmers who took up the so-called 
economic leases offered by landlords is central in Brenner’s arguments. 
But whereas for Dobb, Hilton and Byres the appearance of this class 
was critical to the eventual flowering of rural capitalism, Brenner 
minimizes their role. As in his account of the decline of feudalism, it 
is the landlords who retain the initiative. In the struggles of the late 
Middle Ages the latter succeeded in holding onto the major part of 
the arable land. Then in the sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries 
the nobility, including the high aristocracy, are pictured by Brenner 
as innovative capitalist landlords. Responsive to the competitive 
pressures of the marketplace, they assume leadership in leasing 
their lands on competitive terms to tenants who are also compelled 
to innovate in order to meet their rents. As both landlords and 
capitalist farmers were forced to encourage innovation, a process 
of capital accumulation developed in the countryside. As described 
by Brenner, it is the landlords who force the pace in this movement 
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toward capitalist agriculture. They overshadow their tenants, who 
are forced to accept and accommodate themselves to changes in 
their leases imposed upon them by their landlords. Such a top-down 
view of capitalist origins, if true, would tend to clinch Brenner’s 
argument that the landlord-dominated social property relations that 
emerged out of the class struggles of the late Middle Ages inexorably 
determined the capitalist development that followed.
 Brenner’s evidence on the ongoing control of the bulk of the land 
by landlords, and the emergence of capitalist farms organized on 
the tripartite classic division between landlord, tenant farmer and 
wage labourers, is incontestable. On the other hand, he offers little 
evidence that landlords took the lead in the consolidation of capi-
talist farms. On the basis of intensive archival research, Jane Wittle 
questions Brenner’s notion that short-term leases by landlords helped 
to spark the engrossing, or the reorganizing of the land in England 
into larger units.62 Rather, she argues that enterprising peasant 
producers took the initiative in creating such farms. While Whittle’s 
argument is based on evidence from Norfolk, and would have to be 
extended to be conclusive, she does show that, in this area at least, 
landlord interference in the market for customary land was minimal 
in the period up to 1580. The value of rents to landlords fell in the 
fifteenth century, and they were diminished further in the sixteenth 
century by inflation. Tenants, not landlords, benefited from rising 
land values, and it was tenants, not landlords, who brought about 
engrossment. Far from the market being imposed upon peasants 
from above as Brenner would have it, the emerging land market was 
integral to strategies of peasant acquisition and landholding.63 It was 
the advancing class of capitalist farmers rather than the landlords 
who, seeing opportunity in the market, took the economic initiative.
 Brenner’s view of a landlord-led agrarian capitalism in England is 
also contested on other grounds. Mark Overton, who has an impres-
sive mastery of the concrete details of contemporary research, argues 
that tenants were not at the mercy of landlords with respect to the 
terms of their leases.64 Leases often protected tenants, and these 
protections were frequently upheld in the courts. Economic differ-
entiation was a process which occurred between tenants. Landlords 
did not frequently take the initiative in innovation; it was tenants 
and freeholders who did. Large farms were not a prerequisite for 
higher land productivity. Crop yields were independent of farm 
size from the seventeenth century onwards.65 Finally, on Brenner’s 
view which minimizes the significance of the independent peasant 
producer in England, we would expect that agrarian capitalism 
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developed in areas where landlord control was strong and peasant 
property rights were weak. In fact the reverse is the case, according 
to Overton. The most striking advances in output and land produc-
tivity occurred in areas where lordship was relatively weak. All this 
argues for the decisive importance of the small producer in control 
of the means of the production, rather than the landlord.
 Overton’s critique appears to be derived from the views advanced 
earlier by the distinguished historian of English agriculture H. 
J. Habakkuk.66 Habakkuk denied that landlords were an active 
economic class involving themselves in the improvement of agricul-
tural methods. He even questioned the idea that, as late as the end 
of the eighteenth century, they were prepared to impose economic 
leases on their tenants. Rather than creating the new agriculture, 
Habakkuk concluded that they were the passive beneficiaries of 
it. Habakkuk’s view of economic leases is echoed by that of P. K. 
O’Brien and D. Heath on the actual evolution of so-called economic 
rents as late as the eighteenth century:
In any case, the turnover of established in favour of more efficient 
farms probably changed rather slowly, if only because such 
‘commercial’ behaviour alienated other families on the estate 
and reduced their confidence to invest in land and improve-
ments that gestated slowly through the seasons. Co-operation 
between landlords and tenants continued to depend far more 
upon tradition than upon contractual obligations. The eviction 
of families that had resided upon an estate for generations 
may have become more common in the eighteenth century but 
was still regarded as bad form. Tenancies-at-will worked best 
wherever owners and their stewards operated in a rather close 
working partnership with tenants and provided them with well-
maintained farms, sound advice, and above all adequate rewards 
or compensation for investments in the long-term productivity of 
farm land.67
According to these authors, the time of economic rents arrived not 
in the sixteenth, seventeenth or eighteenth centuries but only in the 
wake of the French and Industrial Revolutions.
salvagIng brenner?
Brenner’s stress on the importance of agrarian class struggle to 
the decline of feudalism and setting the stage for the emergence of 
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capitalism is fundamentally important. So too is his emphasis on the 
accumulation of capital through the extraction of relative surplus 
value made possible by capitalist relations of production, in contrast 
to the ‘Smithian’ approach of Frank and Wallerstein. On the other 
hand, his dismissal of the importance of absolute surplus value and 
primitive accumulation, especially in the periphery, is unfortunate. 
His assumption of the sixteenth-century market as rational and 
competitive appears anachronistic. His privileging of the landlords 
over the rural bourgeoisie as the prime agent of capitalist develop-
ment is doubtful. It is also problematic with regard to the English 
Revolution, as we shall see. 
 Brenner’s problems are only magnified by his epigones. When 
Ellen Wood recently restated Brenner’s views on the origins of 
capitalism,68 she emphasized the importance of the development of 
wage labour to the onset of accumulation even more than him, and 
connected the growing dependence of wage earners on the market 
for items of household consumption to the development of the home 
market for manufactures.69 She may even have understated the 
extent of wage dependence, and of the self-exploitation of farmers 
and craftspeople employing no wage labour under the compulsion 
of the market on which they had become dependent.70 The statistics 
assembled by Gregory King, writing toward the end of the seven-
teenth century, testify to as much as 40 per cent of the population 
in England being dependent on wages for a livelihood.71 Jan De 
Vries found that wage labour was already in the seventeenth century 
the single most important source of income throughout much of 
northwest Europe.72 That being said, in the social relationships 
in sixteenth and seventeenth-century rural England the growing 
influence of wage labour did not amount to a free market in labour, 
as we have already seen, nor did it imply the extent of market 
dependence assumed by Wood. The persistence of apprenticeships, 
master–servant relationships, indenture and the constraints of the 
Poor Law inhibited the full development of an unconstrained labour 
market.
 In explaining the emergence of capitalism, Brenner laid emphasis 
on the role of capitalist landlords imposing economic rents on 
more affluent tenant farmers. According to him, this forced the 
latter to innovate in order to meet the terms of their leases. It was 
the new system, based on market compulsion, which was forced 
on landlords and tenants that sparked accumulation. Wood helps 
us to understand Brenner’s logic further. She notes that certain of 
Brenner’s critics have questioned his emphasis on landlords rather 
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than better-off peasants in the genesis of capitalism. Wood responds 
that it was less a question of which class took the lead than of 
understanding the process of market compulsion imposed on both. 
Indeed, she argues that those who take the view of the above critics 
do not fully understand the difference between market involve-
ment and market compulsion. The latter was key. In so far as they 
think that mere involvement in the market automatically leads rich 
peasants to become capitalist farmers, Dobb, Hilton and Byres fall 
back into a Smithian or commercial model of capitalism.73
 But Wood only changes the subject. As we shall see, whether we 
place the emphasis on capitalist farmers or nobles has everything 
to do with our understanding of the social and political history of 
capitalism. Since this is so, we would do well to examine Wood’s 
arguments further. Do we really have to choose between market 
coercion and market opportunity? Hilton’s and Whittle’s researches 
suggest that market opportunities drew rich peasants more and more 
into the market. Such involvement would eventually have made 
them subject to the competitive pressures or the coercive effects 
of the market. Moreover, Wood’s position has a dogmatic quality 
which is not only belied by the concrete historical circumstances, but 
also contradicted by the very authorities she invokes. In The Origins 
of Capitalism she harks back to the work of Karl Polanyi, praising 
him for understanding that markets were historically evolved institu-
tions.74 But Polanyi insisted that markets in England were embedded 
in society until the end of the eighteenth century, and indeed even 
afterward, and as such were deeply regulated. How Polanyi’s concep-
tion can be reconciled with Wood’s notion that markets in England 
operated on the basis of competition, freedom and rationality from 
the beginning of the sixteenth century is unclear.
 I conclude that Wood’s, and indeed Brenner’s, conception of 
the operation of the market is anachronistic. While both chastised 
Wallerstein for his Smithian notion of capitalism based on indi-
vidual choices and the division of labour in the market, and both 
insisted that primacy be given to relations of production or social 
property relations, they too place enormous stress on the market, 
albeit a market conceived as perfect or perfectly competitive in 
the economist’s sense. In a manner of speaking they have thrown 
the market out the front door but only to smuggle an even more 
dogmatic conception of it through the back. There is a lesson in 
this. Forms of commercial or financial capitalism based on markets 
to the exclusion of production can be regressive. Hilton, Takashi and 
Dobb saw them as reinforcing feudalism. They helped to smother 
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the shoots of capitalism in Italy and Germany. Their intrusion into 
industry tended to stifle innovation in manufacturing, as Marx 
and Dobb stressed. Brenner and Wood rightly emphasize that the 
market can never initiate accumulation. On the other hand, as 
Brenner and Wood suggest, where capitalist relations of production 
become fully entrenched, the market including its commercial and 
financial aspects can, once matured, foster economic competition 
and capital accumulation. I would go further, insisting that the 
realization process made possible by markets is indispensable to the 
further expansion of capitalism, understood as a totality based on 
an expanding spiral of value.
 the bIrth of value
It should be noted that Wood is deservedly celebrated as a political 
theorist. She is at her best in describing the connection between the 
emergence of agrarian capitalism and the tentative emergence of a 
labour theory of value in the work of John Locke, in particular in his 
ideas about property rights. For such rights were, in his view, labour-
based. Only the investment of labour to improve land, to increase 
its productivity, could justify the dispossession of indigenous popu-
lations, first in Ireland and later in the American colonies.75 Such 
ideas, Wood argues, distinguished England’s distinctively capitalist 
colonialism from Spain’s or other European countries’. And they 
arose from an agrarian capitalism driven, by the late seventeenth 
century, by the dynamic of relative surplus value.76 As Wood notes, 
Locke was not alone in adumbrating the notion of labour as the 
source of value. In fact, there were frequent assertions among 
Locke’s contemporaries of the view that labour was the source of 
value.77 While they did not articulate a full-fledged labour theory 
of value (that would only come with Marx), it is significant that 
the late seventeenth century saw a cluster of thinkers prepared to 
assert that labour was the source of value. It reflects the growing 
role of labour power in England’s emerging capitalist economy. In 
other words, the recognition by late seventeenth-century students of 
economy that labour is the measure of value signals for the first time 
the definitive supersession of earlier pre-capitalist forms of economic 
exploitation by capitalist relations of production and exchange.78
 How profound a social transformation this represented was 
suggested by Marx where he noted that Aristotle had already discov-
ered that there must be a relation of equality between the values of 
commodities. But to identify such a relation one must acknowledge 
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that all labour is equal. Living in a profoundly unequal society, 
Aristotle could not articulate the notion of the equality of labour. 
Founded on slavery, Greek society had as its basis the notion of the 
inequality of human beings and their labour. The idea of value, or 
that all labour in general is equal, cannot be comprehended until 
the notion of human equality has established itself in consciousness 
as a popular prejudice.79 Such an idea did emerge in the course of 
the levelling social and political transformations in England in the 
seventeenth century.
conclusIon
In this chapter our discussion has underscored the ongoing force 
of Dobb’s account of capitalist origins, in particular his views on 
the importance of primitive accumulation and of the really revolu-
tionary way led by petty producers. These views were challenged by 
Wallerstein, who revived, modified, and expanded Sweezy’s original 
stress on the importance of exchange. His view of capitalism as a 
world-wide system of economic and political relations has ongoing 
if incomplete explanatory power, but Brenner’s critique and reit-
eration of the decisive significance of the wealth-creating potential 
of the new capitalist relations of production in the capitalist core 
remains critical to any understanding of the capitalist accumulation 
process. On the other hand, I believe that Brenner’s conception of 
the history of capitalism is parochial and economistic. Brenner has 
gotten ahead of himself in insisting on the overwhelming influence 
of the extraction of relative surplus value as a factor driving accu-
mulation prior to the Industrial Revolution. His ideas about the 
effect of competitive markets in which landlords are leading actors 
appear historically anachronistic. Uncomfortable with dialectics, 
Brenner fails to see capitalism as an expanding totality in which 
production and realization are each indispensable, and in which 
each has a history. He pays little or no attention to the role of the 
state as an intrinsic feature of capitalism. The state played a critical 
role from the very beginnings of capitalism, and capitalism cannot 
really consolidate itself as a mode of production without control 
of the state. It is the state that helps capitalism to generalize and 
organize itself. Beyond a certain point capitalism cannot develop 
further without control of the state. Accordingly, it is the question 
of the consolidation of the capitalist state through revolution that 
we must now address.
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bourgeoIs revolutIon
This chapter reasserts the classic Marxist view of the English and 
French Revolutions as bourgeois and capitalist. These revolutions 
proved critical to the consolidation of the new mode of production. 
The revolution in Holland was likewise bourgeois and capitalist. 
Economistic readings of the origin of capitalism tend to discount 
the importance of all three revolutions, and Brenner, though he 
recently conceded that early modern Holland was capitalist, ignored 
its revolution. Contrariwise I argue that from the beginning the 
state was intrinsic to capitalism as a result of its generalizing and 
integrating functions. Its revolutionary transformation at a certain 
point was essential to capitalism’s development.
 With regard to England Brenner and Wood argue, improbably, 
that the necessary and sufficient conditions for the development 
of capitalism were established by changes in the social relations of 
production during the late medieval period. The English revolution 
was neither capitalist nor bourgeois. At best it confirmed an already 
functioning capitalism politically. In the case of France Comninel, 
supported by Wood, asserts that its revolution was somehow bourgeois 
but not capitalist. I shall demonstrate that such views are in conflict 
with existing scholarship. The views of Brenner and his followers 
represent an unwarranted revision of the Marxist view of history in 
which the revolutionary mobilization of the people and notably its 
most organized elements are central elements to the transition from 
feudalism to capitalism. In my view the roots of this pessimism are to 
be found in the failure of the revolutionary politics of the 1960s.
 Revolution plays a central role in Marx’s and Engels’s theory 
of history. Capitalism developed within the pores of feudalism. As 
it matured feudalism was transformed into the absolutizing royal 
state in both England and France. In an initial phase the emerging 
bourgeoisie and the royal state acted in partnership, especially to 
curb the private and anarchic violence of the nobility. But beyond a 
certain point, the state began to interfere with the further develop-
ment of capitalism, and restricted the growing power and ambition 
of the bourgeoisie while protecting the interests of the nobles. The 
Dutch, English and French revolutions represented the moment 
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when the bourgeoisie took things into their hands politically and put 
an end to both feudalism and absolutizing or absolute government. 
In the transition from feudalism to capitalism we see revolution as 
the moment in which the fetters inhibiting the full development of 
capitalism were finally cast aside. As a consequence of these revolu-
tions, existing class relations and the superstructure of society were 
transformed so as to clear the way for the blossoming of a fully 
mature capitalism.1
 The English and French revolutions, as well as the revolution 
in Holland, are the classic Marxist examples of bourgeois and 
capitalist revolutions. In recent years there has arisen a substantial 
literature questioning this view. Much of this work is anti-Marxist, 
committed to undermining the Marxist view of history. However 
an important strand of this revisionist history is associated with 
Brenner’s ideas. To what degree Brenner endorses them is unclear. 
In any case, this revisionist viewpoint has crystallized into a school 
of thought known as Political Marxism. This chapter will test the 
claims of this school.
 By capitalist revolution we understand the sweeping away of 
feudal obstacles to the further development of the capitalist forces 
of production by a violent and more or less rapid transformation of 
the state and social relations. Masses of workers, craftspeople and 
peasants were necessarily involved in such great transformations. 
In these three revolutions the petty producers and especially the 
emerging capitalist element among them played a key role. But these 
revolutions are considered bourgeois as well as capitalist because 
the bourgeoisie – profit-seeking merchants, manufacturers and rich 
peasants, but also lawyers, state functionaries, scholars, physicians 
and even a minority of enlightened nobles – assumed political and 
social leadership over the revolutions and became their principal 
directors and beneficiaries. In the wake of such upheavals the 
state acted purposely to spread and integrate capitalist relations of 
production throughout society. Contrary to the views of the Political 
Marxists, bourgeois revolutions were also capitalist revolutions.
holland
At this point it is important to remind ourselves that Engels judged 
the Peasant War in Germany in the light of the notion of bourgeois 
revolution. He saw it as a revolution ahead of its time, or as an early 
bourgeois revolution. Capitalism, if not a mature bourgeoisie or a 
national state, had come into being. But the absence of the latter 
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two elements caused this Revolution No. 1, or early bourgeois revo-
lution, to fail. Germany reverted to feudalism. Meanwhile in Italy 
the absence of a political revolution from above which might have 
created a territorial state guaranteed the decline of its precocious 
capitalism. The vanguard role in the advance toward capitalism was 
taken by Holland and England.
 Although they did not explicitly say so, scholars infer that 
Marx and Engels saw the revolution in Holland as a second early 
bourgeois revolution. They look upon this second and successful 
revolution as a prologue to the English and French revolutions.2 
In the first part of the sixteenth century the 17 provinces of the 
Low Countries became part of the Hapsburg Empire of Charles V 
(1516–56). Already a focal point of northern European trade and 
manufacture, the economy of the Netherlands grew spectacularly 
during the first part of the sixteenth century. Led by Antwerp, which 
became the epicentre of global commerce, the leading towns and the 
17 provinces paid heavy taxes to the emperor, but enjoyed special 
privileges and gained access to the expanding trade of the Hapsburg 
Empire in Europe and in the New World. During this period the 
influence of Protestantism – Lutheran, Anabaptist and Calvinist – 
rose, as did that of a reform-minded and humanist Catholicism.
 Circumstances deteriorated following the accession of Philip II of 
Spain (1556–98). The latter imposed bureaucratic control over the 
provinces, harshly attacked the Protestants and raised taxes at a time 
of growing economic difficulties. At first, the local nobility took the 
lead in opposing these measures. But in 1566 an iconoclastic fury on 
the part of the middle sort of people and the popular classes swept 
the major cities. Philip responded by sending the Duke of Alba at 
the head of the Spanish army into the Netherlands. Over the next 
four years Alba succeeded in suppressing the uprising by means of a 
campaign of terror. But in 1572 revolt broke out anew. Some rebels 
in exile (‘sea beggars’) seized the port of Brill, which allowed the 
insurgents to pursue the war against Spain from the sea.
 The focal point of the rebellion became the northern provinces 
of Holland, Zeeland and Friesland, with power shared between the 
estates of Holland and the aristocratic military commander and 
stadtholder William of Orange. In response to the Spanish sack of 
Antwerp (1576), the northern and southern provinces agreed to a 
policy of religious toleration and a common fight against the Spanish 
army (the Pacification of Ghent). The growth of Calvinist radicalism 
led the elites of the southern provinces to reassert their loyalty to 
Phillip at the beginning of 1579 (Union of Arras). A few weeks later 
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five northern provinces, including Holland and Zeeland, and major 
cities like Antwerp, Bruges, Ghent and Brussels, joined together in 
the Calvinist Union of Utrecht. The provinces of the Netherlands 
at this point permanently divided, as the new Spanish commander, 
the Duke of Parma, recaptured Flanders and Brabant. The city of 
Antwerp was again sacked (1585) by the Spanish army, causing 
tens of thousands of Calvinist merchants and craftspeople to move 
to Amsterdam. Dug in behind the rivers and canals of Holland, the 
Dutch army held off the Spanish while the insurgent navy raided 
Spanish merchant shipping in the Atlantic and the Caribbean. 
Indeed, in the midst of this protracted and revolutionary war of 
liberation, the Dutch republic with its focal point at Amsterdam 
emerged at the forefront of the European economy. By 1609 a truce 
with an exhausted Spain was arranged. The independence of the 
Dutch Republic was affirmed in the Peace of Westphalia (1648).
 Once established the Dutch republic was dominated by merchant 
capitalism. Its vast merchant marine, highly specialized and produc-
tive agriculture, export-oriented industry and control of not merely 
the European bulk trade (fish, grain, wood, wheat), but also the more 
remunerative trades in spices, sugar, furs, silk and wool cloth made 
Holland the centre of the world market in the seventeenth century. 
A powerful merchant elite lay at the core of this system of commer-
cially based capital formation, whose operations were facilitated by 
the development of banking, insurance and joint-stock companies.3
 In the early years of the last century Dutch Marxist historians 
developed the view of the revolt against Spain as a bourgeois 
revolution. According to them, in the first part of the sixteenth 
century the interests of merchant capitalists were strongly tied to 
the Hapsburg monarchy. But the policy of absolutism brought in by 
Philip II reflected a growing antagonism between the nobility and 
the bourgeoisie. The iconoclastic fury marked the beginning of the 
first successful bourgeois revolution. Merchant discontent awakened 
the working class, especially in the Flemish textile cities. The ensuing 
revolt was fuelled by high grain prices and commercial crisis. The 
revolution was stymied in its early years by the ambivalence of the 
property-owning class, which was fearful of lower-class radicalism. 
The unity of the bourgeoisie of the emerging Dutch republic was 
further inhibited by its lack of cohesion as a result of the play of 
special interests and parochialism.4
 The communist historian J. A. N. Knuttel, who published in 
the 1920s, saw the significance of the war of liberation as clearing 
the way for capitalism, and specifically merchant capitalism, in 
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accord with Marx’s concept of bourgeois revolution. According 
to Knuttel, this breakthrough occurred as a result of the initial 
unity of class forces, which included the lesser nobility, merchants, 
craftspeople and workers. Opposition to the established order 
combined economic motives with hostility to the Catholic Church, 
which was bound up with the old order. Following the iconoclastic 
fury, these revolutionary elements turned on one another, leading 
to the decline of the movement in the southern Netherlands. In the 
north neither the working class nor the nobility were very strong, 
ensuring the dominance of the bourgeois element. On the other 
hand, the influence of merchant capital inhibited the development of 
manufacturing, and ultimately led to rule by a corrupt commercial 
oligarchy.5 Although modified by more recent research, this view 
of the origins of the Dutch revolt as the first successful bourgeois 
revolution has remained essentially intact.6
 Beyond the historians of Holland it is perhaps Giovanni Arrighi 
among recent Marxist scholars who has done most to advance 
the idea of a successful early modern Dutch capitalism. Arrighi 
founded his own view on Wallerstein’s world-systems and trade-
based approach, asserting that Holland occupied a key role in 
the emerging cycles of global capitalist accumulation. He stresses 
its innovations in land warfare in defeating the Spanish/Genoese 
empire, the first capitalist world power. At the same time he 
points out how it learned how to internalize the cost of war into 
the structure of private trading corporations like the East India 
Company in a creative way, acquiring an unprecedented capacity 
to carry on naval war, assuring its commercial dominance overseas. 
Arrighi then points to the importance of Holland’s financial strength 
in besting commercial rivals and using its overall economic strength 
to secure its hegemony, based on promoting the balance of power 
while reinforcing proto-nationalist ideas in the monarchical states. 
In Arrighi’s view these accomplishments allowed Holland to become 
the second of the great imperial systems of historic capitalism.7
dutch merchant caPItalIsm
Dutch Marxist historiography clearly viewed the revolution as 
capitalist. Yet it was challenged by a more sophisticated perspective 
coming from outside Holland. However enduring their account of 
the revolution has proved to be, Dutch scholars failed to pay much 
attention to Marx’s theoretical analysis of merchant capitalism: 
capital accumulated on the basis of social forms of production – 
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feudalism, slavery – that were foreign to it and not subject to it. 
According to Marx, this is clear:
in the history of the carrying trade, as conducted by the Venetians, 
Genoans, Dutch, etc., where the major profit was made not by 
supplying a specific national product, but rather by mediating 
exchange of products between commercially – and generally 
economically – undeveloped communities and by exploiting both 
the producing countries. Here we have commercial capital in 
its pure form, quite separate from the extremes, the spheres of 
production, between which it mediates. This is one of the main 
sources from which it is formed.8
Accumulation of capital occurs but without entering into the sphere 
of production. Commercial capital can act as a solvent of pre-
capitalist social relations. But if feudal or slave relations are strong 
enough in the producing countries, it can also strengthen them. 
According to Marx, in Holland manufactures developed, but in 
industries especially related to exports, and notably in shipping and 
ship building. Manufacturing and colonialism were closely tied, as 
colonies served as an outlet for manufactures as well as facilitating 
accumulation through market monopoly. And in a passage referring 
to overseas primitive accumulation, Marx notes that ‘the treasures 
captured outside Europe by undisguised looting, enslavement and 
murder flowed back to the mother-country and were turned into 
capital there’.9 Pace Brenner, Marx believed that Dutch and other 
merchant capitalisms contributed significantly to European primitive 
accumulation, and quite clearly at the expense of the economies in 
the peripheral countries.
 Despite the viewpoint of Arrighi and the Marxist historians 
in Holland, recent historians have had a hard time accepting the 
notion of Holland as a fully fledged capitalist state. Hobsbawm did 
acknowledge that Holland allowed the capitalist world economy 
to overcome the instability of the so-called seventeenth-century 
crisis. The conception of such a seventeenth-century crisis was 
brilliantly articulated by him to describe the widespread political 
and economic difficulties that marked that period in the wake 
of the initial take-off of capitalism.10 The economy of capitalist 
Holland (and England) proved most successful in overcoming this 
economic shakeout. Hobsbawm’s conception of the seventeenth-
century crisis stirred argument but remains convincing.11 But based 
on Marx’s view of the limits of merchant capitalism, Hobsbawm 
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judged Holland to be ‘in many respects a feudal business economy, 
a Florence, Antwerp or Augsburg on a semi-national scale’.12 In the 
face of what Hobsbawm described as the crisis of the seventeenth-
century economy, Holland ‘survived and flourished by cornering the 
supply of certain scarce goods and much of the world’s business as a 
commercial and financial intermediary. Dutch profits did not depend 
greatly on capitalist manufacture.’13
 It is Ellen Wood who most forcefully makes the case for thinking 
of the Dutch economy as pre-capitalist. According to her, its large 
cities and productive agriculture were sustained not by capitalist 
production, but essentially by international trade. Dutch producers 
including farmers were apparently not subject to the competitive 
pressures associated with capitalism. The influence of low-cost 
grain from Eastern Europe reduced the demands of competition by 
lowering the cost of basic inputs. In effect Dutch farmers were subsi-
dized, allowing them to produce higher-cost and more profitable 
farm commodities like cheese and meat. Likewise in the interna-
tional marketplace, the Dutch did not so much compete as rely on 
direct and indirect coercion to maintain their privileged commercial 
position.14 Harking back to the previous chapter, we recall Wood’s 
purist view of the capitalist market, which operates on the basis 
of perfect competition rather than on the basis of subsidization, 
protection and violence.
 Proclaiming himself a follower of the Political Marxism of Brenner 
and Wood, Benno Teschke echoes this purist view of the market in 
his treatment of Holland in his recent study of early modern interna-
tional relations. Teschke directs his fire particularly at Arrighi’s view 
of Holland. In the first place, he denies that the Dutch republic, even 
in its heyday, ever had the capacity to impose hegemony over the 
international state system. Moreover, Holland’s rise was based less 
on internal productive innovations than on commercial profit taking. 
Its military innovations, which were hailed by Arrighi, reflected not 
so much its rise as a capitalist power as its ability to turn trading 
profits into military innovations, protecting its trade. Such steps 
did not alter the age-old logic of unequal exchange sustained by 
military power.15 Furthermore, ‘trade in no way generated aggregate 
economic wealth; it merely redistributed surpluses. Merchant wealth 
is therefore not capital.’16
 But Teschke confuses the existence of capital with the existence 
of the capitalist mode of production. The goal of merchant capital, 
which according to Marx certainly exists in both the feudal and capi-
talist modes of production, is profit. It may only incidentally create 
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growth and can also be economically regressive, as we have repeat-
edly noted. But it can also play a progressive role. It helps to dissolve 
feudal relations, and is a necessary if not sufficient precondition 
for the establishment of the capitalist mode of production, which 
leads to accumulation or economic growth. Indeed, as Brenner and 
Wood have stressed, once the relations of production have changed, 
the competitive pressures induced by the market may be key to the 
enhancement of labour productivity and capitalist accumulation.
agrarIan caPItalIsm
Basing themselves on Marx’s conception of merchant capitalism, 
Hobsbawm, Wood and Teschke reject the existence of early modern 
Dutch capitalism. Yet there is in Marx a view of Holland which 
leads one to be less certain of such a cursory dismissal of Dutch 
capitalism. In Volume One of Capital Marx discusses the origin 
of the so-called national debt. He explains that it first took root 
in Holland as a way of financing Dutch colonial expansion. As he 
explains, public debt became one of the most powerful levers of 
primitive accumulation. Such debt provided almost risk-free returns 
to financiers and merchants who invested in it. At the same time, 
it was financed by taxing the mass of the population. This system 
was first introduced in Holland. According to Marx the great 
seventeenth-century Dutch patriot Hans De Witt extolled it:
as the best system for making the wage-labourer submissive, 
frugal, industrious and over-burdened with labour. The destruc-
tive influence that it exercises on the condition of the wage 
labourer concerns us less however, here, than the forcible expro-
priation, resulting from it, of peasants , artisans, and in a word, 
all elements of the lower middle class.17
This passage from Capital must lead to an understanding of Marx’s 
notion of primitive accumulation to include more than the expro-
priation of English peasants from the land and the pillaging and 
dispossession of non-European populations. Rather it anticipates 
Harvey’s recent conception of accumulation by dispossession in 
which, for instance, employee pension funds are willy-nilly confis-
cated by private corporations, or the unemployment funds of 
workers are appropriated by governments. Clearly such practices 
are not merely a phenomenon of recent times but date back to the 
early history of capitalism.
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 Marx’s observations suggest the emergence in seventeenth-century 
Holland of an expanding pool of wage earners whose labour was 
generating profits that derived from more than exchange relations. 
Indeed, recent research reveals the existence in seventeenth-century 
Holland of an extremely large, if segmented, proletariat.18 Elsewhere 
in Capital Marx notes that in Holland commercial credit and 
dealing in money developed along with trade and manufacture. 
Indeed, financial capital became subordinate to industrial and 
commercial capital. According to Marx, ‘in the seventeenth century 
… Holland served as the model country of economic development, 
just as England does today.’19 Such a view is hardly compatible with 
the view of Holland as a ‘feudal business economy’. Holland, in fact, 
had a substantial manufacturing base with the most advanced tech-
nological infrastructure in Europe. The annual number of patents 
issued in Holland between 1590 and 1680, for example, slightly 
exceeded the number issued in England between 1660 and 1740.20
 It is in this context that Brenner launched a major new interven-
tion in the 1990s. Invited to a conference of experts on the economy 
of the early modern Netherlands to discuss his views, Brenner tossed 
off a paper which not only defended his notion of capitalist origins, 
but asserted, contrary to his earlier Anglocentric perspective, that 
early modern Holland was a fully capitalist economy.21 Unlike in 
most of the rest of Europe, landlords were not a significant factor in 
the evolution of the agrarian economy of the northern Netherlands 
in the late Middle Ages. Instead, an ecological crisis precipitated a 
transformation of the peasant economy in the direction of capitalism. 
The subjugation of these agricultural producers to dependence on 
the market, and the rise of a large market-dependent population 
involved in trade and industry, occurred as part of a single process 
of agricultural transformation.
 The progressive conversion of the low-lying peat soils of the 
northern Netherlands to grain agriculture in the late Middle Ages 
led to a settling of the peat and a rise in the moisture content of the 
soil. The land became unfit for the production of bread grains like 
winter wheat. Producers were forced to turn toward cattle farming, 
dairying and the extensive cultivation of summer grains. Farmers 
retained possession of the land, but lost the option of subsistence 
farming. As a result, they were forced into dependence on the market 
for their inputs. They became subject to competitive pressure, and 
obliged as a result to enter sectors of production that maximized 
return. In short, they were transformed into market-dependent 
capitalist farmers:
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the peasants of the maritime Northern Low Countries had had 
no intention of bringing about a transition from pre-capitalism to 
capitalism. But as an unintended consequence of the acts of recla-
mation … they ended up undercutting the ability of the soil to 
support production for subsistence and transforming themselves 
into market-dependent capitalist farmers.22
Instead of producing bread grains, they had to buy them, and 
were able to do so by producing in an increasingly efficient way 
specialized food products (cheese, butter, meat, barley, hops) for 
sale in the burgeoning markets found in the towns and cities of 
the southern Netherlands. Growing imports of grain from Eastern 
Europe lowered the cost of food and increased the farmers’ discre-
tionary purchasing power as well as that of the expanding urban 
populations. In addition, many farmers supplemented their income 
by finding employment in ship-building, fishing, tanning leather, 
brick-making and so on.
  Cheap food and low wages favoured urbanization and the 
emergence of competitive industries like beer-making and wool 
cloth manufacture. By 1500 half the population lived in towns, and 
the level of full-fledged proletarianization in the northern maritime 
provinces likely stood at 50 percent. If ultimately Holland had to 
cede pride of place to England, it was because, unlike the latter, it 
remained too dependent on international markets. These were still 
based on feudal relations of production, and were overcome by the 
economic downturn of the seventeenth century. Relative to England, 
Holland was dragged down by the crisis.
 Brenner’s account is in itself a tour de force: all the more so, as 
it is punctuated by a systematic critique of the objections offered by 
the distinguished Dutch economic historians at the conference. In 
the course of making his case for Dutch capitalism, Brenner takes 
account, for the first time, of the insistence of some Marxist scholars 
of the importance of peasant differentiation to the development 
of capitalism. He acknowledges that this occurred in the northern 
Netherlands, albeit as a consequence of market competition rather 
than through such competition and deliberately regressive taxation. 
Brenner also touches on the Dutch revolt, but sees its consequences 
largely in economic terms. Immigration of skilled craftspeople from 
the south allowed the Dutch wool cloth industry to become inter-
nationally competitive. The abandonment by many merchants and 
financiers of Antwerp for Amsterdam made the latter city the focal 
point of world trade and finance.
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 In Brenner’s account there is no recognition of the importance 
of the revolutionary struggle against Hapsburg political absolutism 
and the Counter-Reformation, or of the long war of national libera-
tion. Nonetheless, Brenner’s analysis greatly strengthens the view 
of the Dutch Revolt not simply as a bourgeois but as an authenti-
cally capitalist revolution. Earlier we have seen that Dutch Marxist 
historians regarded the triumph of the middle class in the northern 
Netherlands as the result of the fortuitous weakness of both the 
nobility and the proletariat compared with the southern Netherlands. 
But clearly from Brenner’s analysis it can be inferred that the Dutch 
revolution triumphed because the northern economy was strongly 
capitalist, having a capitalist agriculture as its foundation. Moreover, 
contrary to his view of England, where the initiative lay in the hands 
of the landlords, according to Brenner, it was the rural and urban 
middle class who held the initiative both economically and politi-
cally in Holland. Finally, Brenner’s view of Dutch capitalism tends 
to undercut his earlier insistence on the exclusive importance of the 
increase in the extraction of relative surplus value or gains in labour 
productivity to capitalist development. As he clearly acknowledges, 
the advance towards capitalism in Holland was heavily dependent 
on the availability of cheap grain from the periphery of Wallerstein’s 
world economy lying east of the Elbe – grain which was the product 
of a serf economy based on a regime of absolute exploitation.
 Brenner’s view of Holland as a capitalist country was unac-
ceptable to Wood, who, we can recall, had previously dismissed 
the notion that seventeenth-century Holland was capitalist. For 
her, grain from east of the Elbe represented a subsidy to Dutch 
farmers, reducing competitive pressures on them. According to 
her, unrelenting competition for all inputs was a sine qua non for 
capitalist accumulation based on the extraction of relative surplus 
value. Moreover, the Dutch resorted to direct and indirect violence 
to retain their commercial dominance. In Holland producers, 
including farmers, were apparently not fully subject to the competi-
tive pressures associated with capitalism because it was the subsidy 
provided by low-cost Eastern grain that allowed them to produce 
higher-cost farm commodities like cheese and meat. Likewise, in the 
international marketplace the Dutch did not so much compete in the 
market as relied on direct and indirect coercion to maintain their 
privileged commercial position.
 More in sorrow than anger, Wood responded to Brenner.23 The 
main thrust of her reply was to fully elaborate her understanding 
of what a completely competitive market consists of, and to 
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reiterate that England is the only early modern instance of such an 
economy. In particular, she insisted that cheap grain from Eastern 
Europe belied the notion that Holland was a capitalist economy: 
‘the influence of low-cost grain producing regions, which benefited 
the Dutch even more than other economies, if anything reduced 
competitive pressures by lowering the costs of basic inputs’.24 But in 
my view this is tantamount to arguing that low prices for oil from 
the under-developed world based on imperialist relations meant that 
the Western European and American economies in the twentieth 
century were not fully capitalist. Wood is loath to accept the obvious 
truth that extra-economic factors have always been at work in the 
history of capitalism. She goes so far as to argue that the Republic’s 
power was enhanced in large part by devoting much of its tax 
revenues to military ventures that gave it advantages in international 
trade that were not based on strictly market criteria. Therefore, 
according to her, Holland was not capitalist. The economism and 
ahistoricity of such a view is remarkable. As we have seen, Marx 
singled out the relationship between military spending and the 
national debt, which he considered important to understanding the 
way that capitalist primitive accumulation worked in Holland and 
elsewhere. Like Arrighi, furthermore, recent Dutch scholarship has 
linked heavy military spending with state policies of consciously 
stimulating economic demand.25
the PolItIcal marxIsts
In the case of Holland, Brenner clearly kept a distance from Wood. 
Wood, Teschke and Comninel all based their views on Brenner’s 
original conception of the genesis of capitalism. They especially took 
to heart his view of the distinctiveness of capitalist markets as not 
merely encouraging, but necessitating increases in labour produc-
tivity.26 Bois described Brenner’s view rather dismissively as a type 
of political Marxism which ignored the material foundation of class 
capacities. Nonetheless, the scholars who followed in the footsteps 
of Brenner adopted the designation Political Marxism as a badge of 
honour. Coming to prominence in the wake of the collapse of Soviet 
Marxism and the triumph of neoliberalism, these researchers made 
it a point to question commonly accepted orthodoxies on the left, 
including the notion of bourgeois revolution.27
 Despite breaking with the consensus of Political Marxism over the 
question of capitalism in Holland, Brenner’s perfunctory treatment 
of the political and social dimension of the Dutch Revolution 
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conformed to this group’s overall dismissal of the importance of 
the notion of bourgeois revolution. According to Marx and Engels, 
early capitalist development in England and France climaxed in 
bourgeois revolution. In Teschke’s view this conception assumed a 
self-conscious and united class, the bourgeoisie, as the main agent 
of the revolution. Teschke’s conception that Marx thought of the 
bourgeoisie as self-aware and unified at the moment of revolution 
requires immediate correction. As Marx described the revolu-
tionaries of seventeenth-century England and eighteenth-century 
France in The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Napoleon, they did 
not understand their projects explicitly in class terms, but rather in 
terms of the Bible or the Roman Republic.28 That the ideology of 
these revolutionaries was to be found in the political ambiguities 
of evangelical Protestantism or Roman republicanism suggests not 
full class consciousness but a consciousness which reflects a class in 
the making, or one seeking to bridge differences between classes, or 
perhaps both. That Marx pointed this out reflects a more sophisti-
cated understanding of class and its relation to concrete history than 
Teschke supposes.
  Teschke noted that, as a result of what he termed the revisionist 
attack on the idea of bourgeois revolution, the Political Marxists, 
in contrast to other Marxist currents, had jettisoned the concept 
of bourgeois revolution.29 The nexus between capitalism and the 
bourgeoisie in the case of the English and French revolutions or 
other bourgeois revolutions had to be severed.30 In other words, the 
tide of scholarship which put into question the reality of a so-called 
bourgeoisie and of a bourgeois revolution was such that Marxists 
had no real choice but to abandon the idea of a bourgeois revo-
lution. The fact that much of this revisionist scholarship in both 
English-speaking and French academia emanated from liberal or 
conservative sources that might have reasons other than academic 
for arguing against the concept of bourgeois revolution did not 
trouble Teschke.
 Teschke was not bothered either that the notion of jettisoning the 
idea of bourgeois revolution meant throwing out the most revolu-
tionary component of the Marxist theory of history, or the element 
most intimately linked with the expectation of future proletarian 
revolution. The conception of bourgeois as well as proletarian revo-
lution assumes that underclasses can acquire sufficient economic 
and political power to overthrow the ruling class. Political Marxism 
suggests that the economic and political initiative in the advance of 
history always remains with the ruling class. Indeed, in the eyes of 
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Political Marxists, in the case of late medieval France, the one case 
in which the lower class was most successful in class war, success 
in holding onto the land condemned it to an interminable economic 
stagnation and tyranny under the Ancien Régime. Nonetheless, 
Teschke is certain that the weight of historical evidence and the 
theoretical arguments of the Political Marxists have shown that 
‘while the English revolution was not bourgeois, it was capitalist; 
and while the French Revolution was bourgeois, it was not capi-
talist. This re-interpretation presents a fundamental breakthrough 
for Marxism.’31
 It might be a breakthrough for academic Marxism, and if it 
were historically correct we would be obliged to respect it. But it 
can hardly be counted a triumph for revolutionary Marxism, or for 
what Dobb referred to as the revolutionary view of world history. 
Rather the position of the Political Marxists on revolution appears 
to be what the French refer to as a fuite en avant, or headlong 
retreat in the face not of historical facts but of neoliberalism. 
What is the link between neoliberalism and Political Marxism? 
There undoubtedly is one, although it is indirect. I would argue 
that neoliberalism shaped the overall intellectual zeitgeist of the 
last decades. Neoliberalism itself is profoundly antihistorical, 
being a set of policies that seek to deny the profoundly unstable 
economic history of capitalism and especially unfettered capitalism. 
Postmodernism proved a major collaborator, and it too was deeply 
antihistorical, as Ellen Wood helped to show.32 It was in this 
atmosphere that not coincidentally historical revisionism came to 
the fore in both England and France. In the milieu of professional 
historians there could be no thought of repudiating history itself. 
But what postmodernism was to the literary disciplines, revisionism 
was to academic history. Occupying strategic places in academic 
and cultural life, historical revisionists gained enormous influence 
by exploiting certain lacunae in the Marxist accounts of the English 
and French revolutions. Indeed we must admit that this way of 
looking at things produced a significant body of real scholarship 
on the English and French Revolutions through the creation of a 
veritable school of history on both sides of the Atlantic. A Marxist 
view of the English and French Revolutions became a laughing 
stock in such quarters. Given the power of such an institutional-
ized academic viewpoint, it is not surprising that some who abided 
by Marxism capitulated to revisionism. Yet at its core revisionism, 
including Political Marxism, is a rejection of the significance 
of revolution. Above all it is a repudiation of the revolutionary 
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aspirations of the 1960s, the more so as a Marxist view of the 
bourgeois revolutions is still vibrant, as we shall see.
england
Teschke’s notion of the English Revolution is based on Brenner’s 
account. The latter begins by delineating in much greater detail than 
Teschke the development of Marx’s theory of bourgeois revolution. 
After describing its early permutations, Brenner claims that in The 
Communist Manifesto – following the liberal French historians of the 
nineteenth century, François Mignet, Augustin Thierry and François 
Guizot – Marx reached his mature conception of the bourgeois 
revolution. It was based on the development of the forces of produc-
tion under the command of an emergent bourgeoisie. At first allying 
with the monarchy to curb the feudal nobility, the maturing bour-
geoisie ultimately entered into opposition to the monarchy – the 
latter counterposing itself to their increasing economic and social 
demands, and falling back on the support of the nobles: ‘Marx has 
the bourgeoisie and absolute monarchy entering into alliance in the 
early modern period in order to destroy their common enemy, the 
parasitic feudal nobility. Then, as the bourgeoisie grew in strength 
the absolute monarchy gravitated back toward the old nobility.’33 By 
overthrowing both monarchy and nobility, the bourgeois revolution 
cleared away the remaining obstacles to its progress, as well as that 
of the capitalist economy.
 Brenner takes an entirely different tack, based on a class deter-
minism which stresses the initiative of the landlords. Basing himself 
on a reading of the Grundrisse and Capital, he claims that that far 
from production governing property or class relations, the character 
of production was itself conditioned by the established structure of 
property relations.34 In accord with his theory of the predominant 
role of landlords dating from the outcome of the class struggles 
of the late Middle Ages, Brenner insists that they took the lead in 
the process by which peasant producers were reduced to market 
dependence in the sixteenth century. The landlords assumed the 
initiative in instituting primitive accumulation and creating a class 
of capitalist tenant farmers who took up competitive leases, while 
most subsistence peasants were driven off the land and were forced 
into selling their labour for wages. In the process the conditions were 
created for further capitalist accumulation.35
 Brenner then concludes that Marx’s account of landlord-inspired 
primitive accumulation undermines the foundations of his theory 
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of bourgeois revolution, as the landlords themselves removed the 
remaining fetters on capitalist development. The logic of his account 
of Marx’s conception of primitive accumulation was to render 
bourgeois revolution superfluous: ‘Marx’s idea of the so-called 
primitive accumulation … appeared to undermine the historical and 
theoretical foundations of the theory of bourgeois revolution.’36
 It is against this background that Brenner undertook a review of 
the historiography of the English Revolution. As he explains, the 
traditional social interpretation of the revolution was developed 
by R. H. Tawney, Christopher Hill and Lawrence Stone in the 
1940s and 1950s.37 It roughly follows Marx’s forces of production 
approach, with the addition of Tawney’s notion of the rise of the 
gentry, or emergence of an agrarian capitalist class headed by the 
lesser nobility or gentry. This social interpretation collapsed because 
its supporters could not prove that in the seventeenth century the 
landed class divided between capitalist and feudal landlords, or that 
these two groups split along political lines during the crisis of the 
English Revolution.
 According to Brenner, Stone’s Crisis of the Aristocracy played 
a key role in discrediting the social interpretation.38 In particular 
Stone took issue with Tawney’s rise of the gentry thesis, arguing that 
the rise of the lesser nobles and eclipse of the aristocracy was only a 
transitory phenomenon. He argued that it was not a question of the 
aristocracy in crisis, but of the aristocracy in the process of successful 
political and economic transformation. By the beginning of the 
seventeenth century almost all of the greater nobles had abandoned 
the lordly or feudal mode of reproduction, and in consequence were 
improving their economic prospects. Unable to collect rent any 
longer by means of extra-economic coercion, as under feudalism, the 
aristocracy took the lead in the process of primitive accumulation 
and the imposition of economic rents on their land.39 In describing 
this process of aristocratic renewal, Stone helped to undermine the 
traditional social interpretation of the English Civil War as a revolt 
by a new bourgeoisie which had arisen in the interstices of the feudal 
order against a still largely feudal ruling aristocracy.40
 Based on Stone, Brenner rejects the traditional social interpreta-
tion of the English Revolution. On the other hand, in his justly 
acclaimed Merchants and Revolution Brenner also refuses to accept 
the conclusion that the revolution had no social and economic 
basis, as claimed by the revisionists.41 Rather he sees the conflict as 
having been between what he calls the patrimonial monarchy and 
its diverse group of supporters, including merchants and nobles, and 
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an opposition which also included merchants and nobles. Like its 
counterpart in France, the patrimonial English monarchy sought 
to establish control over the country by, among other measures, 
being able to directly extract surplus from the rural population. An 
alliance of capitalist landlords, merchants and others ranged them-
selves in opposition to this project. It was this group rather than a 
class that triumphed through the revolution.42
 In speaking about the monarchy, Brenner uses the term ‘patri-
monial’. This usage, stemming from Max Weber, allows him to 
distance himself from Dobb’s and Anderson’s view that the early 
modern monarchy in England was still feudal, or if you like the 
last rampart of feudalism. To admit this would be to undercut his 
view that England was already a capitalist country in the sixteenth 
century. The term patrimonial is meant to suggest the gap between 
the monarchy and the landlords, who in Brenner’s view are capital-
ists.43 Yet, in seeming contradiction, he is also forced to admit that 
like the French monarchy, his so-called English patrimonial state 
was the negation of capitalism – its project constituting a funda-
mental barrier to the further development of capitalism. Hence the 
issue in the English Revolution was removing the remaining barriers 
to the future of capitalism. In other words, we can say that, far 
from the English Revolution being, at best, icing on the capitalist 
cake, its outcome was critical to its future development. Brenner’s 
view seems quite contradictory. But overall it puts him in the camp 
of revisionism, rejecting the idea that the English Revolution was a 
bourgeois revolution as understood by Marx.
 As one would expect, Wood follows Brenner closely. Calling the 
English Revolution ‘bourgeois’, she claims, requires a definition so 
vague and general as to empty it of meaning. In passing we might 
note that ‘noble’ is likewise a rather vague, broad and historically 
disputed term, which nonetheless, like the term ‘bourgeoisie’, refers 
to the fundamental Marxist notion of class. According to Wood, 
if the revolution advanced the development of capitalism it was 
by consolidating the position of the already capitalist landlords, 
who in any case were already dominant in society and the state. It 
was a case of pushing on an open door. The revolution was not a 
class struggle that gave victory to a capitalist bourgeoisie against 
a ruling class that was thwarting its progress. The class struggle 
that did occur in the revolution was between the ruling class and 
subordinate popular forces. The latter’s class interest had as much 
to do with opposing as promoting the progress of those capitalist 
landlords or their bourgeois allies. Yet Wood notes that this view 
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does not deny the role of capitalist tenant farmers in the develop-
ment of capitalism. What it does deny is the connection between 
this reality and the revolution.44 Whatever Wood may say on this 
latter point, the fact is that in Brenner’s version of the development 
of agrarian capitalism, stress is overwhelmingly laid on the role of 
the landlords as increasingly the recipients of capitalist rents, rather 
than on the economic initiative of capitalist farmers.
 As to the role of the landlords during the revolution, Stone had 
claimed that no correlation has emerged between noble political align-
ments during the revolution and their degree of economic enterprise.45 
Yet Norah Carlin considers the actual statistical evidence offered by 
Stone in support of this sweeping claim – so important to Brenner – to 
be surprisingly unimpressive.46 Moreover, if we focus on the nobility of 
the northwest of England, the most substantial base of royalist support 
during the Civil War, they turn out to be less enterprising, less wealthy 
and less well educated than their brethren in the south.47 Indeed, 
Andrew Bell Appleby has shown that whereas in the south landlords 
were encouraging the development of agricultural capitalism, those in 
the royalist heartland of the northwest took the lead in a seigneurial 
reaction against the peasantry.48 Roger Manning does not deny that 
many landlords across England encouraged their tenants to make 
improvements in order to meet their so-called economic rents. On the 
other hand, as part of the same process many others practised what 
he describes as a fiscal seigneurialism which had nothing to do with 
positive economic initiatives. As such they inspired ongoing popular 
protest.49 But the important point surely is that, contrary to Brenner’s 
and Stone’s view, not all landlords in England, and especially not in 
the royalist bastion of the northwest, can be considered capitalist 
landlords. As such this region must be seen as constituting a crucial 
economic and social base of royalist political support.
the caPItalIst farmers In marx
As we have noted, in Brenner’s version of the development of 
agrarian capitalism it is the passive role he assigns to capitalist 
farmers, in contrast to the aristocratic class, that is notable. On the 
contrary, in chapter 29 of Volume One of Capital, entitled ‘Genesis 
of the capitalist farmer’, Marx places most of the emphasis on the 
appearance of rural capitalists as the principal agents of emerging 
capitalism, with the landlords playing a secondary role.50 Prior to 
the sixteenth century the circumstances and size of their farms were 
still limited. Both farmers and wage labourers who still maintained 
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little plots improved themselves by their own labour. In other words, 
the economic circumstances and the scale of the farms of these petty 
producers were still limited. It was the agricultural take-off which 
began in the last third of the fifteenth and continued almost until the 
end of the sixteenth century that enriched these emerging agrarian 
entrepreneurs, while impoverishing most of the rest of the rural 
population. In a historically evocative image Marx notes that the 
striking thing about these farmers was that they made their capital 
breed by employing wage labour, while paying part of the surplus 
value to the landlords as rent. Enclosure of the commons permitted 
them to expand their holdings of livestock, while increasing the 
manuring of their expanding leaseholds. Meanwhile, inflation 
allowed them to lower real wages and increase prices, reaping rich 
profits as a result. Marx’s view, which is scarcely disputable, is that a 
class of increasingly powerful and ambitious capitalist farmers arose 
in the sixteenth century and seized the economic initiative.
 For Marx it is the capitalist farmers who become the decisive 
figure because from now on they exploit and control the labour of 
the wage-earning producers:
When the capitalist tenant farmer steps in between landlord and 
actual tiller of the soil, all relations which arose out of the old 
rural mode of production are torn asunder. The farmer becomes 
the actual commander of these agricultural labourers and the 
actual exploiter of their surplus labour, whereas the landlord 
maintains a direct relationship, and indeed simply a money and 
contractual relationship, solely with this capitalist tenant.51
It is the command of wage labour that makes the capitalist farmer 
pivotal to the new mode of production. The landlord recedes into 
the background.
 As we saw in Chapter 3, Dobb built on Marx’s insight, under-
lining the key role of small producers as the decisive agents in the 
development of not only capitalist agriculture, but also manufacture. 
In the case of agriculture, substantial peasants rented land, relying on 
wage labour that became available in increasing quantities as a result 
of the process of enclosure. It was from this rising element of farmers 
that most of the innovations in agricultural technique emanated.52 As 
we have seen in the previous chapters, Overton and Byres argue that 
tenant farmers and other rural capitalists were the dynamic element 
in the capitalist transformation of the English countryside. They often 
successfully resisted the economic demands of landlords. In fact, 
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agricultural capitalism developed in areas where lordship was weak 
and peasant property rights were strong. The most striking advances 
in output and land productivity occurred in areas where lordship was 
relatively weak. It was rural capitalists rather than landlords who 
took the initiative in agricultural innovation.
the mIddle sort
In this generation it is Brian Manning who has built his interpretation 
of the English Revolution on Marx’s and Dobb’s view of capitalist 
development.53 A student of Christopher Hill, Manning’s reputation 
was overshadowed, as was Hill’s, by the tide of revisionist history 
from the 1970s. Such revisionism includes the Political Marxism 
of Brenner and Wood. Nonetheless, in a series of works Manning 
sketched a view of the English Revolution based on the rise of an 
emergent middle class, or of the so-called ‘middle sort of people’, 
which has gained increasing if grudging scholarly acceptance. While 
in agreement with Brenner and Wood that capitalism implanted 
itself in England in the sixteenth century, Manning argues that the 
monarchy, and the ruling class of aristocrats and greater gentry who 
supported the monarchy, constituted a continuing barrier to further 
capitalist progress. On the contrary, Brenner denies that elements of 
the aristocracy and greater gentry constituted such a barrier. Rather, 
they led the way toward capitalism. Furthermore, Manning argues 
that it was the mobilization of the middle sort, or rather of a revo-
lutionary element from within this middle sort, that provided the 
social base of the parliamentary cause and enabled it to triumph. 
The monarchy and aristocracy were eventually restored, but not 
before the monarchy was transformed into a constitutional regime 
and feudal tenure became private property.54
 Manning identified the largest landowners, made up of the aris-
tocracy and greater gentry, as the ruling class. They wielded political 
power at the local and national level prior to the revolution. The 
remaining middle and lesser gentry, according to him, were a status 
group. It was a political and religious split in the ruling class that 
made the revolution possible. The largest class was the independent 
small producers, made up of peasants and small craftspeople. In the 
course of the sixteenth century a growing social differentiation of 
this group took place. This division tended toward the emergence of 
capitalist farmers and small manufacturers employing wage labour, 
on the one hand, and those producers with no or little means of 
production, selling more and more of their labour in return for 
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wages, on the other. Manning shows how the rising economic power 
of the former group reflected itself in their greater influence on 
local religious and social life. In contrast to Brenner’s and Wood’s 
over-emphasis on agrarian capitalism, Manning points out the 
importance of the emergence of industry in both country and town, 
and the interaction between farming and manufacturing activity 
in certain regions of the country. In Manning’s view the develop-
ment of capitalism is not merely about agriculture, but about the 
interpenetration of capitalist industry and agriculture.
 By the seventeenth century the term ‘middling’ or ‘middle sort’ 
was used to differentiate the better-off commoners from the gentry 
and from the wage-dependent poor. In the 1630s these middle sort 
– not a class but a class in the making – became more and more 
alienated from the monarchy as a result of the imposition of non-
parliamentary taxation and what were regarded as Popish religious 
policies. Deeply imbued with Protestantism, which was existentially 
understood as the national religion, this middle group was deeply 
offended by royalist religious policies, which included the restora-
tion of railed-off altars and the wearing of surplices by the clergy 
– practices with deeply conservative social meaning. In Manning’s 
account, it is this proto-capitalist element emerging from below and 
in command of labour power, and not the capitalist landlords, that 
was the dynamic political and social component in English society, 
and which seized the initiative in the revolution.
 Both contemporary accounts and modern historical scholarship 
confirm that the bulk of support for the parliamentary side in the 
Civil War came from the middle sort, both in town and country: 
lesser gentry, independent freeholders, enterprising small land-
holders and industrial craftspeople. It is notable that landlords were 
unable to control the political allegiance of these elements, including 
their own tenants. Remarkable was the mobilization for Parliament 
from industrial regions and towns, especially where Puritanism 
and hostility to government economic regulations were strong.55 
The bulk of the aristocracy and gentry – capitalist landlords or 
not – were frightened by popular disorders at the beginning of the 
revolution and the political mobilization of the middle and lesser 
sort, and consequently supported the monarchy. Some workers and 
less-well-off peasants sided with the king. As Dobb had argued, 
the majority of big merchants who were tied to the monarchy and 
aristocracy were royalist when forced to choose sides.
 Manning underlines the importance of Brenner’s Merchants and 
Revolution in illuminating the difference between the established 
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merchants who supported the monarchy, as against the new merchants 
connected to colonial endeavours and linked to the parliamentary cause. 
While old merchants tended to limit their activities to trade, the newer 
element involved themselves in the processing of colonial products 
like sugar and tobacco. Overwhelmingly favourable to Parliament, 
they supported and profited from the Cromwellian conquest of 
Ireland. Many of these merchants were younger sons of minor gentry, 
provincial merchants or prosperous farmers. They backed a more 
democratic London government and the abolition of episcopacy in 
favour of Presbyterianism or Congregationalism. Brenner’s colonial 
merchants were clearly in the forefront of an emergent revolutionary 
bourgeoisie according to Manning. Brenner is silent about the revolu-
tionary political role of this merchant vanguard, despite the fact that 
his research revealed their critical function. The reason, of course, is 
his rejection of the idea of bourgeois revolution.
 Manning demonstrates that the mobilization of the middle sort 
of people played a critical role in the triumph of the parliamentary 
side. On the basis of their support, the ruling class of magnates and 
upper gentry were politically marginalized, and power at the local 
level devolved on those who held lesser gentry status or even on 
those from the middling group. At the national level the republican 
regimes of the 1650s went a considerable distance in constituting a 
strong centralized state organized to enhance English commercial, 
naval and colonial power, to the satisfaction of leading elements 
among the middling sort.
 Indeed, Brenner’s failure to take seriously the importance of 
control of the state to the development of capitalism seriously 
vitiates his theory of capitalist origins. The state provides the 
public space within which the reproduction of capitalist relations 
of production is possible. In effect such a state develops policies 
which totalize such a space in favour of capitalism. As such, a 
state that favours rather than obstructs the development of capi-
talism is indispensable, and cannot be thought of as external to 
its development. Tony Smith considers it crucial, insisting that the 
state is ‘no mere epiphenomenon of capital’.56 Reconciling opposed 
class interests and inter-class rivalries, the state provides the public 
context necessary for continuing capital accumulation. As such the 
state cannot be thought of as apart from the social relations of 
capital. Rather it is an intrinsic part of such relations. Smith writes 
about the contemporary state, but his observations apply even more 
forcefully to the early modern state. In that connection, it is note-
worthy that the revolution did away with the Star Chamber, High 
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Commission, Court of Wards and feudal tenure – those institutions 
and legal arrangements that most impeded capitalist development. 
The monarchy was brought under the control of the men of property 
in the Parliament, while it lost its control of the judiciary as well.57 
The subsequent creation by the state of the Bank of England and 
stock exchange established a nation-wide system of money and 
credit.
 The aristocracy was eventually restored to power because the 
widespread popular unrest during the revolution did not lead to the 
dispossession of the aristocracy as a whole or as a class. Meanwhile, 
the unrest and political and religious radicalism unleashed by the 
revolution frightened many among the better-off middle sort. But the 
old ruling class returned on the basis of closer collaboration with the 
middle sort, and with most of the remaining obstacles to capitalism 
removed. Manning notes that:
the fundamental fact is that the aristocracy was not expropri-
ated by the revolution: it retained its estates and its status, 
though deprived temporarily of its political power. In essence 
the Restoration was the re-establishment of the aristocracy in 
political power, but under new terms of relationship to a state 
evolving into a great naval, commercial, colonial and industrial 
power, and to increasing interdependence with the ‘middle sort 
of people’.58
Manning carefully and cautiously concludes that the English 
Revolution was a class struggle. According to him, whether or not 
a struggle was a class conflict depends on the degree to which issues 
of class were involved. Despite the social diversity on both sides, 
it is none the less the case that an aristocratic ethos dominated the 
royalist cause, however many plebeians fought for it. An egalitarian 
ethos emanating from the middle sort helped to mobilize the parlia-
mentary party, even though it contained some aristocrats and some 
of the latter even led it nationally. Indeed, the parliamentary party 
was suffused with anti-aristocratic sentiments. Such antagonistic 
feelings toward the aristocracy marked off those of the middle sort 
who followed the parliamentary party as opposed to those who 
remained neutral or who supported the royal side. Moreover, the 
committed supporters of Parliament among the middle sort had 
greater influence over events.
 The middle sort of people was based in the class of independent 
small producers. Some of these were rising to become capitalist 
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employers, and others were declining into wage-earning employees. 
Classes are constantly being shaped and reshaped, a process out of 
which history is made. A whole class does not become radicalized or 
class conscious at once, and the middle sort lacked the coherence to 
assume a common class position. Groups become conscious of them-
selves as classes in opposition to other classes. As a result of such 
collision, elements of the middle sort became aware of the conflict 
between their economic and social interests and those of the party 
of the aristocracy.
 As we have seen, in the name of Political Marxism Teschke 
asserted that the English Revolution was not bourgeois, but was 
capitalist. I beg to differ. In accord with Manning, I accept the 
view that the revolution was made by a bourgeoisie in formation 
rather than a fully fledged bourgeoisie in the style of the Victorian 
age. Indeed, I accept the view that a bourgeois revolution does not 
require the bourgeoisie as a necessary agent, provided that it clears 
the way for the further advance of capitalism.59 On the other hand, 
the role of new merchants of London in making the revolution, the 
social make-up of the republican governments and the outcome 
of the revolution justify us in continuing to refer to the English 
Revolution, like the Dutch Revolution, as a bourgeois revolution. 
Moreover, such a revolution did not entail the complete destruc-
tion of the aristocracy. That did not happen even in the French 
Revolution. What was required was that it cease interfering in the 
further development of capitalism.
france
Teschke speaks of the French Revolution as a bourgeois revolution, 
but not a capitalist one. This follows from Brenner’s notion that in 
contrast to England, capitalism failed to develop in France at the 
end of the Middle Ages owing to its different property relations.60 
It is George Comninel who developed this notion into a revisionist 
view of the French Revolution. Comninel, like Brenner, believes 
that Marx mistakenly accepted the categories of liberal nineteenth- 
century French historiography which supposed a basic conflict 
between the nobility and the bourgeoisie. In consequence, he 
misconstrued the nature of the revolution of 1789 as a bourgeois 
and capitalist revolution. The following discussion is designed to 
confute this Political Marxist view of the French Revolution. Its 
purpose is to show that both capitalism and a capitalist bourgeoisie 
were intrinsic to the revolution.
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 According to Comninel, a class that based itself on profit did not 
exist in France prior to 1789. Appropriation of surplus value by 
a bourgeoisie did not occur. Both the nobility and the bourgeoisie 
based themselves on rent and income from state offices. As a result, 
Comninel believes that the two groups must be regarded as members 
of a single class. Hence, the conflict that did break out between 
the bourgeoisie and the nobility in 1789 was essentially an inter-
elite struggle rather than a class conflict.61 On this point Comninel 
is in complete accord with leading conservative revisionists of the 
French Revolution. Comninel rejects the idea that capitalist farming 
existed on the large tenant farms of northern France that operated 
on the basis of wage labour and profit. He disallows the idea that 
such operations were capitalist because the labour force was kept 
dependent on its own subsistence production rather than being fully 
proletarianized. Furthermore, the process of production was blocked 
from expansion and improvement of the means of production by a 
whole body of traditional practices, rights and obligations.62 Wood, 
Comninel’s thesis supervisor, found these arguments persuasive. The 
French Revolution may have been bourgeois but it was not capitalist. 
Prior to the French Revolution capitalist conditions did not exist.63
rural caPItalIsm
Like Brenner, Comninel and Wood rightly emphasize the existence of 
an agrarian capitalism and a rural bourgeoisie as a sine qua non for the 
existence of capitalism. But in Chapter 2 we saw that such a capitalism 
did consolidate itself in France at the end of the sixteenth century. 
Moreover, despite the triumph of the absolute state and a heavy 
burden of rent and taxes, this bourgeoisie persisted in the seventeenth 
century alongside a commercial and even manufacturing bourgeoisie. 
It re-emerged with new vigour in the eighteenth century.64 
 We have seen that Comninel denied that the tenant farmers of 
the rich grain lands of northern France were capitalists. Yet in 
the eighteenth century the Physiocrat Anne-Robert-Jacques Turgot 
described them as ‘agricultural capitalist entrepreneurs’. These rich 
peasants who rented large farms favoured a free market in grain, 
as espoused by Turgot. They organized production using their own 
tools and equipment. At the same time, they employed a workforce 
paid in wages. Based on their operations, they derived a profit and 
as a result paid the landlords what amounted to a capitalist rent.65 
Indeed, the farmers of such enterprises had to pay not only these 
rents, but usually also seigneurial dues, taxes and tithes. But since 
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their farms were on fertile lands that were close to good roads 
and towns, they were able to take advantage of high prices and to 
enjoy profitable returns. Yet they often enhanced their revenues by 
farming ecclesiastical tithes and seigneurial obligations. As such, the 
incomes of such farmers were made up of both capitalist profits and 
feudal rents. They also earned money from taking interest on loans 
to poorer peasants. Through their business and social connections 
and their lifestyle, these farmers constituted part of the bourgeoisie 
alongside those of the middle class who lived in the surrounding 
bourgs and towns. Jean-Marc Moriceau describes these wealthy 
farmers in the Ile de France as attaining the level of a kind of gentry 
in the eighteenth century.66
 In northern France this elite of wealthy farmers constituted a 
minority among the more numerous and broader group of pros-
perous peasant ploughmen or labourers. On a lesser scale than 
the wealthy farmers, they too hired wage labour and loaned grain, 
ploughs, wagons and money to their less well-off neighbours. As 
such, they too were part of an emergent class of rural capitalists. 
More generally, we can say that the French countryside even in the 
south and west saw a halting and tentative progress toward capi-
talist relations in agriculture and the development of an agrarian 
bourgeoisie.67
 Moriceau notes that in the Ile de France and over much of the 
rest of the north of France, genuine agricultural improvement took 
place. Especially in regions close to cities that were affected by 
new agronomic ideas and by the growing availability of manure, 
productivity significantly increased in the second half of the eigh-
teenth century.68 The idea of introducing agronomic improvements 
spread to the better-off peasants through the increasing influence of 
country postmasters, who often were themselves successful farmers. 
The intrusion of capitalism played an important role in destabilizing 
the countryside and mobilizing the rural population on the eve of 
the revolution. Capitalist farmers emerged as the leaders of the rural 
revolution.
the rIse of PolItIcal economy
In the years leading up to the revolution, capitalism emerged rapidly 
not only in agriculture, but also in industry, as we shall see.69 These 
dramatic economic changes and the incipient financial and economic 
crisis of this period produced a remarkable outpouring of economic 
literature. Between 1750 and 1789 some 2,200 books on political 
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economy were published in France, with 804 appearing in 1789 
alone.70 These numbers testify to the reality of profound economic 
change. Led by François Quesnay and Turgot, the leading econo-
mists of the time organized themselves into the so-called Physiocratic 
School. The Physiocrats based themselves on the theory that value, 
or as they put it net product, derived from the land. At the same time 
they were fervently committed to laissez-faire within the framework 
of a so-called legal despotism – an idealized version of the Ancien 
Régime.
 Marx had high praise for the Physiocratic School, seeing them as 
the first economists to sketch a theory of surplus value.71 According 
to a recent study of the school by Gianni Vaggi, profit was a system-
atic feature of the Physiocratic understanding of the so-called net 
product or surplus.72 Indeed, the decades leading up to the revo-
lution saw the evolution of Physiocratic teaching in the direction 
of explicitly capitalist conceptions. Following Quesnay, Nicole 
Baudeau, a popularizer of Physiocratic doctrine, demonstrated the 
productive potential of free or wage labour and of the capitalist 
entrepreneur in both farming and manufacture.73 As is well known, 
another Quesnay disciple, Turgot, actually attempted to introduce 
a free market in grain and labour during his tenure as controller-
general and minister of finance. Indeed, it is in Turgot’s writings 
that we witness the transformation of Physiocratic teaching from 
an economic theory based on agriculture into a theory of capitalism 
proper. This was simply a reaction on the part of a sophisticated 
economic thinker, on the one hand, to the increasing pervasiveness 
of capitalist farming based on wage labour, and on the other hand, 
to the growth of manufacturing.74
  In his principal work, Réflexions sur la formation et la distribution 
des richesses (1766), Turgot repeatedly underlines his fealty to the 
basic principles of Physiocratic theory. Nonetheless, in a backwards 
and forwards manner, Turgot moves toward a recognition of the 
value-creating potential of both industry and agriculture, of the 
essential role of capital to the activity of farmers and manufacturers, 
and to the common condition of agricultural and farm workers, 
both of whom were competing to sell their labour to employers in 
return for a wage.75 In Turgot’s work the primary focus becomes 
not land as a material entity that produces wealth, but capital as a 
value which attempts to expand and realize itself whether in farming 
or manufacture.76 At the same time, Turgot explicitly acknowledges 
the more productive and advanced form of capitalist agriculture 
based on capitalism, prevalent throughout the north of France where 
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competitive leases were the rule.77 While Turgot harked back to the 
notion of the net product at various points in the Réflections, he 
increasingly acknowledged the role of profit in capitalist activity.78 
Turgot’s economic principles, like those of other French theorists 
of the time, were a reflection and theorization of what had already 
emerged in French society, and which he hoped would develop 
further.
 The Physiocrats were not without their critics. Jean-Joseph-Louis 
Graslin and Emmanuel-Joseph Sieyès rejected altogether the idea 
that land was the source of wealth. On the contrary, they asserted 
that it was labour which was the true source of wealth. Labour 
in both agriculture and industry produced value.79 The position of 
Sieyès in this respect had important political implications. In the 
Physiocratic scheme elaborated under the Ancien Régime the landed 
proprietors enjoyed a special place as receivers of the net product. But 
in the social order described in Sieyès’s justly famous revolutionary 
pamphlet Qu’est-ce que le tiers etat? this group simply vanishes.
Wage labour In france
The growing prominence of a labour theory of value was directly tied 
to the increasing dependence of most of the population on wages. 
But, according to Comninel, no true proletariat existed because the 
wage-earning class, which Comninel acknowledges existed, was 
required to live off its own subsistence. An authentic proletariat 
must be dependent on the market for its means of subsistence as well 
as be wage-based. As a matter of fact, Comninel’s concept of a wage-
earning class living off its own subsistence appears to be a bit of a 
contradiction in terms. If wage workers in eighteenth-century France 
could sustain themselves through their own subsistence, why did 
they turn to wage work in increasing numbers? As we have already 
seen, the rural wage-earning class in eighteenth-century France in 
fact did not, and could not, live off its own subsistence. That is why 
it turned more and more to wage work.
 It is true that many rural workers had gardens and were able to 
glean and forage for a certain portion of their subsistence. It is this 
possibility that Comninel points out. Nonetheless, a substantial part 
of the food, and eventually even the clothing and household articles 
of rural workers, had to be obtained by spending money in the 
market. Money – indispensable to subsistence – was only available 
to the labouring classes through the sale of their labour power in 
the market in return for wages. Consequently, the sale of labour in 
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return for wages was an intrinsic feature of the eighteenth-century 
economy. Moreover, dependence on wages seems to have increased 
among the rural population throughout the century. Following from 
this growing importance of wage labour, the role of surplus value or 
capitalist profit produced by wage workers composed an expanding 
element in the eighteenth-century French economy.
  Comninel’s view is perhaps based on the purist idea that a true 
proletarian is one who not only must sell all their labour power in 
the market, but also one who must buy all their means of subsistence 
in the market as well. Comninel apparently would have us believe 
that the rural labouring population prior to the revolution was not 
proletarianized because it did not obtain all means of subsistence 
from the market.
 While the degree of wage dependency varies depending on time 
and place, it is also true historically that growing dependency 
on wages entails a progressive loss of control over the means of 
production on the part of producers as capitalism develops. From 
Comninel’s quite unhistorical and mechanistic perspective, prole-
tarians, and hence capitalism, either do or do not exist. From this 
standpoint it is impossible to distinguish, over time, degrees of wage 
dependence as the capitalist economy evolves. In Comninel’s view the 
working class comes into being fully developed ex nihilo or it does 
not exist at all. There is no making of the working class through the 
vicissitudes and contradictions of concrete history. Indeed, Comninel 
contrasts eighteenth-century French peasant producers with what 
he represents as a truly proletarianized English rural workforce 
who are consequently utterly dependent on the market. Eighteenth-
century England is pictured, in contrast to France, as a place where 
a fully rational agrarian capitalism existed.80 That this was far from 
having been the case has recently been shown, for example, by J. 
M. Nesson. Not only did commons rights largely survive in England 
into the nineteenth century, even a peasantry continued to exist, 
according to Nesson.81
 In the decade prior to the outbreak of the revolution, the 
influence of the Physiocrats waned. Turgot continued to be read, 
but now alongside the work of Adam Smith, whose reputation 
grew larger and larger on the eve of the revolution.82 Successive 
editions of his work appeared, and his ideas became an important 
part of the ideological context in which the National Legislative 
Assembly swept away feudalism and imposed a legal framework of 
liberal capitalism based on the principles of constitutional govern-
ment.83 The growing popularity of Smith in France was not simply a 
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reflection of the popularity of British liberal ideas. It was a response 
to the fact that in the four decades prior to the revolution, capi-
talism, which had been weak and underground, suddenly surged 
powerfully to the surface. It is precisely the rapidity of such change 
that engendered revolution.
the revolutIonary crIsIs
There can be no question about the existence of agrarian capitalism 
on the eve of the revolution of 1789. On this basis there occurred a 
tremendous expansion of commerce, especially foreign and overseas 
commerce. Manufacture also grew spectacularly. The investment 
of capital and the reorganization of manufacture in the direction 
of concentration and centralization of production were especially 
notable in mining and cotton and chemical manufacturing. As a 
consequence in the last decades prior to the revolution there took 
place an enormous growth of the role of profit in the economy, 
and the power and influence of the economic bourgeoisie.84 In the 
actual revolution the regime of aristocratic privilege and feudalism 
was swept away, and the legal and political superstructure of society 
was reorganized in order to facilitate capital accumulation. The 
continued entrenchment of feudalism under the absolute monarchy 
and the overwhelming popular revolution against it made the revo-
lution an event of epochal scale.85 On the basis of this tremendous 
upheaval the bourgeoisie assumed power. Moreover, there was a 
clear consciousness that the bourgeoisie had taken power. Ongoing 
industrialization and the experience of the Revolution helped to 
create the beginnings of working-class consciousness as well.86
conclusIon
In summary I have reasserted the classic Marxist view of the Dutch, 
English and French revolutions as capitalist and bourgeois revolu-
tions. The emergence of the territorial state after 1500 in France 
and England was critical to the initial development of capitalism 
in these two places. In Holland such a state was produced by its 
prolonged revolutionary struggle. Few would deny the growing 
strength of capitalism in England. We have likewise established its 
growing presence in Holland and France prior to their revolutions. 
Sixteenth-century monarchies had based themselves on the support 
of landlord nobles in the first instance, but also drew support from 
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merchants and an emerging layer of manufacturers and rural capi-
talists. But at a certain point the growing power of these embryonic 
capitalists came into conflict with the increasingly absolutist rule of 
the Hapsburg, Stuart and Bourbon monarchies. The latter hemmed 
in the further development of capitalism and the social and political 
aspirations of a still young and emergent bourgeoisie. Increasingly 
these monarchies fell back on the landlords and more conservative 
elements of the merchant class for support. In the revolutionary 
crises, in each instance the lead was taken not by the established 
merchants, who tended to support the existing regime or sit on the 
fence, but by lesser merchants and better-off petty producers, urban 
but also rural. As a result of revolution, the state was restructured 
in each case to enhance the further accumulation of capital at home 
and abroad, and to advance the social and political ambitions of 
the bourgeoisie. By transforming the state from a feudal to a capi-
talist institution, the revolutions in Holland, England and France 
helped to consolidate capitalism as a system. In taking this view 
we have challenged the view of Brenner and the Political Marxists, 
who would deny the significance and even the existence of these 
bourgeois and capitalist revolutions.
 These early modern revolutions exemplify the formation of a 
capitalism from below, which was likewise seen in the United States 
following its revolution. These were classic bourgeois and capitalist 
revolutions, which we would argue were indispensable to the full 
flowering of capitalism. But even in the case of Holland, England 
and France capitalism was facilitated by state support in the form 
of mercantilism, colonialism and colonial slavery. Indeed, their 
revolutions intensified such state support. Beyond this are cases 
like Scotland and Prussia in the eighteenth century, where another 
possible passage to capitalism occurred, based on a type of revolu-
tion from above instituted by the state and the landlord class. It is 
to a consideration of the role of the state in supporting or instituting 
capitalism that we turn in the next chapter.
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PolItIcal caPItalIsm
The Dutch, English and French Revolutions were both popular 
and bourgeois-capitalist revolutions. The petty producers, espe-
cially the emergent or proto-capitalist element, were paramount in 
these capitalist revolutions from below. In this chapter we take up 
Lenin’s contrast between such ‘capitalisms from below’ and ‘capi-
talisms from above’. The outlines of these contrasting historical 
paths derive from Lenin’s conceptual elaboration of Marx’s contrast 
between the revolutionary petty-producer-led transition and the 
non-revolutionary merchant-led transition to capitalism. In fact 
Lenin’s stress on the rural petty producers as key to the emergence 
of capitalism from below echoes across the previously discussed 
original transition debate, influencing the views of Dobb and Hilton 
on the transition in England.
 England has been my prime example of the installation of capi-
talism largely from below. While gentry, landlords and merchants 
had their part, I have insisted that the main dynamic of the transi-
tion came from the grassroots. But it will be one of this chapter’s 
main purposes to break from an Anglocentric view of capitalist 
origins and to extend our understanding of such beginnings by 
introducing a comparative perspective. I have already shown that 
the revolutionary path of capitalism from below applies to Holland 
and France as well as England. Following Lenin, I shall show how 
the phenomenon of capitalism from below extended across the 
Atlantic to nineteenth-century America in the wake of its revolu-
tion. Discussion of the Prussian example as well as the instances of 
Scotland and Japan allows us to contrast the notion of capitalism 
from below with that of capitalism from above: that is, capitalism 
imposed by landlords and the state.
 Capitalism from above features landlords in control of a state, 
or a state acting independently, responding to capitalism’s uneven 
development by consciously producing ‘combined development’, 
a form of accelerated, conscious and planned development of 
capitalism. But even capitalisms developing from below were 
hardly immune to this logic of state intervention. Early modern 
Holland, England and France adopted policies like mercantilism and 
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colonialism in the service of capitalist development. Recognizing 
this is important in opposing Eurocentric and economistic views, 
which assert that capitalism was an economic system which in its 
‘classic’ forms at least did not require fostering by the state, and in 
particular that colonialism and slavery had little or nothing to do 
with its development. I argue, on the contrary, that the state played 
a key role in the development of capitalism, whether from above 
or below, and that the overseas initiatives of the state represented 
a crucial step in strengthening European capitalism and vaulting it 
from economic marginality to world primacy.
 Throughout the chapter Lenin’s conception of the origin of 
capitalism based either on the American path from below or the 
Prussian path from above serves as a key. Following the history 
of these paths enables me to show that control over the state by 
bourgeoisie supported by small producers or by landlords helped 
to determine the character of the capitalism that developed in each 
instance. A revolution which creates a state like the United States 
which rests on small producers opens the way to the free play of 
the market. Under such conditions capitalist relations and forces of 
production develop most rapidly. But it will be shown that even so 
the state intervened heavily to support this process. The Prussian 
instance demonstrates in turn how the state not only intervened 
to ensure the survival of its nobility, but aided them in making the 
transition to capitalism at the expense of the peasant producers. As 
their historical development has recently been fruitfully explored 
from the point of view of capitalism from above, the examples 
of Scotland and Japan are discussed with an eye to developing a 
comparative understanding of alternative routes to capitalism. The 
decisive role of the state is illustrated by applying Trotsky’s concep-
tion of combined and uneven development to the Scottish path 
to capitalism. It illustrates the speed and contradictory nature of 
capitalist development in states with archaic social relations.
 Mercantilism is commonly thought of as an economic policy 
and doctrine based on state intervention in the economy which 
was characteristic of the early modern period. I argue that it is as 
characteristic of modern capitalism as it was of the early modern 
form. Moreover it exemplifies one of the ways that the coercive 
role of the state has been used to accelerate the accumulation of 
capital. Anderson, Wallerstein and Teschke argue that mercan-
tilism reflected the views of a state directed by the nobility. On the 
contrary, mercantilism was among other things an expression of the 
interests of a rising bourgeoisie within the absolutist state. Indeed, 
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its most successful practitioner was capitalist England. Following 
the seventeenth-century revolution from below, bourgeois economic 
interests predominated in that state. Colonialism and slavery were 
two of the most successful features of mercantilism backed and 
protected by the state. The role of colonialism and slavery in the 
development of capitalism has been greatly disputed. Discussion of 
these disputes will open the way for the next chapter, which deals 
with the Industrial Revolution.
lords In the makIng of the modern World
In my argument so far, I have made clear that the bourgeois and 
capitalist revolutions in Holland, England and France opposed abso-
lutist regimes based on the landlord class. This was true even of the 
Spanish monarchy’s intervention in the Low Countries in light of the 
European-wide aristocratic social and political base of the Hapsburgs. 
The foundation of the royalist cause in England, likewise, was the 
landed class. While there were capitalist landlords in England, most 
landlords supported the monarchy, and only a minority supported 
Parliament. The main social base of the revolutionary party was rural 
and urban petty producers as well as merchants and manufacturers. 
Moreover, it was principally from this same social element that 
agrarian and manufacturing capitalism emerged.
 In emphasizing the bourgeois and capitalist character of these 
early revolutions, I have opposed the arguments of Brenner and his 
followers that it was landlords who played the main role in ushering 
in capitalism in England, for Brenner the first and classic path of 
capitalist development. Now I aim to put the role landlords did play 
in the development of capitalism in perspective. While it was not 
central in the English case, it was in other places. And this differ-
ence in the social character of the regimes that opened the way for 
capitalism made a lasting political difference: they contributed to the 
emergence of modern democratic political orders or to twentieth-
century fascisms, or determined that modern class struggle would 
assume the form of Gramscian wars of position or of movement.
 The origins of modern dictatorship or democracy are the central 
problematic of Barrington Moore’s famous Social Origins of 
Dictatorship and Democracy: Lord and Peasant in the Making of 
the Modern World.1 Though urban merchant and industrial capi-
talists were involved, the political destiny of modern states was 
determined by agrarian social relations, according to Moore. In the 
early modern revolutions discussed by Moore, including England, 
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France and the United States, it was an emergent agrarian capitalist 
class which included capitalist farmers, rather than a dominant 
landlord class, that played the key role in the transition to capi-
talism. This was true also in heavily urbanized Holland, as Brenner 
has shown. Where the early modern transitions to capitalism were 
based on the grassroots of society as in the above cases they proved 
critically important to the emergence of a democratic political order. 
On the other hand, Moore argued that the continued dominance 
of landlords over peasants in Germany and Japan in the process of 
capitalist development led to a politically reactionary outcome in 
the form of modern fascism. It eventually could lead, as in the case 
of twentieth-century China and Russia, to the elimination of the 
landlords altogether and the installation of communist regimes.
 Successful early modern political revolution made it possible 
to pursue modern class struggle within the limits of a liberal 
democratic political order. Contrariwise the failure of such early 
modern struggles ensured that modern class struggles in Germany, 
Japan, Russia and China would take the form of violent counter- 
revolutionary or revolutionary conflict. Moore’s formulation has 
the virtue of linking the development of capitalism to class struggle 
and the nature of the state. Its indebtedness to Lenin’s distinction 
between capitalism from above and below is patent. But in terms 
of its modern outcome it is also reminiscent of Antonio Gramsci’s 
distinction between the conditions which allow class wars of position 
(parties, unions, strikes, legislation) as against those of movement 
(insurrectionary politics).2 Moreover, Moore’s analysis suggests that 
revolutionary or non-revolutionary transitions to capitalism mark 
significant historical differences. It is a world away from the indif-
ference to the question of political revolution in the approach to the 
transition problem of the school of Political Marxism.
 Engels was the first to note that a transition from feudal society 
to capitalism had arisen on the basis of the institution of capitalism 
from above, in the form of Prussian landlords taking the lead 
in using the state to initiate and institute capitalism.3 Moreover, 
for him the character of such a transition was no mere academic 
question. It bore on the political and economic future of capitalism 
and the prospects for socialism in Germany and elsewhere. In The 
Peasant Question in France and Germany (1894) he tried to deal 
with the fact that the peasants in these two countries remained 
an influential political element that had to be dealt with by astute 
socialist policies. On the other hand, he noted that as a result of the 
development of landlord capitalism the peasants were no longer a 
heller maintext.indd   138 6/7/2011   11:50:58 AM
 p o l i t i c a l  c a p i ta l i s m 139
factor in the important German state of Prussia: ‘east of the Elbe the 
same process has been going on for centuries; here too the peasant 
is being increasingly “put down” or at least economically and politi-
cally forced into the background’. They were no longer a significant 
element. Big landed estates in Prussia present a simple political case: 
‘we are dealing with undisguised capitalist production’.4 It was not 
necessary to temper socialist measures in Prussia, as it was elsewhere 
in Germany where peasants remained politically influential.
 The agrarian question was of urgent concern for the most 
important successors of Marx and Engels, particularly for Karl 
Kautsky, the acknowledged leader of German Social Democracy until 
the First World War, and Vladimir Ilyich Lenin, the leader of Russian 
Bolshevism. In The Agrarian Question (1899) Kautsky sought to 
deepen Engels’s analysis by assembling and examining data from 
Germany, France, Britain and the United States with an eye on their 
political implications. He was particularly interested in the different 
pace and character of capitalist accumulation in industry and agri-
culture. His study included the extent of rural capitalist development, 
its emergence in different national contexts and the barriers that 
impeded its further progress. Kautsky analyzed both the nature of 
class relations and the forms of the productive forces, including the 
level of mechanization. The penetration of capitalism in agriculture 
was more complex than in industry, but was no less inexorable. 
It would be wrong for Marxists to either retard or accelerate the 
disappearance of the peasant producer, Kautsky concluded.5
 But while Lenin fulsomely praised Kautsky’s work and its political 
conclusions, he was above all concerned with the possibility of revo-
lution in Russia. It was in this context that he elaborated Engels’s 
conception of capitalism from above into one of two contrasting paths 
to capitalism. In the second edition of The Development of Capitalism 
in Russia (1907), Lenin outlined the alternative routes to capitalism:
Either the old landlord economy, bound as it is by thousands 
of threads to serfdom, is retained and turns slowly into purely 
capitalist, ‘Junker’ economy. The basis of the final transition 
from labour-service to capitalism is the internal metamorphosis of 
feudalist landlord economy. The entire agrarian system of the state 
becomes capitalist and for a long time retains feudalist features. 
Or the old landlord economy is broken up by revolution, which 
destroys all the relics of serfdom, and large landownership in the 
first place. The basis of the final transition from labour-service to 
capitalism is the free development of small peasant farming.6
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Under the Prussian path the state assumes a capitalist form but 
retains feudal characteristics. As Lenin puts it in The Agrarian 
Programme of Social-Democracy in the First Russian Revolution, 
composed the same year, the Prussian route assumes the political 
form of a ‘landlord monarchy’. The American path leads to what 
he describes as a ‘farmers’ republic’.7 In the same work he names 
the alternative paths as Prussian and American:
These two paths of objectively possible bourgeois development 
we would call the Prussian path and the American path, respec-
tively. In the first case feudal landlord economy slowly evolves 
into bourgeois, Junker landlord economy, which condemns 
the peasants to decades of most harrowing expropriation and 
bondage, while at the same time a small minority of Grossbauern 
(‘big peasants’) arises. In the second case there is no landlord 
economy, or else it is broken up by revolution. In this case the 
peasant predominates, becomes the sole agent of agriculture, and 
evolves into a capitalist farmer.8
In this passage Lenin points out the terrible economic consequences 
of Prussian-style capitalism on the mass of producers. Elsewhere in 
the same work he contrasts this outcome with what is possible for 
such producers under the American route:
A mass of free farmers may serve as a basis for the develop-
ment of capitalism without any landlord economy whatsoever 
since, taken as a whole, the latter form of economy is economi-
cally reactionary, whereas the elements of free farming have 
been created among the peasantry by the preceding economic 
history of the country. Capitalist development along such a path 
should proceed far more broadly, freely, and swiftly owing to the 
tremendous growth of the home market, and of the rise in the 
standard of living, the energy, initiative, and culture of the entire 
population.9
In these few lines Lenin captures not only the economic but also the 
political difference a capitalism from below made to the political 
and social evolution of England, France and the United States as 
suggested by Moore. At the same time we are able to appreciate 
better why Gramscian class wars of position have characterized 
these countries, compared with the class wars of socialist revolution 
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and fascist counter-revolution in places like Russia, Germany and 
Japan where capitalism came to predominate. 
 At the same time as he outlined these contrasting paths Lenin 
moved from a Eurocentric to a global understanding of capitalist 
development. Initially preoccupied with the development of capi-
talism in Russia in order to contest narodnik claims that it was 
not developing and could not develop there, and to lay down an 
understanding of how socialism could arrive there that was more 
sophisticated than their naïve conception of ‘skipping’ capitalism, 
he aimed, in The Development of Capitalism in Russia (1899), to 
show that despite economic backwardness, capitalism was emerging 
in Russia in the late nineteenth century. Indeed, Lenin’s text is 
path-breaking in dealing with the emergence of capitalism in a non-
Western country. Later, during the First World War, which he and 
other Marxists recognized clearly as an imperialist war first and 
foremost, his attention turned to backward and colonized countries 
in general in Imperialism, The Highest Stage of Capitalism (1916). 
Together these two works shifted the focus from capitalism in the 
West to its development on the capitalist periphery. It need hardly 
be added that, following in the footsteps of Marx’s discussion of 
the prospects of socialism in Russia, this reorientation raised the 
spectre not simply of further capitalist development, but of the 
breakthrough of socialism on the periphery.10 Indeed, it needs to be 
underlined that Lenin’s discussion of both imperialism and the devel-
opment of capitalism in Russia is preoccupied not with the historic 
development of capitalism, but with learning from the past in order 
to make socialist revolution in the future. In Lenin we find a deeply 
politicized understanding of the transition in which the state plays a 
fundamental role.
the amerIcan and PrussIan Paths
Lenin’s distinction between the Prussian and American paths formed 
the starting point for an extended historical and comparative 
analysis of American and Prussian capitalism by Terence Byres.11 We 
encountered Byres earlier in the debate on the decline of feudalism. 
He criticized Brenner’s stress on the importance of social property 
relations and the initiatives of landlords in the development of 
capitalism, emphasizing instead the differentiation of the peasantry 
through market mechanisms.
 Lenin’s account of the American path toward capitalism high-
lighted the absence of a strong landlord class as a barrier to the 
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process of the social differentiation of the rural producers. The basis 
of the transition was a process of differentiation within the mass of 
peasant-farmers – the market-driven evolution of economically well-
positioned producers into capitalist farmers, and the transformation 
of disadvantaged petty producers into wage workers. Lenin initially 
hoped for such an evolution in Russia. He regarded the failure of 
a landlord class to develop in America as a result of the continuing 
availability of ‘unoccupied free land’. Byres notes that Lenin’s 
remark unfortunately leaves out the forcible expropriation of the 
aboriginal population of North America. In contrast it should be 
recalled that Lenin’s mentor Marx did not ignore the dispossession 
of the aboriginals. We can recall his passing and sarcastic reference 
in Capital to the fact that ‘the extirpation, the enslavement and 
entombment in mines of the aboriginal population … signalised the 
rosy dawn of the era of capitalist production’.12
 Two pages further Marx shifts his glance to the North American 
mainland:
The treatment of the aborigines was, naturally, most frightful in 
plantation colonies destined for export trade only, such as the West 
Indies, and in rich and well-populated countries, such as Mexico 
and India, that were given over to plunder. But even in the colonies 
properly so called, the Christian character of primitive accumula-
tion did not belie itself. Those sober virtuosi of Protestantism, the 
Puritans of New England, in 1703, by decrees of their assembly 
set a premium of £40 on every Indian scalp and every captured 
red-skin: in 1722 a premium of £100 on every scalp; in 1744, after 
Massachusetts-Bay had proclaimed a certain tribe as rebels, the 
following prices: for a male scalp of 12 years and upwards £100 
(new currency), for a male prisoner £105, for women and children 
prisoners £55, for scalps of women and children £50.13
Such passages indicate that Marx fully understood that the growth 
of capitalist forces of production came at the expense of non- 
European peoples. Rosa Luxemburg in The Accumulation of Capital 
(1912) pointed out how ‘in the wake of the railways, financed by 
European and in particular British capital, the American farmer 
crossed the Union from East to West and in his progress over vast 
areas killed off the Red Indians with fire-arms and bloodhounds, 
liquor and venereal disease’.14
Nonetheless, when it came to evaluating capitalism in its own terms, 
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Lenin like Marx thought of the United States as the most advanced 
capitalist country, unleashing extraordinary productive forces while 
promoting social and political progress. In the case of the produc-
tive forces, not only did agricultural output increase, there also 
developed an expansion of demand for manufactures including agri-
cultural means of production as well as consumer items.15
 Lenin’s other path to capitalism, as we have noted, was ‘capi-
talism from above’ or the Prussian route to capitalism. There, the 
late eighteenth and early nineteenth-century feudal class gradually 
transformed itself into a class of capitalist farmers in a way that 
stifled the development of the peasant economy. As Lenin described 
it, the Prussian landlord dependence on serfdom of the early modern 
period continued, while being slowly transformed in the direction of 
capitalism. Byres concludes that Prussian agriculture became capi-
talist while retaining many feudal aspects, and was reactionary in its 
effects on the population: ‘this was a far more reactionary solution 
for the agrarian question than the English or the North American …. 
It was politically and socially reactionary. It was also “economically 
reactionary”.’16 Prussian landlordism became Junker-controlled 
capitalist farming, the new basis for the social and political domina-
tion of this class. The peasants were reduced to wage workers while 
still bearing the degrading stigma of serf status, and the development 
of the home market and the forces of production were retarded 
because of the impoverishment of the mass of the population.17
 Byres’s scholarly study, which includes economic and historical 
sources that have appeared since Lenin wrote, finds the latter’s 
account of the Prussian path still convincing and scarcely departs 
from it. His investigations enable him to deepen Lenin’s notion of 
the Prussian path’s economically reactionary nature. He acknowl-
edges that Prussian capitalism did release labour for industry. On the 
other hand, it did not provide a market for producer or consumer 
industries, and did not supply capital or food to the industrialization 
process. Industrialization progressed in spite of, rather than because 
of, the contribution of capitalist agriculture in Prussia.18
 In contrast Byres’s account of the American path differs substan-
tially from that of Lenin. It features a much greater regional diversity 
than indicated by Lenin. Though Lenin was aware of the planta-
tion slavery economy in the Southern states of the United States, 
he underestimated its importance. More importantly, contrary to 
Lenin’s expectations the social differentiation of the agricultural 
population into capitalist farmers and agricultural workers in the 
North did not run its course, and the bulk of American agriculture 
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remained based on the family farm or petty commodity production. 
Not only did the spread of tenant farming and the development of 
mechanization in agriculture allow the perpetuation of the family 
farm,19 according to Byres:
we also see, in the activities of the American state, powerful inter-
vention which served to reinforce significantly the survival of the 
family farm/petty commodity production. … That state interven-
tion acted to maintain and support agricultural overproduction 
and so sustain the widespread existence of family farms.20
With regard to the intervention of the state, Byres refers to the 
American government’s clearing of the West of its indigenous popu-
lation, conversion of the land from state-owned to private property, 
encouragement of the railways and establishment of state banks. 
In the longer run he refers to the establishment of permanent farm 
subsidies by the federal government in the 1930s.21 The conception 
of American capitalist development as the result of the free play 
of the market is completely mythical. Yet Byres’s own account of 
American capitalism from below might be criticized for not making 
more of the importance of political revolution, with the significance 
of the American Revolution and Civil War and the role of petty 
producers in these conflicts. Breaking with the English state and 
capitalist merchant oligarchy in the initial revolutionary clash and 
ending slavery in the second conflict made it possible to consoli-
date a strong state, allowing the better part of North America to 
be exploited on a capitalist basis. Farmers, petty merchants and 
craftspeople provided the rank and file of the victorious armies in 
these conflicts.
 Byres achievement was to criticize and deepen Lenin’s conception 
of the two paths to capitalism, and by doing so show how fertile 
a political and historical conception it was. He concludes his study 
of the American and Prussian path in the transition with reflections 
on the significance of these cases to the study of capitalist origins 
elsewhere. He argues that such an extension of Lenin’s idea requires 
investigations of the nature, the prerequisites and the class agents 
of accumulation, which almost invariably will be found to lie in 
the countryside.22 As Brenner has suggested, the outcomes of such 
transitions are determined by class struggle. But, Byres argues, the 
nature of the landlord class in each instance, as well as the process 
of peasant social differentiation, must be studied in greater detail 
than Brenner allows. The intervention of the state is also critical 
heller maintext.indd   144 6/7/2011   11:50:59 AM
 p o l i t i c a l  c a p i ta l i s m 145
to the transition, and must be investigated carefully. Finally, pace 
Brenner, the form and level of development of the productive forces 
are crucial to an understanding of the nature and outcome of class 
conflict.23 In the Prussian and American cases, the transition was 
provoked by a crisis in the feudal and slave modes of production 
respectively. But such a crisis need not have led to the end of the 
system, whose existence might have been indefinitely prolonged. In 
both cases a dramatic external political shock – the crushing defeat 
inflicted by Napoleon in the Prussian case, and defeat of the South 
in the American Civil War – was the catalyst for the demise of the 
existing system.24
 Byres concludes that his study suggests great diversity in the 
historical circumstances under which a transition can occur. But 
such diversity does not obviate or preclude the need for theory.25 In 
fact Byres’s work on the Prussian and American path constitutes a 
remarkable vindication of a comparative and theoretical approach to 
the problem of capitalist transition. The main categories with which 
he works – the traditional Marxist categories of class relations, 
mode of production and the state – have allowed him to study the 
problem at a sufficient level of abstraction to be generalized to the 
problem of transition not only in these two instances but also other 
cases.26
combIned and uneven develoPment In scotland
Neil Davidson has recently analyzed the transition to capitalism 
in eighteenth-century Scotland as an example of capitalism from 
above. As in Prussia, the conversion of the nobility from feudalism 
to capitalism was essential to the future. Equally important was 
the fact that the Scottish state had a reactionary character, facili-
tating the imposition of capitalism. In England the 1688 Glorious 
Revolution ended the seventeenth-century civil war by thwarting the 
final attempt to impose Stuart absolutism, and inaugurating a capi-
talist and constitutional state. In backward Scotland the revolution 
of 1688 only restored the feudal regime. Centralized government 
had been imposed on a still-feudal Scottish society by the Stuarts. 
Their overthrow returned power to a feudal nobility to whom the 
rural population were personally subject. The Crown ruled through 
heritable jurisdictions and military tenures controlled by certain 
great feudal families.27
 In the decade that followed, the restored Scottish establishment 
feebly responded to an especially severe subsistence crisis which 
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killed as many as 15 percent of the population of one million.28 
Population catastrophe was followed by the crash of the speculative 
colonial venture in Panama known as the Darien Project (1698). 
Much of the nobility as well as the commercial bourgeoisie of 
the Lowlands bought land sight-unseen in Panama. The Scottish 
state and civil society proved unequal to the colonial effort, and 
it collapsed, setting off a nation-wide financial and commercial 
crisis.29 The successive disasters convinced the Scottish ruling class 
that the only way out was to accept union with England (1707).
 Over the next half century, though feudalism remained in place, 
it came under increasing strain as a result of the growing pressure of 
English commercial and financial influence. A minority of great lords 
responded positively by moving toward capitalism, while the rest of 
the nobility sought to deal with their dire economic circumstances 
by increasing the exploitation of their peasant tenants while partici-
pating in a succession of Jacobite political uprisings.30 The Jacobites 
were led by the most unreconstructed feudal nobles, and professed 
loyalty to the Stuart line. With their final defeat at Culloden in 1746, 
the British Parliament in which pro-unionist Scottish nobles and 
commoners sat ended Scottish feudalism as a socio-economic system 
by abolishing military tenures and heritable jurisdictions, albeit 
leaving intact the economic power of lords over tenants.31 Enough 
of the structure of the feudal state was retained to ensure one-party 
Tory rule in Scotland on the basis of a total rural electorate of less 
than 3,000 male voters. Under this reactionary political set-up the 
capital Edinburgh had a mere 33 voters.32 Meanwhile with no 
other economic option open to them, the bulk of the Scottish lords 
made a rapid transition towards capitalist agriculture. In Scotland 
as in Prussia, capitalist relations of production were imposed by the 
landlords.
 In the wake of this change Scotland experienced an extraordinary 
economic transformation:
the transformation which took place in Scotland between 1746 
and 1820 was unprecedented in European history and would not 
be seen again on such a scale until the industrialization of Russia 
after 1929. Indeed, the experience of Scotland was far closer to 
that of Russia than England in terms of the speed and intensity 
with which it occurred.33
Its rate of economic growth, including industrialization, equalled or 
even surpassed England’s. Citing Wallerstein, Davidson even speaks 
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of a ‘Scottish Great Leap Forward’.34 These dramatic changes were 
introduced by an emerging capitalist class made up of the now-
capitalist nobility, tobacco and sugar merchants, academics and 
professionals, sustained by a British state which totally excluded 
popular representation.
 We have seen that uneven development is a fundamental if not 
a founding characteristic of capitalism. In explaining this rapid and 
deep transition, Davidson makes use of this idea but he enriches it 
by employing Trotsky’s further conception of combined and uneven 
development. Davidson notes that uneven development is often 
confused with combined and uneven development. He explains that 
the notion of uneven development is part of the classical Marxist 
tradition, and this is the way we have employed it up to now. The 
notion of combined and uneven development, on the other hand, 
grew out of the debates on revolution in the international socialist 
movement at the turn of the twentieth century. According to Trotsky, 
the notion of uneven development should properly come before that 
of combined development, because the latter grows out of the former 
and completes it. It is a conception which arises out of the advance 
of industrialization and imperialism. According to Trotsky, workers 
in under-developed countries like Russia can seize the political 
initiative on the basis of such a theoretical conception.35
 Under capitalist conditions, the economic advance of some 
states requires those left behind to try to catch up: ‘crucially, the 
prior development of some states cannot but affect the conditions 
under which the late developers enter the world system, not least 
through imperialist domination which prevented the latter from 
becoming independent centres of capital accumulation’.36 In the 
case of Great Britain, not only were English merchants ahead of 
their Scottish counterparts, they actively blocked their entry into the 
world market. Yet obstacles put in their path by English capitalists 
were dramatically surmounted by Scottish entrepreneurs. Davidson 
concludes, ‘a theory of uneven development alone, however, even in 
a modified form, is inadequate to explain the pattern of develop-
ment in Scotland, or indeed anywhere else. We also require a theory 
of combined and unequal development.’37
 This theory was initially outlined by Trotsky to show how a 
revolutionary political situation developed in Russian as a result of 
capitalist development:
When the productive forces of the metropolis, of a country of 
classical capitalism … find ingress into more backward countries, 
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like Germany in the first half of the nineteenth century, and 
Russia at the merging of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, 
and in the present day in Asia; when the economic factors burst 
in a revolutionary manner, breaking up the old order, when 
development is no longer gradual and ‘organic’ but assumes 
the form of terrible convulsions and drastic changes of former 
conceptions, then it becomes easier for critical thought to find 
revolutionary expression.38
 From the perspective of global history Trotsky explained that:
a backward country does not take things in the same order. The 
privilege of historic backwardness – and such a privilege exists 
– permits, or rather compels the adoption of whatever is ready 
in advance of any specified date, skipping a whole series of inter-
mediate stages. … The development of historically backward 
nations leads necessarily to a peculiar combination of different 
stages in the historic process.39
Often this process of assimilation and modernizing development 
proceeds within an overall social and political structure marked by 
archaism, as was the case with Russia but also Scotland.40 Trotsky 
concluded that ‘without this law … it is impossible to understand 
the history of Russia, and indeed of any country of the second, third 
or tenth cultural class.’41
 It was the sudden and rapid transformation of Scotland into a 
capitalist country that provided the catalyst for the dawn of the 
Scottish Enlightenment. At the heart of this cultural movement 
lay the birth of political economy – a body of thought which 
sought to theorize the transition to capitalism and provide a 
program for its advance. Its single greatest achievement was 
Adam Smith’s Wealth of Nations, which as Hobsbawm put it, 
‘is best read – as his contemporaries read it – as a handbook of 
development economics’.42 Davidson insists that the program of 
political economy of Smith and the others was bourgeois and 
capitalist in its class basis and revolutionary in its intent, which 
was to impose capitalism on rural Scotland.43 Smith, in particular, 
aimed to reduce the role of the state, which he identified with the 
vestiges of feudalism, while at the same time freeing market forces 
within the field of civil society.44 Along with other members of 
the Scottish Enlightenment, he sought to accelerate the removal 
of the remaining legal obstacles in the way of the modernization 
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of Scottish agriculture while dissolving the intellectual barriers to 
enlightenment by substituting the study of political economy for 
obscurantist Calvinist or Jacobite ideology. The goal was to enable 
Scotland to compete in all respects with the English within the 
British state.45 In such a politically unified British state the only 
possible development strategy for a Scotland undergoing combined 
and uneven development was paradoxically not to further increase 
state intervention, but to accelerate the introduction of laissez-faire 
economic policies.
  Born at the climax of the Scottish transition from feudalism 
to capitalism, Smith’s work constitutes the first comprehensive 
theorization of the emergent capitalist system. That Smith could 
conceptually bring together the various elements of capitalism into 
a political-economic synthesis reflects the growing maturity of 
the capitalist system as a whole toward the end of the eighteenth 
century.
JaPanese caPItalIsm
In the view of Byres the Japanese case is another example of the 
imposition of capitalism from above. The Japanese instance, as was 
noted in Chapter 1, already formed part of the original debate on 
the capitalist transition during the 1950s. Takahashi had pointed 
out that proto-capitalist elements were already challenging Japanese 
feudalism prior to the Meiji Restoration. Nonetheless, he conceded 
that feudalism remained important throughout the early modern 
period, and inflected the development of Japanese capitalism into 
the twentieth century. Hobsbawm and Anderson took account of 
proto-capitalist tendencies in Japan prior to the intrusion of Admiral 
Perry, reflecting an internal dynamic in the direction of capitalism. 
But Anderson insisted that the prime mover was the incursion 
of the West, which forced Japan to join the world market – an 
indispensable attribute of capitalism.
 The agrarian question or when and how the key capitalist 
transition in agriculture took place, which preoccupied Byres, 
also divided two contending schools of Japanese Marxist scholar-
ship in the first part of the twentieth century, and Byres provides 
a useful account of their debates. The Kozaha or feudalist school 
intellectually supported the Japanese Communist Party’s position, 
which envisaged the revolution in Japan occurring in two stages: 
a bourgeois democratic revolution against feudalism and then a 
socialist one. According to interwar Kozaha scholars, the Meiji 
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Restoration had simply reformed the feudal land system, leaving the 
emperor as an absolutist monarch, albeit one who now relied on 
the support of bourgeois capitalists as well as feudal landowners. 
The extreme poverty of the largely tenant farming population, 
whose payments in kind to the landlords amounted to about 50 
percent of gross product, tended to confirm the Kozaha analysis 
that even by the 1930s no agrarian transition to capitalism had 
occurred. While they did not deny that capitalism existed in Japan, 
it was based on semi-feudal landownership and semi-serfdom. The 
Comintern’s 1932 thesis concurred: the Japanese situation could 
not be appraised ‘without taking into account and analyzing the 
peculiarities of the system prevailing in Japan, which combined 
extraordinarily strong elements of feudalism with a very advanced 
development of monopoly capitalism’.46
 By contrast the Ronoha, or workers and peasants school, 
supported the left wing of various socialist parties which rivalled the 
Communist Party theoretically and politically. It held that a direct 
advance to socialism was possible because capitalism had penetrated 
all aspects of Japanese society, including agriculture, since the Meiji 
Restoration, a bourgeois revolution. The peasantry was undergoing 
disintegration into a class of wage labourers as capitalism developed 
in the countryside as well as everywhere else in society. The high 
level of tenant rent was the result of the extreme competition for 
land between producers rather than of landlord coercion.47
 Byres accepted the Kozaha emphasis on the persistence of 
feudalism, in which landlords continued to control the peasantry, 
whose holdings were minimal. He also emphasized the prevalence 
of tenancy, the scarcity of wage labour and the very high rate of 
surplus extraction through a heavy burden of rent. But he departed 
from this school, emphasizing the central role of the Meiji state in 
the capitalist transition in dissolving classic Japanese feudalism. 
These measures fell short, however, of preventing the further devel-
opment of feudal tenancy. State power was also used to break 
peasant resistance to high rents, usury and heavy taxation. Indeed, 
government taxation of the peasantry was vital to the accumulation 
of capital outside of agriculture.48
 In these debates it is the Kozaha perspective, which stressed 
the persistence of feudalism, that is the more persuasive. Even the 
onset of capitalism was conditioned by the continued extraction 
of surplus by heavy landlord rents. Capitalism was then imposed 
by the state using these surpluses to initiate capitalist moderniza-
tion. Such a process represents a variant of the path of capitalism 
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from above, familiar in the case of Prussia and Scotland. But in 
contrast to the latter cases where the landlords became the agents 
of capitalist accumulation, it was the state itself that directed this 
process. Those scholars in the Kozaha school who regarded the 
reforms of the American occupation as decisive to the full flowering 
of Japanese capitalism were particularly discerning. The post-1945 
agrarian reform raised the productivity of Japanese agriculture, 
released labour into industry, destroyed the political and social grip 
of the landlords and ensured the triumph of industrial and finance 
capital.49
 In the case of Japan a capitalist transition occurred without the 
presence of capitalist relations in agriculture. Rather, it was the 
surplus pumped out of the agrarian sector that largely financed 
capitalist industrialization. In each case the state played an essential 
role in this process, albeit in Japan the landlords initially played an 
intermediary role. Such a state-directed transition, which may also 
be seen in Taiwan and Korea, presents another variant of capitalist 
transition alongside the Dutch, English, American, French, Scottish 
and Prussian examples. Byres doubts the likelihood of such a state-
directed transition in Pakistan and India, where landlord influence 
remains considerable.50 On the other hand, the examples given do 
not exhaust the diversity of possible passages to capitalism. Based on 
these examples the following factors have to be taken into consider-
ation in studying capitalist transitions taking place in other parts of 
the under-developed world: the nature of the landlord class, differ-
entiation of the peasantry, class struggle, labour supply, changes in 
the productive forces and the role of the state.51
 This discussion of the role of the state in Asian capitalism points 
to the fact that the development of capitalism has varied greatly. 
Whereas late-developing Japan represents a clear case of state-
directed development, England seems an instance of a more largely 
market-driven capitalism. The United States appears as an even 
more extreme example of the latter. Yet the state loomed large in 
the early stages of English capitalism, and some regard the United 
States as an outright neo-mercantilist state. It maintained high 
tariffs, and forcibly and consciously instituted capitalist agriculture 
at the expense of slave holders and the hunting and gathering popu-
lations. Russia exemplifies the very embodiment of state-directed 
capitalist development. The case of German capitalism, based on 
an alliance of capitalist landlords on the one hand, and bankers 
and industrialists on the other, appears to approximate the Japanese 
and Russian model. It has been suggested that these cases, as well 
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as those of, for example, Korea and Taiwan, might all be examined 
from the perspective of the so-called developmental state. Even 
mercantilist Holland and England could be regarded as instances of 
such a state.52 An understanding of capitalist development requires 
a comparative understanding of such historical and geographical 
differences and the role of the state in each instance. Likewise we 
should be open to comparing these cases with those of the socialist 
Soviet Union and Maoist China. In terms of their development 
strategies, both socialist states appear to be closest to the example 
of Japan, in which the surpluses necessary to industrialization 
were squeezed out of the peasantry by the state. The difference 
would seem to lie in the Soviet and Chinese attempt to not only 
exploit but reorganize peasant production. Indeed, in the latter case 
Mao pursued policies of rural industrialization comparable to the 
development of rural industrialization in early modern Europe.
the mercantIlIsm of free trade
The deep-seated prejudice that capitalism represented a triumph 
of free trade over political imperialism goes back to Adam Smith. 
In fact as John Gallagher and Ronald Robinson pointed out long 
ago, capitalism has used both overt political imperialism and free 
trade to assure global domination depending on the historical and 
strategic circumstances.53 For both political and economic reasons, 
Smith was a committed advocate of the free market and a believer 
in a minimal state. A determined opponent of Stuart and other 
absolutist monarchies’ restraints on individual and economy liberty, 
he aimed to reduce the role of the state to undertaking public works 
and maintaining order. He was at pains to denounce what he called 
the mercantile system, or state-regulated overseas trade. According 
to Smith, mercantilism was biased in favour of foreign trade and 
export-oriented industry to the neglect of the development of the 
internal economy, which depended on agriculture and attendant 
industries. Smith, to be sure, was to a certain extent a supporter 
of overseas commerce, regarding it as favourable to the division of 
labour, competitiveness and innovation. However, he was opposed 
to protectionism and the conquest and maintenance of colonial 
possessions.
 Countries that acquired colonies in quest of power in inter-
national affairs often benefited less than the countries that were 
hindered from acquiring such colonial possessions. The regulations 
heller maintext.indd   152 6/7/2011   11:50:59 AM
 p o l i t i c a l  c a p i ta l i s m 153
that were designed to exclude rivals frequently ended up crippling 
the industry of the colonizing power.54 Such prohibitions repre-
sented a distortion in the efficient employment of capital which 
might otherwise be used to meet more effectively the demands of 
the market at home and abroad. Smith here is theorizing based on 
an amnesia which ignores the history of capitalism which was based 
on state protectionism. Excluding foreign goods through tariffs and 
navigation acts allowed local manufacturers to accumulate capital, 
create a home market, and force open foreign markets. Smith’s 
amnesia in fact is a harbinger of the moment, noted by Gallagher 
and Robinson, when the politics of early modern capitalist impe-
rialism gave way to the politics of free trade in England, the most 
advanced of the capitalist states.
 In this discussion of capitalist origins, we have seen how the early 
modern state was at first essential to prolonging the feudal order but 
in the longer run provided an indispensable framework within which 
capitalism and national markets developed. Continuing to take the 
English case as our example, the state’s enclosure acts, labour statutes 
and poor laws, justices of the peace, regulated markets, militias, 
armies and navies, definition of private property relations, provision 
of means of exchange and credit, and government contracts were 
indispensable to early capitalism. Mercantilism has been seen as 
being concerned with state-directed and supported overseas trade 
as part of this pattern of state intervention in the economy. But it is 
important to emphasize that the internal economy of early modern 
states was another important aspect of the mercantile system, or 
mercantilism. The creation of national export industries dependent 
on the state entailed restructuring which enhanced the internal as 
much as the external power of the state.
 In the eyes of early modern governments no real distinction 
existed between political and economic power. In its latter aspect 
mercantilism was a theory of international relations viewed from an 
economic perspective. Such doctrines reflected policies of economic 
nationalism which characterized European governments between 
the sixteenth and eighteenth centuries. No one better summed up 
the mercantilist theory than the late seventeenth-century political 
economist William Petty. In 1690 Petty described the theory as 
concerned with ‘the Wealth of every nation, consisting chiefly in the 
share which they have in the Foreign Trade with the Commercial 
World rather than in the Domestick Trade, of ordinary Meat, Drink, 
and Cloaths, &c. which bring in little Gold, Silver, Jewels and 
other Universal Wealth’.55 As Michael Perelman notes, ‘for Petty 
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universal wealth was merely a sign of power which derived from the 
development of the economic forces of the nation’.56
 Under the sway of Adam Smith’s negative judgement, the assess-
ment of mercantilism on the part of liberal economic theorists and 
historians has traditionally been hostile. Government interference, 
the existence of monopolies and the overall search for economic 
rents have been seen as crippling economic growth. However, strands 
of a dissenting interpretation remained alive. The nineteenth-century 
German historical school, influenced by the neo-mercantilist views 
of Friedrich List, tended to be more favourable to the role of the 
state in the economy, and in the 1930s when state intervention was 
on the agenda, the history of mercantilism attracted much interest. It 
was then that the great works on the history of mercantilism by Eli 
Heckscher and Jacob Viner were written.57 The followers of Smith 
tended to deride the mercantilist belief that money was an essential 
ingredient in the wealth of a nation. On the contrary, John Maynard 
Keynes argued that the mercantilist view was an implicit recognition 
of the tie between the abundance of money and low interest rates 
which would stimulate trade and investment.58
 Despite its bias toward laissez-faire, Ronald Findlay and Kevin 
O’Rourke’s recent sweeping history of world trade adopts a 
historical perspective which eschews passing judgement on whether 
mercantilism was positive or negative. The authors explain that the 
mercantilist theoreticians of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries 
regarded international trade as a zero-sum game. Colonies were 
regarded as a market for manufactures and a source of raw materials 
from which foreigners had to be excluded. Political and military 
conflict between states was taken for granted. Those states that 
could garner a sufficiently large amount of financial resources would 
triumph in war. Such success could then ensure the wealth necessary 
to maintain and extend the power of the state. The objective of a 
state’s economic policy was to secure monopoly control over a given 
sector of trade, thereby gaining monopoly profits and providing the 
means to carry on warfare. Acquiring precious metals was important 
in this regard. Given the presumed reality of the zero-sum nature of 
these conflicts, the liberal notion of gains from trade to all parties 
as a result of peaceful commerce was beside the point.59
 As our brief discussion of the historiography of mercantilism 
indicates, non-Marxists have made important contributions to 
an understanding of mercantilism. Nonetheless, in the course of 
discussing the transition to capitalism, the Marxist school provides 
important insights into the theory and practice of mercantilism. 
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Marx himself regarded mercantilism as part of the apparatus of the 
early modern state which promoted capitalism. It is a feature of a 
system of state power, parts of which can be found in the states on 
the European Continent, but which comes together in England at 
the beginning of the seventeenth century. It involved a systematic 
combination of elements which included colonies, a national debt, 
a modern mechanism of taxation and the protectionist system. Each 
of these elements makes use of the state, defined as the concentrated 
and organized force of society, to accelerate the transition from 
the feudal to the capitalist mode of production. Summing up this 
process, Marx concludes:
But they all employ the power of the State, the concentrated 
and organized force of society, to hasten, hothouse fashion, the 
process of transformation of the feudal mode of production into 
the capitalist mode, and to shorten the transition. Force is the 
midwife of every old society pregnant with a new one. It is itself 
an economic power.60
As Perelman notes, Marx saw mercantilism as an attempt to overcome 
the slow development of the internal and overseas market by the use 
of coercion to speed the accumulation of capital.61 In other words 
political power was used to create and accelerate the emergence of 
markets, as we have emphasized. Elsewhere Marx speaks of colo-
nialism, public debts, heavy taxes, protection, commercial wars and 
such like as ‘children of the manufacturing period’.62
 As a set of economic ideas, mercantilism marked the first attempt 
to speculate about the emerging capitalist order according to 
Marx:
The first theoretical treatment of the modern mode of production 
– the mercantile system – proceeded necessarily from the superfi-
cial phenomena of the circulation process as individualised in the 
movement of merchant’s capital, and therefore grasped only the 
appearance of matters.63
This was partly the result of commercial capital being the first 
independent mode of the existence of capital in general, but it was 
also the consequence of the overwhelming influence of commer-
cial capital in the period when feudal production was overthrown 
and modern production began to develop.64 Moreover, for Marx 
mercantilism served the interests of a rising bourgeoisie:
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the national character of the mercantile system is not merely a 
phrase on the lips of its spokesmen. Under the pretext of concern 
solely for the wealth of the nation and the resources of the state, 
they, in fact, pronounce the interests of the capitalist class and the 
amassing of riches in general to be the ultimate aim of the state, 
and thus proclaim bourgeois society in place of the old divine 
state. But at the same time they are consciously aware that the 
development of the interests of capital and of the capitalist class, 
of capitalist production, forms the foundation of national power 
and national ascendancy in modern society.65
It is under the mercantile system that industrial capital, and conse-
quently wage labour, first develops in antithesis to, and at the 
expense of, feudal landed property. Indeed under mercantilism, ‘one 
form of wage labour, the industrial, and one form of capital, the 
industrial, were recognized as sources of wealth, but only in so far 
as they produced money.’66
 Dobb perceptively discussed the economic motivations behind the 
mercantile system. According to him, those who wrote on economic 
matters, and the merchants themselves, took it for granted that 
political interference or economic regulation by the state was indis-
pensable to making a profit in trade. The petty mode of production 
still dominated, and the rent of land still seemed the only natural 
form of surplus. According to Dobb:
the productivity of labour was still low, and the number of workers 
employed by a single capitalist was seldom very numerous. It was 
accordingly still difficult to imagine any substantial profit being 
‘naturally’ made by investment in production. … Under such 
circumstances if merchants or merchant manufacturers were to 
be subject to unrestrained competition what basis for profit could 
there be?67
More or less unrestricted competition and the extraction of surplus 
value were seen as incompatible with one another. Without regu-
lation which limited competition and protected price margins, 
merchant capital might enjoy windfalls but could obtain no 
enduring source of income. As a result it was believed that trade and 
industry would languish for lack of an incentive to invest money in 
such enterprises.68 Dobb is here speaking of overseas trade, but pace 
Brenner such conditions have to be borne in mind with respect to 
the evolution of the internal market as well.
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 Mercantilists of the seventeenth century sought to increase the 
amount of money circulating in the state. This was part of a drive 
toward a favourable balance of trade. What was sought was an 
increase in exports, particularly of manufactures, while permitting 
as few imports as possible. The French finance minister Jean-
Baptiste Colbert (d. 1683) defined commerce abroad as facilitating 
the import of goods that favoured manufacture while placing an 
embargo on the import of foreign manufactures. While the import of 
foreign manufactures was discouraged, the import of raw materials 
necessary to manufacture at home was sanctioned. A favourable 
balance of trade which drew money into the country could be 
expected to increase prices internally. At the same time, it tended 
to depress the price level of the country from which the gold had 
been drained. It thereby helped to lower the price of the products 
which were purchased abroad for import, and to raise the price of 
exported commodities – the policy of buying cheap and selling dear. 
These notions particularly applied to captive or colonial markets in 
which alternative sources of supply could be politically excluded.69
 According to Dobb, mercantilism simply continued at the national 
level the exploitative policies of the late medieval towns in relation 
to the surrounding countryside. As such, the mercantile system 
played an important role in the nurturing of capitalist industry. 
From this perspective mercantilist authors sometimes regarded the 
surplus gained from foreign trade as the only real source of accumu-
lation and state revenue. It was essentially the economic policy of an 
age of primitive accumulation, Dobb concluded.70 By this he meant 
that accumulation took place as a result of trade based on political 
manipulation and control of exchange.
 As we noted, Keynes suggested that mercantilist thinkers associ-
ated a plenitude of money with cheap credit or low interest which 
would stimulate the economy. Dobb demurred, saying that the 
balance of trade and the profits so derived were uppermost in the 
minds of theorists and policy makers. From the late seventeenth 
century onwards proponents of mercantilism made no simple 
connection between the quantity of money in circulation and interest 
rates. Emphasis was placed instead on the growth of commerce, a 
capitalist class and stock or capital as the surest ways to ensure the 
availability of credit.71 From the same period dates a preoccupation 
with using a favourable balance of trade to create employment at 
home through an expansion of manufacturing industry. At the same 
time, the mercantilist conception of prosperity was premised on the 
notion of keeping wages for workers low.72
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 Keynes brought forward more historical evidence than Dobb 
credits him with for his view of a mercantilist notion of monetary 
economic stimulation. But the disagreement between the two is 
about more than just historical facts. Keynes advanced his overall 
argument about the balance of payments, the level of interest and 
economic activity to counter the still-prevalent liberal orthodoxy of 
the 1930s that such relationships were self-adjusting in terms of the 
international division of labour and should not be tampered with. 
In his eyes the mercantilist policy which tried to bring money into 
the country and lower the rate of interest was a laudable attempt to 
stimulate the economy using the relatively primitive political tools 
at hand. The Marxist Dobb, like orthodox economic liberals, tended 
to be sceptical about the feasibility of such short-term and politically 
inspired fixes.
 Dobb clearly sees mercantilism as a policy emanating from 
the royal court and the ruling state elites. But he also views it as 
reflecting the interests and outlook of the more privileged merchants 
and manufacturers. Clearly these two groups were affiliated, the one 
subordinated to the other. Dobb is sensitive to the fact that that the 
class basis of the two groups differed. That being the case, he also 
points out that the system of privileges, monopolies and rents fuelled 
conflict between the privileged merchants and manufacturers and 
the newer merchants and manufacturers.73
 Perry Anderson’s view of the class basis of mercantilism follows 
from his view of the early modern state, which he sees as reflecting 
the class interest above all of the nobility. As such mercantilism 
represented the economic outlook of a feudal ruling class that had 
accommodated to an integrated national market yet retained its 
fundamental perspective on matters economic and political. It was 
a theory of the intervention of the political order into the workings 
of the economy in the interest of both the prosperity of society and 
the power of the state. Its amalgam of the political and economic 
represented the antithesis of the later Smithian attempt to separate 
the political from the economic – a nexus which scandalized the 
Scottish political economist.
 If we follow Anderson, the aristocratic bias of the policy is 
reflected above all in its attitude toward war. Whereas Smith and 
his followers were predisposed in favour of peaceful and mutually 
advantageous commerce, the mercantilists were strongly bellicose. 
They stressed the necessity and profitability of war. According to 
them, a successful economy depended on success in war. It was 
the same zero-sum view applied both to war and economic life, 
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according to Anderson. While this is undoubtedly a brilliant insight, 
one would have to question whether bellicose attitudes were unique 
to the nobility. It makes it appear that a policy of war would presum-
ably have to be foisted on a reluctant early modern bourgeoisie. Yet 
for the most part, the latter group were equally bellicose, although 
for different reasons. War was an intrinsic part of the history of the 
emergent bourgeoisie. Indeed, based on his notion of aristocratic 
control over the early modern state, Anderson insists that mercan-
tilism emanated from an aristocratic perspective on international 
politics. This runs counter to the more convincing view shared by 
Marx and Dobb that it emanated from the bourgeoisie within the 
structure of the state, which absent a bourgeois revolution was 
still dominated by the nobility. Mercantilism undoubtedly sought 
the suppression of particularistic obstacles to commerce within the 
national territory, and strove to create a unified domestic market 
for commodity production. It characteristic creations were the royal 
manufactures and regulated guilds in France, and the chartered 
companies in England. The medieval and corporatist lineage of the 
former seems evident.74
 Unlike the above authors, Arrighi focuses on the mature mercan-
tilism of the eighteenth century. He regards mercantilism as a 
synthesis of capitalism and territorialism, which was perfected by 
the British and the French in the eighteenth century. According to 
Arrighi the British instance represents a third stage in the historic 
cycles of global capitalist development, in which capital was fused 
with state power as the basis of great imperial power. It challenged 
the established positions of the Spanish, Portuguese and Dutch 
empires. Mercantilist policy had three parts: colonialism based on 
settler colonies, capitalist slavery and economic nationalism. Of the 
three, settler colonialism was the most important, relying largely 
on the private initiatives of subjects. French and English colonies 
were more successful than the earlier colonies of their rivals. 
Slavery grew out of the colonies’ need to supplement their labour 
force, and reached huge proportions in the eighteenth century. 
The third element was economic nationalism, which facilitated the 
open-ended accumulation of economic surpluses and the construc-
tion of the domestic or national economy of the mother country. 
Through private and bureaucratic initiatives the French and British 
monarchies internalized as much of the inputs necessary to war 
and state-making as was feasible, enlarging the tax base while 
strengthening the state. Britain’s island geography and transatlantic 
status gave it an important comparative advantage.75 Nonetheless, 
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both eighteenth-century British and French mercantilism were quite 
successful.
 Teschke’s view of mercantilism arises from his overall view of 
the evolution of international relations. It is based on an extension 
into the field of international relations of the premises of Brenner 
and Political Marxism, with which he strongly identifies. He rejects 
the dominant paradigm of the discipline of international relations 
which considers the Treaty of Westphalia of 1648, ending the wars 
of religion, as the founding moment of the modern state system. 
Rather, geopolitical modernity began with the Glorious Revolution 
in 1688, which saw the birth of the first capitalist state in England, 
and was marked above all by the consolidation of parliamentary 
rule in that country. The subsequent expansion of English capi-
talism in the eighteenth century then step-by-step undermined the 
governments and the state system of the Ancien Régime. Modern 
sovereignty embodied in English politics should not be confused 
with absolutist sovereignty, which was reflected in the Treaty of 
Westphalia. The Bourbon monarchy in France was the most perfect 
exemplar of the latter. French absolutism is regarded by Teschke as 
standing in complete opposition to English capitalism, in conformity 
with Brenner’s and Wood’s view of non-capitalist France. Like Wood, 
too, Teschke views Holland as an example of merchant capitalism 
closely tied to feudalism. Indeed, whereas Arrighi regards Holland 
as the linchpin of seventeenth-century European politics, Teschke 
downgrades its importance in the operation of the post-Westphalian 
system.
 Mercantilism created a structural nexus between trade and 
government. Such a structural link between the economic and 
political is the antithesis of modern capitalism. Commercial capi-
talism under the mercantile system was not capitalism. According 
to Teschke, international trade under capitalism is characterized by 
open and competitive markets. Under dynastic conditions, mercan-
tilism was a geographical strategy of extending the accumulating 
reach of pre-modern states, not a qualitative change in the logic 
of the world economic order. Internationally, the redistribution 
of wealth through unequal exchange was a zero-sum game: total 
wealth was not increased thereby. The zero-sum conception which 
conceived of total wealth as finite was elevated into an economic 
law in mercantilist doctrine. This was because the sphere of produc-
tion remained outside its theoretical scope: ‘profits from trade were 
not systematically reinvested in the means of production but in the 
means of violence’.76 On a national level, economic growth was 
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thought of in terms of absolute population growth, absolute gains 
from trade and immigration, or absolute territorial gain.77
 Teschke’s account is deficient in its view of the relationship 
between the state and market on at least three counts. In the first 
place, he refuses to take account of the fact, already pointed to by 
Arrighi above, that the most successful mercantile state was not an 
absolutist state, but the most successful capitalist country: post-
revolutionary eighteenth-century England.78 Robin Blackburn has 
described the English mercantilism of that period as an inverted 
one, not with financiers and merchants serving the raison d’état any 
longer, but with the state serving capitalist purposes. For all that, it 
was still mercantilist in that the state more than ever interfered in 
the market. The state created a zone of imperial ‘free trade’ for its 
merchants and manufacturers, offered them protection and gained 
favourable terms for their entry into other markets.79 Eighteenth-
century France, too, is an example of a successful mercantile state 
which willy-nilly was drawn in the same direction. Despite its 
feudal and absolutist character, competition with England forced 
it to increasingly preoccupy itself with the well-being of French 
commerce and industry.80
 Second, Teschke fails to recognize that as mercantile states both 
England and France were very interested in the development of new, 
more productive manufacturing technologies. This is true of virtually 
all mercantilist regimes in the eighteenth century. Third, and most 
egregiously, Teschke quite mistakenly twists the story of capitalism 
into a history of the triumph of the market and the effacement of 
the state. Nothing could be more in conformity with the opinions of 
Adam Smith and further from the historical truth. It belies Marx’s 
view that the mercantilist state was used to accelerate the creation 
of the market. England did not become a truly free-trading state 
until the mid-nineteenth century, and then only for a generation. Its 
free-trade ideology amounted to propaganda designed to discourage 
would-be industrial competitors like the United States and Germany. 
Statesmen and thinkers like Alexander Hamilton of the United States 
and Friedrich List of Prussia fully appreciated the importance of state 
protectionism to the development of industry. The United States, the 
most dynamic capitalist state of the nineteenth century, may right-
fully be considered neo-mercantilist. As against the Smithian view 
of the history of capitalism, which insists that it is the history of a 
progressive liberation from the thrall of the state, the existence of a 
strong state is integral to it. Indeed, I have insisted on this as a basic 
theme from the late Middle Ages onward.
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colonIalIsm
As I have noted, Marx closely connected mercantilism with the 
development of industry. It was an aspect of the age of early modern 
manufactures. According to Marx colonialism was a critical feature 
of the mercantile system:
Today industrial supremacy implies commercial supremacy. In 
the period of manufacture properly so called, it is, on the other 
hand, commercial supremacy that gives industrial predominance. 
Hence the preponderant role that the colonial system plays at 
that time.81
Marx’s judgment of colonialism was an ambivalent, or better a 
dialectical, one. For while condemning its injustice and ills, he 
also saw colonialism as advancing the development of capitalism 
as a world system, and ultimately leading to socialism, which he 
conceived of as a unified global order based on social and political 
equality. From the sixteenth century the development of capitalism 
and colonialism was part of a single process of increasingly global 
accumulation. Western Europe was undeniably at the centre of capi-
talism. But socialism would put an end to uneven development and 
self-evidently would have no political headquarters.
 Many historians and postcolonial theorists choose to deny or 
forget Marx’s dialectical approach and universalist and socialist 
perspective on the ultimate fate of capitalism. Looking at the short 
or medium term they prefer to see Marx’s view as fundamentally 
Eurocentric. But I cannot go along with those who take offence 
at Marx for his view of the history of capitalism. For him the 
extension of European domination over most of the rest of the 
world while capitalism universalized itself was a historical process 
that could not be ignored, wished away or merely denounced. Two 
centuries or even half a millennium under the thrall of capitalism is 
not long in terms of humankind’s long past or socialist future.
 Marx’s critics accuse him of Eurocentric attitudes. Where such 
lapses occurred they have been acknowledged and criticized by 
Kevin Anderson, a recent sympathetic student of Marx’s approach 
to non-Western societies.82 But Anderson makes clear that Marx’s 
faults in this respect have little to do with his essential point of view. 
Those who brandish the charge of Eurocentrism against him often 
do so because they refuse or are unable to appreciate his dialec-
tical sense of the historical process, his mordant sensibility and his 
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tough-mindedness.83 This dialectical approach was the one he took 
to the study of capitalism itself. In the Communist Manifesto and 
the Grundrisse, for example, we find magnificent paeans in appre-
ciation of the power of capitalism. At the same time such praise is 
accompanied by denunciation of the intrinsically exploitative and 
destructive character of the system, which degrades the producers 
and nature itself. This double-sided perspective helps to reinforce 
Marx’s authoritative and scientific method with an aesthetic and 
stylistic sense of detachment which helps readers grasp the fact that 
history proceeds in an ironical fashion. Writing about India, for 
example, his early accounts viewed the British conquest as positive 
although violent, because it furthered the progress of capitalism 
in England through primitive accumulation, while leading to the 
liquidation of the so-called Asiatic mode of production. This was 
inescapable as capitalism extended its global reach. Yet reporting 
the bloody-mindedness and racism of the British in repressing the 
Indian Mutiny (1857), Marx brought to the surface what he had 
undoubtedly already understood, namely, the cruelty of the British 
conquerors. Moreover it was not overly Eurocentric of him correctly 
to conclude that the British in India were preparing the ground for 
their own demise, as the Indians would sooner or later develop the 
capacity to liberate themselves from British domination.84 
 Marx’s views on India have been questioned at a deeper level.85 
Based on what is now understood of the economic and manufac-
turing dynamism of India during the eighteenth century, some critics 
point out that Marx’s notion of India as locked into the Asian mode 
of production, based on the symbiotic relationship between village 
peasants and artisans, is open to serious doubt. Yet in a nuanced 
response Irfan Habib has pointed out that Marx’s early view of the 
Asiatic mode was not set in stone. He was never prepared to go so 
far as to acknowledge that pre-colonial India could be considered a 
particular form of feudalism, as some scholars do today. On the other 
hand, as he studied further, he came to acknowledge that private 
property, commodity exchange and a class structure did emerge 
in early modern India, and that it was accordingly far from being 
a stagnant society. Habib also noted Marx’s condemnation of the 
deliberate destruction of Indian textile manufacturing by the British 
at the beginning of their rule, and the way they milked India through 
the siphoning off of tax as the tribute of ‘good government’.86 On 
the other hand, we should recognize that Marx’s approval of the 
British policy of building railways, introducing Western education 
and political centralization must be offset by the recognition that the 
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British systematically crippled Indian manufacturing and inhibited 
economic development almost up to the end of their rule.87
 Marx understood that the exploitation of India was made possible 
by colonialism, which he saw as basically a form of political and 
military domination. Likewise he understood that it was essentially 
through military conquest that the English imposed landlordism 
on Ireland. Furthermore, English political control enabled them to 
undermine Irish industry at the same time as they were destroying 
Indian manufacturing.88
 The English conquest of Ireland was based on what Wood argues 
was a distinctively English and capitalist landlord-based colonialism. 
Its distinctiveness from the Spanish, French and Portuguese form of 
colonial exploitation was rooted in an agrarian capitalism whose 
dynamic lay in raising the level of relative surplus value.89 In other 
words English colonialism was an outgrowth of a unique and 
superior form of capitalist economy. This judgement perhaps makes 
sense with respect to some British colonies of North America like 
New York and Pennsylvania in the short run. In the longer term 
such English-style landlordism was undermined in North America 
by access to cheap land.
  We can question whether it applies to Ireland at all. Marx noted 
that under colonialism Irish agriculture was organized along similar 
lines to English capitalist agriculture. He furthermore recognized 
the capitalist aspirations of Irish tenant farmers. But, contrary to 
Wood, he stressed that both the labour and capital of such farmers, 
rather than going toward the creation of more relative surplus value 
and further accumulation, were for the most part confiscated by 
rack-renting and largely absentee English landlords.90 Political and 
economic colonialism in Ireland, it should be noted, worked through 
what has been described as a classic form of racial oppression – the 
precursor of the racial oppression inflicted on African slaves in the 
New World.91 Viewed from this perspective, racism was a form of 
ideological control that was born in the early modern period and 
was designed to reinforce colonial domination and exploitative 
relations of production.
 Following the Second World War many theorists in the under-
developed countries explained under-development through the 
notion of unequal exchange. Samir Amin, for example, underscored 
the transfer of surplus from colonial countries to the developed 
world as a result of the transfer of surplus value from countries of 
lower to those of higher productivity.92 Apparently unbeknownst to 
Amin this process of unequal exchange had already been pointed 
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out in Marx’s Grundrisse, in a critique of David Ricardo’s theory 
of comparative advantage entitled ‘Two nations may exchange 
according to the law of profit in such a way that both gain, but one 
is always defrauded’.93 As Marx explains:
nations may continually exchange with one another, may even 
continually repeat the exchange on an ever-expanding scale, 
without for the that reason necessarily gaining in equal degrees. 
One of the nations may continually appropriate for itself a part 
of the surplus labour of the other, giving back nothing for it in 
the exchange.94
In common with other proponents of the dependency school, 
Wallerstein views unequal exchange as a characteristic feature of 
colonialism, facilitating the export of capital from the periphery and 
its accumulation at the centre of the world system. Responsibility 
for this state of affairs was due in large degree to the power of 
the strong states in the core, which politically enforced economic 
inequality. In direct opposition, Brenner insisted that the failure of 
capitalism in the periphery and the haemorrhage of capital toward 
Europe was due not to colonial domination but rather to the class 
relations within colonized states which stymied the rise of capi-
talism. As we have noted earlier, Brenner ignores the way that the 
international relations of dependency shape internal class relations 
in favour of ongoing colonialism.
 Jim Blaut, a Marxist geographer, has been the most outspoken 
opponent of Brenner’s Eurocentrism, regarding it as directed against 
not only Wallerstein’s view, but also other proponents of the depen-
dency school like Amin and André Gunder Frank. Blaut made 
known his position in different places, but nowhere more cogently 
than as part of a debate in the journal Political Geography (1992).95 
Prior to 1492, according to Blaut:
Europe was not in any way ahead of Africa and Asia in develop-
ment or even in the preconditions of development. After 1492, 
Europeans came to dominate the world, and they did so because 
1492 inaugurated a set of world-historical processes which 
gave to European protocapitalists enough capital and power to 
dissolve feudalism in their own region and begin the destruction 
of competing protocapitalist communities everywhere else.96
There are four main points to Blaut’s argument:
heller maintext.indd   165 6/7/2011   11:50:59 AM
166 t h e b i rt h o f  c a p i ta l i s m
•	 Europeans	 had	 no	 advantage	 over	 Africans	 or	 Asians	 prior	 to	
1492 in respect of an evolution toward capitalism and modernity. 
Medieval Europe was no more advanced or progressive than 
Africa or Asia.
•	 It	 was	 colonialism	 especially	 in	 the	 Americas	 which	 made	 
capitalism possible and gave Europe the advantage after 1492.
•	 The	exploitation	of	the	Americas	in	the	sixteenth	and	seventeenth	
century produced much more capital than is acknowledged and 
enabled a major transformation of European society.
•	 There	was	no	uniquely	European	 transformation	of	 relations	of	
production from feudalism to capitalism, as Brenner and others 
have insisted. Rather, there was a transition toward capitalism 
from a range of broadly feudal and feudal-tributary modes of 
production that was hemisphere-wide prior to 1492. It was Euro-
pean colonialism after that date that arrested the process outside 
of Europe.
 In response to the first point, Chris Harman, who was committed 
to the idea that Western Europe was the starting place of early 
capitalism, conceded Blaut’s argument to an extent.97 According 
to him, the productive forces of humanity were developing across 
Eurasia and in Africa over a long period prior to 1492. In several 
places in these regions, tendencies to capitalism were emerging. But 
Harman underscores that for contingent historical reasons such 
tendencies emerged more slowly elsewhere than in Western Europe, 
and this provided Europe with an advantage. On the contrary, 
Blaut asserts that these proto-capitalist tendencies were developing 
uniformly everywhere. But even if this is true, the first breakthrough 
to capitalism turned out to be a zero-sum game, with the Europeans 
emerging as the winners. Once ahead, the Europeans were able to 
maintain their advantage by force.
 Moreover, the development of European colonialism, which is 
Blaut’s second point, is regarded by him as the key stumbling block 
in the way of further non-European capitalist development. Indeed, 
it should be stressed that the essence of colonialism is in the final 
analysis not economic domination. It is about the use of force and 
the opportunities that force allows. Political control permits the 
restructuring of economic relations in favour of those who wield 
coercive power.
 But colonialism has to be understood in dialectical fashion as an 
outgrowth of the dynamic development of capitalism within Europe. 
Its development did not come out of the blue, but reflected the 
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expansive drive of capitalism. It arose out of the quest for increasing 
amounts of bullion necessary to supply the rapidly emerging capitalist 
marketplace within Europe at the end of the fifteenth and beginning 
of the sixteenth centuries. The urgency to find fresh sources of gold 
and silver was admittedly increased by the simultaneous search for 
profit in the African slave trade and slave plantation economy, as 
well as the growth of the Asian spice trade. In the course of its subse-
quent development, colonialism expanded out of the need to find 
markets for European manufactured products, create settler-colonies 
and profit further from the slave trade and the slave plantation 
economy.
  It should be reiterated that even so, Europe’s early overseas 
success was as much or more a military and political than an 
economic one. Yet its martial and administrative superiority already 
reflected a growing technical and organizational capacity which 
was an outgrowth of an internally expanding capitalist economy. 
It then used its martial strength and political power to enhance its 
internal economic development while expanding its political and 
economic reach further overseas. In other words, Blaut tends to 
view colonialism as a contingent, or perhaps political and military, 
factor ensuring European success, while standing in the way of the 
economic development of non-Europeans. In fact colonialism sprang 
from Europe’s internal dynamic, which for better or worse included 
both its emerging political and economic strength.
 André Gunder Frank radically challenged Blaut’s conception.98 
Contrary to Blaut’s view of even global development, Frank insisted 
on its uneven character. Against the whole pack of Eurocentric 
historians, he argued that in 1492 and for long afterward it was Asia 
that was globally in the economic ascendant, not Western Europe. 
But it should be immediately recalled that it was Hobsbawm who 
first invoked uneven development as part of the original transition 
debate conceding the backwardness of Western Europe in relation 
to much of Eurasia. But instead of seeing this as a disadvantage as 
Frank would have it, Hobsbawm argued that it turned to Western 
Europe’s advantage. Hobsbawm, we can recall, also harked back 
to the notion of uneven development, insisting that capitalism 
developed on the periphery of Eurasia and entailed a process of 
rapid coming from behind and leaping ahead. In other words, it was 
the very backwardness of the West which gave it an advantage.
 Marx’s view of the integral role and significance of overseas 
conquest and colonialism in the history of capitalism remains 
intact. From the beginning his view of colonialism was dialectical, 
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destructive of non-European societies while helping to accelerate 
the development of the capitalist world market and the process 
of capital accumulation. Blaut’s argument that Europe’s conquest 
of the world was not based on capitalism but rather on colonial 
conquest is unsustainable because the power of colonial expansion 
depended on the growing strength of capitalism. Frank’s point about 
the economic superiority of Asia over Europe throughout the early 
modern period confirms that economic progress was far from being 
a monopoly of Western Europe. On the other hand, the notion of 
uneven capitalist development in which what had been peripheral 
emerges as the centre is key to understanding the eventual advance 
of Western Europe over the rest of the world.
slavery
At the focal point of colonialism were the slave trade and the 
colonial slave plantations. The relationship between capitalism and 
slavery has been debated even more fiercely than colonialism. The 
slave and colonial trades emerged as the most dynamic sectors of 
the Europe-centred capitalist economy in the seventeenth century. 
It stoked the flames of European, and especially British, trade and 
manufacturing-based economic expansion in the eighteenth century. 
British exports accounted for over 56 percent of all industrial 
production in the period 1700–1760, and over 46 percent in the 
period 1780–1800. Overwhelmingly North America, the Caribbean 
and Latin America were the major markets for these overseas 
sales.99 It is estimated that in 1770 this Atlantic trade furnished as 
much as 55 percent of ‘gross fixed capital formation investment’ in 
Great Britain.100 At the heart of this Atlantic economy, including the 
North American mainland, lay the slave trade and the plantation 
economy based on slave labour. Already in the sixteenth century 
the number of Africans taken from Africa as captives and enslaved 
amounted to 370,000. By the eighteenth century the total reached 
no less than 6,130,000. In 1800 there were over 3 million slaves in 
the Americas despite an enormous mortality.101
  It was Eric Williams, in his Capitalism and Slavery published in 
1944, who first made the connection between the profits made in the 
slave trade and slave plantations and the Industrial Revolution.102 
He argued that the surplus extracted from the sugar-slave planta-
tion complex and the associated triangular trades opened the way 
to industrialization. Williams’s thesis was contested by historians 
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uncomfortable with the idea that the breakthrough of European 
capitalism was based on slavery. They succeeded in throwing some 
doubt on his statistics regarding the profitability of slavery and the 
significance of exports, arguing that the capital necessary to indus-
trialization was available within the British economy. Yet Williams 
for the most part has been vindicated by recent historiography.103
 Certainly there is little question now that the sale of manufac-
tures in the Caribbean was important to the development of British 
capitalism in the eighteenth century. The speed-up in the rate of 
industrial growth based on exports depended in good part on 
purchasing power generated by the British West Indies. It seems that 
demand stemming from Africa, the Caribbean and North America 
ultimately generated by the production of sugar raised the export 
of manufactures from Britain abroad by a large factor. It may 
have been responsible for more than half of the growth of English 
exports in the third quarter of the eighteenth century. The institution 
of slavery had an important effect in increasing investment in the 
Empire through the development of the triangular trades with North 
America and the Caribbean, as well as in the building of maritime 
and transportation infrastructure. Return on this investment in turn 
increased income in England. At the same time the re-export of 
sugar to the Continent brought enormous profits.
  How can we understand the relationship between capitalism 
and slavery? The classic analysis of the slave mode of production 
is by the Marxist historian of Greek Antiquity, Geoffrey E. M. de 
Ste Croix.104 According to him, the free wage labourer has his own 
labour-power to sell and must be considered variable capital. In 
contrast, the slave is the property of the master, and as such is a 
means of production, or is a constituent part of constant or fixed 
capital, like land, tools and draft animals.105 In Antiquity slavery 
was not the only form of unfree labour. But it was the archetypical 
form of such labour, and the one on which the ruling class depended 
for its control over society and the state.106
 What was its relationship to capitalism in the early modern 
period, when wage labour was gradually becoming the dominant 
form of exploitation? In attempting to answer this question we 
find that there are a number of differing positions. Wallerstein, 
concerned as he is with conceiving capitalism as a single system, 
considered slavery and serfdom as forms of exploitation alongside 
wage labour as part of a capitalist world-system which emerged 
in the sixteenth century. Although wage labour defines the capi-
talist system, slavery and serfdom are integral parts of the global 
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capitalist division of labour according to Wallerstein. Coming from 
the completely opposed tack of neoclassical economics, American 
historians Robert Fogel and Stanley Engerman applied quantita-
tive techniques to economic history and claimed that the American 
slave plantation operated like an efficient capitalist enterprise. 
Fogel and Engerman particularly denied that slave labour was any 
less productive than wage labour or intrinsically incompatible with 
capitalism.107 Critical to their argument is a comparison of southern 
plantation with northern capitalist farming. Critics point out that 
the two econometricians use questionable data and measurements 
of productivity in their comparison, so that the results turn out in 
favour of southern plantation agriculture.108
 According to Byres, at a time when capitalism was flourishing 
and developing, slavery had to adapt to the norms of the capitalist 
world market. But he insists such adaptation does not make slavery 
capitalist. Planters in the Southern states of the United States sought 
to accumulate and maximize profits, but that did not transform 
them into capitalists. Rather they sought to restore and maintain 
an archaic mode of production.109 Rakesh Bhandari, contrariwise, 
argues that so long as capital seeks to valorize labour through 
profits, it can do so through a variety of forms of exploitation: 
slavery, labour tenancy, nominally independent petty commodity 
producers, and formally free wage labour. From the perspective of 
capital there is no essential difference between a wage worker who 
is a wage slave and a slave who is an enslaved wage worker.110 In 
opposition to Bhandari, I would argue that it is only the labour 
power stemming from wage labour that allows the ballooning of 
value and capital accumulation through the extraction of relative as 
against absolute value, involving systematic and cumulative gains in 
productivity. For Bhandari to be correct he would have to show that 
forms of exploitation like slavery could produce such continuing 
increases in productivity.
 In two massive volumes, The Overthrow of Colonial Slavery, 
1776–1848 (1988) and The Making of New World Slavery 
(1997), Robin Blackburn has made a fundamental contribution to 
understanding the relationship between slavery and capitalism.111 
For many years a stalwart of the New Left Review, Blackburn 
is professor at the New School of Social Research and at Essex 
University. Both of Blackburn’s books are both theoretically 
informed and deeply rooted in archival research. In discussing early 
modern slavery, Blackburn seeks to distinguish Eastern European 
serfdom from New World slavery, and thereby sets himself at a 
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distance from Wallerstein. The latter had insisted that the emergence 
of the capitalist world system made Eastern Europe the granary of 
the West. The profits derived from exports encouraged landlords to 
turn their peasant tenants into serfs while tying the Eastern European 
economy to the capitalist world system. But, according to Blackburn, 
serfdom east of the Elbe was not the product of the capitalist mode 
but the response of landlords to the demographic crisis of the late 
Middle Ages. The subsequent turn of landlords to grain exports 
required very few productive imports from the West, and stimulated 
no reciprocal commercial exchanges. Eastern Europe was barely 
integrated into capitalism. In contrast the American slave plantations 
were established to produce cash crops for sale in Europe, which 
was their sole purpose. They remained intimately tied to imports of 
European manufactured goods, which included means of production 
as well as consumer items. At their height Polish grain exports never 
amounted to more than 15 percent of production, with luxury goods 
dominating imports. Europe’s trade with the slave plantations was 
more conducive to cumulative and reciprocal expansion. Hence New 
World slavery was much more closely tied in with West European 
capitalism than was serfdom in Eastern Europe.112
 Blackburn agrees with Byres that New World slavery was not 
intrinsically capitalist in its internal dynamic. Rather, the slave 
economies of the New World were a form of primitive accumula-
tion. They were primitive because their productive organization 
relied not on the economic coercion of the sale of labour power, but 
on non-economic compulsion. The producers were compelled by 
direct and physical coercion to produce a surplus and a commodity 
for sale in the market. Britain’s formal and informal empire rested 
on its military, and especially its naval, strength, or in other words 
on violence or the threat of violence. If primitive accumulation 
had completed itself within England by 1700, it was reinforced 
and extended for a century and more overseas through slavery.113 
Summing up his view of the relation between slavery and the 
emergence of industrial capitalism, Blackburn notes that:
capital’s thirst for surplus-value and the necessarily uneven 
advance of mechanization has, indeed, repeatedly produced 
regimes of extended primitive accumulation, in which forced or 
sweated labour is driven to match the pace of machine industry, 
and is expected to rely on ‘natural economy’ or communal 
resources for their reproduction. New World slavery was the first 
and least-camouflaged expression of this capitalist logic.114
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 But if Blackburn’s view captures the essence of the relationship 
between early modern slavery and capitalism, the question remains 
of the extent of its importance to the development of capitalism 
since the sixteenth century, and more particularly, to the origins 
of the Industrial Revolution in the late eighteenth and early nine-
teenth centuries. The early historians of the Industrial Revolution 
(1880–1945) were nearly unanimous in linking the expansion of 
British commerce of the eighteenth century, including the slave trade 
and plantation slavery, with the onset of industrial capitalism.115 
British Marxist historiography, including Hobsbawm’s Industry 
and Empire (1964) and Christopher Hill’s From Reformation to 
Industrial Revolution (1968), acknowledged the importance of this 
link.116 After the Second World War a new trend in academic histori-
ography surfaced, stressing the importance of British internal factors 
to the Industrial Revolution. It became dominant by the late 1960s 
and remained so until the 1980s.117 The turn toward examining the 
roots of industrialism in Britain was obviously to be welcomed. But 
we cannot help noticing the connection between this Eurocentric 
trend and hostility towards the Williams thesis in these years, which 
coincided with decolonization and national liberation struggles in 
the third world.118 Some still bearing the white man’s burden were 
unwilling to acknowledge that there could be a relationship between 
capitalist development, the Industrial Revolution and slavery that 
might merit an apology.
 Brenner of course cannot be counted as one of these. But among 
Marxists who have espoused the internalist view, it is he who has 
been most outspoken. In the first place, Brenner argues that the 
capital required to build the first factories was actually relatively 
slight. Accordingly, he questions whether a heaping-up of capital by 
primitive accumulation was required as a precondition for industri-
alization. Furthermore, along with others, he argues that it was the 
growth of the home market that was decisive to the development 
of the colonial trade. The growth of internal demand in Britain 
for colonial products was the independent variable that animated 
the Atlantic trade, which was subordinate to it.119 Since the 1980s 
historiography in fact has veered back toward emphasizing the 
significance of overseas trade to industrialization. In 1982 Engerman 
and O’Brien wrote in strong support of the leading role of exports 
in the industrialization process in England between 1688 and 1802. 
They demonstrated that up to 50 percent of the non-agricultural 
workforce in England and Wales was employed in production for 
export. They showed that increases in overseas sales accounted for 
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much of the increase in manufacturing output during the period.120 
Meanwhile Utsa Patniak has shown the tremendous sums that 
Britain skimmed from the slave plantations and India through fiscal 
manipulation and re-export of colonial products. Liberal economists 
obsessed with computing comparative advantage in weighing up 
the balance of colonialism take little account of these realities she 
points out.121
 It is Blackburn’s work on slavery, meanwhile, which is the 
outstanding Marxist reflection of the trend toward taking the role 
of slavery and colonialism in industrialization seriously. In answer 
to Brenner, Blackburn admits that the initial outlays for factory 
construction tended to be relatively small. But he points out the huge 
sums invested in the laying down of infrastructure: canals, roads, 
harbours, docks, warehouses and shipping, all of which required 
capital. In addition, if manufacturers required relatively little fixed 
capital, they needed copious amounts of working capital or credit.122 
Much of this capital came from the Atlantic trade. Moreover, the 
overseas market was the most dynamic sector of the British market 
in the eighteenth century, and its range included the whole of the 
Americas. Its growth and volume cannot be accounted for by the 
growth of demand from the home market. Rather, profits from this 
sector provided much, if by no means all, of the capital required for 
industrialization.123 As I pointed out earlier, dazzled as he is by the 
rise of the productivity of social labour under capitalism, Brenner 
loses sight of the source of the capital that made productivity growth 
possible.
 Merchant capitalists were the most important backers of the first 
generation of industrial manufacturers. The mass-produced goods 
produced in the latter’s factories were in good part aimed at the 
American market. This is especially true in the all-important cotton 
industry, where the connection between slave-trading merchants and 
producers of cotton goods, as well as metal and other manufactured 
products, was particularly close.124 Finally, the direct connection 
between the development of the slave cotton plantation and the rise 
of cotton manufacture needs to be underlined. Cheap raw cotton 
from the Caribbean, then from the deep South of the United States, 
gave Britain its competitive edge, helping to inspire the spread of 
industrialization. Moreover, that success spurred the spread of 
slavery based on the cotton plantation.125
 Overseas trade, the slave trade and the slave plantation clearly rein-
forced the development of capitalism and the Industrial Revolution. 
But Blackburn’s account insists that capitalism battened on this 
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older mode of production and exploited it until it had exhausted 
its possibilities. While underscoring the importance of slavery to the 
emergence of industrial capitalism, Blackburn insists on its ultimate 
limits. It is this that Byres explores in his treatment of the economic 
development of capitalism from below in the United States. His main 
stress is on the transformation of the petty producers of the United 
States into capitalist farmers. But Byres emphasizes that this trend 
was rivalled by the development of the slave plantation. In accord 
with the views of Marx and the well-known historian of American 
slavery Eugene Genovese, Byres argues that beyond a certain point, 
slavery was incompatible with industrial capitalism. Byres criticizes 
Fogel and Engerman’s attempt to prove that the slave plantation was 
an efficient form of capitalist enterprise. Not only did it have funda-
mental limitations with respect to making gains in productivity, it 
cramped the development of the home market in the southern states. 
This is obvious with regard to the impoverished slave population. 
Not so evident was its effects on the million of white small rural 
producers living in the slave states of the American South. Byres 
observes that the Southern master class which politically ruled these 
states shielded this class of farmers from the capitalist marketplace. 
But in doing so it blocked the process of social differentiation which 
was underway in the north and west. As a result, most of these 
farmers were unable to serve as a home market for manufactures 
in the South. Nor could they acquire the capital necessary for agri-
cultural improvement, as was the case elsewhere in the American 
Union.126
conclusIon
Looking back we can note that the theoretical conceptions of Lenin, 
Trotsky and Marx have formed the basis of the argument of this 
chapter that the state played a central role in the development of 
capitalism. Lenin’s idea of capitalism from above and below has 
been our central guidepost. The cases of Prussia, Scotland and Japan 
have been used to demonstrate that capitalism can develop as a 
result of initiatives from the state and the landlord class. Trotsky’s 
insight into the role of combined and uneven development reinforces 
the idea of the key role of the state in a capitalism imposed from 
on high. But our account of the role of the American state demon-
strates that politics were to the fore even in cases of capitalism from 
below. Finally Marx’s view of mercantilism as a use of the power 
of the state as a means of accelerating the growth of the market 
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has guided our examination of the mercantile system. Moreover I 
have abided by his view that mercantilism above all reflected the 
interests of a rising bourgeoisie, albeit one initially contained within 
the shell of the absolute state. Furthermore I have insisted that the 
most successful mercantilisms were practised not by absolutist but 
by post-revolutionary capitalist regimes like Holland and England. 
Colonialism and slavery were two vitally important aspects of 
the mercantile system. Their relationship with the development of 
capitalism has been much disputed. I have sided with the position 
that they were critical to its development. Indeed, I have taken the 
position that colonialism and overseas slavery were vitally important 
to industrialization. Growing markets, plunder and profits from 
abroad proved essential to the Industrial Revolution at home. It is to 
the disputes over the origins and nature of the Industrial Revolution 
that we next turn.
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the IndustrIal revolutIon: 
marxIst PersPectIves
The Industrial Revolution marked the climax of the long transition 
from feudalism to capitalism. Capital entered the productive process 
and transformed the means of production. Its arrival opened up 
the possibility of ending natural scarcity for the first time in human 
history. It also led to a vast extension of the West’s global power. 
The West’s hegemony over the rest of the world fostered an ongoing 
sense of European superiority over non-European peoples. 
 Much history of extremely high quality has been written about the 
Industrial Revolution by Marxist and non-Marxist scholars on the 
basis of deep empirical research, rigorous quantitative methodology 
and novel perspectives.1 This account engages with some of the most 
controversial historical questions that have arisen in writing about 
this momentous event, questions that also turn out to have divided 
Marxist from non-Marxist scholars. While taking note of the contri-
bution of non-Marxists throughout, it demonstrates the way that 
Marxist historians have decisively shaped the ongoing debate.
 Marxist scholars have maintained, as Marx did, that the 
Industrial Revolution, although obviously significant, was less 
so than the inception of capitalism in the sixteenth century. The 
Industrial Revolution must be understood as capitalism’s dénoue-
ment. Historical research has confirmed this view. In this light 
I shall demonstrate that although the Industrial Revolution did 
underwrite a European illusion of cultural superiority over the rest 
of the world, in fact its triumph arrived late, and proved more tran-
sitory and less absolute and unqualified than previously thought.
 Marxists have tended to stress the socially and politically disrup-
tive character of the period of the Industrial Revolution, while 
non-Marxists have emphasized its continuity with the past. The 
Marxist view would seem to be the more historically plausible. Not 
only do non-Marxist historians tend to ignore the disruptiveness of 
the Industrial Revolution, they are prone to downplay the attendant 
exploitation of the common people, whether the emergent working 
class or plantation slaves. While Marxists focus on changes in 
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production and relations of production in explaining the Industrial 
Revolution, non-Marxist scholars of late rather questionably have 
stressed the importance of consumption. They have also, unfor-
tunately as we shall see, tended to resort to a technological or 
intellectual determinism in the way they interpret the important rela-
tionship between the Scientific and Industrial Revolutions. Indeed, it 
is our view that non-Marxist historians of the Industrial Revolution 
tend to be excessively economistic and too dogmatically liberal in 
their approach.
 The term ‘Industrial Revolution’ was coined in the first decade of 
the nineteenth century to refer to the mechanization and concentra-
tion of manufacturing already in progress. By the 1840s reference 
to the Industrial Revolution had become part of current English 
and French usage. Though it referred to major technical transfor-
mation, it already carried with it an implicit comparison with the 
immense impact of the French Revolution. It was in the 1830s that 
the term was first employed by Peter Gaskell in The Manufacturing 
Population of England (1833) in the decisive sense of a new order 
of society.2
 As between Marx and Engels, it was Engels who first made use 
of the term Industrial Revolution in this more profound sense. In the 
introduction to his celebrated The Condition of the Working Class 
in England (1844), Engels referred to how:
the history of the proletariat begins with the second half of the last 
century, with the invention of the steam-engine and of machinery 
for working cotton. These inventions gave rise, as is well known, 
to an industrial revolution, a revolution which altered the whole 
civil society; one, the historical importance of which is only now 
beginning to be recognized.3
According to Engels, the Industrial Revolution started with the 
introduction of machinery driven by the steam engine, beginning 
with the cotton factories. It not only created the proletariat – the 
revolutionary class of the future – it ushered in the transformation 
of the whole of society.
 From our perspective, there are many senses in which the 
Industrial Revolution constitutes the climactic moment in the devel-
opment of capitalism. It is the moment when capital entered and 
fully transformed industry. It is also the moment when the extrac-
tion of relative surplus value as a method of exploiting labour 
finally triumphed. The extraction of relative surplus value, or 
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increases in productivity due to technological improvements or the 
redeployment of labour, had already played a part in the history of 
capitalism. Evident in the reorganization and gradual improvement 
of agriculture since the sixteenth century, it also was manifest in the 
restructuring of industry through the increasing division of labour in 
handicraft manufacture and the spread of the putting-out system. But 
as I have repeatedly argued, the effects of the extraction of relative 
surplus value on the capitalist economy were at first comparatively 
limited. Early capitalism depended mainly on the extraction of 
absolute surplus value, by extending the working day and year, 
intensifying work and keeping wages low. In this stage the extrac-
tion of increasing relative surplus value manifested itself in gradual 
and cumulative improvements in agriculture and rural industry. But 
the extraction of absolute surplus value remained fundamental to 
capitalist production. With the onset of the Industrial Revolution 
the extraction of relative surplus value became decisive. The intro-
duction of machinery and the reorganization of production into 
centralized factories released the full productive potential of social 
labour organized by capital. The result was a dramatic rise in the 
share of industry in British national output.
 Revisionism in the sense of questioning Marx’s view of the 
Industrial Revolution has marked the ongoing debates on the 
Industrial Revolution. As we have noted, revisionism has stressed 
continuity as against the Marxist insistence on rupture. It has been 
sceptical of the Marxist view of the importance of the world market 
in favour of an internalist account of the growth of industry. In 
opposition to Marxist emphasis on changes in the relations of 
production, it has stressed the importance of consumerist demand 
as a factor. In this light it has cast doubt on the Marxist notion of 
the immiseration of the working class. Indeed, it has questioned the 
very notion of the existence of a working class. It has underscored 
the importance of ideas, especially scientific ideas, while ignoring 
their social context.
 Challenges to the Marxist view have fuelled a stimulating and 
constructive historical debate on the Industrial Revolution while 
forcing Marxists to deepen and refine their analysis. Often made 
in the light of revisionist arguments, the contributions of Marxists 
like Steven Marglin and Harry Magdoff on the labour process, 
E. P. Thompson and Perry Anderson on the nature and culture of 
the working class, Hobsbawm and Thompson on the standard of 
living, Ben Fine and Ellen Leopold on consumerism have deepened 
understanding of the origins and effects of the Industrial Revolution. 
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It will be seen that contemporary Marxist scholarship like that of 
Marx and Engels has been focused above all on the effects of the 
Industrial Revolution on the working class. But debates between 
Anderson and Thompson have also fundamentally altered under-
standing of the nature of the capitalist class, while demonstrating 
that far from imposing a unitary view, Marxism can widen debate. 
Furthermore as we shall see, it was left-wing historians who made 
the connection between the English Revolution, the Scientific 
Revolution and the Industrial Revolution. As a result the Marxist 
view of the Industrial Revolution has more than held its own in the 
face of ongoing revisionist challenges. On the other hand, I shall 
argue that an appreciation of Marx’s view of the origins of the 
Industrial Revolution remains indispensable to an understanding 
of it. Forming an essential part of Volume One of Capital, Marx’s 
theoretical analysis of the changes in the relations of production and 
the productive process attendant on industrialization are basic to an 
understanding of his conception of capitalism itself.
hobsbaWm and the overseas market
As we saw in the Chapter 5, while profits of overseas trade, colo-
nialism and slavery played a critical role in setting off the Industrial 
Revolution, Marx and most Marxist historians rightly stressed 
changes in the relations of production as decisive. In short order we 
will consider these innovations. In this section we follow through 
Chapter 5’s argument by taking a closer look at the perspective of 
Hobsbawm, that doyen of nineteenth-century history who insisted 
most strongly of all Marxists on the importance of foreign trade and 
colonialism to the onset of industrialization. Hobsbawm’s arguments, 
which encompass the long-drawn-out history of pre-industrial capi-
talism, illuminate the revolutionary nature of the changes wrought 
by the introduction of modern machine production and the indus-
trial factory. But against the revisionist view which tends to ignore 
the overseas market and the history of colonialism, he reiterates the 
importance of the world market to the Industrial Revolution.
 One of the celebrated quartet of Marxist historians which 
included Hilton, Hill and Thompson, we encountered Hobsbawm 
in the original debate on the transition, where he emphasized the 
importance of uneven development, then noted his work on the 
geographical reorganization of capitalism in the economic crisis of the 
seventeenth century. But while these contributions were important, 
Hobsbawm’s main focus was the nineteenth century, whose primary 
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documents constituted his historiographical home ground. Although 
he touches on the Industrial Revolution at many points in his 
writings, an early work, Industry and Empire (1969) sums up his 
overall position.4 According to Hobsbawm, the overseas market 
– supported at every turn by government intervention – expanded 
much more, and much more rapidly, than the home market in the 
eighteenth century. As he puts it, ‘home demand increased – but 
foreign demand multiplied’.5 And this market expansion overseas 
decisively influenced the heart of the production process: most inno-
vations of this period occurred in the production of goods which 
were demanded by export markets. Cotton manufacture, the first 
industry to be mechanized, was fundamentally tied to the export–
import sector. Its raw material had to be entirely imported from the 
tropics or sub-tropics, and from the end of the eighteenth century 
it sold the greater part of finished goods to colonial and overseas 
markets. 
 British foreign policy focused on securing colonies and opening 
up the markets of the rest of the world to British manufactures. The 
victories of the British navy and army in the colonial wars of the 
eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries meanwhile denied such 
markets to French and Dutch competitors.6 Hobsbawm adds that 
that these military ventures further expanded industry and produc-
tivity, with major improvements in iron production and in machine 
tools being sustained by large-scale orders from the Admiralty.7 
Hobsbawm’s insights on this score have been confirmed by more 
recent writing, and it has become a truism that military expenditure 
aided the progress of the eighteenth-century British economy.8
 Hobsbawm’s stress on the importance of the non-European 
world to the Industrial Revolution in England in part reflected the 
climate of opinion of the 1960s, when the anti-colonial movement 
of the post-1945 period was at high tide. Hobsbawm repeatedly 
compared early British industrialization with the industrialization 
drives of the socialist and under-developed countries. His approach 
was, of course, Marxist but also reflected an overall concern 
with economic development in under-developed countries which 
animated much Western historiography of the Industrial Revolution 
during the period 1950–75,9 though it should be admitted that 
this historiography remained Eurocentric, with the influence of 
the American modernization theorist Walt Rostow being more 
noticeable than that of Marx or Lenin.
 While putting the emphasis on the leading role of the market 
overseas – its importance being as an outlet for most of the 
heller maintext.indd   180 6/7/2011   11:51:00 AM
 t h e  i n d u st r i a l  r e vo l u t i o n 181
products of leading industries like cotton – Hobsbawm also took 
into account domestic demand, which still provided the largest 
vent for manufactured products overall. Increase in population 
expanded both the labour force and consumer demand, although 
expanding poverty after 1750 placed clear limits on the latter. The 
main advantage of the home market was its size and dependability. 
It afforded a large underpinning for the development of an indus-
trial economy, the stimulus for major and widespread improvements 
in inland transport, a strong base of demand for the coal industry 
and the dissemination of certain key technological innovations.10 
Overseas trade, military expenditure, colonial wars, protectionism 
and internal demand constituted the necessary and sufficient 
conditions for the Industrial Revolution according to Hobsbawm.
marx on manufacture and Industry
In analyzing the reasons behind the Industrial Revolution, Marx 
put much more stress on developments within England than did 
Hobsbawm. According to Marx’s account in the concluding chapters 
of Volume One of Capital, successive waves of primitive accumula-
tion within England provided a stream of workers for the mechanized 
factories. The dispossession of the peasants likewise entailed the 
gradual undermining of rural industry and the eventual separa-
tion of agriculture and industry. This in turn widened the market 
for machine-produced industrial commodities. At the same time, 
agricultural improvement cheapened the price of wage labour.11 As 
Marx depicted them in Capital, these changes occurred over a long-
drawn-out period and then suddenly culminated in the Industrial 
Revolution in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries. Of 
course we recall that elsewhere Marx took up Hobsbawm’s point of 
stressing the importance of the development of the world market, 
including the development of colonialism under the aegis of the 
mercantile state. His view of the development of capitalism was that 
of a dialectical totality which included changes in the relations of 
production as well as exchange, or in other words realization.
 Marx focused particular attention on the development of manu-
facture, in its original meaning of products of the hand during the 
long lead-up to the Industrial Revolution. He regarded the manufac-
ture or handicraft workshop as the most advanced form of industrial 
enterprise prior to the introduction of power and machine-driven 
factory production. The economic advantage of the handicraft 
workshop lay in the division of labour within the enterprise. 
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Manufacture prefigured, and later evolved into, the mechanized 
factory. Indeed, Marx insisted that manufacture or handicraft 
workshop production was the characteristic and most advanced 
form of the capitalist mode of production between the sixteenth 
century and the last third of the eighteenth century. For Marx the 
distinguishing feature of the whole earlier phase of capitalism with 
which we have been preoccupied in this volume was manufacture. 
True, he placed great emphasis on the development of capitalist 
agriculture from the sixteenth century onward, but it is noteworthy 
that he called the whole period between the sixteenth and eighteenth 
centuries the age of capitalist manufacture not capitalist agriculture. 
In other words, what was decisive for him were those elements in the 
early modern period which prepared the ground for the Industrial 
Revolution: the revolution in the forces of production, or the break-
through to centralized manufacture using power-driven machinery.12 
Revolution in this department had the potential to revolutionize all 
other sectors of the economy.
 Rural and domestic handicrafts did not simply disappear in the 
face of the development of manufacture beginning in the sixteenth 
century. Rather they coexisted with and were reorganized by manu-
facture, according to Marx. The stage of manufacture, therefore, 
always rested on the handicrafts of towns and the domestic subsid-
iary industries of rural districts, over time destroying these in one 
form and resurrecting them in another. It produced a new class of 
small villagers who cultivated the soil as a subsidiary occupation, but 
found their chief occupation in domestic handicraft manufacture, the 
products of which they sold to the manufacturers directly, or through 
the medium of merchants.13 In Marx’s view the so-called putting-out 
industry of the early modern period constituted what he called the 
‘formal subsumption of labour to capital’, a stage prior to its ‘real 
subsumption’. Town merchants enlisted the services of spinners and 
weavers, but also tanners and ironsmiths and other artisans, in the 
rural areas, effectively subordinating them to urban manufacture, by 
taking over available and established labour processes, rather than 
transforming them and their technology internally as in the ‘real 
subsumption’ that would come later. Under merely formal subsump-
tion, capitalists did however control access to the market, and so 
they controlled raw materials, means of subsistence and in many 
cases the instruments of production as well as credit.
 Merely formal subsumption was an instance of what Marx 
described as the non-revolutionary way. Manufacture was the stage 
of handicraft workshop industry that immediately preceded modern 
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machine production. His detailed and patient examination of manu-
facture and its venerable place in capitalism’s long early history 
underscored the tremendous and sudden breakthrough represented 
by the Industrial Revolution. The essential difference is the change 
from ‘the formal subsumption of labour’ to its ‘real subsumption’. 
The latter, achieved by the introduction of machinery and the reor-
ganization of production in the industrial factory, brings the worker 
under the complete or “real control” of the capitalist. This real 
subsumption of labour is what makes possible the full mobiliza-
tion of social labour, which unleashes the enormous increase in the 
productive power of capital which is the hallmark of the Industrial 
Revolution.
 Marx begins by describing the advance that the stage of early 
modern manufacturing represented over isolated craft production, 
which was common in the Middle Ages. He stresses the organiza-
tion and technological innovations which set ‘manufacture’ off from 
earlier forms of industrial production. As a new form of productive 
organization, ‘manufacture’ was centered in a workshop of skilled 
hand workers under capitalist control, carrying out one or a variety 
of tasks. As a new process of production, it introduced the division 
of labour, though operations done by hand were still dependent on 
the skill of individuals and retained the character of a handicraft. 
Preoccupied with the eventual arrival of the Industrial Revolution, 
Marx was more concerned to point out the limitations of the system 
of manufactures than to detail all its different forms. He noted three 
basic inadequacies. First, because a hierarchical structure based on 
the division between skilled and unskilled workers was inserted 
into the division of labour, the number of unskilled workers could 
not be extended infinitely. Such a hierarchy among the workers 
entailed the ongoing power and influence of skilled workers, and 
prevented the full application of the division of labour.14 The coming 
of the Industrial Revolution was to break the power of the skilled 
workers over production, allowing a full division of labour around 
machinery. Second, the narrow basis of handicraft itself excluded a 
really scientific division of the production process into its constituent 
parts.15 The division of labour could only go so far, for all parts had 
to be capable of being done by hand, and each formed a separate 
handicraft. The Industrial Revolution centralized knowledge of 
production in the hands of capitalists and their managers. Workers 
lost their control of the separate stages of production. On the 
other hand, the centralization of knowledge allowed for a scientific 
reorganization of the whole production process.
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 The third and greatest problem, however, was the inability of 
capital to seize control of the whole disposable labour time of 
the manufacturing workers. Since handicraft skill is the founda-
tion of manufacture, and since within manufacture mechanization 
as a whole possesses no objective framework independent of the 
workers themselves, capital is constantly compelled to wrestle with 
the insubordination of the workers. Quoting Adam Smith, Marx 
acknowledges that workers are made stupid and ignorant in the 
stage of manufacture because they are forced to produce within 
the increasingly narrow limits of their niche within the workshop 
division of labour.16 On the other hand, the refusal of workers 
to submit to the discipline of the workplace and to allow capital-
ists to control their time is also a characteristic of the period of 
manufacture: ‘capital is constantly compelled to wrestle with the 
insubordination of the workmen’.17 Manufacture is able to give the 
capitalist, rather than the workers, control of the product. But the 
capitalist cannot equally control the workers. It is the distinguishing 
feature of industrial capitalism that the capitalist finally achieves 
this control over the production process and over the workers 
themselves.18
  The Industrial Revolution may be seen as arising out of the technical 
progress made during the manufacturing period. The division of 
labour in manufacture, for all its limitations, represented an advance 
over the limited production possible through independent handicraft 
production. Manufacturing streamlined, improved and multiplied the 
tools and implements of labour, and introduced specialization and a 
greater division of labour, setting the stage for the development of 
industrial machines by inventors such as Arkwright and Watt, which 
were made up of combinations of such instruments.19 The purpose 
of introducing machines into capitalist production was to increase 
the rate of surplus value – the volume of surplus value divided by the 
total of variable wages or variable capital.20 But the effect is to greatly 
expand the productive power of industry, especially as the introduc-
tion of machinery is spurred on by the effects of competition. Early 
machines were in reality combinations of simple tools linked to a 
motive force. As such Marx noted that the introduction of machinery 
in the cotton industry predated the use of the steam engine as the 
motive force.21 The implication of this was that the perfection of the 
steam engine was not a precondition of machine production but a 
result of it.
 It was the increasing accumulation of capital in the hands of 
individual capitalists that set the stage for the revolution in the 
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mode of production. The introduction of machinery into capi-
talist industry issued, as Marx put it, from a process in which the 
productiveness of labour ripened as if in a hothouse.22 However, 
it was only with the development of the modern factory based on 
machine production that a sudden and complete transformation of 
the conditions of labour took place, deserving the name revolution. 
In manufacture the worker made use of a tool. In the industrial 
factory the machine made use of the worker. The movement of the 
instruments of labour proceeded from the actions of the workers 
in manufacture. In the industrial factory it is the movements of the 
machine that determined the movements of the workers. The worker 
becomes a mere appendage of the machine: ‘machinery is put to a 
wrong use, with the object of transforming the workman, from his 
very childhood, into a part of a detail-machine’.23 Machine-factory 
production thus facilitated the transition from the formal to the real 
subsumption of labour to capital.24 Furthermore in those sectors of 
the economy where industrial capitalism became dominant, a new 
type of capitalist – the captain of industry – emerged to rival the 
traditional merchant capitalist or banker of the age of manufacture. 
The new industrial capitalist organized and planned production 
while wielding an unprecedented authoritarian discipline over the 
workforce as required by machine production.25
dobb and the ProletarIat
Dobb’s views on the decline of feudalism and birth of capitalism 
sought to resume and update Marx’s own understanding, and in 
doing so set off the transition debate. With respect to the Industrial 
Revolution, Dobb summarized many of Marx’s insights, and refined 
them in the light of current historical research. Dobb saw the period 
as one in which the productivity of labour increased based on rapid 
technical change, the ranks of the proletariat greatly expanded, the 
market for consumer goods and the size of capital investment grew 
rapidly compared with the past.26 But the transformation of the 
means of production in the direction of mechanization was actually 
a long-drawn-out process, with some sectors leading the way at 
the end of the eighteenth century, while others clung to the older 
methods of manufacture and domestic production until late in the 
nineteenth century. The survival of these older methods of produc-
tion meant that a homogenous factory proletariat did not emerge 
until the last quarter of the nineteenth century.27 
 Dobb argued that the relative scarcity of labour in the first part 
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of the eighteenth century helped to promote the technical innova-
tion that brought on the Industrial Revolution. Once initiated, such 
technical innovation enabled capital to save on labour: ‘capitalism 
as it expanded was able to economize on the parallel expansion of 
its proletarian army’.28 The subsequent growth of the proletariat 
was based on the fact that the death rate fell toward the end of the 
eighteenth century while the birth rate remained at a high level. The 
death rate, and particularly the infant mortality rate, moved upward 
again from 1815 in response to the deterioration in the standard 
of living of the increasingly urbanized workers.29 Meanwhile the 
acceleration of enclosure, the ruin of handicraft industries and 
the dismantling of the traditional Poor Laws added to the size 
and flexibility of the labour market. Returning to a fundamental 
theme of his earlier view of capitalist origins, Dobb insisted that 
many of the emerging captains of industry were of humble origins. 
They came from the ranks of master craftspeople or yeomen with 
limited capital, while going into partnership with more substantial 
merchant capitalists. As such they were more likely to be technologi-
cally and organizationally skilled themselves, and thus more capable 
of controlling the productive process than the possessor of capital 
alone. On the other hand, Dobb warned against making too much 
of this in explaining the Industrial Revolution. Access to substantial 
sources of capital was essential to the success of the new industrial 
enterprises.30
the labour Process
In the 1970s Stephen Marglin’s ‘What do bosses do? The origins 
and functions of hierarchy in capitalist production’31 and Harry 
Braverman’s Labor and Monopoly Capital32 rekindled discussion 
of the respective roles of technical and control functions in the 
capitalist labour process, setting off a whole new enquiry. The first 
challenged conventional ideas on the origins of the division of labour 
and the factory system, arguing that both were introduced not for 
reasons of efficiency, but because they offered capitalists the means 
for greater control of their workforce and an opportunity to claim 
a higher proportion of surplus value. Contrary to the accepted view 
that the rise of the factory was caused by the introduction of power-
driven machinery, Marglin dismissed the idea of the ‘technological 
superiority’ of the factory, and with it, the idea that labour processes 
in capitalism were determined, at least to a significant extent, by 
the requirements of technology. Factories existed, Marglin argued, 
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well before powered machinery, and what was really at stake in 
the Industrial Revolution was not efficiency, but social power, 
hierarchy and the discipline of labour. He also pointed out, and has 
recently emphasized, the way the factory itself became an impetus 
to technological innovation. Capitalists sought out and developed 
techniques that were compatible with large-scale factory organiza-
tion. The adoption of the water frame in textile manufacturing was 
an example. Originally designed as a small machine turned by hand 
and capable of being used in the home, it was patented by Arkwright 
and only thenceforth built as a large-scale piece of machinery driven 
by water or steam power. Marglin argued that, even though the 
factory did not actually determine prevailing forms of work orga-
nization, capitalist control and machines were nevertheless most 
highly developed in the factory form of organization.
 It was this high degree of capitalist control in the factory that 
in turn constrained the direction of the future development of 
technology: ‘the key to the success of the factory, as well as its inspi-
ration, was the substitution of capitalists’ for workers’ control of the 
production process; discipline and supervision could and did reduce 
costs without being technologically superior’.33 The implication of 
Marglin’s analysis was that only those technological innovations 
that allowed greater capitalist control can develop under capitalism. 
A new technology, however beneficial to the environment, will not 
be developed if it contradicts the quest for greater capitalist control. 
Contrariwise a technological innovation that would capture more 
surplus value by replacing intractable human labour with energy-
hungry machinery is unlikely to benefit the environment. While 
there is much to Marglin’s view, which stresses the role of machinery 
in ensuring more capitalist control over the social relations of 
production, contrary to his argument, it is important to stress that 
such machinery does increase the rate of surplus value as Marglin 
acknowledges, and under the force of competition must generalize 
itself. Furthermore, if only as a by-product, such machinery did 
vastly enlarge the forces of production, and that was a spectacularly 
important aspect of the Industrial Revolution. 
 Harry Braverman’s Labor and Monopoly Capital also formulated 
connections between changes in technology and work organization. 
His book went back to the Industrial Revolution to seek the origins of 
scientific management and Fordism in order ultimately to comment 
on the implications of the computer revolution of the 1970s. It 
looked at phases of mechanization in the Industrial Revolution as an 
aspect of the history of the rise of scientific management. Braverman 
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described the rise of the modern corporation in terms of the growth 
of automation. He emphasized the essential importance of capital’s 
drive to gain control over the labour process in order to make more 
predictable the extraction of surplus value from workers. Such a 
drive leads to the homogenization of work and the reduction of skill 
required in productive jobs, an ongoing historical process which 
he claimed has continued into the present. Over time workers lose 
control over most aspects of the work process in the factory and 
became more and more deskilled. Such an argument ignores the 
increasingly common consciousness and economic interdependence 
produced by such a homogenization process. Moreover, the recent 
rise of so-called cognitive capitalism based on internet technology 
raises questions about the inexorable deskilling of work and the 
growing control of capital over the work process.
 Both Marglin’s and Braverman’s works were published at a time 
when advanced computing technology and a new microelectronic 
revolution of the 1970s and 1980s were first becoming apparent. 
The future implications for employment, job structures and manu-
facturing organizations were predicted to be unprecedented, and 
so they have proved to be. But the final political and economic 
outcome of these developments remains undecided.
technologIcal determInIsm
As we have seen, Marx stressed the significance of the machine to 
the Industrial Revolution. According to Maxine Berg, Marx and 
his followers overdid this emphasis on the machine while failing to 
understand the ongoing importance of the division of labour. Berg 
is a professor at the University of Warwick who began her career 
researching the social and cultural dimensions of the Industrial 
Revolution, and has become increasingly interested in exploring 
its global context. According to her, in some industries it was the 
division of labour that proved revolutionary. The building industry 
is a good example. Historians have underlined the traditionalism of 
the building trades, as little new machinery was introduced in the 
nineteenth century. But the key to changes in the production process 
was not machinery, but the rise of general contracting from the 
1830s: that is to say, a transformation in the organization of work. 
Marxists have also attributed far greater success to machinery in 
compelling the reorganization of the work process than the real 
history of, and evidence from, workplace struggles actually allows.
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 Berg also made a number of related criticisms of Marxist under-
standings of the labour process under capitalism. Though Marxists 
argue that technological change is the outcome of struggles between 
workers and capitalists, they have been from the start subject to, 
and have failed to expunge, a linear framework of technological 
determinism. Moreover, she argues, the search by Marxists for 
examples of deskilling, divisions of labour and mechanization in 
any historical period is inspired by questions and interpretations of 
production and work suitable only to England and other modern 
Western capitalist economies. Berg also accuses Marxists of seeking 
to situate their individual studies in terms of key turning points that 
marked out the transition to manufacture, or to modern industry as 
the case may be. The result has been a failure to grasp the diversity 
of the experience of industrialization. There were many alternatives 
to mechanization in improved hand technology, the use of cheap 
labour-saving materials, the division of labour and the simplifica-
tion of individual tasks, which were developed in their own right. 
Finally, according to Berg, another problem of the Marxist perspec-
tive is its narrow focus on the workplace and production process. 
The impact of the Industrial Revolution on culture, community and 
family was ignored. This is a peculiarly ‘male’ perspective, and it is 
not surprising that most historical studies of labour processes are 
focused on a male labour force and male attitudes to work. Happily, 
according to Berg, recent social historians have stressed the role of 
the world outside of work in shaping the structure and attitudes of 
the so-called labour aristocracy.34
  Marx must be defended against Berg’s criticisms because he was 
by no means unaware of the impact of the Industrial Revolution 
on more traditional industries. As a matter of fact, he noted that 
in his own time manufactures still using the old methods like the 
potteries, glass-making, baking and nail-making had fallen under 
capitalist exploitation as much as the mechanized factories.35 
Marx furthermore pointed out that the gradual prevalence of the 
mechanized industries was important because it tended to force the 
pace of capitalist change throughout the economy and to forecast 
its future development. Moreover, in the final analysis Marx was 
not an academic historian dwelling on the past but a revolutionary 
communist. In stressing the importance of the machine and the 
factory he was focusing on the most deep-seated and in the end the 
most historically influential aspect of the Industrial Revolution. It 
was the machine and factory that were the leading edge of a new era 
which made possible the vast expansion of production that flowed 
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from the transformation of the mode of production. It was from 
the factory that the revolutionary figure of the industrial capitalist 
emerged, who commanded the industrial work force and would 
dominate the new age.36 More important from the socialist perspec-
tive, the birth of the organized proletariat within the industrial 
factory held out the prospect of ultimately overturning the whole 
capitalist order. Berg’s contention that Marx’s and Engels’s neglected 
consideration of family, community and family is a point well taken, 
though Engels’s The Condition of the Working Class in England is 
a litany of the horrific effects of the Industrial Revolution on the 
moral and cultural state and the poor housing, clothing and food of 
workers and their families in the new industrial cities.
 Other Marxists too come out better than Berg’s criticisms suggest. 
Dobb noted the unevenness of the mechanization of industry, while 
the revered Marxist historian Raphael Samuel, a pioneer of the 
cultural history of the Industrial Revolution, demonstrated that 
the struggle over the introduction of machinery remained a crucial 
aspect of class struggle in many sectors of manufacturing well into 
the nineteenth century. Moreover, Samuel argues that far from 
superseding traditional sectors of manufacture, sectors dominated by 
mechanized industry more often than not incorporated these older 
methods of production rather than replacing them altogether.37
 Mention of Samuel reminds us that he was among the chief 
inspirations of the History Workshop Journal founded in 1976. The 
journal consciously dedicated itself to the recovery of history from 
below. As such it assumed a deliberately socialist perspective in 
which feminism and Marxism had an important place. The culture 
of the Industrial Revolution – gender, family, urban life, entertain-
ment and sports – was among its preoccupations. In this light Berg’s 
insistence on the need to overcome a narrow Marxist economism 
in the study of the Industrial Revolution, while laudable, appears 
somewhat misplaced. Inspiring this turn toward understanding 
the culture of the working class above all was the towering figure 
of E. P. Thompson, who surpassed all his Marxist predecessors in 
recovering the origins of the English working class.
thomPson and the WorkIng class makIng Its oWn 
hIstory …
Marx and Engels viewed the Industrial Revolution as a catastrophe 
for workers, who lost control of their work and were dispossessed, 
and whose standard of living was reduced to bare subsistence as a 
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result. While Dobb was fully cognizant of these deleterious effects 
on workers, he tended to discount the social and political unrest 
that accompanied the Industrial Revolution, characterizing the 
period as one in which the working class remained deeply divided. 
To the contrary, Hobsbawm put stress on the level of social and 
political discontent during the period. In his study of the Industrial 
Revolution and in other writings, he underlined the successive 
waves of Luddite and radical, trade-unionist and utopian-socialist, 
and finally democratic and Chartist agitation that characterized the 
period 1815–48. According to Hobsbawm, ‘no period of British 
history has been as tense, as politically and socially disturbed, as the 
1830s and early 1840s, when both the working class and the middle 
class … demanded what they regarded as fundamental changes’.38 It 
was the Industrial Revolution as well as the French Revolution that 
brought the people, and more especially the proletariat, onto the 
stage of modern history. 
 But it was Thompson – another in the quartet of great British 
Marxist historians – who most deeply and controversially explored 
the cultural and social meaning of the Industrial Revolution, and 
his work gave rise to the greatest number of critical controversies. 
Thompson was motivated by a profound commitment to recon-
stituting the history of the English working class, rescuing it from 
its internment in the archives. He began this work by taking up 
Marx’s remarks, which we have already noted, about the lack or 
refusal of discipline among workers in the pre-industrial economy. 
In a brilliant article entitled ‘Time, work discipline and industrial 
capitalism’, Thompson explored the relaxed discipline characteristic 
of the pre-industrial work force and the trauma of work inten-
sification that came with the imposition of machine and factory 
methods of production.39 Moreover, it was impossible fully to 
understand the response of the mass of the English population 
to the Industrial Revolution without taking account of the pre-
industrial traditions of popular protest which reached far back into 
English history: religious non-conformity, notions of the rights of 
free-born Englishman, and the ideologies that helped to galvanize 
eighteenth-century popular protest.40 In explaining the behaviour of 
the pre-industrial mob, Thompson, in a famous article published in 
Past and Present, singled out the existence of a popular ideology or 
moral economy of provision which rejected the unrestricted appli-
cation of the laws of the market, of supply and demand, especially 
when it came to the availability of bread in times of dearth.41 Since 
Thompson wrote, we note parenthetically, it has been demonstrated 
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that pre-industrial protest shaped the character not only of the 
working class but of capitalism itself. The researches of historians 
like Berg and Andy Wood have shown that worker resistance or its 
absence helped determine the forms of industrial organization that 
emerged in different sectors of the economy.42 
 These currents of resistance resurfaced powerfully in the period of 
feverish revolutionary agitation in England which followed the taking 
of the Bastille in France in 1789. As part of this wave of protest 
which engulfed intellectuals, artisans and members of the radical-
ized middle class, workers took an increasing part. Government 
repression during the Napoleonic Wars only strengthened demo-
cratic resolve: ‘while the [revolutionary] years 1791–5 provided the 
democratic impulse, it was in the repressive years that we can speak 
of a distinct “working class consciousness” maturing’.43 Sympathy 
for revolutionary political change served as an impetus which helped 
to strengthen nascent working-class organizations.44 
 The new steam-driven factories struck contemporaries as 
embodying forces which were transforming nature itself: ‘the mill 
appeared as symbol of social energies which were destroying the 
very “course of Nature”’.45 Some commentators expressed alarm 
at the potential power not only of the new middle class of indus-
trial capitalists, but also of the mass of workers who stood behind 
them.46 To observers on the left and right, there seemed a direct 
correlation between steam power, the factory and the tumultuous 
emergence of the working class. According to such witnesses, the 
appearance of this new class was reflected in the waves of agitation 
that marked the years between the close of the Napoleonic wars 
and the mid-century, culminating in the Chartist movement.47 
Thompson disagreed. He insisted, on the contrary, that most of the 
unrest was focused in the ranks of the craftspeople and workers in 
the old crafts and industries rather than among the new mill hands. 
It was against the intrusion of familiar enemies like the master, the 
Tory magistrate and the parson that these craft workers protested 
in the first place.48 In other words traditional complaints against 
the lack of democracy, the cost of living and political corruption 
continued to animate much of the social dissent.
 Over time more and more protest came to include demands 
for the right to organize unions.49 Such protest represented an 
outgrowth and amplification of the unrest of the eighteenth 
century and the French Revolutionary period. Indeed, the state and 
employers deliberately associated it with a detested revolutionary 
French Jacobinism.50 
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 Despite echoes of the past, Thompson argues that the period 
between 1790 and 1830 saw the formation of the working class. 
This was reflected above all in the growth of class consciousness, 
the sense of an identity of interests between the diverse groups 
of working people as against the interests of other groups. It was 
manifest, likewise, in the eventual maturation of working-class 
political and industrial organization: ‘by 1832 there were strongly 
based and self-conscious working-class institutions – trade unions, 
friendly societies, educational and religious movements, political 
organizations, periodicals – working class intellectual traditions, 
working-class community patterns and a working-class structure of 
feeling’.51 But Thompson insisted that the formation of the working 
class was not the spontaneous product of the factory system. An 
external force – the Industrial Revolution – was not imposed on the 
undifferentiated mass of the population and did not single-handedly 
generate a working class. Rather, changing productive relations 
and working conditions associated with the Industrial Revolution 
interacted with the radical religious political and cultural traditions 
of the previous century and, in the hands of their heirs, resulted in 
the institutions, culture and social organization which became the 
English working class. According to Thompson, ‘the making of 
the working class is a fact of political and cultural, as much as of 
economic history’.52 At this point Thompson was not only invoking 
the agency of the working class in its own making, he was also 
insisting on the open-endedness and political nature of the histor-
ical process of class formation. For Thompson class is a political 
category. Thompson’s project was not simply about recovering the 
history of the working class. It was about reasserting the agency of 
this class as the driving force of history against what he regarded as 
the attempt by Stalinism to repress such agency.
 … but not In cIrcumstances of Its oWn choosIng
This insistence on the centrality of working-class self-assertion was 
important in reintroducing the importance of culture and agency 
in Marxism. But they also proved very controversial. Thompson 
admitted that the development of capitalist industry had something 
to do with the emergence of the working class. But he put his 
emphasis upon the notion that the working class emerged through 
a history of its own making. It was above all the development of 
its collective consciousness that made it into a class, in his view. 
Thompson’s stress on the importance of the cultural determinants 
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of class subsequently led some poststructuralist thinkers to a 
questioning of the notion of class altogether. Scholars like Patrick 
Joyce and Garth Stedman Jones took Thompson’s emphasis on the 
cultural aspect of class to the point of rejecting the Marxist notion 
of class-in-itself, the insistence that the existence of a class must 
reflect their common relations to the means of production as well 
as ‘class-for-itself’, the consciousness of this common condition, the 
political aims and projects and cultural trends that develop out of 
it. For these poststructuralists, to tie economic and social location to 
consciousness is to be economically determinist. Class has meaning 
only in so far as its members recognize themselves to be members of 
such a grouping, irrespective of any ‘objective’ or ‘economic’ deter-
mination. According to them, English workers demonstrably did 
not recognize themselves as such. Those who insist on the existence 
of class-in-itself in their eyes are guilty of class essentialism. On 
this basis, these poststructuralists have questioned whether English 
workers during the Industrial Revolution can be considered to have 
belonged either to a class-in-itself or class-for-itself.53 
    Thompson disassociated himself from such a culturalist view, 
which went with the suggestion that he had distanced himself from 
the emphasis on economic and material factors characteristic of his 
fellow British Marxist historians, particularly Dobb:
I find actively unhelpful recent attempts to suggest a rupture in 
British Marxist historiography between the work of Maurice 
Dobb and the historiography of the 1960s (including the work of 
myself …). I see on both sides of this supposed ‘break’ a common 
tradition of Marxist historiography submitted to an empirical 
discourse (albeit with differing emphases); and ‘culturalism’ is a 
term which I refuse.54
We would expect nothing else from someone who was not merely a 
historian, but a committed historical materialist and political revo-
lutionary. Indeed, Thompson’s understanding of class as political 
rather than something merely cultural should be underscored. 
  In The Poverty of Theory, Thompson’s celebrated diatribe 
against the structuralism of Louis Althusser (and Perry Anderson), 
he sought to situate himself at some distance from others’ attempts 
to emphasize economic or social determinism. In his polemic 
Thompson denounced what he thought of as Althusser’s arbitrary 
imposition of an unbefitting theoretical straitjacket on the concrete 
facts of history. Nonetheless, it seems to us, as Perry Anderson has 
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suggested, that Thompson bent the branch too far – viewing class 
too much in terms of class-for-itself, its degree of consciousness and 
political organization.55 Consequently he conceded too much to the 
poststructuralist critics of Marxism, who in the name of an empiri-
cist or linguistic immanentism rejected what they called essentialism 
or the possibility of abstraction from the empirical, and in so doing 
discarded the Marxist view of history altogether. 
 Marx could never be accused of insisting on a one-to-one corre-
spondence between thought and concrete historical facts. According 
to him, the two were separate in the sense that thought has its own 
specificity and the facts of history have an existence independent 
of thought. As a result, the order of exposition of the categories of 
thought differed from that which was manifest in the relations of 
real historical development. A process of abstraction was necessary 
to avoid limiting thought to the mere repetition of the concrete 
things that happened in history. Abstraction, which lay at core of 
Marx’s method, allowed the interpretation of society in its complex 
manifestations. On the other hand, in order for this process of 
interpretation to be successful abstractions had to be constantly 
compared to historical realities so that the general logical deter-
minations remained in accord with concrete history, while being 
distinguished from it.56 
  With regard to the existence or not of a working class during the 
Industrial Revolution, then, its existence as a class-in-itself would 
represent an abstraction from the relations of production existing 
in English society at that time. As such, it represents what may 
be described as a logical tendency which underlies the concrete 
historical circumstances. The existence or not of the working class as 
a class-for-itself then becomes a matter of interpreting the concrete 
historical realities of the period, which contrary to Stedman Jones 
and Joyce are still in dispute.57 Richard Price, for one, believes that 
the period of the Industrial Revolution was a transitional age from 
the point of view of class relations. He interprets the late eighteenth 
and first part of the nineteenth century as a period in which pater-
nalistic class relations decayed as well as the autonomy of wage 
workers characteristic of the seventeenth and eighteenth century. An 
industrial system of class relations in which the industrial proletariat 
became paramount crystallized toward the end of the nineteenth 
century.58 In other terms older forms of class relations were decaying 
and new forms based on industrialization were being formed. 
    As is the way with poststructuralism, the culturalists arbitrarily 
and irrationally reject out of hand the method of abstraction. For 
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them the surface of things as revealed by its discourses is all that 
matters. Reacting against the preconceived idea of some Marxists 
that society can be thought of as made up of the interconnected 
abstractions of a bounded system, they have replaced it with the 
notion that it can be understood through a self-referential notion 
of language or an all-encompassing concept of culture which subor-
dinates, dissipates or even excludes the categories of the social, 
economic and political. Behind this cultural or idealist turn lies 
a deep social pessimism, born of the revolutionary failures of the 
1960s and the triumph of neoliberalism.
the human cost
While Thompson’s historiography of the working class, with 
its brilliant evocation of popular subjectivity but lack of struc-
tural foundation, may have divided him from some Marxists, his 
historiography of the Industrial Revolution, which reinstated the 
catastrophic view of the Industrial Revolution, beat a path back to 
traditional emphases. As studied first by Marx and Engels and then 
amplified by historians like Arnold Toynbee, Beatrice and Sydney 
Webb, and John Lawrence and Barbara Hammond, the period of 
the Industrial Revolution was seen as one of economic instability, 
poverty and exploitation. However, recent revisionist academics 
have been interested less in the victims of industrialization than in 
the rate of economic growth, less in the human cost of enclosure 
than in improvements in agricultural output, less in exploitation and 
ruthless competition than in dislocations, immature financial institu-
tions and exchange, uncertain markets and the inevitable course of 
the trade cycle.
 These practitioners of what Thompson termed the anti- 
catastrophic orthodoxy criticize the lack of precision of the older 
catastrophic school. Thompson, in turn, challenged this new school 
for its moral complacency, narrowness of frame of reference and 
ignorance of the actual working-class movements of the time.59 He 
sought to gauge the historical meaning of the Industrial Revolution 
from the perspective of a historian with a profound understanding 
not merely of England in the throes of industrialization, but of the 
social tempos of pre-industrial England. Thereby he put himself in 
a position to measure the full human cost of industrial capitalism in 
a way that escaped others.
   Thompson’s achievement is clearest in his contribution to the 
so-called standard of living debate. The human cost of the Industrial 
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Revolution was an active issue for those who lived in the nineteenth 
century, and was much debated then. In the twentieth century it gave 
rise to the standard of living controversy among academic historians. 
It began with the publication of J. H. Clapham’s Economic History 
of Great Britain (1926) and John Hammond’s essay ‘The Industrial 
Revolution and discontent’ in the Economic History Review 
(1930). Using quantitative data, Clapham claimed that the average 
wage of industrial and agricultural workers increased by some 60 
percent between 1790 and 1850. Hammond sought to raise doubts 
regarding Clapham’s data by invoking the argument of previous 
critics like Toynbee, who stressed the deterioration in the quality of 
life but was largely ineffectual in dealing with the statistical evidence. 
And though Clapham’s intellectual heir T. S. Ashton questioned his 
mentor’s calculations in the 1950s, he agreed with Clapham that the 
Industrial Revolution had improved, rather than worsened, the lot 
of workers. It was not until 1957 that a more serious debate began 
when Hobsbawm entered into the fray. He began by criticizing the 
weakness of Hammond’s reply to Clapham, while seeking to show 
that both the quality of life and the material standard of living of 
the working classes worsened during the Industrial Revolution. Like 
Ashton, he criticized Clapham’s estimate of wages. He explored the 
question of mortality rates and unemployment, and while not being 
able to reach definitive conclusions, argued that the data suggested a 
worsening in the standard of living of workers. The main weight of 
his argument rested on evidence regarding levels of food consump-
tion, which appeared to have declined. Hobsbawm was then 
answered by R. M. Hartwell who, in addition to disputing the points 
made by Hobsbawm, argued for an improvement in living standards 
based on the changing size and distribution of national income.60
   As we would expect, Thompson placed himself squarely in the 
pessimists’ camp without, however, allowing his underlying sense of 
moral indignation over this matter to cloud his scholarly judgement. 
On the question of the distribution of the national income, for 
example, he acknowledged the difficulties of determining the division 
of income between classes, and was prepared to concede that workers 
might even have seen a slight improvement in wages over the period 
1790–1840. According to him, the meaning of any such hypothetical 
improvement was derisory in the face of the evidence that as a result 
of industrialization workers were more exploited, more insecure and 
more miserable than before. In his eyes what mattered most was the 
political and cultural trauma inflicted on workers by industrializa-
tion.61 He conceded that the substitution of the potato for bread 
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was nutritionally beneficial to workers, but he observed that no 
longer being able to afford the traditional white bread was taken 
as a mark of working-class humiliation. The consumption of meat, 
likewise, was a mark of status as well as having nutritional value. 
Meat consumption, he observed, declined between 1790 and 1850, 
but he admitted it was difficult to be definitive.62
 On the other hand, his overall conclusion was scathing: ‘his 
[the worker’s] own share in the “benefits of economic progress” 
consisted in more potatoes, a few articles of cotton-clothing for his 
family, soap and candles, some tea and sugar, and a great many 
articles in the Economic History Review’.63 On housing and the 
urban environment, he was even more bleak:
this deterioration of the urban environment strikes us today, as 
it struck many contemporaries, as one of the most disastrous of 
the consequences of the Industrial Revolution, whether viewed in 
aesthetic terms, in terms of community amenities, or in terms of 
sanitation and density of population.64
 The standard of living debate continued for the next half-century 
in article after article based on increasingly refined and sophisticated 
data. Its outcome has recently been summed up by Hans-Joachim 
Voth in the first volume of the academically authoritative Cambridge 
Economic History of Modern Britain (2004).65 According to Voth, 
research since the 1980s lends increasing credence to the pessimist 
view. Real wages failed to increase by anywhere near the amount 
suggested by earlier calculations. Any gains made were likely the 
result of longer hours at more intensive work. Thompson’s views 
on the horrors of life in the cities, furthermore, have been mainly 
sustained. Infant mortality remained quite high, life expectancy 
and average height at maturity disturbingly low as the Industrial 
Revolution unfolded through the first half of the nineteenth 
century.66 On the question of lowered life expectancy, Thompson’s 
view had already been anticipated by Hobsbawm.67 Their common 
pessimism has been entirely vindicated by recent research.68 
 The debate over the consequences of the Industrial Revolution 
was not about the wisdom or not of economic growth. Marxists and 
non-Marxists both agreed that overcoming scarcity was important. 
The dispute centered around whether or not such growth came, 
and continues to come, at an acceptable human and environmental 
cost. Non-Marxists tended to ignore or deny that there were such 
costs in the past, and to minimize the possibility that there will be 
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greater costs in the future. For them more or less unlimited capitalist 
growth is axiomatically positive, resolving the problems of the past 
and helping to resolve those of the future. On the contrary, Marxists 
do not regard economic growth as an end in itself. In their view 
it was important to recall the human and environmental price in 
order to fortify the working class politically with the memory and 
purpose of its historic struggle. The goal of growth in the past from 
a working-class perspective was to achieve economic sufficiency. 
Any back-of-the-envelope calculation of the relationship between 
current levels of world population and global GDP reveals that such 
material sufficiency is now possible. The justification for further 
human privation or environmental deterioration has disappeared. 
The issue for the twenty-first century is not further material growth, 
but redistribution of existing wealth on a world scale.
Proto-IndustrIalIzatIon
For Marx the modern factory was the most advanced form of 
industry and the birthplace of the industrial proletariat, which he 
believed would destroy capitalism. Hence he sought to identify the 
antecedents of such factories. He found them in the early modern 
‘manufacture’ or large handicraft workshop and its workforce, 
which were the most advanced form of economic organization of 
the period preceding the Industrial Revolution. Rural industry in 
his view was merely an extension and dependency of such manu-
factures. But a recent historical school has identified the domestic 
manufacture or rural putting-out systems as a distinct historical 
phase which preceded and paved the way for industrialization 
proper. The point of this model is to direct historians to the regional 
and rural economy, not simply to agriculture, and to the country 
cottage rather than the urban workshop, as the crucial transi-
tional site of economic development. This economic phase is now 
popularly known as ‘proto-industrialization’.
 The concept was first used by Franklin Mendels in an article 
published in the Journal of Economic History (1972), and the word 
and the concept soon became current in the writings of early modern 
economic historians.69 A Marxist version of proto-industrialization 
was laid out by Peter Kriedte, Jürgen Schlumbohm and Hans 
Medick.70 Economic historians have long recognized the existence 
and importance of the great increase in manufacturing production 
in the countryside between the seventeenth and nineteenth centuries. 
This rural industry, practised in conjunction with agriculture, has 
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now been elevated into the crucible of early modern economic and 
social change. It is maintained that proto-industrialization paved 
the way for the factory system and wage labour, or in short indus-
trialization. The development of proto-industrialization from the 
seventeenth to the nineteenth centuries was closely connected with 
the expansion of the market in Europe and overseas. The world 
market for mass-produced goods grew at such a pace from the 
later sixteenth century that traditional urban manufacturers could 
not efficiently respond, hampered as they were by guild restrictions 
and high labour costs. Complementary agricultural development 
entailed increasing regional differentiation between arable and 
pastoral regions. An inter-regional symbiosis based on comparative 
advantage came into being. 
 An underemployed peasantry in pastoral regions became the 
basis for a flexible and self-exploiting industrial labour force, and 
the industry it took up improved the seasonal employment of 
labour. The possibilities of alternative industrial employment broke 
through the traditional limits placed on population growth by the 
size of landholdings. Rural workers, living as they did in a world of 
traditional peasant culture and values, took less than the customary 
urban wage for their industrial work, and laboured more intensively 
in the face of falling wages. Access to small amounts of land enabled 
them to produce part of their own subsistence. Their dispersal across 
the countryside, furthermore, made it difficult for them to organize 
to prevent wage reductions by merchants. Access to this cheaper 
labour force, therefore, gave merchants a differential profit, one 
which was above the usual urban rates. This differential profit in 
turn provided a major source for capital accumulation.
 Proto-industry is credited not just with being a source of labour 
and capital, but, in addition, with providing the entrepreneurship 
and the technical and organizational changes which led to the first 
major increases in productivity before the factory.71 In the specifi-
cally Marxist version of proto-industrialization as conceived by 
Kriedte, Schlumbohm and Medick, proto-industrialization is seen as 
an intrinsic feature of the transition from feudalism to capitalism. 
In this version stress is laid on the contribution that proto- 
industrialization made to the growth of the labour supply necessary 
to the eventual Industrial Revolution. Proto-industry developed 
in regions where peasants exploited substandard agricultural land 
and were forced to seek employment to supplement their income. 
Alternately social differentiation and enclosure led to land shortage. 
The goal of those family households that became involved in 
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proto-industry was, in the first instance, to preserve as much as 
possible of the norms of the subsistence peasant economy. 
 At the same time, merchant capital employed the inexpensive 
labour of such rural populations to supply growing foreign markets, 
bypassing guild restrictions in the towns. Over time involvement 
in proto-industry upset the traditional balance between land 
and population of feudal-peasant society in favour of expanding 
labour supplies resulting from early marriage. Proto-industrial 
rural households tended to be more egalitarian, without the rigid 
division of labour typical of patriarchal peasant families. Such 
families increasingly took on the characteristics of a proletariat. The 
demographic increase which resulted from the proliferation of such 
families set the stage, at least in England, for the mechanization and 
concentration of production.
  While the latter might have happened in some regions of England, 
it should be pointed out that most regions of that country and the 
rest of Europe where proto-industry established itself over the course 
of centuries did not see a transition to mechanized and concentrated 
industries. On the contrary, most such areas eventually witnessed 
deindustrialization. Where industrialization eventually did develop, 
concentration and mechanization appeared to develop not out of 
the character of proto-industry but rather as a result of attempts 
to overcome its negative features: high inventories, high transaction 
costs, poor work intensity, theft, weak quality control and a lack 
of flexibility in adapting to market change.72 Marx’s view, which 
stressed that such rural industry was a mere adjunct to the large, 
hierarchically organized manufacturing urban workshop which he 
regarded as the true precursor of the modern factory, appears to me 
to be more convincing.73 Furthermore for Marx the concentrated 
workforce at the site from within which the modern proletariat was 
spawned was a matter of not merely economic but also political 
significance. 
  But political commitment ought not to blind scholars to appre-
ciating the full historical significance of a great economic change 
such as the Industrial Revolution. As an apologist for capitalism 
during the upheaval of the Industrial Revolution, Thomas Malthus 
complained that lack of sexual restraint on the part of the working 
class led inevitably to over-population and unalterable misery. 
The destitution of the emergent working class was its own fault. 
In response to this patently ideological argument, Marx in high 
dudgeon correctly pointed out that the true culprit was industrial 
capitalism, whose drive to accumulate was producing the relative 
heller maintext.indd   201 6/7/2011   11:51:00 AM
202 t h e b i rt h o f  c a p i ta l i s m
surplus population or so-called reserve army of labour necessary to 
hold down wages. As a result of this dispute, Wally Seccombe argues 
that Marxists have wrongly shied away from including demographic 
factors in the analysis of capitalism and other modes of production. 
Without such an analysis no fully materialist analysis of capitalism 
is possible.
 He bases his analysis on Marx’s observation that ‘every special 
historic mode of production has its own special laws of population, 
historically valid within its limits alone.’74 Closely following Marx’s 
own quite subtle analysis of the question of population, Seccombe 
urges that the specific fertility regime of major classes, including 
peasant and working-class producers, must figure in the analysis of 
a mode of production. Such a fertility regime should include cultural 
as well as social and economic factors.75 In other words whereas 
Malthus treated population as an independent variable, it ought 
properly to be broken down and analyzed in terms of the evolution 
of a particular mode and its social relations of production. As to 
proto-industrialization Seccombe agrees that increases in fertility 
that attended proto-industrialization made possible part of the 
population growth which was necessary to the Industrial Revolution 
and the creation of a reserve army of labour. But drawing on recent 
research, he argues that higher fertility and increases in popula-
tion after 1750 were the result of the more general and widespread 
phenomenon of West European proletarianization.76 A fully mate-
rialist analysis of this critical period of capitalism requires that 
horizons be expanded beyond merely the production of an industrial 
labour force in England to the European development of capitalism 
overall.
the IndustrIous revolutIon
Jan de Vries takes a sanguine view of proto-industrialization, 
seeing it as an element in what he labels as an industrious revo-
lution. De Vries’s concept of industrious revolution is meant to 
downgrade the historic significance of the Industrial Revolution 
proper. As a Continental historian focused on the early modern 
period in Holland, de Vries has been sceptical of an approach that 
is focused on the uniqueness of English capitalist development and 
its Industrial Revolution. The starting point of his analysis is a 
new academic perspective which downgrades the scale of economic 
change during that period.
  Recent scholarship by quantitatively orientated economic 
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historians has given rise to a new consensus that the rate of 
economic growth in the Industrial Revolution was much less spec-
tacular than originally believed. Earlier estimates of growth between 
1760 and 1830 have been roughly halved. The long-term transfor-
mative effects of the new technology and modes of organization 
of this period are not denied, but it is argued that their weight 
in the overall economy was not substantial until the latter half of 
the nineteenth century.77 Such a view at first glance diminishes the 
importance of technological innovation and other increased supply 
factors in initiating modern economic growth. This new perspec-
tive also lends some support to Marglin’s contention that the initial 
purpose of industrialization was to increase capitalist control over 
the workforce, and that it was not driven by the requirements of 
a more productive new technology. But this might also suggest 
that we should look upon the coming of industrialization not as a 
once-and-for-all breakthrough of industrial machinery, but as a less 
sensational and much more prolonged history of cumulative tech-
nological progress. Indeed, Andy Wood has argued that early forms 
of industrial capitalism are to be found already in the seventeenth 
century in the metalware-producing regions of the West Midlands, 
the textile region of the West Riding, the lead fields of Derbyshire, 
the northern Pennines and Yorkshire and the Newcastle coal fields.78 
David Levine and Keith Wrightson take a similarly long view in their 
study of coal mining in Newcastle between 1560 and 1765.79
  The implications of this research for Marxist scholarship are 
complex. On the one hand, it lends credence to the fundamental 
Marxist contention that the birth of capitalism in the sixteenth 
century was more historically decisive than the eventual Industrial 
Revolution. On the other hand, it also leads us to reconsider the 
historical significance of the distinction between the revolutionary 
and non-revolutionary paths to capitalism which was so important 
to Marx and Dobb. For them the revolutionary path was revolu-
tionary because it entailed a reorganization or even a transformation 
of the means of production. The non-revolutionary path entailed a 
merely formal and external control of such means of production 
by merchant capital. As such, however, it could be connected with 
that other characteristic of early modern industry noted by Marx, 
the resistance of craft producers to industrial discipline. Resistance 
to such changes by producers and merchant capitalists was likely 
responsible for much of the delay in the onset of the Industrial 
Revolution.80 Indeed, it is noteworthy that the first industry to 
undergo mechanization was the cotton industry, which was in fact 
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a virtually new industry which came into being largely independent 
of the traditional textile trades. Older sectors of industry tended to 
resist such innovation. 
   To return to de Vries, his argument that the economic impact of 
the Industrial Revolution was not really felt until the second half 
of the nineteenth century implies that the most important economic 
changes came not in the Industrial Revolution but in the centuries 
prior to it. It was this early modern period that prepared the 
ground for the subsequent Industrial Revolution. It came about as 
a result of the so-called industrious revolution of the period from 
the sixteenth to eighteenth century, which affected not only England 
but the rest of Northwest Europe. According to de Vries, research 
has revealed the period preceding the technological breakthroughs 
of the Industrial Revolution to have been much more economi-
cally dynamic in England and on the Continent than previously 
believed. At the core of this dynamism lay changes in the relation-
ship between the family-household economy and the market.81 Such 
a view reminds of us of the fact that capitalism did not develop 
simply in England but in the whole northwest quadrant of Western 
Europe. 
 This research confirms that prior to the seventeenth century the 
number of hours worked and the intensity of work was much less 
than today. As a result society was leisure-rich for the great majority. 
In the seventeenth century the birth of a new urban and consumer 
society, based on an intensification of labour and greater special-
ization and division of labour, began to undermine this relaxed 
approach.82 The amount of family labour per year oriented to the 
market increased, as did the purchase of commodities by family 
households. One way that such households increased money income 
available for the purchase of consumer goods was by increasing 
agricultural productivity, not through technological improvement, 
but by dint of reduced leisure and intensified work on the land.83 
The deepening of rural markets gradually led to the displacement 
of labour out of direct agricultural work toward rural transport, 
crafts and manufacture. Thus, whereas 75 percent of labour time 
in the countryside was devoted to agriculture in the early sixteenth 
century, this declined to approximately 50 percent by 1800.84
  According to de Vries the chief implication of recent research 
is that proto-industry was about family-households redeploying 
female and child labour from subsistence agriculture toward money-
producing commercial activity. While not doubting the involvement 
of family members in proto-industry, de Vries questions whether the 
heller maintext.indd   204 6/7/2011   11:51:00 AM
 t h e  i n d u st r i a l  r e vo l u t i o n 205
members of the household formed a single working unit, as propo-
nents of the theory of proto-industrialization have argued.85 From 
the seventeenth century more and more female labour independent of 
the family became engaged in the production of ready-made clothes. 
Rising demand prompted the expansion of a retail clothing industry 
which included tailors, dressmakers, seamstresses and second-hand 
clothes dealers, many of whom were women. According to de Vries 
over the course of the eighteenth and early nineteenth century ‘one 
can speak of a gradual feminization of retailing’.86
 Over the period 1500–1800 both the intensity and duration of 
work increased. De Vries observes that the Protestant Reformation 
played a not insignificant part in facilitating this change by instilling 
a work ethic and helping to suppress holy days.87 That this period 
of early modern capitalism saw a redeployment and some intensi-
fication of labour seems plausible. It fits well with the view that 
while the exploitation of relative surplus value slowly increased, the 
extraction of absolute surplus value remained centrally important 
through the first three centuries of capitalism. It is suggestive as 
well of a capitalist economy in which human labour as well as draft 
animals and wind and water power played a much greater role than 
in the capital and fossil-fuel intensive economy we inhabit.
  There seems little to object to in de Vries’s overall contention 
that a more efficient use of labour helped to prepare the way for 
the Industrial Revolution.88 His further claim that the expansion of 
internal demand played a role in the move to industrial capitalism 
seems uncontroversial, at least on the surface.89 On the other hand, 
the second element of his ‘industrious revolution’, that increased 
demand based on rising wage income in the family household was 
what mobilized this more effective deployment of labour, appears 
more questionable. De Vries provides evidence of a considerable 
expansion of the market for consumer goods across a broad range 
of commodities in the eighteenth century. He shows that parts of the 
working class were able to increase purchases of coffee, tea, tobacco, 
ready-made clothes and even watches in the same period.90 On the 
other hand, his evidence suggests that for workers the family-house-
hold was not an important site of either production or significant 
market-based consumption.91 Individual members of workers’ families 
found employment. But the actually quite limited number of relatively 
cheap items bought in the market for consumption by workers were 
consumed individually rather than by the family. In other words, the 
working-class family did not act together as a productive unit, nor 
did it practise collective consumption. As a result de Vries fails to 
heller maintext.indd   205 6/7/2011   11:51:00 AM
206 t h e b i rt h o f  c a p i ta l i s m
demonstrate that a rise of overall family-household income among 
workers was able significantly to compensate for stagnant real wages 
or per capita income during the Industrial Revolution. As we shall 
see, there is little evidence of a consumerist revolution among the 
working class.92 
 De Vries’s industrious revolution is part of a current trend in 
historiography which seeks to shift the emphasis from supply to 
demand in explaining the Industrial Revolution. Basing itself on 
the somewhat exaggerated notion that the contemporary economy 
is built on consumption, it sees the origins of modernity, and indeed 
the Industrial Revolution, in the growth of this same consumption. 
Ben Fine and Ellen Leopold observe that this perspective on the 
Industrial Revolution is especially attractive to right-wing histo-
rians. Fine and Leopold argue that it is a perspective which stresses 
individual choice and consumer satisfaction, associates economic 
progress with the consuming rich both old and new, and draws 
attention from Marxist preoccupations with work, production and 
class.93 Fine and Leopold have asserted with some exaggeration 
that the notion that demand can play a significant role in major 
economic change is quite weak. Rather, I would say that it could 
not play such a role until wages began to rise in the advanced 
capitalist countries after 1880. Demand certainly could not assume 
such a position under the conditions appertaining during the 
Industrial Revolution, which included declining real wages.94 The 
purchase of new clothes which would have expanded demand was 
largely beyond the means of workers. Rather, it was through the 
acquisition of hand-me-downs from their betters or through the 
second-hand market that they acquired their apparel. Mass markets 
for manufactured clothes did not emerge until the second half of 
the nineteenth century.95
the scIentIfIc revolutIon
Like de Vries, Margaret Jacob viewed the seventeenth and eigh-
teenth centuries as decisive for the Industrial Revolution. But for 
her it was the contribution of the Scientific Revolution to creating 
a new scientific and technological culture that was critical to the 
breakthrough of the Industrial Revolution. Moreover she situated 
the roots of this movement in the context of the English Revolution. 
I have previously stressed the social and political importance of the 
English Revolution to the full institutionalization of capitalism. It 
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brought the state under the control of capitalist property owners 
and abolished the political and social barriers in the way of further 
capitalist development. According to Jacob, the essential context 
for the emergence of the new science, likewise, was the English 
Revolution:
the English Revolution shaped both science and its [social] inte-
gration, not only in England but, as English science spread, also 
in much of the Western world. … By 1660 and the end of the first 
phase of the English Revolution, the prosperity of the English state 
came to be seen as linked – at first tentatively and then decisively – 
with the development of science and technology.96
The political and social upheaval which overthrew the established 
order of society also established the new scientific culture. It shaped 
the natural philosophical thought of Isaac Newton and Robert 
Boyle, moving them towards a mathematical and experimental 
method of inquiry and placing the question of the social uses of 
the new knowledge in the forefront of serious discussion among 
contemporaries. Scientific progress which could lead to human 
improvement, as conceived originally by Francis Bacon, became an 
intrinsic part of the revolutionary goals of the Puritan revolution-
aries. The Puritan regime failed to realize these objectives, but in 
failing it made science and natural philosophy an intrinsic feature of 
a new social philosophy. By the time of the Restoration (1660), the 
prosperity of the English state was seen to be linked with advancing 
science and technology. 
 Jacob did not propose this in isolation. She acknowledges the 
fundamental contribution of the left-wing English medical historian 
Charles Webster and other researchers to the definitive establish-
ment of this historiographical perspective.97 By the late seventeenth 
century a political economy crystallized which was committed to 
the idea that the future of England lay with the development of an 
economy based on manufacturing.98 In the opening years of the 
next century Newtonian ideas came to be disseminated widely, espe-
cially through pamphlets, public lectures, associations, dissenting 
academies and textbooks, influencing engineers, practically minded 
natural philosophers and merchants with industrial interests,99 
and playing an important role in fostering innovation in manufac-
ture. However, while she stresses its contribution to the Industrial 
Revolution, Jacob makes it clear that the appearance of this new 
culture should not be conceived of as an alternative to economic 
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explanations. Emphasis on culture should not be seen as supplanting 
the economic.100
 Jacob’s stress on the importance of the new scientific culture also 
resonates with our discussion of the relative role of capitalists and 
workers in technological change. While Jacob allows that skilled 
artisans were necessary to the Industrial Revolution, she under-
scores the importance of entrepreneurs imbued with Newtonian 
ideas to the mechanization of the cotton industry.101 In contrast, the 
historian of technology Liliane Hilaire-Perez makes a strong case for 
the importance of the more tacit mechanical knowledge of skilled 
craftspeople.102 The latter view echoes the perspective of Marx, who 
noted the importance of skilled artisans to the construction of the key 
machines of the Industrial Revolution. On the other hand, he also 
pointed out that once such scientific knowledge became embodied in 
machinery, it helped change the balance of power in the factory from 
the workers to the capitalist. Indeed, a fundamental objective of the 
leaders of the Scientific Revolution like Francis Bacon, Robert Boyle 
and William Petty was to appropriate the knowledge of craftspeople, 
reorganize it and deliver it into the hands of capitalists.103 
 Despite Jacob’s efforts to root her analysis in economic and social 
reality, critics have falsely accused her of idealism, with William 
Ashworth seeing her work as a throwback to the views of Walter 
Rostow, who ascribed the Industrial Revolution to the ideas of 
the Scientific Revolution.104 In fact, Jacob’s scholarship, while not 
explicitly Marxist, nonetheless represents a courageous attempt to 
overcome an unfortunate legacy of anti-Marxism which hamstrung 
the development of the field of the history of science from the 
inception of the Cold War, if not earlier.105 Others have followed 
Jacob’s path. Gideon Freudenthal recently showed that the scientific 
ideas of the seventeenth century arose in the context of a rising 
interest in technological innovation coincident with the emergence 
of capitalism,106 reviving the ideas of the Soviet scholar Boris Hessen 
and the great Marxist theoretician Henryk Grossman, who were 
subject to ferocious and derisive criticism by non-Marxist historians 
of science in the 1930s and 1940s.107 Following up a suggestion 
in Marx’s Capital, Grossman carefully analyzed the outstanding 
contribution of the French philosopher René Descartes in stressing 
the combination of theoretical and craft knowledge in transforming 
production.108
 These works reveal how critical the ideas of the Scientific 
Revolution were to the triumph of industrial capitalism, that their 
roots lay in the skills of craftspeople and revolutionary intellectuals 
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who flourished particularly during the English Revolution, and 
that later they came to be controlled by bourgeois intellectuals and 
entrepreneurs. This history has a significant bearing on the future. It 
should be recalled that the monopolization of knowledge of the whole 
process of production by capitalist management and the resulting 
ignorance of workers was basic to capitalist control of the industrial 
process. That was the conclusion that Marx drew from the develop-
ment of nineteenth-century capitalist industry. The computer-driven 
capitalism of today, however, may be changing the balance of forces 
back in favour of producers, as internet optimists suggest. This may 
be reason for optimism on the part of socialists too. The essence of 
the socialist project, after all, is collective and increasingly rational 
control of the economy by the so-called collective worker. It points 
to a target toward which socialists should aim: that is, control over 
the intellectual heights of the economy in which knowledge brings 
control. Moreover, it should be added that this is a terrain which is 
highly favourable to those who aspire to socialism. Under socialism 
the sharing of ideas and information between socialist production and 
distribution collectives, and so the improvement of the standards of 
production, would be carried on as of a matter of course.
 This transformation has been theorized by Carlo Vercellone and 
others who reflect the outlook of so-called autonomist Marxism.109 
According to Vercellone, industrial capitalism is being eclipsed by 
so-called cognitive capitalism, or a form of capitalism dependent 
on knowledge. Industrial capitalism still exists and is proliferating, 
particularly in the third world. But it is being overshadowed by 
the development of high-tech industries which prefigure, and will 
dominate, the future economy. Biotechnology, computer and other 
high-tech industries and university research parks, as well as corporate 
industrial campuses, are archetypes of such future knowledge 
-based industries. In the new cognitive stage of capitalism the 
hegemony of the older industrial capitalism with its mass production 
and hierarchical division of labour is eroded. In this new cognitive 
phase the relation of capital to labour is characterized by the decisive 
importance of knowledge, and the production of knowledge by 
means of knowledge connected to the increasingly immaterial, 
networked and cognitive character of labour, whose importance is 
vastly greater than in the phase of industrial capitalism. Under these 
conditions the balance of forces may have changed, and it might 
become progressively more difficult for capital to contain knowledge 
within the limits of the capitalist means of production and property 
rights which generate profits.
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 In this view the cognitive, interconnected and immaterial nature 
of labour erodes capital’s ability to exploit it as wage labour, that is, 
to transform it into variable capital and thereby garner surplus value 
from it. For capital to continue to do so it has to fetter the devel-
opment of the potentiality of labour. There is a striking similarity 
here with Marx’s view. He argued that the further development of 
the forces of production, including scientific progress, is eventually 
stymied by the continued dependence of capital on wage labour:
On the one side, then, it [capital] calls to life all the powers of 
science and of nature, as of social combination and of social 
intercourse, in order to make the creation of wealth independent 
(relatively) of the labour-time employed on it. On the other side, 
it wants to use labour time as the measuring rod for the giant 
social forces thereby created, and to confine them within the 
limits required to maintain the already created value as value.110
The difference in Marx’s view and Vercellone’s is eliminated if we 
assume that variable capital is a force of production whose further 
development is eventually constricted at the stage of cognitive capi-
talism by the need of capital to force labour into a form from which 
it can extract surplus value.
the effacement of the bourgeoIsIe
The reduction in the growth estimates for the period 1760–1830 has 
not only led to the view that the Industrial Revolution represented 
less of a dramatic break than had previously been supposed, it has 
also reinforced doubts that the period can be seen as one in which 
the industrial bourgeoisie achieved economic power, and political 
and cultural hegemony. A new orthodoxy has emerged which not 
only denies the revolutionary character of the Industrial Revolution 
from an economic perspective, but goes on to claim that the indus-
trial middle class in England failed to gain the upper hand politically 
and economically. As a consequence, it is argued that the industrial 
bourgeoisie never came to determine state policy in ways favourable 
to industrial capitalism. The higher status attached to non-industrial 
forms of wealth alongside common cultural interests and sociability 
allowed the financial and landed elites to continue to dominate the 
English state. The industrial bourgeoisie subordinated itself to this 
elite and aspired to join it.
  Such a ‘gentlemanly capitalism’ dominated nineteenth and 
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indeed twentieth-century Britain, causing a bias toward rentier and 
ultimately imperialist interests. This interpretation fits with a conser-
vative revisionist view of British history which tends to minimize or 
dismiss the disruptive character of the seventeenth-century English 
Revolution.111 Both views hold that the control of the landed and 
propertied classes was never seriously challenged. The modern 
history of Britain is one of ordered and gradual change without 
radical breaks.112 The thesis of gentlemanly capitalism represented 
a new orthodoxy which emerged in the years of Thatcherism and 
neoliberalism. While both Thatcherism and neoliberalism ideologi-
cally were critical of the previously existing flabby and conciliatory 
postwar period of welfare-state capitalism, both have sought to 
present class rule and the rule of the market as part of a history that 
never really changes and is in fact part of the normal order of things. 
Thatcherism and neoliberalism were presented as an attempted 
restoration of this natural order. The reader will note the unfortu-
nate congruence between the idea of the natural rule of the landed 
elite and the conception of Brenner, who insists that the landlords 
took the initiative in instituting capitalism from above.
 Ironically the idea of gentlemanly capitalism emerged in the 
aftermath of a debate on English history between Thompson and 
Anderson, which grew out of their celebrated contretemps over 
class. In an article in New Left Review published in 1964, Anderson 
argued that the passage of the Reform Act (1832) and the repeal 
of the Corn Laws (1846), far from representing the triumph of the 
English bourgeoisie over the landed elite, marked its effacement in 
the face of the imminent threat of lower class radicalism:
In the wake of the repeal of the Corn Laws a campaign was 
launched to do away with primogeniture the ultimate legal 
defense of the aristocracy: the call for ‘free trade not only in corn 
but in land’ aimed directly at the root power of the aristocracy. 
The bourgeoisie refused to follow the call. Its courage had gone. 
Henceforth it was bent exclusively on integrating itself into the 
aristocracy, not collectively as a class, but by individual vertical 
ascent. This treason not only perpetuated landlord control of 
political life, but was the source of the chronic problems of the 
incompletely modern English industrial capitalism faced with 
rising German and American competition.113
The aristocratic outlook which continued to dominate the British state 
and the mentality of the more successful layers of the bourgeoisie made 
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it very difficult to address the declining competitiveness of British 
manufacturing. Britain drifted toward a rentier capitalism and a 
commitment to imperialism overseas as an alternative. The implication 
was that Britain missed its appointment with a necessary bourgeois 
revolution during the crises of 1832 and 1846. Anderson formulated 
this view in an effort to explain the apparent economic and social 
paralysis of Britain in the 1960s and 1970s. According to Anderson, 
the ongoing aristocratic ascendancy had blocked the further rational 
development of British capitalism. 
 Thompson responded to Anderson by insisting that the latter 
was intent on imposing a French model of revolutionary change 
on English history. According to Thompson, from 1688 the 
aristocracy as a class no longer dominated England. Aristocrats, 
gentry and merchants all were capitalists. Down to the Reform 
Bill of 1832 what he refers to as Old Corruption ruled over the 
English state – the state being relatively autonomous from the class 
system. As such, it included certain aristocratic magnates and great 
merchants as well as their hangers-on.114 In the crisis of 1832 
the industrial bourgeoisie played a role, but alongside the gentry 
who were also capitalist. Moreover, the industrial bourgeoisie left 
the heavy work of popular agitation and protest in the hands 
of plebeian radicals.115 The Anderson view that the aristocracy 
emerged from the crisis as the masters of the state is seriously 
overstated in Thompson’s opinion. According to Thompson, the 
aristocracy was useful in providing stability and order but the 
reality of political and even cultural power had passed into the 
hands of the bourgeoisie.116 
 In a subsequent article, Anderson made clear that, like Thompson, 
he considered England since 1688 a capitalist country. and that the 
aristocracy was already at that point a capitalist landed class. But 
he also reiterated his view that both before and after 1832 the 
landed elite as well as the financiers dominated British society and 
politics, with all the negative consequences that followed. In doing 
so, he argued that this was the consequence not simply of political 
and cultural privilege, but of their economic wealth, which was 
considerably greater than that of the industrial bourgeoisie.117 It is 
Anderson’s view that has, somewhat ironically, tended to prevail in 
conservative academic circles. This is due in part to the influence of 
a right-wing interpretation of the place of gentlemanly capitalism 
in the interpretation of British history. But I would also point out 
that Anderson’s notion of persistent aristocratic power, which 
he extended to the entire European continent in Lineages of the 
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Absolutist State, became the foundation of a sweeping reinterpreta-
tion of European nineteenth century history by the Marxist historian 
Arno J. Mayer. The situation in England figures largely in Mayer’s 
account: ‘Although England’s economy was dominated by manu-
facturing and merchant capitalism, the aristocracy continued to be 
paramount. This was so because land remained the chief source of 
wealth and income.’118
 Anderson’s view of continued aristocratic political dominance 
represents an important corrective to the assumption of a triumphant 
industrial bourgeoisie. It helps to explain a lot about the trajectory 
of English capitalism in the late nineteenth century. But there is a 
danger that such a view may obscure the determining character of 
class conflict. As Thompson insisted and Anderson admitted, both 
the industrial and aristocratic elite were members of the same capi-
talist class. Moreover, in the two great political conflicts between 
these elites in the first part of the nineteenth century, it was the 
interests of the industrial bourgeoisie that predominated. Finally 
the ultimately conciliatory attitude of the industrial bourgeoisie 
toward the nobility was dictated by their need to make common 
cause against the political and economic threat of the emerging 
working class. Their defensiveness in this respect parallels that of 
the French bourgeoisie following the June Days and the Commune. 
In my view the overall evolution of nineteenth-century England as 
well as France was determined by class conflict rather than inter-elite 
struggles. In both cases the state mediated an alliance between the 
landed and manufacturing bourgeoisie against workers, and evolved 
in the direction of favouring imperialism and high finance at the 
expense of industrial modernization.
conclusIon
I conclude this discussion of the Industrial Revolution by insisting on 
the ongoing importance of Marxist views. Not the least important 
was Marx’s own view of the historical meaning of the Industrial 
Revolution, which remains fundamental to an understanding of 
capital itself. Moreover, without derogating from the contribu-
tions of non-Marxist scholars it can be said that the contributions 
of Hobsbawm, Thompson, Anderson and others working in this 
tradition remain at the forefront of historiographical discussion of 
the period. Hobsbawm’s stress on the overseas and colonial market, 
his and Thompson’s emphasis on the turmoil and distress caused 
by industrialization, and Thompson’s and Anderson’s discussion of 
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class relations constitute enduring contributions to understanding 
the transformations of the new industrial age.
 I have also made a point of qualifying the importance of the 
Industrial Revolution, pointing to the greater significance of the 
sixteenth-century origins of capitalism and the trend to diminish 
the actual degree of economic transformation entailed in the initial 
phases of industrial capitalism. There is a danger that too much 
stress on the Industrial Revolution will only confirm what I have 
attempted to avoid in this narrative, a too Anglocentric view of 
capitalism. Industrialization began almost simultaneously in France 
and elsewhere on the Continent, although perhaps not to the same 
extent. Moreover, England’s advantage proved short-lived, eroding 
significantly from the 1870s onwards. From then on industrial capi-
talism began to take hold in Germany, the United States and even 
Japan. It is important therefore in conclusion to try to place capi-
talism in global perspective, as I shall try to do in the final chapter 
of this account.
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 caPItalIsm and World hIstory
The coming of the Industrial Revolution signalled the global 
triumph of capitalism. This economic revolution, coupled with 
imperialist rule, underpinned the subsequent two centuries of 
Western ascendancy. But what strikes me is how slow the arrival 
of the triumph was – it took three centuries – and how economi-
cally hard-pressed capitalism was up almost to the last moment 
before it finally prevailed. Up to the second half of the eighteenth 
century, the longstanding outflow of bullion from Europe toward 
Asia continued. This ongoing fiscal deficit reflected the competitive 
inferiority of Western products. This was particularly marked in the 
commercially decisive cotton industry. It was only toward the end 
of the eighteenth century that this commercial lag was overcome by 
technical innovation and machine production.1 Far from the birth 
of the Industrial Revolution being seen as taking advantage of an 
enormous opportunity to capture an open world market, it can be 
interpreted as a defensive reaction faced with persistent and ongoing 
Asian commercial superiority. Moreover, this Eastern advantage 
was not merely a reflection of a positive balance of trade. As we 
shall learn, the internal economies of the most advanced regions 
of Asia were at least equal to those of the capitalist West until the 
beginning of the nineteenth century.
 This last assertion points to the fact that in the last 20 years a revo-
lution has taken place in our understanding of global history. This 
intellectual upheaval began with the advance of a wave of historical 
writing directed against Eurocentrism. This anti-Eurocentric trend 
in historiography formed part of the emergent postcolonial strain 
in poststructuralist thought. Dedicated to criticizing and eliminating 
the legacy of European colonialism, postcolonialism in the main 
was hostile to Marxism, which it regarded as a Eurocentric form of 
thinking. In reaction I shall show in the first place that Marxism in 
the twentieth century was actually in the vanguard in the fight against 
Eurocentric ideologies and their material roots in colonialism and 
imperialism. Furthermore, taken to its limit postcolonialism’s rejection 
of Marxism and other kinds of Western thought falls into irratio-
nalism, and is in fact a brand of conservatism strongly reminiscent of 
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the romantic reaction to the Enlightenment. In this concluding chapter 
I shall turn the anti-Eurocentric historiography that this school has 
produced against itself by demonstrating that it actually reinforces our 
own Marxist interpretation of the history of capitalism.
 It is worth recalling that the romantic movement of the early nine-
teenth century which reacted against the French Revolution helped 
to create modern historiography. Similarly postcolonial thought has 
engendered a historiography of great importance to a proper global 
history of capitalism. Despite the anti-Marxist bias of much of it, 
the conclusions of postcolonial historiography underscore the basic 
argument of this narrative. Based largely on a reconsideration of the 
internal history of Western capitalism I have insisted that capitalism’s 
global conquest proved to be a protracted process, requiring no less 
than three centuries. It will now be shown that looking at history 
from a global perspective, postcolonial historiography arrives at the 
same conclusion. It was only after 1800 that European capitalism 
came to dominate the globe.
 As we saw in the earlier discussion of colonialism, Jim Blaut 
in the 1980s initiated the academic debate over capitalism and 
Eurocentrism. Reacting above all to the Eurocentric, not to say 
Anglocentric, views of Brenner, Blaut, who considered himself a 
Marxist, sought to defend Wallerstein and Frank by reasserting the 
importance of colonialism to the success of European capitalism. The 
first scholar systematically to challenge Eurocentric history, Blaut 
argued that protocapitalist currents were present in many places in 
Eurasia prior to the European discoveries. It was European colo-
nialism that allowed Europe to dominate the rest of the world and 
block the development of capitalism elsewhere. In response I qualified 
Blaut’s view by pointing out that the success of colonialism itself had 
to be understood as an outgrowth of a European capitalist dynamic.
 Despite the drawbacks of Blaut’s argument, important further 
attacks on Eurocentrism emerged in the work of John Hobson, 
Andre Gunder Frank and Jack Goody.2 Insightful though these 
authors are in terms of the debate on Eurocentrism, their rejection 
of Marxist concepts like capitalism, mode of production and class 
relations, has tended to stifle discussion rather than enlarge it. 
In particular their refusal to engage with these categories makes 
it difficult for them to deal with the causes of the Industrial 
Revolution. The debate over the relationship between capitalism and 
Eurocentrism has recently come to a head in the dispute between 
Robert Brenner and Keith Pomeranz over the level of economic 
development in England compared with the lower Yangtze delta in 
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the early modern period. Pomeranz’s intervention may be seen as an 
attempt to bring the precision of neoclassical quantitative methods 
to the support of the postcolonial position.3 In the course of the 
debate that followed it was shown that while Brenner is correct in 
asserting the ultimate advantage of the capitalist economy based 
on higher levels of productivity, this lead did not become manifest 
before 1800. This finding confirms a central thesis of this work, that 
the productive superiority of capitalism only became evident little by 
little, and then only under the aegis of the mercantilist state.
 Indeed, as we shall see, Arrighi in Adam Smith in Beijing (2007) 
argues that the belated victory of Western capitalism has proven a 
Pyrrhic one given its capital and energy-intensive nature.4 In Arrighi’s 
view the more labour-intensive model of the market fostered by the 
contemporary Chinese state will prove more economically competi-
tive and more ecologically sustainable in the twenty-first century. In 
conclusion we outline the premises of a non-Eurocentric approach 
to the history of capitalism. Among other elements we point to 
the importance of David Harvey’s concept of spatial-temporal fix, 
Amiya Kumar Bagchi’s vision of a common human fate under capi-
talism and Peter Linebaugh’s account of the ecological ravages of the 
capitalist mode of production.5
the attack on eurocentrIsm
Blaut’s was only the opening salvo in a barrage of attacks on 
Eurocentric history which were published from the 1990s onward. 
As these critics have explained, Eurocentrism has informed historical 
writing since the nineteenth century if not before. This was not only 
the case with European and American historiography, it affected the 
spatial and temporal conceptions of historical writing world-wide. 
Europeans and Americans conquered the world, renamed places 
and restructured economies, societies and politics. They destroyed 
or marginalized other ways of understanding basic concepts of 
space and time. History was universalized in their image, which was 
premised on the triumph of capitalist modernity.6
 Eurocentrism first emerged as an early modern religious and 
cultural ethnocentrism, which intensified with the consolidation 
of territorial states in England, the Netherlands and France. It was 
further confirmed when the Enlightenment identified its rational 
human subject – the white European middle-class male – as the 
essential protagonist of a progressive history. But this would not 
have gone far without colonial conquest and the eventual take-over 
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of the world by European capitalism. The Industrial Revolution 
provided a powerful confirmation of Eurocentric ideology. From 
this followed not merely European political and economic ascen-
dancy, but a consciousness of cultural and even racial superiority. 
European scholarly disciplines, among others history, geography, 
anthropology, literary studies and philosophy, were deeply coloured 
by Eurocentric assumptions.
 Postcolonial critics have argued that Marxism itself is contami-
nated by Eurocentrism, and for this reason is illegitimate in the 
struggle against it. I shall respond at two levels, by reviewing the 
actual historical development of the struggle against Eurocentrism 
and by exploring the theoretical foundations of this anti-Marxist 
stance. On the first level let me begin by asserting as undeniable that 
Marx and his disciple Lenin were committed to the idea of world 
socialist revolution. They stood opposed to capitalism and to the 
perpetuation of a world order dominated by the capitalist nations 
of Europe and North America. More to the point, the ideas of Marx 
and Lenin have been of immense importance to national liberation 
and socialist revolutionary struggles throughout the non-European 
world. As the postcolonial author Robert Young admits, ‘with some 
exceptions, Marxism historically provided the theoretical inspira-
tion and most effective political ideology for twentieth century 
anti-colonial resistance’.7
 Eurocentrism developed in tandem with the expansion of the 
capitalist world market, reaching its climax in the period of capitalist 
imperialism and colonialism in the late nineteenth and early twentieth 
centuries. The material foundation of this ideology was shaken by 
the First World War and the 1930s Depression. It entered crisis as 
a result of the catastrophic political and economic consequences of 
the Second World War on the major colonial states: England, France, 
Holland and Belgium. The United States, the sole surviving capitalist 
great power, restructured both imperialism and the accompanying 
Eurocentric world view after 1945. It did so through its world-wide 
system of naval and air bases and its policy of open markets rein-
forced by new international financial institutions – the International 
Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank – which it controlled. The 
hegemony of Eurocentric culture was strengthened by the invention 
of the American ideologies of mass consumerism and moderniza-
tion on the model of postwar American society. The Point Four Aid 
Program (1949) facilitated the export of the modernization ideology 
to under-developed countries by linking educational and scientific 
institutions there to those in the United States.
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 Ideologically and politically Lenin’s writings and the founding of 
the Communist International (1919), the Congress of the Peoples of 
the East (1920) and the creation in Brussels (1927) of the League 
Against Imperialism laid the groundwork for resistance to imperi-
alism and Western cultural hegemony.8 Based on this political and 
ideological groundwork, a major offensive against Eurocentrism 
and imperialism was launched right after the Second World War 
with the Chinese Revolution (1949) and the Korean War (1949–53). 
It continued with the Cuban (1959–) and Vietnamese Revolutions 
(1965–75). These uprisings inspired by Marxism were revolu-
tionary struggles but also national liberation movements against 
Western imperialism and colonialism. They were high points in a 
great series of national liberation struggles in Iran, Algeria, Egypt, 
Iraq, southern Africa, Ethiopia and Eritrea running from the 1950s 
through the 1970s. Mao Zedong, Ho Chi Minh, Fidel Castro, 
Ernesto Che Guevara, Kwame Nkrumah, Achmed Sukarono and 
Abdal Nasser emerged as the most important political leaders of the 
anti-imperialist movement.
 In 1959 the newly decolonized states sought to give themselves a 
degree of political cohesion by creating the non-aligned movement at 
Bandung. Intellectually and politically Lenin’s ideas on imperialism 
and anticolonialism proved critically important. Mao’s concept of 
a people’s war and Castro and Guevara’s of guerrilla war played a 
large part in the military strategy of anti-imperialist struggle. In terms 
of economic development, Lenin’s New Economic Policy, the Soviet 
economist Evgenii Alexeyevich Preobrazhensky’s theories of socialist 
accumulation, Mao’s conception of the Great Leap Forward and 
Cultural Revolution, and the ideas of Latin American dependency 
theorist Raúl Prebisch were important. Not to be overlooked espe-
cially in a discussion of Eurocentrism were the ideas of the Marxist 
theoretician Frantz Fanon on the need to achieve a psychological 
liberation from Eurocentric influence through struggling for national 
liberation. Marxist ideas gained ascendancy throughout the under-
developed world but especially in Asia. This is obvious in the case of 
China and Vietnam, but the ongoing political relevance of Marxist 
ideology throughout the Indian subcontinent should also be noted.
 By 1980 the combination of struggles in the under-developed 
world, coupled with growing social and ideological protest in the 
United States and the other advanced capitalist countries, had placed 
Eurocentric ideas and imperialism on the defensive. But US counter-
insurgency campaigns, neoliberalism as well as ideological currents 
like ethno-nationalism and postmodernism helped to take the wind 
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out of anti-imperialist resistance. It is in this context of attacks that 
the hostility to Marxism in postcolonial studies should be placed. 
For as Crystal Bartolovich has remarked: ‘this field has been deeply 
and constitutively informed by theoretical protocols and procedures 
– Foucauldian discourse analysis, deconstruction, Lacanianism 
– which are not merely indifferent, but in their dominant forms, 
actively and explicitly hostile to Marxism’.9 Capitalism since the 
1980s has become thoroughly global, and nowhere is it more 
dynamic than in Asia. It is likewise among the intellectual bour-
geoisie of Asia that some of the strongest roots of postcolonialist 
ideology are to be found. It is Marxism, of course, that continues to 
be the most important critique of capitalism, continuing to inspire 
active resistance notably in South Asia. Given the above historic 
record and the global nature of contemporary capitalism, the post-
colonial charge of Marxism being Eurocentric appears politically 
suspect in its motivations.
 As to the notion that Marxism is an intellectual construct 
contaminated by its Western origins, Neil Lazarus points out that as 
used by postcolonialists, the ‘West’ is invoked as an ideological trope 
which serves to make it difficult to trace out the actual political and 
economic roots of its historic power over the rest of the world.10 
In this perspective, Eurocentrism including Marxism is seen not as 
an ideology but as a world view, whose horizon cannot rationally 
be transcended, only deconstructed and discounted. According to 
the postcolonial view, Marxism is inscribed in the fabric of Western 
disciplinarity and institutionalized knowledge production, and 
hence is contaminated. Taken to its limit, postcolonialism falls into 
complete irrationalism, considering all intellectual practices that 
stake a claim to represent truth as inherently false.11
 In my view, in so far as it is able to continue to grasp social 
reality, Marxism must be regarded as applicable and useful outside 
the European context. Indeed, Arif Dirlik claims that Mao produced 
a specifically Chinese version of Marxism which became the foun-
dation for a distinctive Chinese modernity.12 As Mao Zedong 
expressed it in 1938:
Communists are Marxist internationalists, but Marxism must be 
realized through national forms. There is no such thing as abstract 
Marxism, there is only concrete Marxism. The so-called concrete 
Marxism is Marxism that has taken national form; we need to 
apply Marxism to concrete struggle in the concrete environment 
of China, we should not employ it in the abstract.13
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In any event, given the place of Marxist thought and practice in 
twentieth-century China, the idea that Marxism is fundamentally 
Eurocentric appears absurd.
 Academic arguments against Eurocentrism began when the radical 
political movements that had begun after 1945 subsided. Indeed, 
anti-Eurocentric scholarship began to flourish when Marxism and 
Communist movements and governments retreated. Like poststruc-
turalism and cultural studies, postcolonialism or anti-Eurocentrism 
seems to have been a product of the reaction to the politics of 
national liberation and third world Marxism. Indeed, it arose coinci-
dently with the full emergence on the world stage of East and South 
Asian capitalism in the 1980s, which helped to breathe new life into 
capitalism and the bourgeoisie. In this light I cannot help but feel 
that in the hands of some the debate over Eurocentrism, however 
important, represents an attempt to change the subject. Whereas in 
the 1960s and 1970s the future of the global capitalist system and 
imperialism was a political issue, from the 1980s the geographic 
centre and the cultural significance of the capitalist system became 
the question which vexed the minds of an increasingly depoliticized 
scholarship. That being said, like cultural studies and poststructur-
alism, postcolonial scholarship has had important impact on the 
discipline of history, and notably the question of the transition.
PostcolonIal hIstorIes
As has been noted, attacks on Eurocentric historical conceptions 
multiplied from the 1990s onward. We shall consider three: John 
M. Hobson’s The Eastern Origins of Western Civilisation, Jack 
Goody’s The Theft of History and Andre Gunder Frank’s ReOrient, 
which arguably are among the most important.14 The most notable 
thing about Hobson’s work is its demonstration of the astonishing 
technological dependence of the West on Asia up to the very eve 
of the Industrial Revolution. Meanwhile, in a thorough-going and 
convincing fashion Goody shows how deeply Eurocentric geographic 
and historiographical conceptions have shaped and distorted the 
consciousness of both Europeans and non-Europeans. Finally Frank 
argues that Asia rather than Europe dominated the world system 
until the Industrial Revolution.
 Professionally Hobson is interested in international relations 
theory and globalization from a postcolonial perspective. His work 
‘argues that the East (which was more advanced than the West 
between 500 and 1800) provided a crucial role in enabling the rise of 
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modern Western civilization’ and seeks ‘to replace the notion of the 
autonomous or pristine West with that of the oriental West’.15 More 
specifically, he asserts that the peoples of Asia after 500 ad created 
a global communications and economic network which allowed 
the diffusion of Eastern ideas, institutions and technology which 
were assimilated by the West, and that the development of Western 
imperialism after 1500 enabled the West to appropriate all manner 
of economic resources, enabling it to develop at the expense of the 
East and the rest of the world.16 Hobson shows that the West’s tech-
nological reliance on Asia did not end abruptly with the opening of 
the age of colonialism at the beginning of the sixteenth century, but 
went on throughout the early modern period. He demonstrates that 
such key inventions of the eighteenth-century agricultural revolution 
as the iron moldboard plough, rotary winnowing machine, seed-
drills and horse-harrowing husbandry and crop rotation schemes 
originated in China.17
 Hobson’s argument that the West’s triumph was due to a sequence 
of fortuitous accidents, that the rise of the West could be explained 
almost wholly through contingency, is less convincing. According 
to Hobson, ‘the Europeans needed a great deal of luck given that 
they had been neither sufficiently rational, liberal-democratic nor 
ingenious to independently pioneer their own development’.18 
Hobson even explains the British Industrial Revolution by pointing 
to the fact that the latter were good copycats of other people’s ideas, 
as used to be said disparagingly of the Japanese.19
 Beyond the notion of the West as lucky or good copycats, Hobson 
does not offer any explanation for the emergence of Western capi-
talism. As I pointed out in the Introduction, the rise of capitalism 
cannot be explained as a merely aleatory matter. Otherwise history 
as a discipline has no rational foundation. The task of the historian 
is rather to elicit the factors that if they did not determine, none-
theless shaped events: in this case, the emergence of capitalism. 
As to the matter of copying, what Hobson fails to acknowledge 
is that being open to foreign techniques and ideas might reflect 
a positive feature of a society, whose internal social and political 
structures consequently are worth analyzing. Many societies of 
course borrow techniques and ideas from elsewhere. But there were 
a number of structural features of emergent capitalism that made 
such borrowings fall on particularly fertile economic ground. Marx’s 
insistence on capitalism’s distinctive social relations of production, 
in which capitalists fully control the means of production and are 
able to innovate at will, is of most significance. But also notable 
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is Hobsbawm’s stress on the West’s historic backwardness and 
marginality, which tended to make it open to exogenous influences. 
Likewise Wallerstein’s emphasis on the failure to consolidate an 
overarching imperial political order, as well as Harman’s underlining 
of the internal weakness of the early modern territorial states, need 
to be taken into consideration. Together these structural features 
of capitalism point to the existence in Europe of a space for the 
market and the productive classes which was not evident elsewhere. 
In short, in his eagerness to combat Eurocentrism Hobson turns 
a blind eye to any internal characteristics of Western society that 
may have enabled it to achieve political and economic supremacy. 
It is not surprising therefore that Hobson concludes that Marx, the 
student of capitalism, was nothing but a Eurocentric orientalist.20
  Perhaps the most sweeping critique of Eurocentrism thus far 
has come from the British anthropologist Jack Goody. As a social 
anthropologist with a deep interest in the study of kinship and 
family systems, he has in recent years devoted his attention to a 
comparative analysis of complex societies and their interactions. 
Goody regards economic surplus, towns and trade and communica-
tion as key to the analysis of such societies. Over long periods of 
time there has been ongoing interaction between the developed areas 
of the world, with no region able to claim an inherent superiority.
 He is not always but is mainly respectful of Marx, and in the 
pages of New Left Review has been highly laudatory of the work 
of the French Marxist anthropologist Maurice Godelier, for whom, 
he notes in passing, the last instance never arrives.21 On the other 
hand, he is impatient with what he regards as the simplistic formula-
tions of Marxists who harp on about class and the social relations 
of production. But his objections are mainly directed against 
Eurocentrism, of which Marxism forms a part in his view.
 His recent work The Theft of History (2006), reveals just how 
deeply entrenched Eurocentric conceptions have been: ‘Europe has 
not simply neglected or underplayed the rest of the world, as a 
consequence of which it has misinterpreted its own history, but … 
it has imposed historical concepts and periods that have aggravated 
our understanding of Asia’.22 On the one hand, Goody attempts to 
challenge the grand Eurocentric narrative which teleologically links 
Antiquity, the Renaissance, Reformation, Scientific Revolution, 
Enlightenment and the Industrial Revolution. On the other hand, 
he aims to begin to reintegrate the history of Africa and Eurasia 
into the narrative of world history.23 In this regard Goody acknowl-
edges his debt to the work of Martin Bernal, the Marxist scholar 
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who frontally challenged the received conception of the Aryan 
origins of Greek civilization.24 Bernal underlined the affiliation of 
Greek culture with Egypt, Africa and the Levant. He stressed the 
racist character of the Aryan myth, which he argued developed in 
nineteenth-century Europe. Goody agrees, but asserts that the roots 
of this myth lie much deeper in European thought.25
  Goody demonstrates the degree to which African and Asian 
cultural and technological achievement has gone unacknowledged 
by Eurocentric thinkers and historians. At the same time, he points 
out that these same scholars have arbitrarily annexed whole periods 
of history to the European narrative. Indeed, he underlines that 
fundamental European conceptions of space, time and periodiza-
tion have been imposed on the rest of the world.26 According to 
Goody, Eurocentricity permeates the work of even the most non-
Eurocentric of Europeans, like the Marxist scientist and sinologist 
Joseph Needham. Goody recognizes that the latter’s monumental 
history of ancient Chinese science pioneered in demonstrating the 
achievements of non-European civilizations. Yet Needham’s unfor-
tunate commitment to Marxism (in Goody’s eyes at least) led him 
to the mistaken view that bureaucratic feudalism impeded Chinese 
development and blocked the emergence of a capitalist class.27 
Goody meanwhile offers no critique of Needham’s extremely 
positive assessment of Chinese science, nor does he find Needham’s 
assessment Eurocentric, which after all are the main points.
 The non-Marxist historian Braudel is likewise chastised by Goody 
for insisting on the uniquely progressive nature of Western merchant 
capitalism. Goody himself insists on the equally vibrant character of 
Chinese, South Asian and Middle Eastern merchants and financial 
institutions.28 His critique of Braudel leads him to ask:
whether we really need the concept of capitalism, which always 
seems to push the analysis in a Eurocentric direction. … Can 
we not therefore dispense with this pejorative term drawn from 
nineteenth century Britain and recognize the element of continuity 
in the market and bourgeois activities from the Bronze Age until 
modern times.29
Goody argues that a proper historical perspective would be a 
Eurasian and African one, in which there was a steady progress in 
urbanization, increases in the production of goods and ideas, and 
expansion of mercantile capital over a 5,000-year period. He agrees 
that the process of industrialization in Britain that began in the 
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eighteenth century was of utmost significance for the future. But he 
concludes that:
all that process can be described without adopting the nineteenth-
century notion of the emergence of capitalism as a specific stage 
in the development of world society, and we can dispense with 
the supposed sequence of periods of production leading to it 
that are confined to Europe. Such an account avoids European 
periodization and its assumption of long-term superiority.30
In effect Goody calls for the rejection of the transition from feudalism 
to capitalism as a problem. How then to account for British indus-
trialization, so important to the future, as Goody admits? While 
recognizing the significance of the enormous expansion of the 
forces of production which follow from industrialization, he fails 
to acknowledge that it was based on changes in the relations of 
production. However important Goody’s challenge to Eurocentricity 
is, in rejecting the question of the transition he takes things too far. 
Indeed, by singling out the transition problem for attack, Goody 
underscores its continuing significance.
 A ground-breaking historical work in the struggle against 
Eurocentrism has been Andre Gunder Frank’s ReOrient.31 Unlike 
the works of Hobson and Goody which are rooted in social anthro-
pology and postcolonialism, Frank’s account is solidly anchored in 
comparative study of early modern Asian and European history. 
Frank was a founder of dependency theory, and helped inspire 
Wallerstein’s and Arrighi’s research. Deeply committed to third 
world Marxism, he contributed as best he could to national libera-
tion struggles in the 1950s and 1960s. In his later years, he drifted 
away from these Marxist commitments, questioning Wallerstein’s 
ideas about the onset of the capitalist world system in the sixteenth 
century in a work published in 1993.32 Then in ReOrient he took his 
distance from Marx himself by first of all castigating his supposed 
orientalism and mistaken ideas about the Asiatic mode of produc-
tion.33 Taking a step further, he explicitly rejected the theoretical 
notion of a capitalist mode of production, preferring instead to 
discuss the world economy. He regards as: 
questionable to say the least the very concept of a ‘capitalist 
mode of production’ and the supposed significance of its alleged 
spread from Europe to the rest of the world … [and the] very 
significance imputed to different modes of production of course 
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including ‘feudalism’ and ‘capitalism’, not to mention any alleged 
‘transition’ between them.34
Frank’s perspective on global history deserves our attention because 
it embodies an important corrective to a too Eurocentric view. As 
Frank saw it, Europe was hardly a factor in the world economy 
prior to the sixteenth century. It was the East that created a world 
market which it controlled until as late as 1800. Contrary to the 
Eurocentric conception, Europe was not in the global economic 
vanguard after 1492. In terms of population growth, gains in 
productivity, technological innovation and per capita income, China 
and India preserved their lead over Europe until the eighteenth 
century. It was bullion from the New World that allowed Europe to 
increase its economic role for the first time in the sixteenth century. 
But its trade deficit with the East remained in place for centuries. 
The Scientific Revolution did not provide Europe with a higher 
level of scientific and technological capacity than Asia. The ideas 
of the Scientific Revolution did not influence European technology 
until the nineteenth century. China and other places in Asia had a 
level of technological facility in guns, ships, textiles, metallurgy and 
agriculture which was as high as or higher than that of Europe in 
the early modern period. Many technological and scientific ideas 
which appeared in Europe were borrowed from the rest of Eurasia in 
the medieval and early modern period. The financial and economic 
institutions of Asia were no less rational and no more despotic than 
those of the West.
 The ascendancy of the West which dates from the eighteenth 
century was based in the first place on the cyclical nature of the 
world economy. Europe advanced as a result of a cyclical oscil-
lation downward of the Asian economy. Meanwhile, colonialism 
and slavery provided the Europeans with the capital to invest in 
industrial technology. But such resources were not enough at first 
to induce them to invest in labour-saving technology. It was the high 
cost of wages and other resources that finally caused Europeans to 
invest in new means of production which reduced the cost of labour. 
Meanwhile, the low-wage structure of the Chinese economy brought 
about by a rising population precluded such investment.
 Frank’s work elicited an important riposte from his erstwhile 
colleagues in dependency theory, Samir Amin, Arrighi and Wallerstein, 
in the pages of the latter’s journal Review.35 In his refusal to 
recognize the importance of changes in modes of production, and 
specifically the importance of the advent of capitalism, Frank was 
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accused by them of denying the significance of historic breaks and 
turning points, and more importantly their causes. Amin went so 
far as to claim he was even practising a kind of history based on 
eternal cycles. Indeed, according to these former colleagues Frank’s 
obsession with economic flows was nothing less than an economism 
which amounted to a paean to economic efficiency in the neoliberal 
mode. Frank ignored the importance of the development of the 
law of value and the decisive importance of political and military 
power in history, and particularly the history of global capitalism. 
He wrongly denied the world-wide character of capitalism, and its 
polarizing effects in terms of the development of core and periphery. 
In his eagerness to deny a dialectical relationship between the two 
phenomena, Frank asserts, but fails to provide evidence for, the 
overall decline of Asia prior to the rise of the West. Amin, Arrighi 
and Wallerstein argue, I believe correctly, that the way to look at 
the early modern period is not merely on its own terms, but also in 
terms of the development of the underlying forces determining the 
future, which was to be a capitalist one. Frank deliberately ignores 
the future by practising a kind of empiricism uninterested in what 
lies ahead.
 Despite their criticisms, Amin, Arrighi and Wallerstein do not 
deny the economic superiority of Asia in the early modern period, 
lasting into the eighteenth century, which Frank insisted on. It was 
left to a Canadian scholar, Ricardo Duchesne, to try to do so in an 
article which was published in 2003 in Science and Society.36 In 
opposition to Frank, Duchesne argued that there was not one world 
economy at the beginning of the eighteenth century, but two – an 
Asian and a European one – and that of the two it was Europe 
that had the better part.37 Europe’s economy, based on emerging 
capitalist relations of production, was on the rise while Asia’s was 
in decline. Based on a paper published by Patrick O’Brien in 1991, 
Duchesne even claimed that overseas trade and colonialism had little 
to do with the Industrial Revolution. In that piece O’Brien asserted 
that the ‘connexions from the world economy to the industrial 
revolution are not nearly strong enough to seriously weaken the 
present “Eurocentric consensus” that its mainsprings are to found 
within and not beyond the continent’.38 O’Brien’s view, if true, 
would confound not merely Frank, but also Blackburn, who we 
saw demonstrated the intimate tie between colonial slavery and the 
origins of the Industrial Revolution. In fact O’Brien has been quite 
inconsistent on this matter, and not on just one occasion. In any 
case, in a relatively recent piece published in New Left Review in 
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1999 he reversed his position again, and allowed the manifold and 
close links between the Industrial Revolution and overseas trade.39
 Frank claimed that England was spurred toward industrialization 
as a result of its relatively high wages. Duchesne complains that 
Frank does not supply proof. Moreover, he asserts that, according 
to the consensus, wages remained stationary in the early stages of 
the Industrial Revolution and rose between 1820 and 1850. In fact 
Frank is correct on the matter of high wages as a catalyst to indus-
trialization, as pointed out by Dobb and more recent authorities.40 
Moreover, the new consensus on the direction of wages during the 
heyday of the Industrial Revolution, as noted by Voth, is opposite 
to what Duchesne has asserted. On the other hand, Duchesne rightly 
points out that although Frank admits that prolonged economic 
expansion in Asia did eventually lead to polarization and a lack 
of effective demand, Frank in his post-Marxist phase chooses to 
ignore the important point that such a situation arose from the over- 
exploitation of the mass of the population by the ruling bureaucratic 
and landed elites. Internally these regimes were weakening economi-
cally and politically, and as a result preparing the way for a takeover 
by Western imperialism. Duchesne concludes that it seems evident 
that Chinese economic expansion in the early modern period was 
based on extensive growth, in which population and total economic 
output grew at about the same rate, with no increases in output 
per capita. On the other hand, England experienced a prolonged 
process of steady if gradual increase in agricultural productivity.41 
True China was able to increase the productivity of the land, but 
such increases came at the expense of greater and greater inputs of 
labour – in other words, there was declining labour productivity. In 
the eighteenth century England experienced significant increases in 
the productivity of both land and labour.42
the great dIvergence
It is this argument about differential rates of productivity in China 
and England which constitutes Duchesne’s strong suit against Frank. 
From at least the early eighteenth century England was outpacing 
China economically, Duchesne concludes. Indeed, the latter was on 
the threshold of an economic crisis. But Duchesne’s view on this 
matter had already been challenged by the appearance of Kenneth 
Pomeranz’s The Great Divergence (2000).43 Pomeranz is a historian 
of China who studies the past from the point of view of neoclas-
sical economics. He is part of a network of California economic 
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historians who came to prominence in the age of neoliberalism, it is 
fair to say, while rewriting economic history from this perspective. 
Pomeranz was not directly answering Duchesne. If he was chal-
lenging anyone it was the bigger fish Robert Brenner. Reviewing 
Brenner’s social property approach at the beginning of his work, he 
looks down his nose at it, noting that in the final analysis it corre-
sponds to the institutional approach of Douglas North, especially in 
its stress on individual property rights. Such private property rights 
imply alienated labour, in other words producers, earning wages 
and unable to enjoy the full fruits of their labour. Both North and 
Brenner assume as a result that the most productive economy is one 
where land and labour are completely separated.44
  Pomeranz starts his quantitative analysis by insisting that a 
proper discussion of the respective economic performance of Europe 
and Asia should narrow the focus to the most advanced areas of 
development. Accordingly, he focuses on England and the lower 
Yangtze delta. He then attempts to show that these regions were 
quite similar in the character of their economies, the nature of their 
respective patterns of growth and the effects of such growth up 
to 1800. In both cases the institutional structures and population 
patterns reinforced economic growth. Growth of fixed capital and 
levels of productivity and gross domestic product per capita were 
approximately similar. It was only after 1800 that England and the 
rest of Western Europe embarked on a growth path different from 
and superior to that of the lower delta.
 But England was not able to move to a higher growth path as a 
result of an advantage inherent in its internal economy. Given his 
neoclassical approach Pomeranz is not prepared to consider the rela-
tionship between England’s mercantile state and trading companies, 
and its internal capitalist relations of production. Nor is he interested 
in the internal social relations of the Yangtze valley which might 
account for its economic dynamism. Consideration of produc-
tive relations of a given mode of production is irrelevant. Rather, 
England’s accelerated growth was the a result of the unique form of its 
mercantile state and merchant companies, which made possible access 
to the land, raw materials and slave labour of the American colonies.
 For Pomeranz growth is the result of population increase, a subse-
quent increase in demand, followed by the growth of supply as result 
of specialization and an increasing division of labour. This sequence 
follows in the absence of institutional or demographic constraints. 
Meeting these conditions, England and the lower Yangtze both expe-
rienced impressive growth and increases in standard of living. Land, 
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labour and commodity markets in both cases were equally free, 
while the rules governing private property were likewise favourable 
to growth. In both China and England the erosion of family wealth 
through excessive childbirth was excluded by birth control measures 
including late marriage and infanticide. Whatever advantages England 
possessed in industrial technology were offset by China’s superiority in 
agricultural technology. Levels of capital accumulation, productivity 
and well-being were entirely comparable.
 Nonetheless, towards the end of the eighteenth century the 
population increase in both societies began to create the possibility 
of shortages of land, raw materials and animal fibres. If allowed to 
continue such trends would have required a resort to increasingly 
labour-intensive methods to compensate for the shortage of land. 
Such resources were potentially available in Eastern Europe as well 
as in Western China, where millions of peasants migrated in the 
eighteenth century. Potentially raw materials from these regions 
could have been exchanged for English or Chinese manufactures. 
In both cases poverty and remoteness ruled out such plans. In other 
words the imperial expansion of China in the eighteenth century 
and the growth of the East European commerce proved incapable of 
generating sufficient demand to absorb English or Chinese manufac-
tures. Accordingly, these outlying regions were not able to become 
reliable suppliers of food and raw materials.
 What opened the path for England’s exit from this cul de sac was 
Atlantic expansion. This allowed the establishment of the distinc-
tive overseas food and raw-material-producing economies using 
slave labour that allowed England and later Europe to escape the 
Malthusian trap. This kind of unequal exchange was not established 
between the core and periphery in China. The result was that after 
1800 China moved toward Malthusian crisis. In the meantime, 
Europe was able to exchange an expanding volume of manufactured 
exports for sugar, grain, cotton and timber, while avoiding commit-
ting the massive amount of land and labour which would have been 
necessary to produce them at home. The development of this trade, 
meanwhile, made it feasible to develop the coal resources and steam 
power attendant on the Industrial Revolution. In arguing for the 
notion of equal levels of economic development between England 
and China in the early modern period, Pomeranz joins Blaut and 
Frank in challenging Eurocentrism. But from our perspective, that 
of the transition debate, Pomeranz’s perspective offers important 
support to the idea that colonialism and slavery played a critical role 
in the triumph of industrial capitalism.
heller maintext.indd   230 6/7/2011   11:51:01 AM
 c a p i ta l i s m a n d wo r l d h i sto ry 231
  Reacting to the threat that Pomeranz’s sophisticated analysis 
poses to his own view, Brenner, assisted by the China specialist 
Christopher Isett, soon entered the lists against him.45 As with 
Pomeranz, the focus of Brenner’s and Isett’s response is on a compar-
ison of England and the delta of the Yangzte. But with Brenner there 
is a welcome return to a social relations of production, or what he 
calls a social relations of property approach. According to him, 
there is a complete contrast between these relations in England in 
the early modern period and the Yangtze delta in the Qing period 
(1644–1912). The contrasting economic strategies of the upper and 
lower classes in these regions led to decisively different outcomes, 
manifest already in the period prior to the Industrial Revolution.
 In the Yangtze delta peasants and landlords possessed direct 
access to the means of social reproduction: land and rent, the 
latter based on extra-economic coercion. They were accordingly 
shielded from the need to utilize resources in the most productive 
way possible in the face of market competition. As a result, they 
had no need to allocate resources in ways that would promote 
economic development. The region experienced a Malthusian trajec-
tory, which by the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries turned into 
a demographic and ecological crisis. In England the situation was 
reversed. Most peasants did not have direct control of land, and 
landlords were unable to garner rent based on extra-economic 
coercion. They were both free and compelled by market competition 
to use resources so as to maximize their rate of return. As a result 
England experienced economic growth which led to the Industrial 
Revolution. The obvious conclusion from this analysis, and one 
with which I agree, is that the contrasting relations of production 
in bureaucratic and feudal China and capitalist England explain the 
radically different outcomes. In my view there is no question that 
the divergent course of class struggle between peasant producers 
and landlords in China and England determined this different result. 
The bureaucratic feudal state in China was repeatedly rescued from 
peasant revolt by foreign invasion, as in the Mongol invasion of 
the thirteenth century and again in the Manchu invasion of the 
seventeenth century. In England, to the contrary, late-medieval 
peasant revolt began to move England away from feudalism and 
toward capitalism. The only modern invasion of England in 1688, 
rather than reinforcing bureaucratic and feudal control, destroyed 
the vestiges of the bureaucratic feudal order with the political 
support of English and Dutch capital. Brenner goes on to reiterate, 
not very convincingly, that colonialism and slavery had nothing to 
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do with English economic growth and the origins of the Industrial 
Revolution.
 But this was not the last word. In 2009 Robert C. Allen published 
a paper which challenged the views of Brenner and Isett.46 Allen is 
known as a brilliant and iconoclastic econometric historian. Among 
his remarkable works is an analysis of Soviet industrialization in the 
1930s which surprisingly concluded that it represented a noteworthy 
example of the efficient use of economic resources.47 Allen criticized 
both Brenner and Pomeranz for basing their work on a comparison 
of a few crops: rice and wheat in the Yangtze, and wheat in England. 
Allen points out that agriculture in both cases was about much 
more than grains. Meat, butter and wool were produced by farmers 
in England, while Chinese farmers raised pigs and chickens, and 
cultivated cotton and mulberry trees. A full analysis requires that all 
these products be factored in, especially since animal and vegetable 
production reinforced each other. On this basis Allen reanalyzed the 
data. His conclusions reinforced Pomeranz: that productivity and 
incomes in China were on a par with those in England. The Great 
Divergence came after 1800.
 Do Allen’s conclusions put Brenner’s relations of production 
approach into question? They do not, in my view. What they do is to 
postpone its full impact to the nineteenth century. It took centuries 
for capitalist relations of production, and especially the extraction 
of relative surplus value, to manifest their economic superiority. 
Allen’s data on the development of English agricultural productivity 
which Brenner himself cites makes this clear.48 Between 1500 and 
1750 labour productivity in English agriculture rose by slightly 
more than 50 percent. Yet in its first hundred years (1500–1600), 
when capitalist relations were first starting up, there was a net 
decline in productivity. The next century saw moderate cumula-
tive gains, which were enough to overcome the previous threat of 
Malthusian crisis. But the major rate of gain over the whole period 
came between 1700 and 1750, with continuing increases into the 
nineteenth century. At a certain point, quantitative economic gains 
turned into a qualitative economic transformation. But looking 
back it is important to reiterate that primitive accumulation and the 
extraction of absolute surplus value were intrinsic to the early devel-
opment of capitalism, including the gradual rise of the importance 
of the extraction of relative surplus value. The importance of the 
extraction of relative surplus value in increasing the rate of growth 
only became evident over the long run. The prevalence of capitalist 
relations of production in the West was thus a gradual process. 
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Yet in conclusion it is important to recall that the West’s colonial 
conquests, to which Pomeranz attributes so much, already reflected 
the internal dynamism of capitalist relations of production in the 
early modern period.
the asIan IndustrIous revolutIon
Brenner and others who have insisted on the importance of the 
extraction of relative as against absolute value have viewed China 
and Asia as the prime examples of where continued reliance on the 
latter can lead. Given ongoing Malthusian constraints, more and 
more labour must be invested in maintaining an existing per capita 
level of output. Rather than development, the result is what is referred 
to as involutionary growth, diminishing returns on increasing inputs 
of labour. Eventually even this expedient is exhausted and society 
falls into demographic crisis. Pomeranz and Allen fundamentally 
agree with this assessment, contesting only the date at which China 
moved toward such a crisis. But in a recent work, Adam Smith 
in Beijing (2007), Giovanni Arrighi questioned the whole concept 
of Asian involutionary growth as a Eurocentric presumption. 
Indeed, he argues that it is precisely labour-intensive growth that 
in the longest run is the only sustainable form of economic growth. 
Capital-intensive and resource and energy-consuming forms of 
expansion, characteristic of the West, are necessarily transitory and 
have a declining prospect.49
 We encountered Arrighi previously through his study of the 
history of the cycles of capitalist accumulation. In The Long 
Twentieth Century Arrighi postulated four great phases of capital 
accumulation – Spanish/Genoese, Dutch, English and American – 
each functioning on a larger scale than the preceding one. In each 
hegemonic cycle, elites combined financial and economic power 
with state political power in order to impose control over the 
world market while reaping a maximum of profits. Within each 
cycle, capital moved through an initial period of investment in the 
commodity form of capital, towards a withdrawal to the safer realm 
of financial circulation as opportunities for profitable investment in 
the real economy dried up. The onset of financialization represents 
a signal of the eventual decline of a given historical phase of capital 
accumulation and the passage of capital via the international credit 
system into the hands of a new hegemonic power.
 According to Arrighi, the decline of the American phase of capital 
accumulation in the late twentieth century was signalled by the 
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financialization of the American economy beginning in the 1970s. 
This presaged the decline of its economic and political hegemony, 
and the emergence of a new hegemon in East Asia. At the time he 
wrote The Long Twentieth Century in the 1990s, Arrighi forecast 
that Japan would become the new hegemon. In his new work he 
claims that China rather than Japan has emerged as the leading East 
Asian economic power. But whether it can play, or is willing to play, 
the role of hegemonic power is debatable.
 The unending accumulation of capital and power is what defines 
the European developmental path as capitalist. In contrast, the 
absence of such an unlimited quest characterized the developmental 
path of East Asia prior to the Great Divergence. East Asia was a 
market economy but not a capitalist one.50 In this light it is Adam 
Smith, the champion of the market, rather than Marx, the analyst of 
the capitalist mode of production, who inspires Arrighi. According 
to Arrighi, it was Smith, towards the end of the eighteenth century, 
who extolled China as a market economy superior to Europe.51 At 
the same time it was Smith who insisted that the social division of 
labour was the basis of economic development.52 Parenthetically, 
we should recall that Marx chastised Smith for not taking the social 
division of labour seriously into account. Instead, he based his 
claims of the virtues of the market division of labour on the analyti-
cally inappropriate technical division of labour (the pin factory).53 
Indeed this is a crucial point, for Marx believed that Smith not only 
side-stepped discussing the pitfalls of the market division of labour, 
but in so doing obscured the fact that a socialist economy could 
create a superior social division of labour. Arrighi admits that Smith 
mistakenly used the pin factory as his example of the virtues of the 
market division of labour. He furthermore acknowledges that Smith 
decried even the technical division of labour within the pin factory as 
soul-destroying. But even so Arrighi endorses Smith’s correlation of 
rising labour productivity with the development of specialized units 
and branches of production arising from an expanding market.54
 Based on his positive view of the market, Smith considered 
China as the ultimate exemplar of what he called the ‘natural’ path 
of development. Such a natural path uses exchange to develop the 
home market to promote agriculture and retail trade rather than to 
expand foreign trade. Coupled with Smith’s critique of the technical 
division of labour and of the negative effects of large-scale capital 
(the joint-stock company), Arrighi notes that Smith believed that 
the European path to development which emphasized the capture of 
foreign markets was ‘unnatural’ and ultimately unsustainable.55
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 Smith’s recognition of China’s inward rather than outward-
directed economic path is undoubtedly historically correct. Yet 
he does not sufficiently acknowledge Smith’s simultaneous dispar-
agement of China’s low wages and lack of economic dynamism. 
Furthermore, Arrighi should acknowledge that Smith actually had 
little real knowledge of the vastness and complexity of the Chinese 
economy.56 In any event Arrighi argues that China’s more ‘natural’ 
or Smithian path not only was the basis of China’s development in 
the past, but is the key to the growing emergence of China as the 
world’s future economic powerhouse.
 The source of his view lies in the theory of the industrious 
revolution developed by the Japanese economic historian Kaoru 
Sugihara, who according to Arrighi has put Smith’s view into 
modern context.57 As we have seen, de Vries took up Sughira’s term 
‘industrious revolution’ and applied it to the development of the 
early modern European economy. But in de Vries’s conception the 
Western form of industrious revolution entailed the increasing pull 
of market demand and consumption in a way which was not true of 
Sughira’s Asia.58 Whereas Brenner and Pomeranz see China sooner 
or later falling into a Malthusian crisis, Sugihara instead posits 
an early modern Chinese industrious revolution which enabled 
it to avoid such a fate. In the early modern period (1500–1800), 
the development of labour-absorbing institutions and labour-in-
tensive technologies in response to shortages of land and natural 
resources enabled China and East Asia to dramatically increase their 
populations, while experiencing not a deterioration, but a modest 
increase in their standard of living. Japan in fact followed a similar 
course to China with an even more impressive gain in standard of 
living.
 The concept of industrious revolution was first set forth by 
Hayami Akira with reference to Tokugawa, or early modern Japan. 
According to Akira, the liberation of the peasants from outright 
servitude in the seventeenth century, the entrenchment of family-
based farming, an increase in population and a growing scarcity 
of arable land contributed to a mode of production that depended 
on the investment of labour. Peasants worked longer and harder 
but their incomes also grew. They accordingly came to value work, 
developing a strong work ethic. In applying Akira’s concept of indus-
trious revolution to China, Sugihara does not see it as a prelude to a 
home-grown industrial revolution. In contrast to Europe, the indus-
trious revolution in Asia was a market-based development which did 
not have the capacity to generate the capital and energy-intensive 
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development characteristic of Britain and later the United States. On 
the contrary, based on the family household and to a certain extent 
the village community, it represented a technological and institu-
tional path which was distinct from that of the West, and one which 
would eventually enable it to challenge the latter’s dominance.
  Workers in the West were progressively deprived of the oppor-
tunity to use their skills and initiative on account of the increasing 
dominance of capital. In contrast, in East Asia workers were 
encouraged to share the concerns of employers and to develop 
the interpersonal skills necessary for flexible specialization. In the 
countryside stress was placed on being able to perform not one, 
but a multiplicity of tasks, while cooperation rather than individual 
achievement was inculcated. The management and prospects of the 
family farm were a matter of common concern to all members of the 
household. Overall know-how and management skills were prized 
among family members.
 Within this context the development of labour-intensive tech-
nologies led to small improvements in living standards based on 
full employment. Such development mobilized human rather than 
non-human resources. Sugihara argues that this tendency to mobilize 
human as against non-human resources in the course of develop-
ment continued to mark East Asia even as states there began to 
absorb Western technologies into their economies. In Japan, China 
and elsewhere in the region, a hybrid style of development or labour-
intensive industrialization took hold, which in the relative absence 
of industrial capital, cheap energy and abundant raw materials 
substituted flexible, cooperative and skilled forms of labour. After 
the Second World War this form of development fully merged with 
that of Western capital-intensive and energy-consuming forms of 
development, in Japan first of all, but later in post-revolutionary 
China and elsewhere in East Asia.
 The rise of East Asia, and notably China, has thus been due 
not to a convergence with the Western capital and energy-intensive 
path, but to a fusion between the latter and the East Asian labour-
intensive approach. This synthesis has great importance in terms of 
the future of the world economy. The Western economic develop-
ment path was an extraordinary achievement, greatly expanding the 
productive capacity of a small proportion of the world’s population. 
The Eastern path, on the other hand, was a miracle of distribu-
tion holding out the prospect of a diffusion of the benefits of the 
miracle of production, originally a monopoly of the West, to the 
great majority of the world’s population through labour-intensive 
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and energy-saving forms of industrialization. Indeed, in the light 
of the growing ecological crisis associated with industrialization, 
the miracle of distribution can only continue if the Western path 
converges with that of the East.59
 It is Sugihara’s thesis, which he claims descends from the views 
of Smith, that Arrighi applies to China. Indeed, he maintains that 
there are tentative signs that the current political leadership of 
this emerging economic power has lately committed itself to this 
combined path as the only means of achieving an economic develop-
ment which is environmentally sustainable.60 While the focal point 
of world economic power is moving to East Asia, Arrighi does not 
believe that this heralds the emergence of a new Chinese hegemony. 
Rather, it suggests the necessity of a multilateral world order. Indeed, 
his conception of a convergence between the Eastern and Western 
paths of development points not to socialism in the classic sense, but 
to some sort of transcendence of capitalism based on the market.
 China evolved as a market society dominated by a paternalistic 
bureaucratic state. Its preoccupation with internal development was 
largely responsible for its mainly peaceful and non-aggressive relation 
with its neighbours. No doubt, too, its great size also allowed it to 
intimidate its neighbours without resort to war. But the exclusion 
of aggressive bourgeois influence from government further helped 
to limit its involvement in wars of expansion. In contrast to Frank, 
Arrighi does not believe the Chinese and European economies were 
closely linked together until the intrusion of Western imperialism in 
the nineteenth century. The Chinese Revolution created the condi-
tions under which this kind of market society could re-emerge once 
Mao exited the scene. Capitalism has made great inroads in China, 
but continued peasant access to the land blocks the process of 
primitive accumulation necessary to capitalism.61
 Reaction to Arrighi’s notion of the importance of the industrious 
revolution to Chinese past and future development is epitomized by 
Mark Elvin. Invoking various authorities, Elvin insists that China’s 
attempt to substitute labour for capital is a classic example of the 
dead end of involutionary growth. Moreover, whatever economic 
progress China made in the twentieth century was through the appli-
cation of capital-intensive techniques stemming from the West.62
 Arrighi stresses the importance of the Chinese Revolution, which 
was based on the peasantry. That upheaval cleared the ground for 
reviving and empowering its traditional market economy based 
on small-scale producers.63 On the other hand, in my opinion he 
ignores or dismisses the key link between the overthrow of the 
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feudal landlords by the Revolution and the emergence in China of 
an American path to capitalism, as defined by Lenin and Byres. The 
overthrow of the landlords and of feudal rent by Mao’s revolution 
placed power in the hands of the Communist party and state while 
empowering the petty producers. Once Deng Tsao Ping decided to 
liberalize the market, an explosion of market exchange took place 
which has been encouraging social differentiation and tremendous 
accumulation of capital, especially by a bourgeoisie closely tied to 
the party-state. It is only the reticence of the state in the face of rising 
levels of rural protest that blocks this process of social differentia-
tion accompanied by primitive accumulation from moving toward 
a complete capitalist transition. How long these restrictions on 
capitalist development will continue remains to be seen.64
a non-eurocentrIc hIstory
In the light of these postcolonial historical accounts, in this 
concluding section we consider what a non-Eurocentric but Marxist 
history of capitalism would look like. Such a history would pay 
due regard to the fact of the European birth of capitalism and the 
economic potential of the capitalist mode of production. But it would 
also recognize that what gives capitalism importance today is not its 
past association with the culture or politics of the West, but rather 
its transcendence of its European origins. Capitalism is sweeping 
the globe while finding new centres of accumulation, and at the 
same time is in the midst of a crisis whose outcome is uncertain. 
It has proved to be both a revolutionary mode of production and 
an intrinsically unstable and unsustainable one. From this perspec-
tive Eurocentrism, including attempts to link capitalism to some 
intrinsically European essence, must be rejected. Accordingly a non-
Eurocentric view of the origins of capitalism eschews a culturalist 
explanation of its beginnings. Instead it recognizes the relative back-
wardness of Europe and the existence of proto-capitalist elements 
in non-European societies. It analyzes the objective social, economic 
and political conditions which favoured capitalism in some places 
and blocked its path in others. It acknowledges the critical role of 
state-backed colonialism and imperialism in fostering the success of 
Western capitalism and blocking its development elsewhere. 
 As much as possible a non-Eurocentric history of capitalism 
pursues a comparative perspective, examining the development of 
capitalism in both European and non-European contexts. Finally 
a non-Eurocentric history of capitalism acknowledges that the 
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centre of capital has been displaced repeatedly, and that it is being 
displaced again. In this connection Harvey’s work on spatial fixes 
is of great importance because it points to the intrinsically uneven 
character of capitalist development and the shifting location of its 
historical epicentre. Finally a non-Eurocentric history ought to be 
based on the assumption that whatever its economic benefits may 
have been, capitalism has operated against the interests of the mass 
of a common humanity, and threatens the natural foundations of 
human society.
harvey’s sPatIal fIx
A scholar who has been particular aware of the effects of the 
historical and geographic unevenness of the capitalist accumula-
tion process and the importance of the current shift of its global 
epicentre to China is David Harvey. We can recall that Harvey’s 
insistence on the notion of accumulation by dispossession helped to 
deepen our understanding of primitive accumulation as an ongoing 
process that is intrinsic to capitalism not merely in the early modern 
period, but right up to the present. But his notion of accumulation 
by dispossession is but part of his overall conception of the renewal 
of the process of capital accumulation by means of what he terms 
spatial fix. Harvey argues that one of the ways that capitalism has 
repeatedly attempted to overcome its crises of over-accumulation is 
through the abandonment of older centres of accumulation which 
have exhausted their profit potential, and movement toward new 
poles of accumulation. In the contemporary context, the movement 
of investment capital from the United States toward China is a key 
instance.65 Such displacement can provoke severe social and political 
turbulence, in what Harvey calls a switching crisis. Arrighi has lately 
applied Harvey’s ideas of spatial fix and a switching crisis, to illu-
minate his own conception of the outbreak of signal crises and the 
initiation of a financial or declining phase of power in the historical 
cycles of successive Genoese/Spanish, Dutch, British and American 
hegemonies.66 In each instance, it is the displacement of capital from 
a place where over-accumulation has led to stagnation toward a 
fresh centre of accumulation that provokes crisis and conflict.
 It was Marx himself, of course, who first pointed out how 
capital had successively moved from Venice to Holland to England 
and finally to the United States, from one pole of accumulation to 
the next through the mechanism of the international banking and 
financial system.67 While we have limited hard or quantitative data 
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on such capital movements, the sequence has been more or less 
confirmed by Braudel and Richard Goldthwaite.68 It is to Harvey’s 
credit that he has brought this geographical dimension of the 
historical movement of capital to the fore. Nonetheless, this spatial 
displacement of capital should be seen in light of Marx’s more 
fundamental notion of uneven development, which he considered a 
characteristic feature of capitalism.
 We can recall that it was uneven development that marked the 
genesis of capitalism in backward Western Europe emerging out of 
the more civilized parts of Eurasia, as pointed out by Hobsbawm. 
But we have also observed the characteristic geographic unevenness 
of capitalist development making itself felt through the concentra-
tion of wealth, initially created by widely scattered petty producers, 
into the hands of early capitalists, whose relatively dispersed points 
of economic activity ultimately became concentrated in cities like 
Milan, Paris and London. Moreover, from capitalism’s early spread 
over Italy, Germany and France we have seen its step-by-step 
geographical concentration in Holland and England. Spatial fix 
appears to be one feature of this overall tendency toward uneven 
development, which seems to be related to opportunities to make 
and sustain profits, or the lack thereof.
caPItalIsm versus humanIty and nature
Amiya Kumar Bagchi’s Perilous Passage: Mankind and the Global 
Ascendancy of Capital looks at the global impact of the development 
of capitalism from the perspective of global human development.69 
As such it helps to transcend the divide between Eurocentric and 
non-Eurocentric conceptions of history. Bagchi, an eminent historian 
and political economist, rose from humble circumstances to become 
one of India’s most distinguished social scientists and head of 
the Institute of Development Studies in Kolkata. Like Frank and 
Arrighi he denies that Europeans gained any decisive advantage in 
technology and standard of living over Asia prior to the Industrial 
Revolution. Until the nineteenth century European manufactures 
could not compete on equal terms with those of China and India.70 
Unlike other critics of Eurocentrism, Bagchi remains committed to 
a Marxist view of history.
 Marx’s theoretical works lay out the basic dynamics of capitalist 
accumulation on a world scale.71 Capitalism is not simply about free 
trade and free markets. Competition among capitalists and the states 
that backed them was an integral part of the rise of capitalism in 
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Europe and its spread to the rest of the world. The social relations 
of production are fundamental to an understanding of the nature of 
capitalism. Ongoing conflicts between labour and capital continu-
ally challenged the uninterrupted accumulation of capital. There is 
a fundamental difference between a state like Qing China, which 
reined in the unrestricted accumulation of capital, and one like 
eighteenth-century England, which promoted the unchecked accu-
mulation of economic power, thereby facilitating the development 
of factory production.72
 But what is truly unique among anti-Eurocentric historians, and 
indeed all the scholars considered to this point, is Bagchi’s analysis 
of capitalism from the perspective of human development. Human 
development he defines as progress toward the achievement of 
decent levels of health, literacy, political and social freedom and 
environmental sustainability.73 Economic growth in the form of an 
expansion of goods and services is positive, but only if leads to global 
human improvement: ‘I argue that economic growth in the sense of 
production of more goods and services can be said to be a good thing 
only if it leads to greater human development.’74 By that measure 
the development of capitalism was negative even for most Europeans 
until nearly the end of the nineteenth century. The advantages reaped 
by the European elites came at the expense of the suffering of millions 
of people in Europe, the Americas, Africa and Asia.
 Bagchi properly emphasizes the exploitation and ravages of 
European imperialism and colonialism on non-Europeans, and their 
role in barring the way to economic development outside of Europe. 
But his narrative also documents the dispossession and exploitation 
of the peasant and working-class producers of Europe by emergent 
capitalism.75 His survey of global demography demonstrates that the 
development of capitalism has over most of its history been associ-
ated with high infant mortality and death rates. Indeed, he shows 
that Holland’s decline as a leading capitalist power was related to 
population loss as a result of the unhealthy and dangerous condi-
tions in which workers, including large number of merchant sailors, 
were forced to live.76 In other words, capitalism has oppressed human 
beings, whether they were European or non-European. Despite his 
anti-Eurocentric perspective, Bagchi understands that capitalism has 
been a system that has inflicted harm on most of humankind including 
European peasants and workers. Indeed, he makes the important 
point that if hypothetically the capitalist breakthrough had occurred 
in India or China, the result would have been the same.77 The political 
lesson of such a perspective could not be clearer.
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 Bagchi admits that damage to the environment occurred prior to 
the onset of capitalism and colonialism.78 But he demonstrates that 
Western colonialism inflicted enormous damage to the ecology of 
China and India. Recently a former student of E. P. Thompson, Peter 
Linebaugh, has attempted to document the terrible harm inflicted on 
the natural environment by the destruction of the commons world-
wide by capitalism. In his Magna Carta Manifesto (2008) Linebaugh 
lays stress not so much on the internal dynamics of capitalism, but on 
its devastation of the commons, which historically has been funda-
mental to the subsistence economy of the mass of humankind.79 
Enclosure of the land entailed the expropriation and privatization 
not merely of the subsistence holdings of peasant producers, but 
also of the woodlands, meadowlands and marshlands which were 
customarily exploited in common. The privatization of such common 
resources was a key factor in forcing producers to sell their labour for 
a wage, which as we have seen was in turn critical to the accumula-
tion of capital. But the transformation of the land and its products 
into commodities meant an economy based on use values was made 
impossible. More to the point, such expropriation of the commons 
and conversion of it into private property intensified the exploitation 
of the natural environment.
 Over time the exploitation of the environment by capital developed 
into what Marx called a metabolic rift between capitalist society and 
nature. Linebaugh convincingly demonstrates the beginnings of this 
process in the Tudor and Stuart period.80 Deforestation, pollution 
of the air from coal burning and of the water from industrial and 
human waste were already problematic in the sixteenth century. But 
especially impressive is his panoramic description of the step-by-step 
extension of this process into Africa, India and the Americas until it 
has engulfed the whole world. Nature has always been a free good 
for capitalism to dispose of as it saw fit. This was a precondition for 
the existence of capitalism, and an enormous boon to its operations 
across five centuries. But at the beginning of the twenty-first century 
we are approaching the limit of such a framework. The existence of 
humanity and the planet itself is imperilled if such exploitation of 
nature continues.
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conclusIon
In bringing this discussion of the transition problem to a close, I 
can offer a number of observations. With respect to the nature of 
the debate, virtually all of its participants claimed to have been 
inspired by Marx’s texts. Yet as the initial exchange between 
Dobb and Sweezy and the subsequent one between Brenner and 
Wallerstein suggest, they have drawn different conclusions from 
Marx’s writings. It is my view that in these instances Dobb and 
Brenner have the better part, in being closer to Marx’s view and 
the historical evidence. Yet even in this respect Brenner fails to 
appreciate Marx’s dialectical method. It would have allowed him to 
appreciate the unity of the process of capitalist accumulation, which 
entails both the extraction of surplus value through the develop-
ment of capitalist relations of production(capitalists and workers) 
and the realization of profit through the development of the market. 
The latter is posited by the former.
 In part divergent interpretations of Marx arise from the fact 
that Marxist scholars bring different political and intellectual 
agendas to the texts in the first place. Furthermore, the enormous 
and sometimes contradictory corpus of Marx’s writings fosters the 
development of opposing viewpoints. The authoritative standing 
of Marx’s texts, moreover, lends them to different interpretations, 
as authoritative texts tend to do. Indeed, I would go further in 
suggesting that the promethean nature of the content and style of 
Marx’s writings is apt to provoke creative reinterpretations of it in 
the light of changing circumstances. The intellectual vibrancy of 
the controversies in the transition debate confirms this point. But 
rather than lamenting this state of affairs, it should be celebrated as 
affirming the ongoing intellectual strength of Marxist thought.
 With respect to the basic themes of this work, I should first insist 
once more on the protracted nature of the transition which took 
place over three or more centuries, confirming its gradual nature. 
There were revolutionary moments – the fourteenth-century class 
conflicts, the Renaissance, the English and French Revolutions, the 
Industrial Revolution – when, as a result of long-term underlying 
changes, quantity became quality and sudden and even violent 
change took place. Rather than insisting on unending historical 
continuity or inexplicable revolution, it is important to comprehend 
the relation or rhythm that exists between slow and long-term 
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change and sudden leaps and transformations. The movement from 
feudalism to capitalism in any case unfolded over many centuries. 
Although we cannot be specific, it is likely that any transition 
to socialism, likewise, will take a long time, with many sudden 
changes, surprises and reversals – the collapse of the Soviet Union 
being a case in point.
 In the second place, the late seventeenth and eighteenth centuries 
appear to be the period when the basic commodity categories of 
capitalism – private property, money, exchange in the competitive 
market, the concept of labour as the basis of value – consolidated 
into a new mode of production. Private property – the legal form of 
the commodity – crystallized into a legal concept in the late seven-
teenth century. A basic framework for the circulation of money 
capital and a credit market was created in the same period, with 
the creation of the Bank of England, a national debt and a stock 
exchange. A competitive market for land and labour came into 
existence in the seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries. The 
notion of wage labour as the source of value, in contradistinction 
to other forms of value, made its appearance in economic treatises 
in the late seventeenth century. Indeed, the birth of an increasingly 
sophisticated capitalist political economy from the late seven-
teenth century onward was an important symptom of capitalism’s 
maturation. It is important to note that this process of consolida-
tion followed the English Revolution, confirming the importance 
of revolution at the level of the state as an integral feature of 
capitalism’s genesis.
 Just as the English capitalist state consolidated the new mode 
of production at home, it played an equally decisive role in 
orchestrating overseas expansion and colonialism. The Industrial 
Revolution was decisive in European capitalism’s conquest of the 
rest of the world. The Industrial Revolution and colonialism opened 
the way for the Great Divergence at the beginning of the nineteenth 
century which saw the economic triumph of the West over the rest 
of the world. This triumph was reinforced and extended by the 
political and military intervention of European imperialism, which 
crippled non-European economic progress.
 But the moment of the Great Divergence was also the period 
of the French Revolution, a capitalist revolution with European 
and global impact. Among its reverberations was the Haitian 
Revolution, which dealt a body blow to the emergent capitalism of 
the French Ancien Régime. The revolution in Haiti, coupled with 
the Tupac Amaru revolt in the Andes and the Pontiac Revolt in 
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North America, marked the beginning of the long resistance of third 
world countries to Western colonialism and imperialism.
 In this account of the transition, it is the petty producers – 
peasants and urban craftspeople – who figure as central agents 
of the transition. They were the underclass of the feudal system, 
whose ambitions were kept in check by heavy rent and other legal 
and personal restrictions maintained by the upper class. Their 
combativeness revealed itself during the late medieval crisis and 
played a key role in the decline of feudalism. At the same time, the 
removal of feudal constraints allowed the economic ambitions of 
the better-off small-scale producers to assert themselves. The social 
splitting of this group was apparent as early as the late fifteenth 
century, and in the next century led to the birth of two new classes, 
capitalist farmers and agricultural wage workers. The development 
of these two largely rural classes was visible in Italy, France and 
Holland, but above all in sixteenth-century England where it proved 
critical to the emergence of capitalism. Capitalist farmers, a group 
whose economic ambitions were evident in the late medieval period, 
together with well-to-do craftspeople followed a revolutionary path 
by reorganizing production in both agriculture and industry from 
the sixteenth century onward. Led by these same proto-capitalist 
elements, petty producers and wage workers provided the shock 
troops of the early modern social and political revolutions.
   Early more or less successful variants of capitalism were manifest 
in Italy, Germany, France and Holland. The new mode of produc-
tion finally consolidated itself in England in the course of the 
seventeenth century. From the beginning the development of the 
global market played an essential role in both helping to dissolve the 
vestiges of the feudal system and providing a market for capitalist 
manufactured commodities. The distinguishing feature of the new 
mode of production was the use of wage labour, and its employment 
as variable capital in both agriculture and industry. The new social 
relations of production made possible capital accumulation on the 
basis of the extraction of relative as against absolute value. While 
these advantages were already evident from the sixteenth century, 
their superiority did not become evident until the eighteenth century. 
It was only towards the end of the eighteenth century and the onset 
of the Industrial Revolution that the Great Divergence between this 
mode of production and those in place elsewhere became clear.
  Having discussed the origins of capitalism at length and carried 
his sketch of the history of capitalism down to the twentieth century, 
Dobb ventured to discuss its future prospects at the conclusion 
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of his Studies in the Development of Capitalism. Based on this 
long perspective, he cautiously took the view that the role of state 
monopoly capitalism, evident since the beginning of the twentieth 
century, was bound to increase. The Great Depression of the 1930s 
and the two World Wars had permanently increased the role of 
the state in the economy. He also asserted that the influence of the 
socialist states led by the Soviet Union, and of the countries of the 
third world, would likely grow. As Dobb presented them, these 
developments seemed to be the more or less inevitable outcome 
of a long historical process. The first of these forecasts has been 
more or less sustained. The role of the state as an instrument of 
big capital looms larger than ever, especially in the light of the 
collapse of the recent experiment in global neoliberalism. On the 
other hand, Dobb’s further prediction about the future influence 
of the Soviet Union and its allies as well as the under-developed 
countries represents a cautionary tale of the dangers of historical 
prediction. The Soviet Union is no more, while with the exception 
of China and possibly India and Brazil, the economic gap between 
the developed and under-developed countries has increased rather 
than diminished.1
 Forecasting the future in the wake of the Second World War, 
the basis of Dobb’s predictions was that the development of state 
monopoly capitalism, the growing power of the Soviet bloc and 
the third world states would hem capitalism in and eventually lead 
to its collapse. The neoliberal experiment that began in the 1980s 
represented a temporarily successful reaction to these trends. This 
neoliberal endeavour has collapsed, and the global capitalist system 
has entered a period of the doldrums if not outright decline. If there 
is no immediate remedy this period of decay could prove indeter-
minately prolonged and dark. In my more pessimistic moments I 
recall Dobb’s own characterization of the decline of feudalism as 
stretching out over centuries.
 Writing in 2000 while the neoliberal experiment was still going 
strong, Guy Bois saw neoliberalism as a symptom of deepening 
capitalist crisis. Toward the conclusion of his account of the late 
medieval feudal crisis, Bois offered a qualified comparison between 
that crisis and the contemporary crisis of capitalism.2 In doing so, 
Bois was able to suggest the gravity of the current situation from 
a historical perspective. Like the late medieval crisis, the current 
state of affairs is marked by ongoing large-scale unemployment, 
growing insecurity, violence and social marginalization. The two 
eras are likewise characterized by outbursts of the irrational in the 
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realm of culture in which the existing elites are fully complicit. At 
the same time, Bois hastened to distinguish the sources of crisis in 
each case: the one engendered by an insufficiency of production in 
an economy based on petty production, the other rooted in a crisis 
of over-production in an economy based on industrial capitalism.
 According to Bois, the response to this contemporary crisis of 
over-production at the heart of the economy has been the emergence 
of a powerful financial capitalism. This financial capitalist regime 
freed itself from state regulation while subordinating the spheres 
of commercial and industrial capitalism to itself. In its pursuit of 
higher and higher rates of return it forced down wages and induced 
a fall of demand which has exacerbated the problems of the global 
economy. Meanwhile ongoing unbalanced consumption in the 
American economy, based on massive debts and commercial deficits, 
is the linchpin of the system. Financial speculation has propped up 
the system so far. Published eight years before the bursting of the 
great financial bubble, Bois’s analysis must be regarded as prescient. 
Set off by his discussion of the late medieval crisis, it suggests the 
seriousness of the current situation.
 Arrighi too offered an analysis of the contemporary crisis. In The 
Long Twentieth Century, published in 1994, he portrayed the crisis 
as one of American capitalism but not of capitalism as a whole. 
Analyzing capitalism’s history, he divided it into four successive 
hegemonic periods over five centuries, the last of which was the 
American. Like Bois, Arrighi saw the onset of the recent financial 
phase of capitalism as a symptom of decline preliminary to the 
ultimate emergence of a new hegemonic power. In this context, he 
predicted the rise of a new hegemon in the form of the East Asian 
powerhouse Japan. By the time he came to publish Adam Smith 
in Beijing in 2007, he was still convinced that the rising centre of 
world economic power lay in the East. His bet was now not on 
Japan but on China. More importantly his new forecast for the first 
time acknowledged that the capitalist system itself and not simply 
American capitalism was in crisis. China would lead the way not 
because it was the embodiment of a new and superior form of capi-
talist hegemony, but because it offered a form of economic activity 
that was not only more competitive in the market, but sustainable, 
in contrast to the energy and capital-intensive economies of the 
West. The ecological crisis had made such economies into dinosaurs. 
A global market economy of a sort could continue, but no longer 
based on capitalism and a regime of political hegemony.
 Arrighi’s prediction of a non-capitalist future for China should 
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be taken with a grain of salt. On the other hand, it does reflect an 
awareness that the current crisis is not merely a short-term crisis of 
profits and demand, but a more long-term one involving a crisis of 
energy shortage and environmental sustainability as well as global 
governability. In the latter context, no one can rule out the possi-
bility that the current hegemon, the United States, will attempt to 
hold onto its status by resorting to war against its rivals, and notably 
against China. It has already demonstrated its willingness to fight 
for control of the energy resources of the Middle East, and its deter-
mination to defend the hegemonic position of the dollar at almost 
any cost. In the face of its industrial decline and massive interna-
tional indebtedness, the continuation of the global dollar standard 
is essential to holding on to its remaining power. While the situation 
has obviously evolved from that described so clearly and brilliantly 
by Lenin in Imperialism the Highest Stage of Capitalism, the possi-
bility of conflicts over energy and the control of financial markets 
between unequal and rival centres of capitalist accumulation cannot 
be dismissed. Contrariwise, a new global system of financial and 
political regulation may itself fetter the possible emergence of a 
stable new phase of capitalist accumulation. In any case, the future 
governability of the global financial and political system remains an 
intractable structural feature of the current crisis.
 Indeed, the political order has been central to my account of 
capitalism’s history. I have underscored the role of the state in 
nurturing capitalism at its beginnings, overseeing its development 
through mercantilism and through combined and uneven develop-
ment, and then being itself transformed by revolution. Throughout 
I have insisted on its role in totalizing capitalist relations: general-
izing, maintaining and integrating capitalist relations right through 
society. At the same time I have underscored the fact that capitalism 
internationally has developed historically through a system of rival 
and competitive states. I have harped on the role of the state in part 
because of the need to reject what has been an overly economistic 
understanding of capitalism. But I have also focused on the role of 
the state because I believe it to have been no less an essential feature 
of capitalism than the market and capitalist relations of production 
themselves, and its future role is today among the most important 
contradictory aspects of the current crisis. For one of the essential 
elements of the present situation is that the state and its territorial 
base continues to be essential to the continued operation of capi-
talism, and yet has become an obstacle to the further development of 
capitalism as a global system with an appropriately global means of 
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regulating itself. Indeed, the development of such a world-wide insti-
tutional mechanism, necessarily limiting the power of the territorial 
state, might well constitute a barrier to further capital accumula-
tion. In the light of this crisis of the capitalist state, the objective of 
the working class should be to organize itself politically in order to 
advance the democratization of the political order, locally, nationally 
and internationally, as an alternative to capitalism.
 Let me conclude this discussion of the limits confronting capi-
talism by referring to the problem of sustaining value, the central 
concept of Marxist political economy. Marx observed that the accu-
mulation of capital itself becomes a barrier to future accumulation. 
In the first instance, he was referring to the short-term and recurrent 
difficulty of maintaining profit margins on the basis of a growing 
mass of capital. But in a wider and longer perspective, he was 
pointing to the problem of the continued accumulation of surplus 
in the form of capital becoming a barrier to the further development 
of the forces of production. 
 In order to understand why this is the case, it is important to 
recall that the application of scientific culture to economic life was 
of great importance to Marx’s understanding of capitalism, and more 
importantly, its eventual transformation into socialism. According to 
Marx’s Capital, the introduction of machinery into production in 
the Industrial Revolution, rather than lightening labour, had the 
effect of enlarging the pool of proletarians, increasing the workday, 
intensifying the character of work, and enslaving the worker to the 
machine.3 Under capitalist conditions the quest for surplus value 
increases the exploitation of workers while deskilling them.
 On the other hand, writing in the Grundrisse, Marx argued 
that beyond a certain point the colossal development of capitalist 
industry undermines value or abstract labour as a measure of social 
wealth. He contrasts value – a form of wealth bound to the expen-
diture of human labour-time – with the gigantic wealth-producing 
potential of modern science and technology. Value, which is intrinsic 
to the initial period of industrialization, becomes increasingly anach-
ronistic in terms of the potential of the mature system of production 
to which it gives rise:
but to the degree that large industry develops, the creation of real 
wealth comes to depend less on labour time and on the amount 
of labour employed than on the power of the agencies set in 
motion during labour time, whose ‘powerful effectiveness’ is itself 
… out of all proportion to the direct labour time spent on their 
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production, but depends rather on the general state of science and 
on the progress of technology.4
 Under such circumstances the full realization of the potential of the 
mature productive system would entail the withering away of value. 
But capitalism cannot permit such an abolition of value because it 
lives off of it: ‘the theft of alien labour time, on which the present 
wealth is based, appears a miserable foundation in face of this new 
one, created by large-scale industry itself’.5 The overthrow of value 
is only possible through the overthrow of capitalism by socialism. 
Otherwise, the further transformation and development of the forces 
of production in the direction of the full application of science and 
new technologies, including those that are more ecologically sound, 
is crippled by the persistence of the indispensable quest by capital 
for value, and especially surplus value.6
 We have seen how step-by-step a regime of capital was consti-
tuted in the early modern period based on the development of 
private property, the exchange of commodities based on competitive 
markets and the realization of profit. At the heart of this profit-based 
system lies the creation of value from the sale of labour power, and 
especially, the ultimate extraction of surplus value from the process. 
The existence of capital is tied to the creation of value, off which it 
lives and without which it cannot exist. On this basis, there has been 
historically a tremendous development of the forces of production. 
Included in these forces of production are all the scientific, technical 
and cultural resources, including the ecological sciences, necessary 
to further human development and the preservation of humanity’s 
relationship with nature. Yet these resources are being increasingly 
commodified, because they are proving vital to the development of 
the most technically advanced forms of productive capital. Indeed, 
in order to produce profits the production of such knowledge must 
necessarily be tied to a labour process that produces value.
 But the further creation of such knowledge is being inhibited in 
so far as such resources are commodified. Turned into intellectual 
property, such resources cannot be developed further if they do 
not fit within the increasingly narrow limits prescribed by capital 
accumulation. In other words, the production of knowledge itself 
is being privatized and tied down on the Procrustean bed of value 
creation. On the contrary, the effective production of knowledge 
is based on the free exchange and sharing of information. Such a 
constricted set-up is not viable even on its own terms. Meanwhile, 
it is proving difficult for capital to garner surplus from the 
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intellectual and cultural products so produced, or to keep control 
of the workers who produce them. In other words, the relations of 
production necessary to the production and safeguarding of profits 
fetter innovation, on which the competitive marketplace is based. 
Marx argued that the freeing of the forces of production from the 
necessity of value creation would make possible their unrestricted 
development and application to human development.
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